Donohoo v. Donohoo

[Cite as Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2026-Ohio-3492.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO CLERMONT COUNTY DONOVAN L. DONOHOO, JR., : CASE NO. CA2025-04-023 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 9/8/2026 JILL R. DONOHOO, : Appellant. : : APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 2009 DRB 01042 Barron, Peck, Bennie & Schlemmer, and J. Michael Kaufman and Steven C. Davis, for appellee. Trolinger Law Office, LLC, and Christopher L. Trolinger, for appellant. ___________ OPINION SIEBERT, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Jill Donohoo ("Wife"), appeals a decision of the Clermont County  Clermont CA2025-04-023 Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, terminating the spousal support obligation of appellee, Donovan Donohoo ("Husband"), and denying Wife's request for an upward deviation in Husband's child support obligation. On appeal, Wife challenges the trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to modify spousal support, its termination of Husband's spousal support obligation, its calculation of the parties' respective incomes for spousal support and child support purposes, and its refusal to order an upward deviation in child support. {¶ 2} Finding no merit to Wife's assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. Facts and Procedural History A. Divorce Proceedings {¶ 3} The parties married in 1985 and had two children during the marriage. Their son, Tyler, born in 1987, has severe developmental disabilities, and is unable to support himself. Tyler has lived with Wife throughout these proceedings, and Wife has remained his primary caregiver. {¶ 4} Following approximately 24 years of marriage, Husband filed for divorce. On October 17, 2011, the trial court entered a decree terminating the marriage. The decree ordered Husband to pay child support for Tyler in the amount of $249.87 per month indefinitely and spousal support to Wife in the amount of $4,600 per month. The decree further provided that the spousal support obligation would continue until the death of either party, a significant change in circumstances, or Wife's remarriage or cohabitation. {¶ 5} In awarding spousal support, the trial court considered the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C), including the length of the marriage, the parties' disparate earning abilities, their physical conditions, and Wife's continuing responsibilities as Tyler's -2-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 primary caregiver. {¶ 6} At the time of the divorce, Husband held a bachelor's degree in accounting and owned DCA CPAs, LLC, through which he earned approximately $150,000 annually. Together with other income, Husband's annual income totaled $153,851. Wife, who held an associate's degree in nursing, worked part time as a recovery room nurse and earned $23,489 annually. {¶ 7} The parties were each 50 years old at the time of the divorce. Husband was in good health. Wife, however, suffered from osteoarthritis and fibromyalgia, conditions that limited her ability to work full time. Her responsibilities caring for Tyler further restricted her earning capacity. {¶ 8} The trial court divided the parties' marital estate, including retirement accounts valued at nearly $600,000 and other assets with a net value exceeding $800,000. Notably, Wife received a portion of the value of Husband's accounting business in the division of assets. To equalize the property division, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $250,298. B. Post-Decree Proceedings {¶ 9} On May 27, 2022, Husband moved to terminate his spousal support obligation, asserting that substantial changes in circumstances had occurred since the divorce. In support, he cited his declining health, his planned retirement following the sale of his accounting practice, and Wife's improved financial circumstances, which he argued eliminated her need for continued spousal support. {¶ 10} Approximately two months later, on July 18, 2022, Wife moved to modify child support, noting that the existing support order had not been reviewed since the 2011 divorce decree. {¶ 11} The magistrate conducted an evidentiary hearing on July 20, 21, and 25, -3-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 2023. Both parties testified, and Husband presented testimony from his cardiologist. In addition, the parties entered numerous exhibits into evidence. {¶ 12} At the time of the hearing, Husband was 62 years old and Wife was 61. Husband had sold DCA in 2022 for approximately $2.23 million and entered into a two- year employment agreement with the purchaser. In addition to his employment income, Husband owned several income-producing business and real estate interests. {¶ 13} Wife likewise owned substantial assets and derived income from multiple sources. She owned farmland, rental property, and Pules Road Farm, which generated income through sharecropping, government agricultural payments, and a pending solar lease. Wife also received income from property sales, rentals, gambling winnings, and other agricultural operations. Although she retired from nursing in 2018 and briefly worked as a realtor, she ceased working altogether in 2022. Despite there being multiple