Full Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Stewart v. Champaign Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Div., 2026-Ohio-4407.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY STATE EX REL. KRISTOPHER C.A. No. 2026-CA-23 RICHARD STEWART Relator v. DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ENTRY CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION, ET AL. Respondents ________________________________________________________________________ PER CURIAM: {¶ 1} In this prohibition action, relator Kristopher Richard Stewart seeks “an order prohibiting the respondents – the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Judge Brett A. Gilbert, and Magistrate Meghann S. Scott – from exercising further judicial or administrative authority over [him] in Case No. 2015 DR 00157, vacating all prior void orders issued therein ab initio, and cancelling all active or impeding [child support] enforcement actions.” The respondents have answered Stewart’s complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Stewart opposes the motion. For the following reasons, this court grants judgment in favor of the respondents and denies the writ. I. Factual & Procedural Background {¶ 2} Stewart is a party to a divorce action filed in the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division (Case No. 2015 DR 00157). The matter is assigned to Judge Gilbert. {¶ 3} When the divorce complaint was filed in 2015, Stewart was incarcerated. With respect to service of the complaint, the docket reflects that a certified mail return receipt addressed to Stewart was endorsed by “Ami Oliver on behalf of Kristopher Stewart.” Stewart did not file a responsive pleading or otherwise defend in the divorce action. On October 19, 2015, the court entered a final decree of divorce. {¶ 4} On May 4, 2026, the Champaign County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) filed a motion for contempt against Stewart, who is no longer incarcerated. With respect to service of the CSEA’s motion, the docket reflects that a certified mail return receipt addressed to Stewart was endorsed by “Corey Gossett, Agent for Kristopher Stewart.” A summons ordered Stewart to appear before Magistrate Scott on July 8, for a hearing on the CSEA’s motion. On July 9, Magistrate Scott continued the hearing until August 26. {¶ 5} On August 20, Stewart filed a “Special Limited Appearance, Motion to Vacate Void Judgment and Orders Ab Initio, and Motion to Quash Defect Service” in the common pleas court. On the same day, Magistrate Scott issued an order stating that Stewart’s motion would be considered at the August 26 hearing. On August 21, Stewart filed a “Special Limited Appearance, Emergency Objection, and Motion to Set Aside Magistrate’s Order.” On August 24, Judge Gilbert issued an order acknowledging Stewart’s August 20 filing, indicating that the August 26 hearing would proceed, and stating that Stewart’s motion would be considered at that hearing. On August 25, Stewart filed a “Notice of Continuing Objection to Personal Jurisdiction, Non-Consent to Proceedings and Demand for Equity.” 2 {¶ 6} On August 26, Stewart filed this original action. In support of his petition, Stewart claims that service of both the divorce complaint and the CSEA’s contempt motion was defective under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Stewart claims that neither Ami Oliver nor Corey Gossett was authorized to accept service of process on his behalf. Further, Stewart claims that he “never voluntarily consented to or submitted to the personal jurisdiction” of the common pleas court and has “appeared strictly through a Special Appearance to challenge the court’s structural want of jurisdiction.” {¶ 7} Stewart also filed an “Expedited Emergency Motion for an Immediate Stay of Proceedings Pending Adjudication of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition.” This court denied the motion and ordered that the matter proceed in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. {¶ 8} On September 23, the respondents filed an answer to the petition and their motion for judgment on the pleadings. On October 22, Stewart filed a memorandum in opposition. We proceed to resolve the motion. II. Law & Analysis A. Writ of Prohibition Elements {¶ 9} To obtain a writ of prohibition, the relator must establish (1) that a judicial officer is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) that exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna, 1995-Ohio-98, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith, 1994-Ohio- 302, ¶ 8. 3 B. Prohibition and Personal Jurisdiction {¶ 10} A prohibition claim may challenge the absence of personal jurisdiction. Lundeen v. Turner, 2021-Ohio-1533, ¶ 16. “When a prohibition claim is predicated on defective service, ‘[i]f contested allegations of defective service of process are not premised upon a complete failure to comply with the minimum-contacts requirement of constitutional due process, prohibition does not lie.’” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok, 1999-Ohio-329, ¶ 9. In such cases, the claim fails because a party has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For example, a party that lacks actual notice of a pending action “may obtain relief directly from the trial court by petitioning the trial court to vacate the judgment on the ground that they were not properly served.” Id. at ¶ 18. Alternatively, a party that is aware of a pending action “may raise the failure of service right away by asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of process.” Id. at ¶ 19. Thus, “absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, appeal from a decision overruling a Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction will generally provide an adequate legal remedy which precludes extraordinary relief through the issuance of a writ of prohibition.” Goldstein v. Christiansen, 1994-Ohio-229, ¶ 9. C. Civ.R. 12(C) Standard {¶ 11} “Civ.R. 12(C) motions are specifically for resolving questions of law.” State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 1996-Ohio-459, ¶ 21, citing Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 166 (1973). “Under Civ.R. 12(C), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings ‘[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial.’” One Church v. Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co., 2026-Ohio-2764, ¶ 10. When considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion, our review is necessarily “limited to the complaint, the answer, and any attached documents.” Id. This court will grant a Civ.R. 12(C) motion if, after construing the 4 material allegations in the petition as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the relator, we find beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the relator to relief. Pontious at ¶ 21. “Thus, Civ.R. 12(C) requires a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. D. The Respondents Are Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law {¶ 12} Stewart’s allegations of defective service of process are not premised upon a complete failure to comply with the minimum-contacts requirement of constitutional due process. Indeed, a minimum contacts analysis could come into play only if Stewart was an out-of-state defendant. See Goldstein at ¶ 16 (“a state court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the nonresident possesses certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”), citing Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The petition contains no allegation that Stewart did not reside in the State of Ohio when the divorce complaint was filed in 2015 or when the CSEA’s motion was filed in 2026. Thus, Stewart cannot demonstrate that the respondents patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over his person. Further, Stewart has adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Stewart may move to vacate the decree of divorce and he may defend against the contempt motion on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of process. Therefore, after construing the material allegations in the petition as true and making all reasonable inferences in Stewart’s favor, it is beyond doubt that he cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to a writ of prohibition. E. A Common Pleas Court Is Not Sui Juris {¶ 13} Although the issue was not raised by the respondents in their motion for 5 judgment on the pleadings, the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a court is not sui juris. See State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121 (1973) (“Absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right.”). III. Conclusion {¶ 14} For all the foregoing reasons, the respondents’ September 23, 2026 motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. The respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. {¶ 15} Writ of prohibition DENIED. Costs taxed to the relator. For the court, RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. To The Clerk: Within three (3) days of entering this judgment on the journal, you are directed to serve on all parties not in default for failure to appear notice of the judgment and the date of its entry upon the journal, pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B). RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE 6