Jordan v. Jordan

[Cite as Jordan v. Jordan, 2026-Ohio-3610.] IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO EMILY REBECCA JORDAN, Case No. 25 CAF 11 104 and 25 CAF 11 105 Plaintiff - Appellee - Cross-Appellant Opinion And Judgment Entry -vs- Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, ROBERT THOMAS JORDAN, Case No. 22 DRA 10 0656 Defendant - Appellant - Cross- Judgment: Affirmed Appellee Date of Judgment Entry: September 15, 2026 BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges APPEARANCES: DOUGLAS W. WARNOCK and KATHERINE M. SNIDER, for Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant; EUGENE B. LEWIS and JACOB W. SMITH, for Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee; and EIMEAR M. BAHNSON, Guardian Ad Litem Montgomery, J. {¶1} Husband and Appellant, Robert Jordan, appeals from the judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, asserting three assignments of error. Wife and Cross-Appellant, Emily Jordan, also appeals from that same judgment, asserting four assignments of error. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM in all respects. STATEMENT OF THE CASE {¶2} The instant appeal arises from the divorce case between Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Emily Rebecca Jordan (“Wife”) and Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee Robert Thomas Jordan (“Husband”). Husband and Wife were married on June 4, 2010. The duration of the parties’ marriage was from June 4, 2010, to October 11, 2023. Three children were born as issues of the marriage: Ava Leigh Jordan, born September 13, 2012; Sydney Mae Jordan, born May 19, 2014; and Kinley Brooke Jordan, born August 25, 2019. Appellee filed her Complaint for Divorce on October 24, 2022. {¶3} The matter preceded to trial on October 11, 2023, and lasted for several days. Testimony was presented from Wife, Husband, nine lay witnesses, and five expert witnesses. Two hundred and four (204) exhibits from Wife and Husband were admitted into evidence. On February 1, 2024, the magistrate issued a Magistrate's Decision, with numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ultimately granting the parties a divorce due to incompatibility. Both parties filed objections and supplemental objections. On October 16, 2025, the trial court overruled all objections and issued its Judgment Entry and Decree of Divorce. The Divorce Decree made other final orders, including the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, division of property, and spousal support. BACKGROUND FACTS {¶4} The trial court determined the following relevant facts, as found by the Magistrate and subsequently set forth in the Divorce Decree. At the time of trial, both Wife and Husband were 45 years old, employed, and in good health. Wife is originally from West Virginia, where she obtained a Doctor of Dental Surgery from West Virginia University in 2004. Wife and Husband dated during Wife's residency, and she relocated to Ohio to practice as a dentist in the Columbus area. Wife earned her Doctor of Dental Surgery degree and an additional Master of Science degree.  {¶5} Husband is from Ohio and obtained his bachelor's degree in Health and Sports Management from Miami University in 2001. In 2009, Husband moved into Wife's home that she purchased on June 17, 2008. Husband did not contribute any funds for Wife’s purchase of the Westbrooke Place home. Wife and Husband were married on June 4, 2010. They had three children during the marriage. At the time of trial, Ava was 11 years old; Sydney was 9 years old; and Kinley was 4 years old. {¶6} Wife described herself as the primary manager of the household and primary caregiver of the three children. Multiple witnesses, including nannies and neighbors, confirmed that Wife appeared to be the primary caregiver and was indeed a good mom. Wife scheduled the children's appointments, activities and play dates, managed nannies and babysitters, did the grocery shopping, and prepared meals. Several witnesses confirmed Wife’s primary role in parenting the children. To assist with childcare, the parties hired nannies for the children, but they also used outside care. Even during 2020 and COVID, the parties had in-home care for the children while Husband worked remotely, and Wife's dental practice had slowed due to the public health emergency. {¶7} Husband was less active in the overall household management and child rearing, and that was a major point of tension between the parties. However, Husband’s witnesses testified that Husband was involved in transporting the children to their sporting activities, getting them to and from school, and he did supplemental grocery shopping during the week. It appeared that after Wife filed for divorce, Husband made more effort to be involved with the children. Husband and Wife both testified they agreed to the children’s extracurricular activities, educational, and medical decisions. Further, despite their busy lives, Husband and Wife were quite social with neighbors, friends, and family for many years.  {¶8} Wife testified that Husband's excessive use of alcohol negatively impacted their marriage and their children. Wife and other witnesses testified to Husband's excessive use of alcohol and related incidents. Husband admitted to excessive drinking and that it was a factor in their marital dysfunction but denied alcohol dependency or requiring treatment. In 2015, the parties sought marriage counseling with Dr. William Adrion where the initial issue presented to the counselor was Husband's use of alcohol. The parties’ last marriage counseling session with Dr. Adrion was in 2020 and Dr. Adrion last saw Husband in 2021. Dr. Adrion found that alcohol was a central component in Husband's life, and he was using it to mute his temper. Dr. Adrion recommended that Husband remove alcohol from the home and abstain from drinking. He also recommended a 30-day inpatient stay, to which Husband declined. {¶9} Per the evidence, Husband was involved in at least two alcohol-related incidents that involved police intervention. One incident occurred during a Hilton Head vacation in September 2021. Husband testified that while on the trip, he learned of the sudden death of a high school friend. Due to the death of his friend and what he perceived as the lack of support from Wife and the other vacationers, Husband isolated himself and drank to excess. Husband and Wife had an argument at the pool that involved the oldest child, resulting in the police being called. The Hilton Head police escorted Husband from the beach house and Husband flew back to Ohio alone. {¶10} The second alcohol-related incident involving police occurred on September 20, 2022. Wife and the children were visiting her family in West Virginia. The manager of Sam's Bar, located on State Route 23 in Delaware County, testified that Husband came into the bar in the evening and ordered a beer and bourbon drink. The manager stated that she heard Husband call her a racial slur, after which Husband was told to leave the bar. The manager witnessed Husband leave the bar and proceed to walk across State Route 23, which is a four-lane highway with a speed limit of 55 mph, and go into a field across the highway. There was no crosswalk or stop light where Husband crossed the highway. Concerned for his well-being, the manager called the Delaware County Sheriff, who reported to the bar and commenced a search for Husband at approximately 9:30 p.m. To assist in the search for Husband, the Delaware County Sheriff utilized a Columbus Police Department helicopter. {¶11} On September 21, 2022, at 4:00 a.m., Wife saw Husband on the marital residence’s security cameras. She called the police to inform them, who reported to the home and charged Husband with disorderly conduct, a minor misdemeanor, a violation of R.C. 2917.11(B)(1). Husband told the police that he attempted to walk home from the bar but got stuck in weeds and bushes. Husband entered a plea of no contest to the charge of disorderly conduct, was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a $150 fine. {¶12} The Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) submitted her Pre-Trial Report and Recommendation on October 4, 2023. In her report, the GAL recommended shared parenting with a nearly equal parenting time schedule. Wife was to be the residential parent for school placement purposes. As to decision-making, the GAL recommended that if the parents could not reach a decision in the areas of education, children’s activities, and the children’s health, the parties were to independently consult issue-related professionals, such as a coach or teacher. If no decision could be made, the parties could submit the issue to the Court for a final decision. The GAL finally recommended in her report that Husband use Soberlink two times a day.  {¶13} At trial, the GAL testified regarding her report and investigation. She found the children to be well adjusted to their home, neighborhood, and school. The GAL recommended a main priority was that the children remain in their current school system. The three children were involved in multiple activities during the week, including travel soccer, gymnastics, and swimming. While the parents testified that they had tried to protect the children from their marital dysfunction, the GAL testified that the children were aware of their parents' marital issues and had witnessed their arguments. The two older children were in counseling, to which the GAL recommended the parties continue. The GAL further recommended counseling for Husband and Wife. {¶14} The GAL noted the parties' division of responsibilities, with each feeling they did more than the other. Wife did a significant part of managing the household and while the GAL observed that Husband contributed, he often let Wife take the lead. The GAL felt Husband would be a successful parent if he maintained his sobriety. The GAL reaffirmed Husband's use of Soberlink twice a day for one year and upon a failed test, the children would be returned to Wife until a negative test. The GAL reiterated her recommendation of shared parenting; however, the GAL testified at trial that a true 50/50 was not the best right away. Tr. 1920. The GAL recommended a step-up parenting time schedule for Husband to ease the transition for the children and allow Husband time to adjust. {¶15} The GAL did not recommend the use of “OurFamilyWizard” for communication because the parties had demonstrated they could agree on decision-making through text or email. The GAL did not feel that one party should be designated a final decisionmaker, but suggested that if the parties could not agree, the parties could enlist a third- party decision-maker to avoid any return to Court. She recommended the parties use a joint online calendar to