sources of income, the evidence revealed discrepancies between Wife's various income streams and the taxable income she reported, raising questions regarding the accuracy of her reported earnings. {¶ 14} Husband testified that he intended to retire upon the expiration of his employment agreement at the end of 2023. He explained that his decision was motivated by the favorable sale of his accounting practice, increasing work-related stress, and ongoing health concerns, including treatment for prostate-related issues. {¶ 15} Husband's cardiologist testified that he began treating Husband in March 2022 after Husband experienced chest pain, shortness of breath, and heart palpitations. Husband was diagnosed with symptomatic premature ventricular contractions, a condition that, while not life threatening, significantly affected his quality of life. According to the cardiologist, occupational stress contributed to Husband's symptoms. Husband likewise testified that he feared "dying at [his] desk" if he continued working. -4-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 {¶ 16} On October 17, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision terminating Husband's spousal support obligation effective December 31, 2023, the date of his anticipated retirement. The magistrate also modified Husband's child support obligation, recommending that he pay $1,096.62 per month beginning July 18, 2022, and $1,023.05 per month beginning January 1, 2024. {¶ 17} Both parties filed objections. Following oral argument, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision on March 4, 2025 with modifications. The court concluded that for the purposes of determining whether Husband's spousal support obligation was appropriate and reasonable under R.C. 3105.18, Husband's income from all sources was $127, 947.47 and Wife's income from all sources was $83,077.67. The trial court found both Husband and Wife demonstrated significant changes in circumstances which rendered "the existing spousal support award unreasonable or inappropriate." As to Husband, the trial court affirmed the magistrate's finding that Husband's "declining health" and his "loss of income from the sale of his practice and retirement, through no fault of his own, was a substantial change in circumstances that was, alone, sufficient to terminate spousal support." As to Wife, the trial court held her "increased income, increased assets, and gambling habits" constituted a significant change in circumstances because her "need for support is greatly diminished." After considering the significant changes in circumstances to both parties, the trial court held spousal support should terminate effective May 27, 2022—the date Husband filed his motion to terminate—rather than December 31, 2023. Based upon the trial court's recalculation of incomes, it ordered Husband to pay child support of $1,026.90 per month effective July 18, 2022, and $476.81 per month effective January 1, 2024. {¶ 18} Wife now appeals, raising four assignments of error. She challenges the trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to modify spousal support, its -5-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 calculation of the parties' respective incomes, its decision to terminate spousal support, and its refusal to order an upward deviation in child support. II. Appeal {¶ 19} Because the trial court's authority to act on Husband's motion affects several of Wife's arguments, we first address whether the court possessed jurisdiction to modify, rather than merely terminate, the spousal support award. A. Jurisdiction to Modify Spousal Support {¶ 20} Whether a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a spousal support order presents a question of law that we review de novo. Tedrick v. Tedrick, 2016-Ohio-1488, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). {¶ 21} A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of a spousal support award unless the decree expressly reserves jurisdiction to do so and the court finds that a change in circumstances has occurred. R.C. 3105.18(E)(1). Absent an express reservation of jurisdiction, a trial court may not modify a spousal support award. Kimble v. Kimble, 2002-Ohio-6667, ¶ 10; Brumbaugh v. Williams, 2010-Ohio-5448, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.). {¶ 22} The divorce decree in this case provides that Husband's spousal support obligation "shall continue until either party's death or significant change in circumstances or upon Wife's remarriage or cohabitation." Although the decree identifies specific events that would terminate the obligation, it contains no language expressly reserving jurisdiction to modify the award. {¶ 23} That distinction is significant here. A modification changes the amount or duration of support. A condition subsequent, by contrast, identifies an event that terminates the obligation upon its occurrence. Guggenbiller v. Guggenbiller, 2011-Ohio- 3622, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.), citing Hibbard v. Hibbard, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 5164, *2 (12th Dist. -6-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 Dec. 27, 1988) (Hendrickson, J., concurring). Ohio courts have long recognized that a decree may identify conditions