State ex rel. Chavis v. Bur. of Sentence Computation

[Cite as State ex rel. Chavis v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, 2026-Ohio-3516.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT State ex rel. Jeremy Chavis, : Relator, : No. 25AP-161 v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Bureau [of] Sentence Computation, : Respondent. : D E C I S I O N Rendered on September 8, 2026 On brief: Jeremy Chavis, pro se. On brief: [D. Andrew Wilson], Attorney General, and Salvatore Messina, for respondent. IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION LELAND, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Jeremy Chavis, an inmate, commenced this original action in mandamus seeking an order compelling respondent, Bureau of Sentence Computation (“bureau”), to correct its records to reflect a criminal sentence imposed by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas following relator’s 2001 criminal conviction. {¶ 2} In 2001, relator was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, for offenses committed on or about June 26, 1996. The trial court’s sentencing entry imposed a term of “30 years to life” on each aggravated murder count and a single additional 3-year term for merged firearm specifications. (Relator’s Ex. C at 1, attached to Feb. 4, 2025 Compl. for Writ of Mandamus.) The court ordered the No. 25AP-161 2 terms for the aggravated murder sentences to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the firearm specification term. {¶ 3} On February 4, 2025, relator filed the instant mandamus action. Relator’s complaint alleged that the bureau informed him via written correspondence in 2023 “that his sentence is designated as a ‘Full Sentence’ not eligible for ‘Good Time.’ ” (Compl. at 3.) Relator contends this designation is inconsistent with the trial court’s sentencing entry, and he seeks a writ to compel the bureau to correct its records to remove the “full sentence” designation. {¶ 4} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate recommends denial of the request for a writ on the ground that relator “has not established a clear legal right to the requested relief because the only term of imprisonment for 30 years authorized under former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) was for full years.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 36.) {¶ 5} Relator has filed a pro se objection to the magistrate’s decision, asserting the magistrate erred in concluding he failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to have the bureau adjust its records “to reflect a sentence of 30 years to [l]ife imprisonment without the ‘full’ sentence designation.” (Apr. 23, 2026 Relator’s Obj. at 1.) Relator argues, as he did before the magistrate, that the trial court’s sentencing entry did not designate his sentence as a “full” sentence as claimed by the bureau, and he maintains the bureau “is attempting to correct the sentencing court’s error and impose the sentence it believed the court should have imposed.” (Relator’s Obj. at 16.) {¶ 6} In response, the bureau contends the objection lacks merit because the magistrate correctly found that relator’s aggravated murder sentence is governed by former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2). Specifically, the bureau argues, the magistrate correctly determined the trial court’s imposition of “[30] years to life” necessarily entails “ ‘full years’ as the statute did not allow for any other option when an offender is sentenced [to] this term of confinement.” (Apr. 29, 2026 Respondent’s Response to Obj. at 4.) {¶ 7} In order to obtain mandamus relief, relator must establish “a clear legal right to the requested relief,” a “clear legal duty” on the part of the bureau to provide it, “and the No. 25AP-161 3 lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh, 2019-Ohio-1569, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 2012-Ohio-69, ¶ 6. {¶ 8} As set forth above, relator was convicted in 2001 for two counts of aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, arising out of conduct occurring on or about June 26, 1996. Each count carried multiple specifications, including aggravating circumstance specifications under R.C. 2929.04 and firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.145. As found by the magistrate, because the aggravated murder offenses were committed before July 1, 1996, “the amended sentencing provisions enacted through S.B. 2 did not apply to [relator’s] convictions, even though he was sentenced after the effective date of S.B. 2.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 29, citing State v. Rush, 1998-Ohio-423, paragraph two of the syllabus.) {¶ 9} The magistrate further observed that, under the version of R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) then in effect, once the jury found an offender guilty of aggravated murder with an aggravating circumstance specification, the statute “ ‘called for one of three sentences.’ ” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 30, quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Janas, 2020- Ohio-1462, ¶ 7, fn. 2.) Specifically, the available sentencing options were “ ‘death, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment.’ ” (Emphasis in original and emphasis omitted.) (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 30, quoting former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2).) Analyzing the text of former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2), the magistrate concluded “the only term of imprisonment for 30 years authorized under former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) was for full years.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 36.) {¶ 10} In reaching that determination, the magistrate relied in part on State v. Rembert, 2014-Ohio-300 (8th Dist.), in which the Eighth District Court of Appeals noted that, “pursuant to the aggravated murder sentencing statute, when a defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after either 25 or 30 years, the years are necessarily ‘full’ years, because ‘full’ years are the only available punishment authorized by the statute when a defendant is ordered to serve 25 or 30 years before becoming eligible for parole.” (Emphasis in original.) Rembert at ¶ 15. {¶ 11} The magistrate also noted the sentencing entry reflects relator was found guilty of both counts “with Specification,” and that the trial transcript “reflects a statement No. 25AP-161 4 by the common pleas court that [relator] ‘was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder . . . and he was also found guilty of the specifications to those counts and also found guilty of the firearm specifications on each of those counts.’ ” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 36, quoting July 9, 2025 Relator’s Submission of Evid. at 2.) The magistrate concluded that, because the trial court sentenced relator to a term of imprisonment for 30 years for the offense of aggravated murder under the former sentencing statute, and “a term of 30 years for such offense was necessarily 30 full years,” relator failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to have the bureau “adjust his records to reflect a sentence of 30 years imprisonment without the ‘full’ sentence designation, or a clear legal duty on the part of the bureau to provide such relief.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 37.) {¶ 12} Based on our independent review of the record and the governing statutory provisions, we conclude the magistrate properly determined that, for the offenses at issue, former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) authorized only a 30-year term measured in “full years.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at ¶ 36.) As explained in Rembert, a trial court’s sentencing entry imposing life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 years, despite omitting the word “full,” nonetheless imposed a sentence of 30 full years “because ‘full’ years are the only available punishment authorized by the statute when a defendant is ordered to serve . . . 30 years before becoming eligible for parole.” Rembert at ¶ 15. Stated otherwise, notwithstanding the omission of the word “full” in the sentencing entry at issue here, former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) did not authorize a sentencing court to impose a 30-year term subject to reduction for good-time credits. {¶ 13} Relator seeks to distinguish his case from Rembert, arguing that, “[u]nlike [the defendant] in Rembert,” he “did not receive a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 years” (but instead received a sentence characterized as 30 years to life). (Emphasis omitted.) (Relator’s Obj. at 9.) This distinction is unavailing. The reasoning employed by the Eighth District in Rembert did not depend on the phrasing of the sentencing entry, but rather on the statute itself and the court’s observation that when a defendant is ordered to serve 30 years before becoming eligible for parole, those years are necessarily full years. Rembert, 2014-Ohio-300, at ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). See also State v. Goodwin, 2020-Ohio-5187, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (noting that the court in Rembert “took no issue No. 25AP-161 5 with the trial court’s failure to include the word ‘full’ in the defendant’s sentence” when addressing a similar challenge). {¶ 14} Relator relies on State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, and State ex rel. Fraley v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-4410, to argue that the bureau is obligated to execute the sentence as set forth in the judgment entry and cannot interpret the law to correct perceived errors made by the sentencing court. Both cases, however, are distinguishable. In Henderson, the trial court imposed a definite 15-year sentence even though the applicable statute required “an indefinite sentence of 15 years to life for his offense,” and the Supreme Court of Ohio held the trial court’s failure to impose the statutorily required indefinite sentence rendered the sentence