LaFlare Property Group, L.L.C. v. Ward

[Cite as LaFlare Property Group, L.L.C. v. Ward, 2026-Ohio-3832.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY LaFlare Property Group, LLC Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00304 Appellee Trial Court No. CVG-25-11476 v. Joseph Trevon Ward DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: September 29, 2026 ***** Matthew L. Weisenburger, for appellee. Rashad Z. Daoudi, for appellant. ***** MAYLE, J. {¶ 1} In this landlord-tenant dispute, defendant-appellant, Joseph Ward, appeals the November 24, 2025, judgment entry of the Toledo Municipal Court, Housing Division, awarding damages to plaintiff-appellee, LaFlare Property Group, LLC. For the following reasons, we reverse the November 24 judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for the issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Civ.R. 52.  I. Background and Facts {¶ 2} LaFlare owns an apartment at 2830 118th Street, in Toledo, Ohio, and Ward lived at this property under a written lease from July 1, 2022, through June 1, 2025. {¶ 3} After Ward moved out, LaFlare sent him a letter (“move-out letter”) dated June 24, 2025, claiming that Ward had caused $14,665.97 in damages to the property (Exhibit 1 at trial). The letter included the following ledger itemizing the claimed damages: Final Water Portion $78.31 Used Condom Removal $455.00 Trash removal (sic) $145.00 Damaged Flooring Removal/Replacement $7,350.00 Nail/Screw Hole Replacement – 96 total x $5 per = $480.00 Repaint Entire Apartment $1,050.00 Remove and replace cracked shower pan (sic) $3,240.00 Replace Handrail $72.00 Smoke Detector Reinstallation $48.00 Missed Rent Due to Extreme/Heavy Turnover $417.50 Materials $1,330.16 Total = $14,665.97 {¶ 4} On July 9, 2025, LaFlare filed a complaint against Ward in the Toledo Municipal Court, Housing Division, alleging that Ward had previously occupied the property pursuant to a written lease, which was attached to the complaint, and owed an unspecified amount of “back rent, damages, etc.” LaFlare claimed that Ward owed damages “in an amount to be determined at an assessment of damages hearing.” {¶ 5} On August 18, 2025, Ward filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Ward attached a “tenant statement” (Exhibit C at trial)—provided to Ward by LaFlare— itemizing Ward’s tenant account from March 1, 2022 through June 27, 2025. This tenant 2. statement shows an outstanding balance of $9,985.67 and includes the following, in relevant part: 5/3/2025 by Joseph Ward -937.98 0.00 5/31/2025 Water 78.31 78.31 6/3/2025 Trash Removal 145.00 223.31 6/4/2025 Used Condom Removal 455.00 678.31 6/23/2025 Damaged Flooring Removal/Replacement 984.00 1,662.31 6/23/2025 Nail/Screw Hole Replacement – 96 total x $5 per 480.00 2,142.31 6/23/2025 Repaint Apartment Walls 1,050.00 3,192.31 6/23/2025 Remove and replace cracked shower pan 1,260.00 4,452.31 6/23/2025 Repair Handrail 72.00 4,524.31 6/23/2025 Smoke Detector Reinstallation 48.00 4,572.31 6/23/2025 Materials 1,330.16 5,902.47 6/23/2025 Missed Rent Due to Extreme/Heavy Turnover 835.00 6,737.47 6/24/2025 Charge 307.81 7,045.28 6/26/2025 Legal Action Administered – Page 17 Section 44 of 300.00 7,345.28 lease agreement 6/26/2025 Collection Fee – Page 17 Section 33 of lease 2,280.39 9,625.67 agreement 6/27/2025 Professional Cleaning 360.00 9,985.67 Balance due $9,985.67 {¶ 6} In his motion, Ward sought partial summary judgment on two of the charges: “Legal Action Administered” ($300.00) and “Collection Fee” ($2,280.39). Ward argued that these charges violate R.C. 5321.13(C), which states “[n]o agreement to pay the landlord’s or tenant’s attorney’s fees shall be recognized in any rental agreement for residential premises or in any other agreement between a landlord and tenant.” Ward also argued that LaFlare could not collect a purported “collection fee” because the matter had not been sent to collections, and the provision of the lease that purports to allow LaFlare to impose these charges is unconscionable and unenforceable. 3.  {¶ 7} Simultaneously with his motion, Ward filed an answer and counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As damages, Ward sought to recover: (1) twice the amount of the security deposit that this Court finds was wrongfully withheld; (2) all of the water bill payments Defendant made to Plaintiff during the time of the lease; (3) $10,000 for emotional distress[;] (4) attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined[;] (5) all other remedies this Court deems just and equitable. {¶ 8} The case proceeded to a bench trial on October 30, 2025. Prior to the start of trial, Ward renewed his motion for partial summary judgment, and LaFlare confirmed that it was not contesting the motion. The trial court verbally granted Ward’s motion. {¶ 9} LaFlare’s sole member, Derek DeVerna, took the stand. DeVerna testified that LaFlare was seeking $9,985.67 in damages as reflected in the tenant statement (Exhibit C). DeVerna then identified an estimate dated June 17, 2025 from Rob the Builder LLC (Exhibit D), as “an estimate that I received for repairing the damage that was done to the unit by the defendant.” That estimate provides the following: ITEM QTY PRICE TOTAL Bathroom (demo shower, install tub and 1 $2,700.00 $2,700.00 surround, plumbing repairs) LVP[1] demo 875 sqft $2.00 $1,750.00 New LVP Installation 875 sqft $5.00 $4,375.00 TOTAL: $8,825.00 1 The parties testified that there was vinyl flooring in the apartment, so we assume LVP stands for luxury vinyl plank. 4.  {¶ 10} DeVerna further testified that on June 23, 2025—after repairs were completed—the contractor, Robert Breuninger of Rob the Builder LLC, sent an invoice to LaFlare (Exhibit F) that detailed the following charges for work performed: Tenant • Remove all nails/screws in walls, patch and sand smooth (96): $100 • Paint walls only ($1sqft): $875 • Handrail repair in the hallway leading up to the apartment front door[]: $60 • Reinstall transition strips in bathroom, bedroom and kitchen: $40 • Secure flooring so it is nice and tight in bathroom and bedroom: $50 • Remove kitchen LVP, paint patch minor damage: $100 • Smoke detector remount and battery changes: $40 • Outlet and switch plates: $30 Bathroom tenant caused damage: • Demo shower (doors, pans, walls): $200 • Add 2x4 studs, hang greenboard: $100 • Install bathtub: $300 • Re-route plumbing, modify shower manifold for tub spout, alter drain system: $150 • Install shower surround: $300 *** Labor: $2,345 Materials: $1,108.47 Total: $3,453.47 {¶ 11} DeVerna testified that this June 23 invoice was “part one” of a two-part set of invoices that details “what we had to do in order to get the property back in habitable condition.” The contractor sent the second invoice to LaFlare on June 24, 2025 (Exhibit E), which stated the following: Work completed: • Repaint kitchen ceiling • Clean bathroom ceiling • Clean master bedroom ceiling 5.  • Anchor lower section of handrail Labor: $150 Materials: $106.51 Total: $256.51 {¶ 12} Accordingly, these two invoices (Exhibits E and F) showed that LaFlare paid a total of $3,709.98 for repairs to the property after Ward moved out. {¶ 13} DeVerna testified that although he is claiming damages that exceed the amount he paid to repair the property, he “was limited in the resources that [he] could reinvest into the property” so he did what he could “to get the property back in habitable condition.” Ultimately, he was seeking damages “to complete the rest of the necessary repairs to get the unit in the same condition that it was in prior to the defendant having moved in.” DeVerna did not, however, specify what work remained to be done, or how much the additional work would cost. He confirmed that Ward moved out on June 1, 2025, and a new tenant moved in on July 1, 2025. {¶ 14} On cross-examination, DeVerna was questioned about various discrepancies between charges in the move-out letter (Exhibit 1), the tenant statement (Exhibit C), the contractor estimate (Exhibit D), and the invoices for work actually performed (Exhibits E and F). DeVerna testified as follows: {¶ 15} Damaged flooring: In the move-out letter, LaFlare claimed $7,350 in damages for “Damaged Flooring Removal/Replacement,” but it only paid $150 for flooring repair ($100 for “remove kitchen LVP, paint patch minor damage,” and $50 to “secure flooring so it is nice and tight in the bathroom and bedroom.”). DeVerna explained that “[w]e can’t afford to invest $7,000 each time a tenant moves out. So what 6. we did in being creative is make the unit inhabitable to the best of our ability, [then] seek damages in court. When the damages are received, then we can reinvest into the flooring [based on the flooring quote].” Ward’s counsel noted that the estimate received from the contractor was for $6,000,2 not $7,350 as stated in the move-out letter. DeVerna insisted that he “actually incurred” $7,350 because “all of that flooring had to be entirely removed and within the rest of the apartment the flooring is questionable at best.” We note that the tenant statement contains yet a different number—$984 for “Damaged Flooring Removal/Replacement”—but DeVerna was not asked how that figure was calculated. {¶ 16} Cracked shower pad: Counsel asked DeVerna why the move-out letter listed the cost to replace the shower pad as $3,240 but the invoices show LaFlare paid “roughly $1000”3 in total for all bathroom repairs. DeVerna explained that he initially charged $3,240 because he “did not have a specific invoice” and did not “have all of the material receipts in place.” We note that the tenant statement contains yet a different number—$1,260 to “Remove and Replace cracked shower pan”—but DeVerna was not asked how that figure was calculated. {¶ 17} Painting charges: Counsel asked DeVerna about the cost to repaint the apartment. He asked why the tenant statement includes a charge of $1,050 to repaint the 2 The total estimate is actually $6,125 ($1,750 for “LVP demo” and $4,375 for “New LVP installation.”) 