subsequent that terminate a support obligation without reserving jurisdiction to modify the award itself. See id. {¶ 24} The decree before us falls into the terminable, but not modifiable, category. It does not reserve jurisdiction to modify the amount or duration of support. Instead, it provides only that Husband's obligation "shall continue until" one of four specified events occurs: (1) death, (2) "significant change in circumstances," (3) Wife's remarriage, or (4) Wife's cohabitation. Although one of those events is a "significant change in circumstances," the decree identifies that event as a condition terminating the obligation—not as an express reservation of jurisdiction to modify the award. See Akers v. Akers, 2004-Ohio-2908, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.) (holding that retirement operated as a condition subsequent terminating a spousal support obligation). {¶ 25} Consistent with this distinction, the trial court concluded that the decree "contains no language regarding modification of spousal support, only that it shall continue until a condition is met." The court therefore determined that it retained jurisdiction only to decide whether one of the enumerated terminating conditions had occurred. {¶ 26} We agree with the trial court's decision as to jurisdiction. The plain language of the decree identifies circumstances under which Husband's spousal support obligation ends, but it does not expressly reserve jurisdiction to modify the amount or duration of support. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that its authority was limited to determining whether a terminating condition had occurred. {¶ 27} On appeal, Wife argues that the decree's reference to a "significant change in circumstances" implicitly reserves jurisdiction to modify support because the phrase mirrors the language of R.C. 3105.18(E). We are not persuaded. The decree must contain -7-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 an express reservation of jurisdiction before a trial court may modify a spousal support award. Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 2009-Ohio-1222, ¶ 33. Reading an implied reservation into a termination provision would effectively eliminate the statutory requirement that the reservation be "specifically authorized." R.C. 3105.18(E)(1). {¶ 28} Moreover, neither party challenged the language of the decree in the original appeal. Although this court previously affirmed the divorce decree, we did not hold that the trial court retained jurisdiction to modify spousal support. Rather, this court simply acknowledged the trial court's continuing jurisdiction without defining its scope. Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105, ¶ 46 (12th Dist.). Wife therefore cannot now collaterally attack the language of the decree by arguing that it should be construed as containing a reservation of jurisdiction that it plainly does not. See McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 2001-Ohio-2450, *3 (4th Dist.). {¶ 29} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to modify Husband's spousal support obligation and retained authority only to determine whether one of the decree's terminating conditions had occurred. {¶ 30} We overrule Wife's first assignment of error. B. Calculation of the Parties' Incomes {¶ 31} In her second assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial court miscalculated the parties' incomes for purposes of terminating spousal support and determining child support. Wife primarily contends that the trial court's miscalculations demonstrate its findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court generally reviews a trial court's decision to award support for an abuse of discretion. See Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). -8-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 {¶ 32} Challenges to the factual findings underlying the support order, however, are reviewed under the "some competent credible evidence" standard. Pettit v. Pettit, 2012-Ohio-1801, ¶ 86 (12th Dist.); In re S.C., 2020-Ohio-233, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). "A judgment supported by some competent credible evidence will not be reversed by a reviewing court as against the manifest weight of the evidence." Dario v. Colliver, 2010- Ohio-5310, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). {¶ 33} In support of this asserted error, Wife identifies numerous "calculation" errors relating to Husband's finances, including his employment income, proceeds from the sale of his accounting practice, capital gains, and other sources of income. Yet despite challenging various financial calculations, Wife never explains within this assigned error how any alleged miscalculation affected the trial court's decision. Rather than developing a legal argument, she simply catalogs calculations with which she disagrees. {¶ 34} This deficiency is significant because an appellant bears the burden of presenting legal arguments supported by citations to both relevant authority and the record. Streaker v. Streaker, 2019-Ohio-832, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). An appellate court will neither construct assignments of error nor create arguments on behalf of an appellant because it