State v. Jones

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-3798.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ASHTABULA COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-A-0056 Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas ODRAYE G. JONES a.k.a. MALIK ALLAH-U-AKBAR, Trial Court No. 1997 CR 00221 Defendant-Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: September 25, 2026 Judgment: Appeal dismissed Andy Wilson, Ohio Attorney General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Street, 16 th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215, Kara Keating, Daniel Kasaris, and Erik Spitzer, Assistant Attorneys General, Special Prosecutors, 30 East Broad Street, 23 rd Floor, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). Odraye G. Jones, pro se, Ashtabula County Jail, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (Defendant-Appellant). ROBERT J. PATTON, J. {¶1} Appellant, Odraye G. Jones (“Jones”)1, filed the instant pro se appeal on July 16, 2026. Jones seeks to appeal from a June 29, 2026 judgment entry denying Jones’s April 23, 2026 request to waive the jury for the resentencing phase of the underlying criminal case. The trial court denied that request and concluded that "[t]he 1. Jones refers to himself as “Malik Allah-U-Akbar.” Such designation has been used in some case captions by other courts. This court has consistently referred to appellant as “Jones” throughout these related proceedings. express language and procedural/legislative history of O.R.C. 2929.06(B) require [the trial] court impanel a new jury for the sentencing phase of this trial." {¶2} On August 25, 2026, this court issued a show cause order and requested the parties to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. Upon review of the notice of appeal, the judgment entry subject to this appeal, and the submissions of the parties in accordance with the show cause order, we conclude that this court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. {¶3} Jones was “indicted on November 26, 1997. He was charged with one count of aggravated murder in the shooting death of an Ashtabula City police pfficer. The indictment contained one death penalty specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(3); two death penalty specifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(6); and one firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145.” State v. Jones, 2002-Ohio-2074, ¶ 2 (11th Dist.). On May 26, 1998, a jury found appellant guilty of aggravated murder and all four specifications as charged in the indictment. Id. After considering the sentencing phase of the proceedings, the jury returned a death sentence recommendation. Id. The trial court imposed the sentence of death on June 8, 1998. Id. {¶4} After exhausting his state appeals, Jones sought relief in federal court where the Sixth Circuit determined that Jones was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Jones v. Bradshaw, 46 F.4th 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2022). Since the remand from federal court, the trial court has attempted to proceed to the sentencing phase to no avail, but not for lack of effort. {¶5} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals aptly noted in October 2025: As the district court found, “the state-court record reveals proceedings straining under the weight of a federal court's PAGE 2 OF 7 Case No. 2026-A-0056  mandate and exceedingly complex legal, procedural, and administrative issues—such as [Jones’s] competency to stand trial and his request to represent himself in a capital case; the burden on the defense to investigate and present mitigation evidence in a case more than a quarter-of-a- century old; and containing pre-trial publicity amidst intense public interest.” Jones [v. Bradshaw], 2024 WL 895153, at *8 [(N.D.Ohio February 29, 2024)]. Although there were lengthy delays in proceeding with a new penalty phase, many of those delays were attributable to [Jones]. See id. at *4, 9. (Emphasis added.) Allah-U-Akbar v. Bradshaw, 154 F.4th 482, 495 (6th Cir. 2025), cert. denied sub nom. Allah-U-Akbar v. May, 2026 WL 1513290, 225 L.Ed.2d 234 (June 1, 2026). The Sixth Circuit detailed: [Jones] sought to proceed pro se, which required determining his competency. Id. at *9. Both the [S]tate and [Jones] sought at various times to disqualify the state trial judge assigned to the sentencing proceedings. Id. at *2, 8. The state-court delays associated with [Jones]’s competency evaluations and the various disqualification proceedings are undoubtedly troubling. But this series of events is not due to bad faith or wrongdoing on the part of the [S]tate, nor does it rise to the level of substantial inequitable conduct that would warrant a bar on the death penalty. Id. {¶6} There have been multiple delays due to several procedurally defective and frivolous appeals filed by Jones that have prevented the trial court from completing the sentencing phase of these proceedings in both this court and the Supreme Court of Ohio. Such appeals include but are not limited to, State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-1696 (11th Dist.) (intermediate appellate court without jurisdiction to review direct appeal of death penalty conviction); State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-6113 (11th Dist.) (dismissed for lack of final appealable order); State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-6114 (11th Dist.), appeal not accepted, 2025-Ohio-1283 (dismissed for lack of final appealable order); State ex rel. Allah-U-Akbar PAGE 3 OF 7 Case No. 2026-A-0056 v. Schroeder, 2024-Ohio-6118 (11th