keep track of the children's busy schedules. Wife’s Dental Practice and Income {¶16} Wife is a successful solo practitioner dentist with her own practice, known as Rebecca T. Jordan, DDS LLC (“dental practice”). She performs general dentistry but also has multiple specialties within her dentist practice. Wife specializes in prosthodontics, frenectomies, and the fitting of Advanced Lightwire Functionals (“ALF”) appliances. To perform prosthodontics, after earning a Doctor of Dental Surgery (DDS) in 2004, Wife earned an additional Master of Science in 2007. Prosthodontics include complex dental implants. Frenectomies are lip and tongue-tie procedures, mostly performed on infants. Infants diagnosed with tongue or lip ties can experience challenges with breastfeeding and speech development. Wife is one of only seven preferred providers of tongue and lip ties. An ALF appliance is a growth appliance to help with airway difficulties associated with lip and tongue ties. Since starting to perform frenectomies in 2014, Wife has developed a good reputation for her skills, with patients coming from out of state for her services. Wife does very little marketing for her dental practice and relies mostly on word-of-mouth recommendations. {¶17} Wife presented the expert report and testimony of Rebekah A. Smith, Director of Forensic and Dispute Advisory Services with GBQ Consulting. Smith gave her opinion as to the valuation of the dental practice, valuation of RTJ Real Estate LLC, and an assessment of Wife’s income for support purposes. Smith testified that based on the income approach, the equity value of the Dental Practice was $1,165,000. Smith then applied the Multi-attribute Utility Model ("MUM") analysis to quantify and weigh the personal and enterprise goodwill of the Dental Practice in order to determine the fair market value.  {¶18} Based on the MUM analysis, Smith valued the total “goodwill” of the Dental Practice at $862,000, with 57.l % of the goodwill characterized as “personal goodwill” attributable to Wife individually, and 42.9% of the goodwill was characterized as “enterprise goodwill” attributable to the Dental Practice itself. Smith subtracted the personal goodwill from Wife's equity value in the business, with adjustments, to determine the fair market value as $579,796 (enterprise goodwill plus the adjusted net value of the Dental Practice's assets). {¶19} Regarding Wife's income, expert Smith considered the concept of “double- dipping,” or “double-counting” and explained that if income from the business was used to value the business, that business income could not also be used for support purposes. Smith applied the enterprise goodwill percentage of 42.9% to determine the amount of business income that should be excluded to avoid double-dipping. Thus, without double counting, Smith found that Wife’s income averaged over a five-year period was $475,336. Smith explained that she used a five-year average because COVID impacted medical practices in 2020, the Dental Practice became busier in 2023, and while Wife was the only dentist at the Dental Practice in the earlier years, a part-time dentist worked at the Dental Practice beginning in 2023. {¶20} Husband presented the expert report and testimony of Justin L. Cherfoli, the managing director of Stout Risius Ross, LLC, for his opinion regarding the valuation of the Dental Practice. Husband relied on Cherfoli's report issued on October 6, 2023, which considered the valuation of the Dental Practice as of June 30, 2023. Based on the fair market valuation of the Dental Practice, Husband's expert opined that the fair market value of equity was $1,019,000. While the determination of the fair market value of equity of the Dental Practice by both experts was very close, Cherfoli testified that his valuation did not examine or allocate personal goodwill. Cherfoli testified there was no need to allocate personal goodwill based on the capitalized cash flow method of valuation. He further explained that he adjusted compensation for the owner to a market value, which is what another dentist would be paid to make the same contributions to the practice as Wife made. {¶21} In other words, Cherfoli’s method eliminates personal goodwill because Wife’s contributions are being paid for in the assumed market salary. Cherfoli assumed 35% of Wife's collections would be her market compensation, which is the market level of compensation. Using this percentage, he assumed Wife’s projected compensation to be $450,000. Cherfoli opined that the MUM method was too speculative. {¶22} Regarding Husband’s income, in August 2018, Husband was hired by Abercrombie & Fitch as a Senior Procurement Specialist. He earned approximately $75,000. Husband's employment was terminated on July 30, 2021. Husband started new employment with American Signature, Inc. in 2021 where he earned approximately $90,000. The company eliminated his position in April 2023. On September 18, 2023, Husband found new employment with Lutheran Social Services as a Procurement Manager earning an annualized salary of $77,500,80. At trial, Wife argued that Husband was voluntarily underemployed. Wife presented the report and testimony of vocational expert, Dr. Bruce Growick, regarding Husband's employability and earning capacity. Dr. Growick opined that Husband should be able to secure employment in Central Ohio in the occupational field of Purchasing