is not the duty of an Ohio appellate court to raise arguments for the parties. See In re G.E.S., 2008-Ohio-2671, ¶ 53 (9th Dist.). Moreover, "if an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of error, it is not this court's duty to root it out." In re Constable, 2007-Ohio-3346, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). {¶ 35} In any event, much of Wife's arguments in her third and fourth assignments of error, discussed below, focus on Husband's alleged ability to pay additional spousal or child support, and she references some of the alleged miscalculations in those arguments. Therefore, we will address generally whether the trial court erred in calculating the parties' incomes and will apply our conclusions within our analysis of -9-  Clermont CA2025-04-023 whether the trial court erred by terminating Husband's obligation to continue paying spousal support or in its modification of child support. 1. Husband's Income {¶ 36} Wife first argues that the trial court erred by treating Husband's retirement as reducing his earning capacity. She contends that Husband's retirement was voluntary, unsupported by the medical evidence, and based upon speculation regarding future events. In essence, Wife argues that Husband should have been deemed voluntarily unemployed and that income should have been imputed to him. {¶ 37} Voluntary unemployment or underemployment is a relevant consideration in determining support obligations. Todd v. Todd, 2023-Ohio-3677, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). Whether a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed presents a factual question for the trial court, which must evaluate the circumstances of each particular case. Id. at ¶ 12. A trial court's determination on that issue will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Within the context of retirement, if a party retires with the intent of defeating a spousal support obligation, the trial court may consider the retirement as "voluntary unemployment" and pre-retirement income may be imputed to the retiring party. See Chepp v. Chepp, 2009-Ohio-6388, ¶ 10 (2nd Dist.). {¶ 38} Upon review, we find no merit to Wife's argument. The evidence showed that Husband sold his accounting practice in 2022 and entered into a two-year employment agreement with the purchaser. Husband testified that he intended to retire upon expiration of that agreement because of his age, ongoing health issues, and increasing occupational stress. His testimony was supported by his treating cardiologist, who testified that Husband suffered from symptomatic premature ventricular contractions and that work-related stress contributed to his condition. Although Wife emphasizes that Husband was physically capable of continuing to work, the trial court was free to credit - 10 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 the evidence that his retirement was prompted by legitimate health concerns and long- term retirement planning rather than an effort to avoid his support obligations. {¶ 39} Nor did the trial court improperly speculate regarding Husband's future employment or income. We note that while Wife contends the trial court "engaged in speculation," she invites this court to do the same by finding the trial court should have somehow found Husband would engage in other employment activity after his planned retirement. The difference is that the trial court "speculated" based upon evidence Husband presented, while Wife presented no evidence supporting her invited speculation. At the time of the hearing, Husband testified that he intended to retire upon expiration of his employment agreement, and nothing in the record required the trial court to assume that the agreement would be extended or that Husband would pursue additional employment after retiring from the accounting profession. The court was entitled to evaluate Husband's financial circumstances based upon the competent, credible evidence presented rather than speculate that he would continue working indefinitely. {¶ 40} Likewise, Wife argues that the trial court improperly speculated as to the parties' anticipated Social Security benefits in determining that parties' incomes. Even assuming some uncertainty existed regarding the timing of those benefits, Wife has not demonstrated that any such uncertainty materially affected the trial court's ultimate determination regarding spousal or child support obligations, especially considering their earned income, investment income business interests, retirement assets, and other sources of income. {¶ 41} Wife contends that the trial court should have included the capital gains Husband realized from the proceeds of the sale of DCA. While not entirely clear from Wife's argument, she appears to argue in the alternative that Husband's four-year average for capital gains for the years 2019 – 2022 (approximately $19,000) should have - 11 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 been included in Husband's income. We disagree with both arguments. The trial court properly concluded capital gains cannot be included in child support calculations. R.C. 3119.01(C)(13)(e). As to the determination on whether to terminate spousal support, the trial court found the magistrate did not err in excluding Husband's 