Powers, L.L.C. v. Elm & Assocs. L.L.C.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2026 CA 00026
JudgeGormley
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
[Cite as Powers, L.L.C. v. Elm & Assocs. L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-4624.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
POWERS LLC Case No. 2026 CA 00026
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
of Fairfield County,
ELM AND ASSOCIATES LLC, Case No. 2025 CV 01213
Defendant - Appellee Judgment: Reversed and remanded
and Date of Judgment: November 20, 2026
ERIN MORROW,
Defendant - Appellant
BEFORE: Andrew J. King, Robert G. Montgomery, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Shane P. Benson (Benson & Sesser, LLC), Chillicothe, Ohio, for Plaintiff-
Appellee; Erin Morrow, Lancaster, Ohio, briefed the case on her own behalf as Defendant-
Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Appellant Erin Morrow argues that the trial court should have granted a
motion for relief from judgment that she filed under Civil Rule 60(B). Because we agree with
Morrow that the trial court applied the wrong standard when analyzing that motion, we
reverse the judgment and remand the case for further trial-court proceedings.
The Key Facts
{¶2} Powers LLC twice sued both Elm and Associates LLC and Morrow — who
was Elm’s majority shareholder and founder — to recover money that Powers had lent to
Elm under a loan agreement. In the first suit, the trial court dismissed the sole claim against
Morrow herself, and Powers then voluntarily dismissed the balance of the case.
{¶3} When Powers later filed a second lawsuit against the same defendants, Morrow
failed to respond, which prompted the trial court to enter a default judgment against her. The
next day, Morrow asked the trial court for permission to file a motion to dismiss mirroring
the one that she had filed in response to the first lawsuit, and soon thereafter she also filed a
Civ.R. 60(B) motion asking for relief from the default judgment.
{¶4} The trial court denied Morrow’s requests, finding that she was not entitled to
relief from the default judgment because, in the trial court’s view, she had no meritorious
defense to the claims alleged against her in Powers’s second complaint. Morrow now appeals
the denial of her Rule 60(B) motion.
The Trial Court Erred by Finding That Morrow’s Asserted Defense Was Not a
Meritorious One
{¶5} We employ an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s
decision to deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Maynard v. Scales, 2025-Ohio-5124, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).
{¶6} To obtain relief under that rule, the moving party must demonstrate three
things. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St. 2d 146, 150–151 (1976).
First, the movant must identify a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s claims. Id. Second,
the movant, choosing from among the five options listed in Civ.R. 60(B), must point to one
or more reasons why relief from the judgment should be granted. Id. Third, the movant’s
request must be timely. A movant’s failure to meet any of the three requirements justifies
denial of the motion. Thompson v. Dennis, 2023-Ohio-3946, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.) (citations omitted).
{¶7} Today’s appeal focuses on the first of those requirements: the Civ.R. 60(B)
movant’s duty to identify a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s claims. To point to a
meritorious defense, a defendant need only allege facts that, if true, support a defense to the
allegations in the complaint. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1988). That
identified defense need not be one that is likely to be a winner at trial. See Nationstar Mtge.,
LLC v. Abston, 2019-Ohio-3003, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.) (“A party seeking relief from judgment is not
required to prove that he or she will prevail on the meritorious defense; the movant is merely
required to allege the existence of such a defense”) (quotations omitted); Daimler Chrysler Fin.
v. L.N.H., Inc., 2012-Ohio-2204, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) (“to demonstrate a meritorious defense, the
movant must merely allege operative facts that would support a meritorious defense, not
prove that he or she will prevail on that defense”); Amzee Corp. v. Comerica Bank-Midwest, 2002-
Ohio-3084, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.) (“the adequately pleaded assertion of one or more affirmative
defenses will raise genuine issues of material fact in relation to the averments in the complaint
and, therefore, be meritorious”).
{¶8} In ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, courts should not weigh the evidence or
determine the likely success of the plaintiff’s claims or the movant’s alleged defense. Meglan,
Meglan & Co. v. Bostic, 2006-Ohio-2270, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). The movant “need not establish
ultimate success on the merits” when identifying its allegedly meritorious defense. Law Offices
of Robert E. Soles v. Swinderman, 2026-Ohio-730, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.) (quotations omitted). See also
Meglan at ¶ 10 (explaining that Civ.R. 60(B) movants’ “burden at the hearing was merely to
demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense” rather than “establish the merit” of it).
{¶9} Here, Morrow offered what she says is a meritorious defense by alleging that
she was not a party to the loan agreement between Powers and Elm. She could not be liable
for Elm’s debts, her motion claimed, where she herself never undertook any obligation to pay
them.
{¶10} To be sure, the complaint alleged that defendant Elm’s corporate veil should
be pierced and that Morrow herself should be held personally liable for that company’s debts.
Yet, as the cases above indicate, a trial court, when ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, is not to
determine which party will prevail at trial. Rather, the question is simply whether the asserted
defense raises material factual questions about the merits of the complaint’s allegations.
Morrow’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion did that, arguing that Elm’s corporate debts are Elm’s
responsibility to pay and that she, as a non-party to the agreement, cannot be found liable on
it.
{¶11} So where did the trial court go astray ? In that court’s view, the complaint filed
by Powers against Morrow alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss under Civ.R.
12(B)(6), and therefore Morrow had no meritorious defense to that complaint. Yet just
because a complaint alleges facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss does not mean that
the defendant, at trial, will be unable to prove the merits of any asserted defenses. The trial
court in this case appears to have found no merit to Morrow’s defense just because she could
not show as a matter of law that she should prevail on it at the pleadings stage. That is not
the Civ.R. 60(B) standard when a trial court is weighing whether a proposed defense is
meritorious. See Amzee Corp., 2002-Ohio-3084, at ¶ 20 (10th Dist.) (explaining that an asserted
Civ.R. 60(B) defense “is meritorious if it is not a sham and when, if true, it states a defense in
part, or in whole, to the claims for relief set forth in the complaint”).
{¶12} The complaint alleged, in essence, that Morrow is liable for Elm’s debts.
Morrow, in her Civ.R. 60(B) motion, alleged that she is not liable for those debts because she
never agreed to pay them. At the pleadings stage, neither party is obligated to show that its
factual allegations will prove to be true, and yet the trial court found that Morrow could never
prevail at any trial. That approach placed a burden on Morrow that Civ.R. 60(B) does not
impose. Her asserted defense was, under that rule, a meritorious one.
{¶13} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court so that court can evaluate whether Morrow has
presented sufficient proof on the two other necessary prongs of her Civ.R. 60(B) motion:
timeliness and a valid reason why her motion should be granted.
{¶14} Any court costs must be paid by plaintiff Powers LLC.
By: Gormley, J.;
King, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.