3 The invoices show that LaFlare paid $1,050 for repairs to the bathroom. 7. entire apartment when the invoices show that LaFlare paid its contractor $875 for this work. DeVerna was not given the opportunity to answer this question. {¶ 18} Trash Removal: DeVerna testified that he charged Ward $145 for “trash removal” because he had to have someone out “to take the trash cans … to the curb, to take them back from the curb, to clear the exterior of the property from trash, loose trash left around the property.” He does not have receipts for these payments. {¶ 19} Used condom charge: DeVerna sought $455 for his removal of a used condom from the property. He said he “consulted colleagues, friends on what to charge for a used condom removal and that was a lower number.” {¶ 20} Water charge: DeVerna sought $78.31 for 50% of the water bill for the final month, as he charged throughout the lease because there are two units in the building. He admitted that he does not have “express written permission from the City of Toledo to charge Mr. Ward for water” but said that it is permitted by the lease. {¶ 21} Missed rent charge: DeVerna included $417.50 in the move-out letter for “Missed Rent Due to Extreme/Heavy Turnover,” but sought $835 as damages for missed rent as itemized in the tenant statement. He testified that Ward moved out on June 1, 2025, but had Ward moved out on May 31, 2025, under normal conditions he would have been able to have another tenant moved in by June 10. Here, the new lease did not start until July 1, 2025. He said that he was “too embarrassed of its current condition” and therefore unable to show the property “until the final week of June.” {¶ 22} Nail/screw wall damage: Ward’s counsel asked DeVerna why he included a $480 charge “Nail/Screw Hole Replacement” for 96 holes (charged at $5/each), when he 8. only paid $100 for this work as indicated in the invoices. DeVerna explained that he gets “preferred pricing” not market pricing and that the move-out instructions make clear that LaFlare charges $5 per nail hole. {¶ 23} Unspecified charge: DeVerna was questioned about an unspecified $307.81 charge in the tenant statement, which simply states “Charge” with no explanation. DeVerna explained that “every single other item on [Exhibit C] is itemized. If I missed on this particular charge, I’m sure there is a reason and a legitimate reason for that charge. If every other charge on there has an item, then obviously I made a mistake as I do on occasion.” {¶ 24} After DeVerna’s testimony, LaFlare rested. Ward then testified on his own behalf. He first testified that he paid a $795 security deposit when he moved into the property and never received the deposit back. Overall, Ward disagreed with the charges and descriptions of the damages as alleged by LaFlare. Ward claimed that “everything was fine” and “nothing broken” when he left the property. He testified that it was an old house that needed work at the time that he moved in. He lived there for forty months, and he thinks that the painting and patching of holes should be the landlord’s responsibility. He identified some photos that he took, which show that the property is “fine besides the flooring in the kitchen where … two tile[s] are messed up or moved.” He claimed that the flooring was “poorly installed. There’s all kinds of spaces and [it] looks like it’s not even cut accurately” and “vinyl floors are able to move over time.” Ward denied leaving a used condom on the property and felt attacked for his sexuality by 9. the charge. On cross-examination, Ward admitted to taking down a smoke detector. At the close of testimony, the trial court took the matter under advisement. {¶ 25} The trial court issued a written judgment entry on November 24, 2025. In the judgment entry, the court first reaffirmed its prior decision granting partial summary judgment to Ward on the “Legal Action Administered” and “Collection Fee” charges. The trial court stated that “[t]he court’s judgment will therefore reflect that disposition.” {¶ 26} The trial court then considered Ward’s counterclaims. First, regarding the breach-of-contract claim, the trial court noted