2022 capital gains from his income because they were derived from the sale of an asset—DCA. {¶ 42} And Husband's four-year average of capital gains for 2019-2022 would be heavily skewed because of the DCA sale, so the trial court did not act unreasonably by declining to include that as income. This does not mean the trial court did not consider the capital gains at all in the termination of spousal support—it considered the "relative assets and liabilities of the parties," including Husband's ownership interest in DCA. {¶ 43} The trial court did not err with regard to allegedly incorrect calculations of Husband's income from other sources—namely post-sale DCA receipts, Donohoo Rapp Properties, Geenex Solar LLC, and DCW. The trial court had voluminous competent, credible evidence before it, and which it cited to in its decision. Wife argues the DCA Sale Agreement entitled Husband to income he generated prior to the sale. She points to her Exhibit N, which includes 2022 DCA Bank Statements, and Husband's testimony regarding transferring money from DCA to his various accounts as support for her contention the trial court did not account for this 2022 post-sale income. However, the trial court accounted for Husband's income from his post-sale employment agreement. The cover page to Wife's Exhibit N denotes the DCA Bank Statements as supporting the income from the DCA sale itself, not post-sale income. Likewise, the trial court had Husband's income tax returns and attached schedules, as well as his testimony, which supported the trial court's findings related to Husband's income from Donohoo Rapp Properties, Geenex Solar LLC, and DCW. {¶ 44} Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by not imputing income - 12 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 to Husband based upon his historical earnings as a practicing accountant. Rather, the court reasonably considered the competent, credible evidence supporting Husband's anticipated post-retirement income together with income generated by his remaining business interests, investment assets, and other financial resources. Competent, credible evidence supports the trial court's determinations that Husband's reduction in income resulted from a bona fide retirement rather than a deliberate effort to avoid his financial obligations. 2. Wife's Income {¶ 45} The trial court likewise was required to resolve conflicting evidence concerning Wife's financial circumstances. The evidence established that Wife received income from numerous sources, including rental properties, farming operations, agricultural payments, property sales, and gambling winnings. Wife's tax returns, business records, and other financial documents, however, did not always present a consistent picture of the amount or character of that income. {¶ 46} Resolving those discrepancies was the province of the trial court. As the trier of fact, the court was responsible for assessing witness credibility, weighing conflicting evidence, and determining the appropriate weight to assign the parties' financial records. Donlon v. Lineback, 2017-Ohio-8131, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.); Ruff v. Ruff, 2023-Ohio-2349, ¶ 58 (11th Dist.). The court was not required to accept Wife's characterization of her income or either party's proposed calculations. {¶ 47} On appeal, Wife identifies numerous individual items that she contends were improperly included or excluded from the trial court's calculations, including the treatment of gambling income and losses, investment withdrawals, rental income, farm income and expenses, business income, and other financial transactions. Those arguments largely reflect competing interpretations of the same financial records - 13 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 presented to the trial court. The existence of alternative calculations does not establish that the trial court's findings were incorrect. {¶ 48} The trial court noted that "[d]ue to [Wife's] poor tax reporting, her income is exceedingly difficult to discern." Despite this difficulty, the trial court carefully considered Wife's objections, sustaining some of her objections, including an objection that she should not have been deemed voluntarily underemployed. After considering the evidence, the trial court found that Wife's income and assets had increased substantially since the divorce and that, following Husband's planned retirement, Wife's income would exceed Husband's. Those findings are supported by competent, credible evidence in the record, especially considering the confusing nature of Wife's evidence. 3. Competent, Credible Evidence Supported the Trial Court's Income Calculations {¶ 49} To the extent Wife challenges the trial court's specific income calculations, those determinations were factual findings based upon conflicting evidence. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the witnesses' credibility, weigh the competing financial evidence, and resolve discrepancies in the parties' respective income calculations. An appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because different conclusions could have been drawn from the evidence. Carson v. Manubay, 2023-Ohio-2015, ¶ 46 (12th Dist.). {¶ 50} Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in calculating the parties' respective incomes for purposes of terminating spousal support and determining child support. Because the court's findings are supported by competent, credible evidence, we overrule Wife's second assignment of error. C. Termination of Husband's Spousal Support Obligation {¶ 51} In her third assignment of error, Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating Husband's spousal support obligation. Specifically, she - 14 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 contends that the court (1) improperly elevated her need for support above the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), and (2) applied the wrong legal standard by referring to a "significant," rather than a "substantial," change in circumstances. {¶ 52} We review a trial court's overall decision to terminate spousal support for an abuse of discretion. Farrens v. Farrens, 2026-Ohio-2357, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). Under that standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Morgan v. Morgan, 2010-Ohio-1101, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). Rather, the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in light of the record before it. Id. But where termination rests on underlying factual findings, those findings are "reviewed under the competent, credible evidence standard, which is our formulation of manifest-weight review when applied to questions of fact." See Farrens at ¶ 13. {¶ 53} As discussed under Wife's first assignment of error, the trial court retained jurisdiction only to determine whether a terminating condition identified in the divorce decree had occurred. Once the court determined that it could consider terminating Husband's spousal support obligation, it was required to determine whether the existing spousal support order should continue in accordance with the terms of the decree. Here, the three terminating factors of death, remarriage, or cohabitation are not in question; that meant the trial court had to determine whether a "significant change in circumstances" warranted terminating spousal support. In making that determination, the court considered the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). {¶ 54} Wife relies heavily on her contention that the DCA sale resulted in a "financial windfall" for Husband, making continued spousal support reasonable and appropriate. But the relevant inquiry before the trial court was not whether Husband's income had increased or whether he was capable of paying additional support, but - 15 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 whether the evidence established that a significant change in circumstances had occurred which justified terminating spousal support. {¶ 55} When considering whether spousal support is still reasonable and appropriate, the relevant statute includes 14 factors for the trial court to consider. R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a) – (n). One of the factors is the income of the parties from all sources under subsection (c)(1)(a). But another is the relative assets and liabilities of the parties in subsection (c)(1)(n). While the trial court did not include the capital gains from Husband's sale of DCA in his income, it did not exclude those gains from its consideration on whether to terminate spousal support. The trial court held "the sale of DCA is more aptly considered under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i) which requires the court to consider the relative assets and liabilities of the parties." (Emphasis added.) Rather than ignoring the capital gains, it simply considered those gains under the relative asset and liabilities subsection, instead of the income subsection. Post-divorce, assets for both Husband and Wife increased—each has assets in the form of property, including income producing property. But the disparity in both income and assets between Husband and Wife had decreased significantly since the divorce. At the time of the divorce, Husband's income was approximately 6.5 times greater than Wife's ($153,851 for Husband, $23,489 for Wife). According to the trial court's calculations, Husband's income was 1.5 times greater than Wife's in 2022 ($127, 947.47 for Husband, $83,077.67 for Wife). Even according to our respected dissenting colleague's calculations, Husband's income would have been only two times greater than Wife's in 2022, which still represents a major decrease in the disparity in 2022 versus at the time of the divorce. {¶ 56} Moreover, even if this had been a modification proceeding, Wife's argument would still fail. Under Ohio law, an increase in the obligor's income, standing alone, does not warrant an increase in spousal support. Holder v. Holder, 1999 WL 250243, * 2 (12th - 16 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 Dist. Apr. 26, 1999), citing Gross v. Gross, 64 Ohio App.3d 815, 819 (10th Dist. 1990). Rather, the limited exception recognized in Gross, applies only when the original support award was insufficient to permit the recipient spouse to maintain the marital standard of living and the obligor's subsequent increase in income would make that standard attainable. See Leighner v. Leighner, 33 Ohio App.3d 214, 216 (10th Dist. 1986). Wife neither argues nor demonstrates that the original support award was inadequate under that standard. 