State v. West

[Cite as State v. West, 2026-Ohio-3157.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY State of Ohio, : : Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 25CA11 : v. : : DECISION AND Brandon Chad West, : JUDGMENT ENTRY : Defendant-Appellant. : _____________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant. Nicole Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelsey R. Riffle, Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Gallipolis, Ohio, for appellee. _____________________________________________________________ Smith, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Brandon Chad West, is appealing the trial court’s imposition of consecutive 90-day jail terms after he pled guilty to one count of assault, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(7), and one count of obstructing official business, a second-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) and (B). Appellant raises one assignment of error on appeal, contending that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences for felony and misdemeanor offenses. However, because we find the issue raised on appeal is moot, this appeal is hereby dismissed. Washington App. No. 25CA11 2 FACTS {¶2} On December 20, 2024, appellant entered guilty pleas to one count of assault, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(7), and one count of obstructing official business, a second-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) and (B). On March 5, 2025, the trial court sentenced appellant to 3 years of community control on the felony assault charge. It also reserved a stated, definite prison sentence of 12 months and imposed, as a residential sanction of the term of community control, 90 days in jail. The trial court also sentenced appellant to 90 days in jail on the misdemeanor charge. The trial court ordered the two jail terms to be served consecutively to one another. {¶3} It appears from a review of the record that appellant did not seek a stay of execution of the sentence at either the trial court or appellate level, but rather he began serving his aggregate 180-day jail term and has since been released from incarceration. On appeal, appellant raises a single assignment of error for our review. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS. {¶4} In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences for the felony and misdemeanor Washington App. No. 25CA11 3 counts to which he pled guilty. More specifically, appellant argues that R.C. 2929.41(A), which governs the imposition of multiple sentences, provides that a jail term for a misdemeanor shall be served concurrently with a prison term or sentence of imprisonment for a felony served in a state or federal correctional institution absent certain exceptions which are inapplicable here, and that the trial court erred in ordering the 90-day jail term for the misdemeanor obstructing official business charge to be served consecutively to the 90-day jail term imposed for the felony assault charge. {¶5} In his duty of candor to the Court, appellate counsel has disclosed that appellant had already been released from incarceration at the time the appellate brief was filed October 30, 2025. Nevertheless, appellant argues in his reply brief that although he has already been released from jail, this Court must still correct the sentencing error by either modification or remand for resentencing. {¶6} The State responds by arguing that R.C. 2929.41(A) is inapplicable here because the consecutive sentences at issue were jail terms to be served in the local county jail rather than “terms of imprisonment that will be served in a state or federal correctional institution.” The State further notes that the trial court, in an abundance of caution, issued specified findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. The State urges this Court to uphold the sentences imposed Washington App. No. 25CA11 4 but has responded to the fact that it appears appellant’s jail sentences have been served and he has already been released from incarceration. {¶7} Despite the State’s failure to weigh in on the mootness question, in light of the fact that appellant has already completed his consecutive 90-day jail sentences and has now been released from incarceration, we conclude that the issue he raises on appeal has been rendered moot. This is because “mootness is a jurisdictional question * * * that must be addressed even if the parties do not raise it.” State v. Ford, 2023-Ohio-2473, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.) (finding challenge to felony sentence moot in the absence of a challenge to the underlying conviction where defendant had already served the sentence, reasoning that “there is no relief that could be granted at this point”). {¶8} This Court has observed as follows regarding the doctrine of mootness: In general, a “ ‘case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’ ” Los Angeles Cty. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379 (1979); quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944 (1969). “It is not the duty of the court to answer moot questions, and when [during] pending proceedings * * *, an event occurs, without the fault of either party, which renders it impossible for the court to grant any relief, it will dismiss the petition * * *.” Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237, 92 N.E. 21, syllabus (1910); see also Tschantz v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 566 N.E.2d 655 (1991) (“Ohio courts have long exercised judicial restraint in cases which are not actual controversies. No actual controversy exists where a case has been rendered moot by an outside event.”). “Conversely, if an actual controversy exists because it is possible for a court to grant Washington App. No. 25CA11 5 the requested relief, the case is not moot, and a consideration of the merits is warranted.” State ex rel. Gaylor v. Goodenow, 125 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-1844, 928 N.E.2d 728, ¶ 11; State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 7. State v. Lewis, 2019-Ohio-2009, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (jail-time credit argument was moot once defendant had already completed sentence and had been released, provided the defendant was only challenging the length of the sentence and not the underlying conviction). {¶9} Here, appellant pled guilty to a misdemeanor and a felony. Thus, for sentencing purposes, he was both a misdemeanant and a felon. The Supreme Court of Ohio has noted distinctions with respect to misdemeanants and felons in terms of sentencing. See State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224 (1994). For example, in Golston, the Court explained as follows: This court has held that where a criminal defendant, convicted of a misdemeanor, voluntarily satisfies the judgment imposed upon him or her for that offense, an appeal from that conviction is moot unless the defendant has offered evidence from which an inference can be drawn that he or she will suffer some collateral legal disability or loss of civil rights stemming from that conviction. Golston at 110, citing State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236 (1975) and State v. Berndt, 29 Ohio St.3d 3 (1987). See also State v. Perry, 2002-Ohio-4822, ¶ 5-6 (4th Dist.) (dismissing appeal as moot where misdemeanant voluntarily paid the fine and court costs without seeking a stay of the execution of the court’s sentence Washington App. No. 25CA11 6 and where the record contained no evidence of collateral disability or loss of civil rights), citing State v. Benson, 29 Ohio App.3d 109 (10th Dist. 1986) (stating that “to retain his stake in a controversy and to preserve the right to appeal, a defendant convicted of a criminal offense must, where practicable, seek a stay of the fine or sentence in either the trial court or the appellate court”). {¶10} Here, the record reveals that appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor and was sentenced to 90 days in jail to be served consecutively to a 90-day term of imprisonment in the local jail imposed for a related felony offense. The record also reveals that appellant failed to seek a stay of execution of sentence in either the trial court or this Court, but instead he served his sentence and was released. Additionally, the record is clear that appellant pled guilty to the offenses at issue, that he does not challenge his underlying convictions, and that he does not allege any sort of collateral disability or loss of civil rights. Thus, in accordance with the foregoing cited case law, any issue related to the consecutive service of his misdemeanor sentence with his felony sentence has been rendered moot. {¶11} Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end here as appellant was also sentenced to a consecutive sentence for a felony offense. The Golston Court ultimately held that “the test for mootness outlined in Wilson and Berndt applies only to appeals from misdemeanor convictions.” Golston at 111. In issuing its holding, the Court reasoned as follows: Washington App. No. 25CA11 7 Given the numerous adverse collateral consequences imposed upon convicted felons, it is clear to us that a person convicted of a felony has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the judgment imposed upon him or her. Therefore, an appeal challenging a felony conviction is not moot even if the entire sentence has been satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal. The collateral legal consequences associated with a felony conviction are severe and obvious. Thus, a convicted felon, who has completed his or her sentence during the pendency of an appeal from the felony conviction, need not present evidence that he or she will suffer some collateral legal disability or loss of civil rights in order to maintain the appeal. In this regard, we specifically disapprove of [State v. Williams, 80 Ohio App.3d 542 (1992)], which improperly extended the rule of Wilson and Berndt to cases involving appeals from felony convictions. Golston at 111-112. However, in Golston, the defendant was challenging his underlying felony convictions, unlike here where appellant only challenges the