that Ward was alleging that LaFlare breached the lease by wrongfully withholding his security deposit and seeking unwarranted damages beyond the amount of the deposit. The court concluded that LaFlare did not breach the lease because the “Move-Out Inspection Photos [show] that there were damages beyond normal wear and tear at the property at the time of Defendant’s move-out,” and LaFlare properly charged Ward for those damages. {¶ 27} Next, regarding the unjust enrichment claim, Ward alleged that LaFlare was unjustly enriched by his water payments throughout the lease because Toledo Municipal Code 933.06 provides that “[n]o person shall re-sell water provided by the Department of Public Utilities unless specifically authorized by contract with the Department of Public Utilities to do so.” The court rejected this claim, noting that the city is “not currently enforcing this ordinance” and the claim “fails on the merits… regardless of said enforcement.” {¶ 28} Finally, regarding the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court noted that Ward “contends that a used condom removal charge caused him 10. severe emotional distress as he viewed it as an attack on his sexual orientation.” The court found that the charge was “excessive” and would be stricken from the invoice, but that it was not an indicator of intentional infliction of emotional distress. {¶ 29} The trial court therefore found each of the counterclaims not well taken. {¶ 30} It then found that “[a]s Plaintiff has provided clear and convincing evidence that there was damage to the property when Defendant left the premises, Plaintiff is GRANTED judgment to be offset with the used condom removal charge.” The trial court then issued an award amount of $9,530.67 plus interest to LaFlare, explaining that this represented “$9,985.67 [as stated in the tenant statement, Exhibit C] minus the used condom removal charge of $455.00.” {¶ 31} Finally, the ordered that Ward’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted and that “[p]laintiff’s claims for the Legal Action and Collection Fee charges were barred from being heard at trial.” However, the trial court did not remove the two charges from the total amount of damages. {¶ 32} Six days after the court issued the judgment entry, Ward filed a request for findings of fact and conclusion of law pursuant to Civ.R. 52. Ward alleged that the trial court had issued a general verdict when it granted damages to LaFlare and that the award of $9,530.67 was not supported by findings of fact. Ward claimed that findings of fact and conclusions of law were necessary to aid the appellate court in reviewing the record and determining the validity of the basis of the trial court’s damages award. He argued “[f]or example, Defendant wishes to establish a basis for awarding Plaintiff $2,580.39 in 11. legal fees.” He asked the court to “make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support awarding Plaintiff $9,530.67 on November 26, 2025.” {¶ 33} On January 21, 2026, the trial court denied Ward’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law as moot because the “judgment entry dated November 24, 2025 is not, as purported by Defendant, a general verdict.” The court found that: the judgment entry addresses each claim and counterclaim in the action individually. That Defendant is perhaps unsatisfied with the judgment, or the findings therein, is not sufficient cause for the court to re-issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. While Defendant is correct in that Civ. R. 52’s (sic) general purpose is to aid the appellate court, the court is satisfied that its November 24, 2025, entry is sufficient to satisfy the appellate court’s review. Should the appellate court require further findings of fact and conclusions of law, such a thing may, of course, be ordered. However, absent an order from the appellate court, the judgment entry dated November 24, 2025, is deemed sufficient by this court. {¶ 34} Ward appealed and now brings four assignments of error for our review: Assignment of Error 1: The trial court erred by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Assignment of Error 2: The trial court committed two plain errors when it awarded Appellee damages. Assignment of Error 3: The trial [court] abused its discretion by awarding Appellee money for repair costs. Assignment of Error 4: The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Appellee more in damages than what was actually lost. II. Law and Analysis {¶ 35} In Ward’s first assignment of error—which we find to be dispositive—he argues that the trial court failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Civ.R. 52. Because resolving this assignment of error requires us