State ex rel. Blume v. Mahoning Cty. Pros. Office

[Cite as State ex rel. Blume v. Mahoning Cty. Pros. Office, 2026-Ohio-3722.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY STATE OF OHIO EX REL. GUY BLUME, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF J.B., A MINOR CHILD, Relator, v. MAHONING COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE et al., Respondents. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 26 MA 0050 Writ of Mandamus BEFORE: Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Judges JUDGMENT: Dismissed. Guy Blume, Pro Se, Relator, and Atty. Lynn Maro, Mahoning County Prosecutor, Atty. Kathi McNabb Welsh, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, and Atty. Ray A. Singletary, Assistant Prosecutor, for Respondents. Dated: September 15, 2026  –2– PER CURIAM. {¶1} Relator Guy Blume, individually and as next friend of J.B., a minor child, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus against Respondents the Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office; Jennifer Robbins, the chief assistant prosecutor of that office’s Juvenile Division, named in her official capacity; and John/Jane Does 1-5. The petition arises from a juvenile delinquency matter in which D.P. was adjudicated delinquent for gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); J.B., Relator’s minor daughter, was the child victim. In January 2026, D.P. moved to seal and expunge the record of that adjudication. Relator, appearing as J.B.’s victim representative, opposed the motion, and by judgment entry of May 28, 2026, the juvenile court overruled his objections and affirmed the magistrate’s decision ordering the record sealed. Relator contends that Respondents failed to perform victim-advocacy and notification duties owed to J.B. under Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution (Marsy’s Law) and R.C. Chapter 2930, that the sealing order is void, and that the sealing will result in the destruction of records he seeks to preserve for a pending federal civil action. {¶2} Before us are Respondents’ motions to dismiss the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), Relator’s motions for a peremptory writ with alternative requests for an alternative writ, and his motion to substitute named respondents. The motions present three questions: whether Marsy’s Law or R.C. Chapter 2930 gives a victim a clear legal right to compel the prosecutor’s advocacy or the disclosure of investigative records; whether the duties Relator invokes are ministerial or discretionary; and whether Relator’s pending companion appeal, case No. 26 MA 0037, supplies an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Because the petition establishes none of the three requirements for the writ, we grant the motions to dismiss, deny Relator’s motions, and dismiss the petition. I. BACKGROUND A. The Sealing and Expungement Framework {¶3} Relator’s contentions turn in large part on what the sealing of a juvenile record does, and does not, do to the underlying documents. We therefore begin with the statutory framework governing sealing and expungement. Ohio law sharply distinguishes sealing from expungement. To expunge a record is to destroy, delete, and erase it so Case No. 26 MA 0050  –3– that it is permanently irretrievable; to seal a record is to remove it from the main file of similar records and to secure it in a separate file accessible only to the juvenile court. R.C. 2151.355(A), (B). Sealing therefore does not require destruction; it preserves the record while limiting access to it. State v. K.W., 2024-Ohio-1778, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Where a child has been adjudicated delinquent, the record may be sealed, but not destroyed. In re Anspach, 136 Ohio App.3d 535, 538, fn. 1 (2d Dist. 2000). {¶4} When a court seals a record under R.C. 2151.356, R.C. 2151.357 directs a specific sequence. The proceedings are deemed never to have occurred, and index references to the case are deleted. All original records of the case maintained by any public office or agency, excepting fingerprints, DNA specimens, and DNA records, are delivered to the court, and each office, upon that delivery, expunges the remaining records of the case that it maintains. The court then seals the delivered records in a separate file. R.C. 2151.357(A). The sealing order applies to every public office or agency that has a record relating to the case, regardless of whether the office received notice of the sealing hearing or a copy of the order. R.C. 2151.357(B). {¶5} Once sealed, the records remain under the court’s control. The court may keep an index of them, and they remain open to inspection by enumerated persons and for enumerated purposes: the court; a law-enforcement officer or prosecutor for specified purposes; the person who is the subject of the record; and a party to a civil action based on the case, as needed for that action. R.C. 2151.357(C), (E). {¶6} Expungement is a separate and later step. The juvenile court shall expunge all records sealed under R.C. 2151.356 five years after it issues the sealing order or upon the twenty-third birthday of the person who is the subject of the