Agent or Buyer earning $87,650 per year, about $10,000 more than what he was earning at the time of trial. {¶23} After considering all the evidence presented at the multiple-day trial, the Magistrate made the following findings and conclusions relevant to this appeal: 1. The Magistrate found it was in the best interest of the children that both parties be named residential parents and legal custodians of the minor children. The Magistrate awarded the parties equal parenting time; 2. The magistrate found the Dental Practice had a fair market equity value of $1,165,000, as established by Wife's expert Smith. The Magistrate then determined that of the $1,165,000 equity value, $140,124, was the adjusted net value of the Dental Practice's assets. The magistrate also determined the Dental Practice’s goodwill and distinguished between enterprise goodwill and personal goodwill. Enterprise goodwill was marital property and subject to division, valued at $439,672. The Magistrate found that the personal goodwill attributable to Wife was valued at $585,204, and such was Wife's separate property not subject to division. The Magistrate’s conclusion was that the marital portion of the Dental Practice subject to division was $579,796 ($439,672 enterprise goodwill plus $140,124); 3. The Magistrate determined that in making an award of spousal support, case law from the Fifth District Court of Appeals required the Court to consider income from all sources, including the income derived from property subject to property division. Accordingly, including the enterprise goodwill income of 42.9%, the Magistrate concluded that Wife's income averaged over a five-year period was $545,646 for child and spousal support calculation purposes; 4. While Wife contended at trial that Husband was voluntarily underemployed, the Magistrate found Wife failed to meet her evidentiary  burden based on a review of Husband's employment history. The Magistrate determined Husband's income was $77,500.80 for child and spousal support calculation purposes; 5. The Magistrate then considered the issue of spousal support. Pursuant to the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.l8(C)(1), the Magistrate found it was equitable for Wife to pay Husband spousal support in the amount of $5,500 per month for a period of 48 months, through wage withholding (the trial court increased the duration to 56 months); 6. The Magistrate found it was equitable for each party to pay their own attorney fees; however, because Wife had paid fees in the amount of $41,553 from a marital account prior to the divorce decree, the Magistrate found it was equitable to treat such payments as a pre-decree distribution in the property division. {¶24} Both parties filed numerous objections to the Magistrate’s decision. After carefully considering said objections, the case law, the evidence, and the arguments, the trial court overruled all objections and issued a detailed 82-page Judgment Entry and Divorce Decree. Both parties timely filed an appeal. Husband, as Appellant, asserts three assignments of error that this Court will address first. Wife, as Cross-Appellant, asserts four assignments of error that this Court will address after addressing Husband’s asserted errors. HUSBAND-APPELLANT’S THREE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶25} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL GOODWILL OF APPELLEE'S DENTAL PRACTICE WAS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY.” {¶26} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF APPELLEE'S DENTAL PRACTICE.”  {¶27} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING APPELLEE'S INCOME.” OVERALL STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW {¶28} Both parties appeal several of the trial court determinations, all entailing the same standard of appellate review. Appellate review of a trial court's judgment in a divorce action is under an abuse of discretion standard. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 131 (1989). Abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217 (1983). We must look at the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably. Jackson v. Jackson, 2004- Ohio-816, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.). 1. Marital Property and Value of Goodwill {¶29} In his first assignment of error, Husband argues the trial court erred in determining that the value of Wife’s personal goodwill is not marital property subject to division. According to Husband, any real or personal property, whether tangible or intangible, can only be classified as marital property (not separate property) and is subject to division.1 1 Wife asserts that Husband misstates the issue on appeal in the first assignment of error; claiming that the issue is the valuation of Wife’s dental practice as a whole and whether such valuation is supported by competent, credible evidence. Wife argues that: [w]hile the Magistrate classified personal goodwill as Becky's separate property (Mag. Dec., p. 18), the trial court did not. The Judge rejected, and certainly did not rely on or adopt, a rigid classification of personal goodwill. Rather, the trial court simply used it as a reduction in the total value of the business. (Divorce Decree, p. 41). The trial court specifically rejected a separate vs. marital and designation of goodwill as asset. Wife’s Brief, p. 7.  {¶30} Both Husband and Wife’s experts applied the income approach, specifically the capitalized cash flow method, to determine the fair market value of Wife's 100% interest in the Dental Practice. Wife's expert Smith also conducted a valuation of Wife's personal goodwill in the Dental Practice using MUM. After calculating Wife’s personal goodwill, Smith concluded that Wife’s 100% interest in the Dental Practice had a fair market value of $302,506, while Cherfoli opined the fair market value was $1,019,000. The primary distinction between the experts’ conclusions is the value of Wife's personal goodwill in the Dental Practice. The Magistrate and the trial court determined that Wife’s personal goodwill was not marital property. {¶31} In dividing marital property, the trial court is bound to follow R.C. 3105.171, which requires the court to “divide the marital and separate property.” Thus, a trial court must identify the marital property, value it, and then equitably divide it. R.C. 3105.171(B). The statute prescribes no specific method of valuation or distribution. R.C. 3105.171(C)(1). James v. James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668, 680-81 (2d 1995). {¶32} A trial court’s classification of what is separate and marital property will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Cockerman v. Cockerman, 2017-Ohio-5563, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.). Thus, we review a trial court's classification of property under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, meaning the appellate court will affirm if some competent, credible evidence supports the classification. Taub v. Taub, 2009-Ohio-2762, ¶ 15. If there is some competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's decision, there is no abuse of However, later in the decision, the trial court does mention that the reduction in value is based on Wife’s personal goodwill, which is not marital property. Thus, because Husband asserts the specific issue on appeal, and the trial court adopted the Magistrate’s valuation, and reduced the total value of the business, we will address the issue asserted by Husband and whether personal goodwill is marital property. discretion. Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397 (1989), citing Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio St.2d 203 (1980). The mere fact that a property division is unequal, does not, standing alone, amount to an abuse of discretion. Koegel v. Koegel, 69 Ohio St.2d 355 (1982); Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318 (1982). {¶33} Similarly, in determining the value of marital property, the trial court has broad discretion. See Berish, supra. As such, “[t]he valuation of marital assets is typically a factual issue that is left to the discretion of the trial court.” Roberts v. Roberts, 2008-Ohio-6121, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), citing Berish, supra. This Court’s role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent, and credible evidence upon which the fact finder could base his or her judgment. Tennant v. Martin-Auer, 2010-Ohio-3489, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.), citing Cross Truck Equipment Co. v. Joseph A. Jeffries Co., 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 15233 (5th Dist.); Iranpour-Boroujeni v. Emami, 2024-Ohio-2546, ¶ 88 (1st Dist.) (stating that factual issues like the classification and valuation of property are reviewed under the sufficiency-and-weight-of-the-evidence standards); Boolchand v. Boolchand, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). {¶34} In Ohio, marital property is generally any property acquired during the marriage and owned by either spouse. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i). R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a) and includes the following: (i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by either or both of the spouses, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by either or both during the marriage; (ii) All interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in any real or personal property, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the  spouses, and that was acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage; (iii) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all income and appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of either or both of the spouses that occurred during the marriage; and (iv) A participant account, as defined in section 148.01 of the Revised Code, of either of the spouses . . . “Personal property” includes both tangible and intangible property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(5). “Marital Property” does not include separate property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(4). Separate property is defined in R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a) and includes: (i) An inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent during the course of the marriage; (ii) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property that was acquired by one spouse prior to the date of marriage; (iii) Passive income and appreciation acquired from separate property by one spouse during the marriage; (iv) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property acquired by one spouse after a decree of legal separation issued under section 3105.17 of the Revised