to interpret a civil rule, it presents a question of law that we review de novo. Larson v. Larson, 2011- 12. Ohio-6013, ¶ 8 (3rd Dist.); see Hayward v. Summa Health Sys./Akron City Hosp., 2014- Ohio-1913, ¶ 23, citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 2002- Ohio-2842, ¶ 4. {¶ 36} The relevant section of Civ.R. 52 provides that: [w]hen questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury, judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one of the parties in writing requests otherwise before the entry of judgment…, or not later than seven days after the party filing the request has been given notice of the court’s announcement of its decision, whichever is later, in which case, the court shall state in writing the findings of fact found separately from the conclusions of law. {¶ 37} A judgment is considered “general” when it merely announces the prevailing party or the outcome of the case without providing the factual findings and legal reasoning justifying its result. See Miller v. Miller, 2013-Ohio-5071, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). Conversely, a judgment is not general if the trial court’s written decision identifies the relevant facts and explains the legal basis for its decision. See id. {¶ 38} The purpose of Civ.R. 52 is to “‘aid the appellate court in reviewing the record and determining the validity of the basis of the trial court’s judgment.’” Mulchin v. ZZZ Anesthesia, Inc., 2006-Ohio-5773, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.), quoting In re Adoption of Gibson, 23 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, quoting Werden v. Crawford, 70 Ohio St.2d 122, 124 (1982). Importantly, “[t]he provisions of Civ.R. 52 are mandatory in any situation in which questions of fact are tried by the court without intervention of a jury.” Werden at 124. A trial court therefore lacks the discretion to deny a timely and proper request for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Civ.R. 52. In re Gibson at 173 (“a trial court has a 13. mandatory duty under Civ.R. 52 to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law upon request timely made.”). {¶ 39} That said, a trial court’s failure to comply with the requirements of Civ. R. 52 may be harmless error “‘when the record, considered along with the court’s order, provides an adequate basis to dispose of all the claims presented.’” Cawrse v. DiLallo, 2007-Ohio-3684, ¶ 37 (6th Dist.), quoting Valentine v. Valentine, 2005-Ohio-2366, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.). In other words, the purpose of Civ.R. 52 is nonetheless satisfied if the trial court’s order and the record provide enough detail for an appellate court to evaluate the legal issues presented. State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 2010-Ohio-1473, ¶ 38. {¶ 40} If, however, the appellate court would be required to weigh the evidence or speculate as to the trial court’s reasoning to decide the issues on appeal, the trial court’s failure to comply with Civ.R. 52 is prejudicial error. Luman v. Igo, 2008-Ohio-3911, ¶ 15 (“[t]he failure to comply with a timely request to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is prejudicial error unless a reviewing court can determine, without weighing the evidence, that the appellant has not been prejudiced.”). Stated another way, the trial court’s order, together with the record, must enable the appellate court to resolve the issues on appeal and determine whether the order was “‘decided in reliance upon relevant and competent evidence or upon wrongly admitted evidence, or upon the erroneous application of legal principles.’” Professional Business Systems, Inc. v. Koba, 1983 WL 2958, *4 (8th Dist. May 5, 1983), quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Battle, 44 Ohio App. 2d 261, 267 (8th Dist. 1975). 14.  {¶ 41} Here, the substantive issues on appeal concern the trial court’s calculation of damages. Unfortunately, the November 26, 2025 order does not identify a factual or legal basis for those damages. Although the trial court provided reasoning to support the existence of damages—i.e., it noted that “Plaintiff has provided clear and convincing evidence that there was damage to the property when Defendant left the premises,” and observed that certain photographs (Exhibit I) proved “that there were damages beyond normal wear and tear at the property at the time of Defendant’s move-out”—it did not provide any factual findings or legal reasoning to justify the amount of damages that it awarded. For example, the trial court did not resolve conflicting evidence concerning several of the individual charges, address the discrepancy between the amount LaFlare actually paid for