order, whichever is earlier. R.C. 2151.358(A). Sealing comes first and expungement only afterward; the two are not the same event. State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-106, ¶ 35 (7th Dist.). Even when the time for expungement arrives, the statute forbids expungement while a related civil action remains pending: once the court is notified that a civil action has been filed based on the case, it shall not expunge the sealed record until that action has been resolved and is no longer subject to further appellate review. R.C. 2151.358(C). Case No. 26 MA 0050  –4– B. The Juvenile Proceeding and the Sealing Order {¶7} The following material facts are drawn from the petition, its attachments, the trial-court record, and the filings in this original action. In case No. 2023 JD 00106, the Trumbull County Juvenile Court adjudicated D.P. delinquent for gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and transferred the case to the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, for disposition. The transferred proceeding was docketed as case No. 2023 JK 00675. J.B., Relator’s minor daughter, was the child victim. {¶8} J.B. was represented by counsel during the underlying proceedings. Attorney David Engler was present with Relator and J.B. when the matter was first reported to the Liberty Township Police Department in December 2021, and he remained involved during the ensuing investigation. On June 20, 2023, Attorney Engler filed a notice of appearance on behalf of J.B. At the July 19, 2023 adjudication hearing, one count was dismissed, and the remaining count was amended to gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). D.P., who appeared with counsel, entered an admission to the amended count and was adjudicated delinquent. The Trumbull County Juvenile Court then transferred the case to Mahoning County for disposition. The adjudication entry reflects that the victim’s representative, although properly notified, did not appear and that the court and the prosecutor attempted to make contact. At the October 11, 2023 disposition hearing in Mahoning County, Attorney Engler appeared on J.B.’s behalf, addressed the court concerning restitution, and read a statement submitted by J.B. {¶9} On January 5, 2026, D.P. moved to seal and expunge the records of the Mahoning County juvenile proceeding. By a Victim/Witness Assistance notice dated January 13, 2026, the Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office notified Relator of a February 11, 2026 proceeding identified in the notice as a “Status Hearing: Expungement.” Relator attended the February 11 hearing before the magistrate and, on J.B.’s behalf, opposed the motion to seal. During the sealing proceedings, the State continued to serve Attorney Engler as counsel of record for the victim, but Relator appeared as J.B.’s representative at the February 11 hearing, and Attorney Engler did not appear. {¶10} While the sealing proceedings were pending, Relator corresponded with the Prosecutor’s Office, including Respondent Jennifer Robbins, from January through early Case No. 26 MA 0050  –5– May 2026 concerning the preservation of and access to the juvenile adjudication and investigative records relating to J.B. Respondents advised Relator that the office would communicate with him only within its victim-witness role and would not file pleadings on his behalf, act as an intermediary with the clerk, or provide legal advice. They further advised him to obtain independent counsel. Relator characterizes those communications as a refusal to perform the prosecutor’s victim-advocacy duties. {¶11} On March 24, 2026, the magistrate issued a decision granting D.P.’s motion and ordering the record sealed. By judgment entry filed March 26, 2026, the juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision, subject to the provision that timely objections would automatically stay execution of the entry. Later that day, Relator filed objections, thereby staying execution, and the juvenile court set the objections for hearing on May 7, 2026. The Prosecutor’s Office notified Relator of the hearing on April 2, 2026. Relator attended the May 7 hearing and was permitted to address the court. Attorney Engler did not appear. {¶12} On May 11, 2026, Relator filed in the juvenile court an affidavit from Engler. Engler averred that he serves as a judge of the Trumbull County Juvenile Court and previously represented the victim’s guardian in related federal litigation arising from the same incident. He stated that, for approximately three years after the incident, J.B.’s medical and psychological condition left her unable to participate in legal proceedings or communicate with counsel. Judge Engler further averred that investigative reports, witness statements, recorded interviews, digital evidence, and related materials existed; that the victim and her representatives had not received access to most of those materials; and that preservation of the records was necessary to protect the victim’s participation in the juvenile proceedings, potential appellate remedies, and related civil claims. {¶13} By judgment entry filed May 28, 2026, the juvenile court affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s March 24, 2026 decision. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Relator’s objections for two independent reasons. First, it held that Relator, as the victim’s representative, lacked standing to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. Second, it held that, even if Relator had standing, no transcript of the magistrate’s hearing had been filed within the period required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b). Case No. 26 MA 0050  –6– Relator filed his objections on March 26, 2026; the court determined that the transcript was due on or before April 23, 2026 and that his later request for a transcript did not cure the omission. The court nonetheless construed the objections as an exercise of the victim’s right to be heard under Marsy’s Law, considered the concerns Relator raised, and affirmed the decision to seal the record. {¶14} In language substantially tracking R.C. 2151.357(A), the sealing order directs that D.P.’s record be removed from the main file of similar records and secured in a separate file accessible only to the juvenile court. It further provides that the proceedings are deemed never to have occurred and that all index references to the case must be deleted. Consistent with the statute, the order directs each public office or agency possessing original records relating to the case to deliver those records immediately to the juvenile court and then to destroy any remaining records in its possession, except for fingerprints maintained by a law-enforcement agency and DNA specimens and records. C. This Original Action and the Companion Appeal {¶15} Relator filed his petition on May 11, 2026, invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction in mandamus. Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(1); R.C. 2731.02. Two motions to dismiss followed: one by the Doe respondents under Civ.R. 10(A), 15(D), and 12(B)(6), and one by the Prosecutor’s Office and Robbins under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Relator twice moved for a peremptory writ, each time with an alternative request for an alternative writ, and moved to substitute named respondents for the Does; Respondents moved to dismiss the first peremptory motion. An earlier emergency motion to stay, together with Respondents’ related motion to strike, was resolved by this Court’s June 25, 2026 judgment entry and is not before us here. {¶16} A further round of motions followed. On July 13, 2026, Respondents moved under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) to dismiss Relator’s June 22, 2026 motion for a peremptory writ. On July 14, 2026, Relator moved to strike that filing as unauthorized and untimely, and counsel for Respondents filed a notice modifying their appearance to reflect representation of the Prosecutor’s Office, Robbins, and only those Doe respondents who are officials, employees, or offices of Mahoning County. On July 16, 2026, Respondents moved to overrule the motion to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file their motion Case No. 26 MA 0050  –7– to dismiss instanter, and on July 17, 2026, Relator filed a combined opposition and reply. These filings are addressed below. {¶17} In addition to this original action, Relator has initiated a companion limited appeal, In re D.P., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 26 MA 0037. That appeal is a crime victim’s limited appeal, authorized by Article I, Section 10a(B) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2930.19(A)(2), and it seeks review of the same May 28, 2026 judgment entry that sealed the juvenile record. The companion appeal remains pending before this Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶18} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. King v. Fleegle, 2020-Ohio-3302, ¶ 5. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be issued with caution and only when the right to it is clear. State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2014-Ohio-4022, ¶ 11. The relator bears the burden of proving entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence. Patterson v. D’Apolito, 2024-Ohio-1632, ¶ 32 (7th Dist.). {¶19} Dismissal of a mandamus action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate if, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the petition and drawing all reasonable inferences in the relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts entitling the relator to the writ. Patterson at ¶ 33; State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 2002-Ohio-3605, ¶ 20. Unsupported conclusions are not admitted and are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Patterson at ¶ 33. A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal may also rest on merits issues such as the availability of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hummel at ¶ 20. In ruling on such a motion in an original action, the Court may take judicial notice of the docket and of dispositive entries in the proceedings that are the subject of the petition and in closely related proceedings, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 2021-Ohio-1122, ¶ 13. Such notice is limited to matters not subject to reasonable dispute, such as the existence and terms of those entries, and does not extend to contested factual assertions. Evid.R. 201(B). Case No. 26 MA 0050  –8– III. ANALYSIS A. The Petition Establishes No Clear Legal Right or Clear Legal Duty {¶20} Relator’s petition does not establish a clear legal right to the relief requested or a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of Respondents. Marsy’s Law affords a crime victim, among other rights, the right to reasonable and timely notice of public proceedings and the right to be heard in proceedings in which the victim’s rights are implicated. Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a. A victim likewise has a constitutional right to be present and heard on a motion to seal. State v. Rogers, 2025-Ohio-5778, ¶ 19-24 (6th Dist.). Those provisions confer participatory rights on the victim; they do not impose on a prosecutor a specific, ministerial duty, enforceable in mandamus, to obtain or disclose juvenile adjudication records to the victim or to litigate on the victim’s behalf. A prosecutor’s decisions are committed to broad discretion, and a private relator generally has neither a clear legal right to compel particular prosecutorial action nor a corresponding clear legal duty on the prosecutor’s part. State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lucas Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2021-Ohio-1241, ¶ 11. {¶21} As to the duties Relator invokes, the existence of a duty and its performance are separate questions, and that distinction resolves each theory. The advocacy theory fails because the juvenile-record statutes supply no clear, nondiscretionary duty of the kind Relator asserts. Under R.C. 2151.356, the prosecuting attorney may file a response to a sealing proceeding and may object, but the statute makes the prosecutor’s participation permissive while guaranteeing the victim, the victim’s representative, and the victim’s attorney the opportunity to be present and heard, and a permissive statutory authorization is not the clear, nondiscretionary duty that mandamus enforces. See Whittaker at ¶ 11. The notification theory stands on a different footing, because the victim’s right to notice is mandatory rather than permissive; but the petition identifies no specific notice that was required and not given, and the record before the Court reflects that Relator received notice of, attended, and was heard at the relevant proceedings. Any residual dispute over notice is reviewable through the companion appeal, not by extraordinary writ. The disclosure theory, which rests on an asserted right to obtain the state’s investigative materials, is addressed separately below. Case No. 26 MA 0050  –9– B. Relator Has an Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law {¶22} Relator also has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Marsy’s Law provides that, if the relief a victim seeks is denied, the victim or the victim’s lawful representative may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district. Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a. R.C. 2930.19 confirms that a victim has standing as a matter of right to assert the victim’s rights or to challenge an order denying those rights, and that, if relief is denied, the victim may appeal or, if no remedy on appeal exists, petition for an extraordinary writ. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that whether a direct appeal or an original action is the appropriate vehicle for a victim depends on the circumstances, particularly whether an appeal is available as an adequate remedy, State v. Brasher, 2022-Ohio- 4703, ¶ 22, and that where an immediate appeal is available it is the adequate remedy. State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty, 2020-Ohio-5452, ¶ 49. {¶23} The writ of mandamus must not be issued when there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. R.C. 2731.05; State ex rel. Williams v. Sutula, 2016-Ohio-7453, ¶ 5. Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. Patterson, 2024-Ohio-1632, at ¶ 41 (7th Dist.). Relator has in fact invoked that remedy through his companion limited appeal in case No. 26 MA 0037. With no clear legal right, no clear legal duty, and an adequate remedy at law, the petition states no claim on which a writ may issue, and Respondents’ June 8, 2026 motion to dismiss is well taken. Patterson at ¶ 42. The companion appeal independently bars mandamus as to the sealing order and the victim-rights claims arising from the sealing proceeding; to the extent Relator separately seeks access to investigative or other records, that demand is governed by its own statutory remedies, addressed below. {¶24} The same conclusion answers Relator’s contention that the sealing order is void and must be vacated. That relief is unavailable in mandamus against these Respondents. The sealing order is an order of the juvenile court, and the Prosecutor’s Office and the records custodians have no authority to vacate it; the writ cannot direct these Respondents to undo an order they did not enter and cannot rescind. To the extent the contention is instead