1. Wife's Need for Spousal Support {¶ 57} Wife first argues that the trial court improperly focused on her need for spousal support rather than conducting the balanced analysis required by R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). She contends that the court relied on this court's decision in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 2010-Ohio-597 (12th Dist.), despite our later clarification in Kedanis v. Kedanis, 2012-Ohio-3533 (12th Dist.). {¶ 58} In Kedanis, this court revisited our prior interpretation of R.C. 3105.18 and rejected precedent that elevated the recipient spouse's need for support above the remaining statutory factors. Id. at ¶ 18, overruling Carnahan v. Carnahan, 118 Ohio App.3d 393 (12th Dist.1997). See Ornelas v. Ornelas, 2012-Ohio-4106, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.). Instead, we held that a trial court must consider each of the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) and that "need" is but one factor among many that the trial court may consider in awarding spousal support. Id. at ¶ 19. We have consistently followed Kedanis in subsequent spousal support cases. Sieber v. Sieber, 2015-Ohio-2315, ¶ 47 (12th Dist.) (collecting cases). {¶ 59} Here, the trial court did not terminate spousal support solely because Wife no longer needed support. Rather, it found that Wife's increased income, increased assets, and gambling habits, when viewed together, constituted a significant change in - 17 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 circumstances that rendered the existing spousal support "unreasonable and inappropriate because [her] need for support is greatly diminished." At the same time, the trial court affirmed the magistrate's finding that Husband's declining health and opportunity to retire also constituted a significant change in circumstances. {¶ 60} Although the trial court cited Hutchinson in discussing Wife's diminished need for support, nothing in its decision suggests that it treated need as a dispositive consideration. Instead, the court viewed the financial circumstances of each party. That analysis is consistent with Kedanis, which expressly recognizes that need remains a relevant, albeit not controlling, consideration. {¶ 61} In short, the trial court relied on many of the same factors and comparisons it relied upon when awarding spousal support to determine termination of that spousal support was now appropriate. In the original divorce decree, the trial court weighed the disparity in earnings heavily in its award of spousal support. After evaluating the significant change in Wife's financial circumstances as a whole and comparing those to Husband's change in earning capacity post-retirement, the court concluded the disparity in earnings and other financial circumstances had significantly changed. Likewise, while Husband was much healthier than Wife at the time of divorce, his health had declined, resulting in a significant change in that factor. {¶ 62} Moreover, Husband specifically objected to the magistrate's failure to consider Wife's diminished need for support as an independent basis for terminating spousal support. The trial court therefore was required to address that objection. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d); Motes v. Motes, 2026-Ohio-307, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by discussing Wife's need for continued support when resolving Husband's objections. - 18 -  Clermont CA2025-04-023 2. "Significant" Versus "Substantial" {¶ 63} Wife next argues that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard because it referred to a "significant" change in circumstances—the language used in the divorce decree—rather than the "substantial" change in circumstances described in R.C. 3105.18(F). {¶ 64} We find no reversible error. As this court has recognized, Ohio courts have used the terms "substantial," "material," "drastic," and "significant" interchangeably when describing the degree of change necessary to justify the modification or termination of spousal support. Donlon v. Lineback, 2016-Ohio-7739, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). See also Cook v. Cook, 2020-Ohio-225, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.); Palmieri v. Palmieri, 2005-Ohio-4064, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.). {¶ 65} Although it may be preferable for a trial court to employ the precise statutory language, Wife has not demonstrated that the court applied a different legal standard merely because it used the term "significant" rather than "substantial." Nor has she shown that the terminology affected the court's determination that the existing support award was no longer appropriate. Under these circumstances, the trial court's choice of words does not constitute reversible error. {¶ 66} Finally, Wife generally argues that the evidence does not support the trial court's evaluation of the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). To the extent that argument merely disputes the trial court's factual findings regarding the parties' respective financial circumstances, we resolved those issues in overruling Wife's second assignment of err