Code; (v) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property that is excluded by a valid antenuptial or postnuptial agreement;  (vi) Compensation to a spouse for the spouse’s personal injury, except for loss of marital earnings and compensation for expenses paid from marital assets; and (vii) Any gift of any real or personal property or of an interest in real or personal property that is made after the date of marriage and that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one spouse. {¶35} The Ohio Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether personal goodwill associated with a spouse’s professional practice constitutes “marital” property, “separate” property, or not property at all, in a divorce proceeding. The Court did generally address goodwill in connection with the dissolution of professional practices, in Spayd v. Turner, Granzow & Hollenkamp, 19 Ohio St. 3d 55 (1985). In Spayd, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: The comprehensive definition of 'goodwill' is 'the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.' Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership (6 Ed. 1868) 170, Section 99. See, also, Metro. Natl. Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co. (1893), 149 U.S. 436; 38 American Jurisprudence 2d (1968) 912, Good Will, Section 1.  {¶36} From an economic standpoint, goodwill is the value of a business or practice that exceeds the combined value of the physical assets. Kahn v. Kahn, 42 Ohio App.3d 61, 63 (2d Dist. 1987) (analyzing goodwill in the valuation of professional practice in divorce proceeding after the Spayd decision and finding such valuation marital property; the court did not distinguish between personal and enterprise goodwill); Mieskoski v. Mieskoski, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 7208, *4-5 (8th Dist.) (including goodwill generally in the business as marital property); but see Flexman v. Flexman, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 7061, *10 (2d Dist.) (holding that the goodwill of a sole proprietorship is not an asset subject to equitable division); Young v. Young, 1999 WL 254426 (5th Dist. Apr. 19, 1999) (affirming the trial court's diminished valuation of the husband's business in a divorce action, based upon his role and direct impact in the business). {¶37} For example, here, the trial court determined the initial value of Wife’s dental practice as a whole was $1,165,000. However, the trial court ultimately determined a fair market value of $579,796, after using a reduction for Wife’s personal goodwill in the amount of $585,204. {¶38} Other State’s high courts have addressed the issue and in so doing, distinguish between personal goodwill and enterprise (aka professional) goodwill. For example, very recently, in Sneed v. Johnston, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s determination that “personal goodwill” was marital property and subject to division.2 Sneed v. Johnston, 2026 N.C. LEXIS 937. In reversing, the Court stated: 2 Similar to Ohio’s statute, North Carolina’s equitable distribution “requires the trial court to conduct a three-step process: (1) classify property as being marital, divisible, or separate property; (2) calculate the net value of the marital and divisible property; and (3) distribute equitably the marital and divisible property.” N.C.G.S. § 50-20.  In this divorce case, the trial court had to classify the goodwill of the law firm started by plaintiff Jason M. Sneed during his marriage to defendant Charity A. Johnston. Although the trial court distinguished between the law firm's enterprise goodwill and personal goodwill, it classified both forms of goodwill as marital property and awarded defendant half the total value thereof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, while also asserting that "our courts have consistently declined" to divide goodwill into categories. Sneed v. Johnston, 293 N.C. App. 650, 659, 902 S.E.2d 28 (2024). For the reasons explained below, today we join the ranks of those state appellate courts which have distinguished enterprise goodwill from personal goodwill and have held that the personal goodwill of a professional practice cannot be treated as marital property. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it holds otherwise and remand this case for entry of an equitable distribution order consistent with our decision. Id. at *2.3 3 The Sneed Court examined cases across States. Of those state courts that specifically distinguished between personal and enterprise goodwill, and whether such is “marital property” or “separate” property, many States conclude “that personal goodwill is not marital property, but that enterprise goodwill is marital property.” Sneed, supra, at *14-16, citing May v. May, 214 W.Va. 394 (2005); see also, e.g., Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d 306, 315 (Ky. 2009) (classifying personal goodwill as nonmarital); Howell v. Howell, 31 Va. App. 332 (2000) (categorizing personal goodwill as “separate property in a divorce action”); Butler v. Butler, 541 Pa. 364 (1995) (holding enterprise goodwill to be the only type of goodwill that should be included when valuing a business for equitable distribution in divorce action); Thompson v. Thompson, 576 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1991) (emphasizing that only the business asset of enterprise goodwill is divisible upon divorce); Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721 (1986) (opining that, while personal goodwill “is not a marketable asset distinct from the individual,” enterprise goodwill is “a business asset with value independent of the presence or reputation of a particular individual” and should therefore be characterized as marital property for distribution purposes).  {¶39} The Court distinguished between personal goodwill and enterprise goodwill, quoting the South Carolina Supreme Court as follows: Enterprise goodwill is that which exists independently of one's personal efforts and will outlast one's involvement with the business. Enterprise goodwill is based on the intangible, but generally marketable, existence in a business of established relations with employees, customers and suppliers. Enterprise goodwill attaches to a business entity and is associated separately from the reputation of the owners. The asset has a determinable value because the enterprise goodwill of an ongoing business will transfer upon sale of the business to a willing buyer. In contrast, personal goodwill is associated with individuals. It is that part of increased earning capacity that results from the reputation, knowledge and skills of individual people. The implied assumption is that if the individual were not there, the clients would go elsewhere. Accordingly, the goodwill of a service business, such as a professional practice, consists largely of personal goodwill. Id. at *7-8, quoting Moore v. Moore, 414 S.C. 490 (S.C. 2015). {¶40} Stated differently, “[e]nterprise goodwill is based on the intangible, but generally marketable, existence in a business of established relations with employees, customers and suppliers * * *.” Frazier v. Frazier, 737 N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (Ind. App. 2000); Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ind. 1999) (Enterprise goodwill 'is based on the intangible, but generally marketable, existence in a business of established relations with employees, customers and suppliers). Personal goodwill is the goodwill that depends on the continued presence of a particular individual and is a personal asset, and any value that attaches to a business as a result of this “personal goodwill” represents nothing more than the future earning capacity of the individual and is not divisible. May, supra, at 404. {¶41} We agree with the above cases and conclude that: (1) personal goodwill must be distinguished from enterprise goodwill; and (2) personal goodwill is not marital property subject to division. Indeed, personal goodwill is not subject to equitable distribution in divorce because it is “not a marketable asset distinct from the individual.” Id.; see also Yoon, at 1269 (Ind. 1999). (“[A]ny value that attaches to a business as a result of * * * ‘personal goodwill’ represents nothing more than the future earning capacity of the individual and is not divisible.”); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 391 So.3d 975, 976 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 2024) (“What is evident in the case law is that personal goodwill of a professional is simply not a marital asset in Florida. Personal goodwill * * * is not a marketable asset distinct from the individual who performs services. Personal goodwill - no matter the business setting - is not a part of enterprise goodwill.”); Gaskill, at 314-15 (“The distinction between enterprise and personal goodwill has a rational basis that accepts the reality of specific business situations. In a case such as this one, there can be little argument that the skill, personality, work ethic, reputation, and relationships developed by [wife] are hers alone * * *.”). {¶42} Husband argues “[t]here is a consensus amongst the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Districts that personal goodwill is an asset that may be distributed in a divorce action or incorporated in an overall valuation of a parties’ business.” Husband’s Brief, p. 12; see generally, Bunkers v. Bunkers, 2007-Ohio-561 (6th Dist.); Kahn, supra, However, after review, we find that those cases do not follow a “bright line rule” and certainly do not hold that “personal goodwill” is a marital asset. Instead, the cases analyze goodwill based on the specific evidence presented and affirm a determination of the trial court as not being an abuse of discretion based on said facts. As such, we do not find the cases cited by Husband to be particularly persuasive or controlling. The distinction we recognize today is particularly significant in divorce proceedings where division of marital property is not only required but must also be equitable. {¶43} Because personal goodwill cannot continue without the individual, any value attached to personal goodwill essentially represents the future earning capacity of that spouse. See Moore, supra. Thus, Wife’s personal goodwill is not marital property subject to division. Indeed, as the trial court recognized, “the amount calculated as personal goodwill is not an asset, but instead a reduction in the value of a closely-held business.” See Divorce Decree, p. 41. Because competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial court’s determination that the value of Wife’s personal goodwill is not marital property subject to divisions, Husband’s first assignment of error is overruled. Valuation of Wife’s De