aimed at the juvenile court, mandamus fares no better, for the writ may not control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is abused. R.C. 2731.03; Patterson at ¶ 40-41; State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 2007-Ohio-6754, ¶ 11. Case No. 26 MA 0050  – 10 – {¶25} The order is not void in any event. A judgment is void, and subject to collateral attack in mandamus, only where the issuing court lacked subject-matter or personal jurisdiction; an order that is merely contrary to statute is voidable and reviewable on appeal, not by extraordinary writ. State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 16-17; State ex rel. Crangle v. Summit Cty. Common Pleas Ct., 2020-Ohio-4871, ¶ 10. The juvenile court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the sealing proceeding and personal jurisdiction over its subject. Its determination in the May 28, 2026 entry that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Relator’s objections was a procedural ruling within that proceeding, not an absence of fundamental authority over the sealing matter, and it does not render the sealing order void. Any asserted error in applying the sealing statutes, including any contention that the adjudication was ineligible for sealing, a question we do not reach, would therefore render the order voidable, not void, and the remedy lies in the companion appeal. C. The Sealing Order Preserves, Rather Than Destroys, the Court’s Records {¶26} Although the foregoing independently requires dismissal of the petition, we address Relator’s remaining contentions because the parties have briefed them and because they recur across his several motions. Our analysis of those contentions is confined to whether the petition states a claim in mandamus against these Respondents; it does not decide the merits or the permissible scope of the pending appeal in case No. 26 MA 0037. Chief among those contentions is the premise, underlying Relator’s pleadings, that the sealing and expungement of D.P.’s juvenile record will result in the destruction of all of the documents associated with the case. The premise fails on the face of the order and the statutes described above. The direction to destroy operates only on the duplicate records that other offices and agencies hold, and only after those offices have first delivered their originals to the juvenile court; it does not reach the records assembled in the court’s own sealed file, which include the adjudication and investigative records held by the court. {¶27} Nor does expungement supply the destruction Relator anticipates. Expungement follows sealing by years under R.C. 2151.358(A), and R.C. 2151.358(C) forbids it while a related civil action remains pending. Relator has invoked precisely such a pending federal action, which on his own account defers any expungement rather than Case No. 26 MA 0050  – 11 – hastening it. Relator’s concern that the record will be destroyed thus rests on a mistaken equation of sealing with destruction. It establishes no clear legal right to the relief he seeks, imposes no clear legal duty on these Respondents, and leaves intact the adequate remedies otherwise available; it supplies none of the three requirements for a writ. D. Relator’s Demand for Access to the Investigative Reports, Interviews, and Recordings {¶28} Distinct from the sealing of the juvenile record, Relator also seeks an order compelling Respondents to disclose, or to provide access to, the underlying investigative materials in the delinquency matter. As Relator describes them, those materials comprise the Liberty Township Police Department’s investigative records, including incident reports, witness statements, collected evidence, and correspondence with outside agencies; the school district’s internal investigation records; and recorded interviews and digital evidence. Relator grounds the demand in Marsy’s Law, R.C. 2151.14, and the statutes governing access to sealed juvenile records. This demand, like the others, establishes neither a clear legal right nor a clear legal duty, and an adequate remedy exists; mandamus therefore will not lie to compel disclosure. Indeed, as explained below, the juvenile court has since granted Relator’s request for access to the records in its custody. {¶29} Neither Marsy’s Law nor R.C. Chapter 2930 gives Relator a clear legal right to the investigative file. The rights Marsy’s Law enumerates are participatory and protective, including notice, presence, the right to be heard, and conferral with the prosecutor; none confers on the victim an affirmative right to obtain the state’s investigative materials. Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a. The victim’s right to refuse a discovery request made by the accused operates as a shield against the accused, not as a sword to compel production to the victim. Thomas, 2020-Ohio-5452, at ¶ 28. Marsy’s Law does not make the victim a party to the delinquency case, State v. Hughes, 2019-Ohio-1000, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), and a dispute over the release of investigative recordings is governed by the Public Records Act, not by Section 10a. State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 2020-Ohio- 5585, ¶ 42. R.C. Chapter 2930 imposes duties of conferral, notice, case-related communication, and advisement concerning the victim’s rights; it does not require the Case No. 26 MA 0050  – 12 – prosecutor to disclose investigative reports, witness statements, recorded interviews, or other evidentiary materials. R.C. 2930.06. {¶30} Ohio law also channels each category of material Relator describes into a specific statutory or procedural avenue, and those avenues, not a generalized original action against these Respondents, govern his access. The law-enforcement investigative records are governed by the Public Records Act, which excludes certain trial-preparation records and confidential law-enforcement investigatory records from the definition of a public record. R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g) and (h). Whether a particular record falls within those exclusions is determined through the Act’s own enforcement mechanisms: a request under R.C. 149.43, enforced, if denied, by a public-records mandamus action under R.C. 149.43(C) or a public-records-access complaint in the Court of Claims under R.C. 2743.75. Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2020-Ohio-5371, ¶ 12. That framework is tailored to a records dispute: the custodian bears the burden of proving that any withheld record falls squarely within a statutory exemption, exemptions are strictly construed against the custodian, and the court conducts an individualized, in camera review. Id. at ¶ 24, 27, 29. Relator’s generalized demand that these Respondents simply turn over the file cannot substitute for that process, which the petition does not invoke. {¶31} The juvenile court’s own records are subject to a different regime. The inspection right that R.C. 2152.71(A)(1) confers on a child’s parents, guardian, custodian, or nearest of kin does not extend to arrest or incident reports, law-enforcement investigatory reports or records, or witness statements, and juvenile court and children- services records are confidential under R.C. 2151.14 and related provisions; one who seeks them bears the burden of showing good cause, measured by the best interest of the child, that outweighs the considerations underlying confidentiality. State v. Stevens, 2022-Ohio-4804, ¶ 55 (5th Dist.). Access to those records must be sought from the court that holds them, under the Rules of Superintendence that govern access to court records. A relator who can move in the issuing court and appeal any denial has an adequate remedy at law and cannot reach court records through mandamus, which may not be used to control the court’s discretion or as a substitute for appeal. State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria, 2014-Ohio-243, ¶ 9, 11. And for confidential juvenile records sought for a Case No. 26 MA 0050  – 13 – collateral proceeding, the discoverability determination is committed to the court through an in camera balancing of necessity, good cause, and the considerations underlying confidentiality. Grantz v. Discovery for Youth, 2005-Ohio-680, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). {¶32} Sealing narrows access further still. Once a record is sealed under R.C. 2151.356, inspection is limited to the persons and purposes enumerated in R.C. 2151.357, described above, and an officer or employee who knowingly releases sealed- record information for an unpermitted purpose is guilty of divulging confidential information. R.C. 2151.357. The same statute, however, supplies an access mechanism fitted to the purpose Relator emphasizes: a party to a civil action based on the sealed case may obtain and copy the sealed records as needed for that action, using them solely in that action and otherwise keeping them confidential. R.C. 2151.357(E)(5). Relator thus has a statutory route to the materials for the very litigation in which he says he needs them, without resort to a writ of mandamus. {¶33} The Court also takes judicial notice of the juvenile court’s June 10, 2026 judgment entry, entered after the petition was filed. The entry granted Relator’s May 27, 2026 records request, which invoked the same provisions discussed above, and directed that the adjudication and investigative records be forwarded to him upon payment of the copying cost. That entry confirms that Relator can obtain relief directly from the court that holds the records, and has in fact obtained an order in his favor; it neither compels these Respondents nor imposes any duty on them. To the extent any records remain to be obtained, the statutory procedures described above remain available. The allegation that the police records were shared with the school district while withheld from Relator, even if accepted as true, does not transform the victim’s participatory rights into a clear legal right to the investigative file enforceable in mandamus; the remedy for an unauthorized disclosure, if one occurred, lies elsewhere. The demand for access therefore fails each of the three requirements for a writ of mandamus. E. The Petition Is Independently Deficient as to the John/Jane Doe Respondents {¶34} The petition is independently deficient as