Dist.) aff'd, 2025-Ohio-5003, cert. denied sub nom. Ohio ex rel. Allah-U-Akbar v. Schroeder, 224 L.Ed.2d 508 (Apr. 20, 2026) (petition for writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted); State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-1447 (11th Dist.) (dismissed for lack of final appealable order); and State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-1448 (11th Dist.), cause dismissed, 06/16/2026 Case Announcements, 2026-Ohio-2237 (dismissed for lack of final appealable order, or in the alternative for lack of standing as Jones was not an aggrieved party.).2 {¶7} Jones has again appealed from a trial court’s judgment denying Jones’s request to waive the jury for the penalty phase of the underlying criminal case. Since this court may only entertain those appeals from final judgments, we must determine whether there is a final appealable order. Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96 (1989). A trial court’s judgment can be immediately reviewed by an appellate court only if it constitutes a “final order” in the action. Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(2); Radic v. Sternadel, 2025-Ohio- 4527, ¶ 2 (11th Dist.). If a lower court’s judgment is not final, then this court does not have jurisdiction to review the case, and the case must be dismissed. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1989). {¶8} R.C. 2505.02(B) defines a “final order” and sets forth nine categories of appealable judgments, and if a trial court’s judgment satisfies any of them, it will be deemed a “final order” and can be immediately appealed and reviewed. In this case, the 2. Jones also sought to reopen his prior appeals in Eleventh District Court of Appeals Case Nos. 2000-A- 0083 and 2001-A-0072 in December 2024. This court denied his requests and Jones appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction of either appeal. 06/26/2025 Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-2217. PAGE 4 OF 7 Case No. 2026-A-0056 June 29, 2026 judgment entry being appealed does not fit within any of the categories for being a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). {¶9} The June 29, 2026 entry does not constitute a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). See State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate Dist., 2011-Ohio-5456, ¶ 35. In Bates, the defendant requested to plead guilty to the offense in a capital case and retain the right to have a jury consider his sentence. The trial court denied the request and Bates filed a delayed appeal. The county prosecutor filed a writ of prohibition to prohibit the intermediate appellate court from considering Bates’s appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the prosecutor's request for a writ of prohibition and determined that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal as the entry on appeal was not a final appealable order. {¶10} While factually different than Bates, the entry subject to this appeal is also not a final appealable order. Here, the trial court denied Jones’s request to waive the jury in the sentencing phase of the capital proceeding.3 The trial court’s entry is interlocutory and does not determine the action, prevent a judgment, or affect a substantial right in a manner that would foreclose appropriate relief in a subsequent appeal. As the challenged entry neither disposes of the case nor fits within any statutory category of a final, appealable order, it remains an interlocutory ruling over which this court lacks jurisdiction. In the absence of a final order, the appeal must be dismissed. {¶11} We recognize Jones’s apparent desire to pursue relief on appeal; however, this court is without jurisdiction to consider or review the interlocutory judgments of the trial court. The interlocutory judgments and decisions will be ripe for review in an appeal, 3. Jones was convicted by a jury during the penalty phased and the jury previously recommended the death penalty. PAGE 5 OF 7 Case No. 2026-A-0056 if properly preserved in the trial court, after the trial court completes the sentencing phase of the proceedings. Until the trial court can proceed and complete Jones’s resentencing, the interlocutory judgments will remain unreviewable by this court. Accordingly, appeals from such interlocutory judgments are required to be and will continue to be dismissed. {¶12} Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, all pending motions are overruled as moot. MATT LYNCH, P.J., EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., concur. PAGE 6 OF 7 Case No. 2026-A-0056  JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the memorandum opinion of this court, it is ordered that the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. All pending motions are overruled as moot. Costs to be taxed against Appellant. The Clerk of Courts is hereby instructed to serve a copy of this entry to the following: 1. Appellant, Ashtabula County Jail, 25 W. Jefferson St. Jefferson, Ohio 44047; 2. Trial counsel, Attorney Donald J. Malarcik, 121 S. Main St., Suite 520, Akron, OH 44308 and The Ashtabula County Public Defender’s Office, 22 East Jefferson St., Jefferson, OH 44047; 3. The Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office, 25 W. Jefferson St., Jefferson, Ohio 44047; 4. Special Prosecutors, Attys. Kara Keating, Daniel Kasaris, and Erik Spitzer, 30 E. Broad Street, 23rd Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215; and 5. Judge David A. Schroeder, Chambers. JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI, concurs THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. PAGE 7 OF 7 Case No. 2026-A-0056