repairs ($3,709.98) and the total damages awarded ($9,530.69), or explain why the awarded damages were legally recoverable. For this reason, the trial court erred when it denied Ward’s motion under Civ. R. 52, which specifically asked the court to “make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support awarding Plaintiff $9,530.67 on November 26, 2025.” {¶ 42} Moreover, this was prejudicial error given that the record does not provide “‘an adequate basis to dispose of all the claims presented.’” Cawrse, 2007-Ohio-3684, at ¶ 37 (6th Dist.), quoting Valentine, 3006-Ohio-2366, at ¶ 33 (12th Dist.). This is not a simple landlord-tenant dispute where the landlord’s ledger account was uncontroverted by other evidence. {¶ 43} For example, the invoices (Exhibit F) show that LaFlare paid $150 to repair the floor after Ward moved out. DeVerna testified he was seeking damages beyond this 15. amount to get “the unit in the same condition that it was in prior to the defendant having moved in.” On cross, he maintained that his initial charge of $7,350 for damaged flooring (Exhibit 1) was correct. The contractor, however, estimated $6,125 (Exhibit D) to remove and replace all the flooring. Ultimately, LaFlare claimed $984 in total damages for “Damaged Flooring Removal/Replacement” via the tenant statement (Exhibit C), and this figure was adopted by the trial court without explanation. {¶ 44} Similarly, the tenant statement (Exhibit C) charges $1,260 to replace the shower pad, but the contractor invoice (Exhibit F) shows that LaFlare paid $1,050 for all bathroom repairs. The tenant statement also charges $480 for nail hole replacement (charged at $5/hole), even though LaFlare paid $100 for this repair work. DeVerna testified that the “move out instructions” allow him to charge $5 per hole replacement regardless of the actual amount that he paid for that that work. {¶ 45} The tenant statement also contains a category of damages (an unspecified “Charge” of $307.81) that LaFlare testified he may have included by “mistake,” and two categories of damages (“Legal Action Administered” for $300, and “Collection Fee” for $2,280.30) on which the trial court granted summary judgment in Ward’s favor. {¶ 46} Without an explanation of the specific legal and evidentiary basis for the trial court’s wholesale adoption of the tenant statement (Exhibit C)—less the used condom removal fee—this court can only speculate as to whether the damage award is supported by credibility determinations or other evidence in the record, and otherwise in accordance with the law. For this reason, we must reverse and remand to the trial court for the issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Banks v. D’Andrea, 1994 16. WL 521172, *4 (10th Dist. 1994) (reversing and remanding to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law, where the trial court “did not articulate a specific legal or evidentiary basis for [its damages] award” and the appellate court could “only speculate whether the award is supported by the evidence adduced at trial and is in accordance with law.”). {¶ 47} We therefore find Ward’s first assignment of error well-taken, and reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for the issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court must vacate its previous judgment and reenter that judgment as of the same date that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are entered. See Gaillard v. Gill Constr. Co., 2012-Ohio-4992, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.), citing Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 16 Ohio App.3d 399, 401 (8th Dist. 1984) (“When a trial court’s judgment has been reversed and remanded solely for findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to vacate his previous judgment and reenter the same as of the date of the filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. This procedure is followed to reserve to the parties their respective rights of appeal after such findings have been made.”). Wards remaining assignments of error are overruled as moot. III. Conclusion {¶ 48} Based on the foregoing, we find Ward’s first assignment of error well-taken and reverse the November 24, 2025, judgment entry of the Toledo Municipal Court, Housing Division, and remand this matter for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court is instructed to vacate its previous judgment and reenter judgment as of the 17. date of the filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. All remaining assignments of error are dismissed as moot. LaFlare is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24. Judgment reversed and remanded. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/. 18.