against the John/Jane Doe respondents. The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to original actions, and Civ.R. 10(A) requires the complaint to state the names and addresses of the parties. The petition supplied no address for the Doe respondents and did not aver, as Civ.R. 15(D) requires, Case No. 26 MA 0050  – 14 – that their names could not be discovered. The petition also makes no specific allegation of any act or duty on the part of these respondents from which a clear legal right or duty could be discerned. The June 5, 2026 motion to dismiss filed by the John/Jane Doe respondents is likewise well taken. F. Remaining Motions {¶35} Relator’s June 15, 2026 motion to substitute Janine Ellison, Clerk of the Mahoning County Juvenile Court, and Jennifer Holland, Clerk of the Trumbull County Juvenile Court, for two of the John/Jane Doe respondents seeks to add officials who maintain or execute orders affecting the court’s records. Substitution would be futile. These clerks act in a ministerial capacity in carrying out the juvenile court’s orders; a clerk acts as the court in carrying out its instructions, and the authority to decide whether a matter is properly filed or executed rests with the court, not the clerk. State ex rel. Wanamaker v. Miller, 164 Ohio St. 174, 175 (1955); State ex rel. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. Siroki, 2006-Ohio-1065, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Parikh v. Berkowitz, 2025-Ohio- 2117, ¶ 19. A clerk therefore has no authority to disregard, or to sit in judgment on, a facially valid order of the court, and the remedy for a party aggrieved by such an order lies in an appeal directed at the issuing court, not in a writ against the clerk. State ex rel. Glass v. Chapman, 67 Ohio St. 1, 6-7 (1902). Because the petition fails to state a claim in mandamus, and the relief Relator seeks against the records custodians is unavailable, the motion to substitute is denied. {¶36} The parties’ remaining motions require only brief discussion. Respondents moved to dismiss each of Relator’s motions for a peremptory writ, and Relator moved to strike the second of those motions as unauthorized and untimely, prompting Respondents’ motion to overrule the motion to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file instanter. To the extent Relator’s argument suggests that a court of appeals may not entertain a motion to dismiss in a mandamus action unless an alternative writ has first issued, it is not well taken. As noted above, the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to original actions, including in the courts of appeals, and a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is an accepted vehicle for testing whether a mandamus petition states a claim; the Supreme Court of Ohio and this Court regularly resolve mandamus actions on such motions without an alternative writ having issued. Hummel, 2002-Ohio-3605, at ¶ 20; Case No. 26 MA 0050  – 15 – Patterson, 2024-Ohio-1632, at ¶ 33 (7th Dist.). In any event, Relator did not move to strike Respondents’ June 8, 2026 motion to dismiss the petition; he opposed that motion on the merits, and it is granted above. Because the petition is dismissed and the peremptory-writ motions are denied, these procedural motions present nothing further to decide, and each is overruled as moot in the judgment below. IV. CONCLUSION {¶37} Even after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of Relator’s petition and making all reasonable inferences in his favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of mandamus. The petition alleges no clear legal right to the relief requested and no clear legal duty on the part of Respondents; an adequate remedy lies in the companion appeal for the sealing-related and victim-rights claims, and in the statutory records procedures for the access claims; and the petition is independently deficient as against the John/Jane Doe respondents. {¶38} Accordingly, Respondents’ June 8, 2026 motion to dismiss the petition and the June 5, 2026 motion to dismiss filed by respondents John/Jane Does 1-5 are GRANTED. Relator’s June 9, 2026 and June 22, 2026 motions for a peremptory writ of mandamus, including his alternative requests for an alternative writ, and his June 15, 2026 motion to substitute named respondents, are DENIED. Respondents’ June 17, 2026 motion to dismiss Relator’s June 9, 2026 motion for a peremptory writ, Respondents’ July 13, 2026 motion to dismiss Relator’s June 22, 2026 motion for a peremptory writ, Relator’s July 14, 2026 motion to strike, and Respondents’ July 16, 2026 motion to overrule the motion to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file instanter are OVERRULED as moot. {¶39} The petition for a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED. Any unresolved motions not specifically addressed herein are overruled as moot, and all other pending matters are resolved by this judgment. Costs taxed against Relator. Final order. The clerk of courts is directed to serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B). Case No. 26 MA 0050  – 16 – JUDGE CAROL ANN ROBB JUDGE CHERYL L. WAITE JUDGE MARK A. HANNI Case No. 26 MA 0050