consecutive nature of the sentences that were imposed. Golston at 110 (stating that the defendant was found guilty after a jury trial and was seeking reversal of his convictions and sentences). That is a key difference that leads to a different result here than the result in Golston. {¶12} In State v. Verdream, the defendant challenged the consecutive nature of his sentences after he entered guilty pleas to three felony counts of theft. State v. Verdream, 2003-Ohio-7284, ¶ 1 (7th Dist.). Much like the present case, Verdream only challenged his sentences, did not challenge his underlying Washington App. No. 25CA11 8 convictions, did not request a stay of execution, and had completed his prison sentence during the pendency of the appeal. Id. at ¶ 13. In ultimately determining the appeal was moot, the Verdream court acknowledged the holding in Golston, but reasoned as follows: We are well aware that an appeal challenging a felony conviction is not moot even if the entire sentence has been served before the appeal is decided, because there are many adverse collateral disabilities that accompany a felony conviction even after the sentence has been served. State v. Golston (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 643 N.E.2d 109. For example, a convicted felon may not serve as a juror, may never hold an office of “honor, trust, or profit,” may not engage in certain occupations, and may not obtain or hold certain licenses. Id. at 227, 643 N.E.2d 109. The holding in Golston, though, cannot be applied to a defendant who is only challenging the correctness of the felony sentence itself. If an individual has already served his sentence and is only questioning whether or not the sentence was correct, there is no remedy that we can apply that would have any effect in the absence of a reversal of the underlying conviction. State v. Beamon (Dec. 14, 2001), 11th Dist. Nos. 2000-L-160, 2001- Ohio-8712; see also State v. Moore (Sept. 19, 2002), 7th Dist. No. 00AP0741. Verdream at ¶ 13. The Verdream court ultimately held that because the defendant was not challenging the underlying conviction, the appeal was moot. Id. {¶13} Several other cases, including cases from this Court, have followed the reasoning of Verdream, factually distinguishing Golston when the defendant merely challenges the sentence imposed for a felony offense, has not sought a stay, Washington App. No. 25CA11 9 has completed the sentence, and does not challenge the underlying conviction. See State v. Swain, 2015-Ohio-1137, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) (finding challenge to felony sentence moot where the defendant had already completed the sentence and was not challenging the underlying conviction); State v. Lewis, 2019-Ohio-2009, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.) (holding appeal moot where the defendant had already completed his felony sentence and was not challenging the underlying felony conviction); State v. Lanier, 2020-Ohio-5289, ¶ 4 (6th Dist.) (finding appeal of felony sentence moot where the defendant had already served his sentence and did not challenge the underlying conviction); State v. Ford, 2023-Ohio-2473, ¶ 14, 17 (5th Dist.) (distinguishing the case from Golston in light of the fact the defendant was not challenging the underlying felony conviction and finding the sentencing issues raised to be moot because there was “no relief which could be granted at this point”); State v. Vera-Lopez, 2025-Ohio-2301, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.) (finding appeal moot in the absence of a challenge to the underlying conviction and where the defendant had already completed his jail term, despite the fact that his term of community control had not expired).1 {¶14} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that not only is appellant’s challenge to his misdemeanor sentence moot, the challenge to his felony sentence 1 In the present case, as in Vera-Lopez, although appellant has completed his consecutive jail terms, his term of community control has not expired. However, because appellant only challenges the consecutive nature of his jail terms, the fact that his community control term remains in place is not relevant to the disposition of this appeal. Washington App. No. 25CA11 10 is also moot because appellant challenges only the consecutive nature of his sentences, did not seek a stay of the execution of his sentences, has already completed the jail terms which he challenges, and does not challenge his underlying convictions. Because we find the argument raised on appeal is moot, we do not reach the merits of the argument. Accordingly, we hereby dismiss this appeal as moot. There is no relief that this Court can grant at this time. APPEAL DISMISSED. [Cite as State v. West, 2026-Ohio-3157.] JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and that appellant shall pay the costs. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Hess, J. and Wilkin, J., concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court, _____________________________ Jason P. Smith Presiding Judge NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.