voidable. Henderson at ¶ 1. Here, by contrast, the trial court’s sentence of “30 years to life” corresponded to the only 30-year parole-eligibility term authorized by former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2), i.e., life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 30 full years. {¶ 15} Fraley is likewise distinguishable. Under the facts in that case, the trial court ordered sentences in two different cases to be served concurrently with each other, and the sentencing entries did “not separately address the sentences for the firearm specifications.” Fraley at ¶ 17. The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) subsequently computed a longer aggregate term (13 years rather than 10 years) by treating the specification terms as consecutive, contrary to the trial court’s entry. The Supreme Court rejected the DRC’s approach, holding that the DRC was “obliged to execute the sentence imposed by the court.” Id. at ¶ 17. {¶ 16} Here, unlike in Fraley, the bureau is not modifying the sentence imposed by the trial court or adding a term the court did not impose; rather, the bureau’s designation reflects the controlling statutory scheme and gives effect to the only sentencing option authorized by former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) on these facts. {¶ 17} Upon review of the magistrate’s decision, an independent review of the record, and due consideration of relator’s objection, we agree with the magistrate’s determination that relator failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to have the bureau adjust his records to reflect a sentence of 30 years without the “full” designation, or a clear legal duty of the bureau to provide such relief. We therefore overrule relator’s objection and adopt the magistrate’s decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions No. 25AP-161 6 of law contained therein. In accordance with the recommendation of the magistrate, relator’s request for a writ of mandamus is denied. Objection overruled; writ of mandamus denied. EDELSTEIN and DINGUS, JJ., concur. No. 25AP-161 7 APPENDIX IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT State ex rel. Jeremy Chavis, : Relator, : v. : No. 25AP-161 Bureau [of] Sentence Computation, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Respondent. : MAGISTRATE’S DECISION Rendered on March 26, 2026 Jeremy Chavis, pro se. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Salvatore Messina, for respondent. IN MANDAMUS {¶ 18} In 2001, relator Jeremy Chavis was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas to a term of 30 years to life on each count of aggravated murder with an additional three years of incarceration for firearm specifications. The common pleas court ordered the sentences for the two counts to run consecutively to each other and the sentence for the firearm specifications. Chavis seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Bureau of Sentence Computation (“bureau”) to correct its records to reflect the sentence imposed on Chavis by the common pleas court. For the following reasons, the magistrate recommends denying the writ. I. Findings of Fact {¶ 19} 1. Chavis is an inmate incarcerated in the Marion Correctional Institution. No. 25AP-161 8 {¶ 20} 2. The bureau is a bureau-level administrative section of the Division of Parole and Community Services, which in turn is a division of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”). See R.C. 5120.06(B); State ex rel. Robinson v. Chambers-Smith, 2024-Ohio-2347 (10th Dist.). {¶ 21} 3. In State v. Chavis, Franklin C.P. No. 00CR-11-6605, Chavis was indicted by a Franklin County grand jury on two counts of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01, each of which included multiple specifications, arising out of conduct occurring on or about June 26, 1996. For the first count of aggravated murder, the grand jury indicted Chavis on a specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) providing “that the offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.” (Bureau’s Am. Evid. at 10.) For the second specification under the first count, the grand jury indicted Chavis on a specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) providing that “the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.” Id. For the second count of aggravated murder, the grand jury indicted Chavis on a specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(8), providing as follows: [T]he victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who was purposely killed to prevent the victim’s testimony in any criminal proceeding and the aggravated murder was not committed during the commission, attempted commission, or flight immediately after the commission or attempted commission of the offense to which the victim was a witness, or the victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for the victim’s testimony in any criminal proceeding. Id. at 11. The second count of aggravated murder also included, as its second specification, a specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) providing that “the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.” Id. Both counts of aggravated murder also included as their third specification a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145. {¶ 22} 4. As set forth in an amended judgment entry filed on December 20, 2001, counts one and two were tried to a jury. On November 21, 2001, the jury returned a verdict finding Chavis to be “guilty of Count One of the indictment, to-wit: Aggravated Murder No. 25AP-161 9 with Specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.01 . . . and guilty of Count Two of the indictment, to-wit: Aggravated Murder with Specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.01.” (Bureau’s Am. Evid. at 8; Chavis’s Evid. at 9.) In the amended judgment entry, the common pleas court imposed the following sentence: “30 years to life on Counts One and Two with an additional 3 years actual incarceration for the firearm specification in both counts.” (Bureau’s Am. Evid. at 8; Chavis’s Evid. at 9.) Finding the firearm specification for the two counts merged, the common pleas court ordered the counts to run “consecutive with each other” and “consecutive with the 3 years for the firearm specification in Counts One and Two.” (Bureau’s Am. Evid. at 8-9; Chavis’s Evid. at 9-10.) {¶ 23} 5. Chavis commenced this original action with the filing of his petition for writ of mandamus on February 4, 2025. {¶ 24} 6. Chavis filed a motion to exclude evidence on December 2, 2025. II. Discussion and Conclusions of Law {¶ 25} Chavis requests a writ of mandamus ordering the bureau to correct its records to reflect the sentence imposed by the common pleas court in Chavis’s underlying case. Specifically, Chavis asserts the common pleas court did not impose a sentence “with a ‘full sentence’ designation as claimed by [the bureau].” (Chavis’s Brief at 6.) A. Chavis’s Motion to Exclude Evidence {¶ 26} On December 2, 2025, Chavis filed a “motion to exclude evidence.” Chavis asserts that the bureau, in its amended presentation of evidence, included certain evidence “in regards to jail time credit and Relator’s Federal Sentence.” (Chavis’s Mot. to Exclude Evid. at 2.) Chavis asserts that he has raised no claim regarding jail-time credit or his federal sentence. As a result, Chavis requests that this Court exclude the evidence submitted by the bureau on such matters. {¶ 27} Resolution of the question presented in this mandamus action does not require consideration of the bureau’s materials regarding jail-time credit or Chavis’s federal sentence. Yet, it is unnecessary to strike or exclude portions of the bureau’s evidence since this Court is “capable of determining questions of relevance and assigning appropriate weight without striking evidence or arguments.” State ex rel. Tam O’Shanter No. 25AP-161 10 Co. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2017-Ohio-8167, ¶ 11. As a result, the magistrate recommends denying Chavis’s motion to exclude evidence. B. Purpose of and Requirements for Mandamus {¶ 28} A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy “ ‘issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.’ ” State ex rel. Russell v. Klatt, 2020-Ohio-875, ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2731.01. See State ex rel. Blachere v. Tyack, 2023-Ohio-781, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.) (stating that the purpose of mandamus is to compel the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station). In order for a writ of mandamus to issue in this matter, Chavis must establish by clear and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the bureau to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin, 2021-Ohio- 1508, ¶ 19. “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is a measure or degree of proof that is more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard required in a criminal case; clear and convincing evidence produces in the trier of fact’s mind a firm belief of the fact sought to be established.” State ex rel. Ware v. Crawford, 2022-Ohio-295, ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 2013-Ohio-3720, ¶ 14. C. Whether Chavis Is Entitled to Relief in Mandamus {¶ 29} In 2001, Chavis was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) for conduct occurring on or about June 26, 1996. After Chavis committed the offenses in the underlying case, Ohio’s statutory sentencing scheme for felonies has been the subject of substantial amendments in multiple legislative acts. See, e.g., Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 (“S.B. 2”), 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, effective July 1, 1996; 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”), effective September 30, 2011; 2018 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 201 (“S.B. 201”), effective March 22, 2019; 2020 Sub.S.B. No. 256 (“S.B. 256”), effective April 12, 2021. As Chavis’s offenses were committed before July 1, 1996, the amended sentencing provisions enacted through S.B. 2 did not apply to Chavis’s convictions, even though he was sentenced after the effective date of S.B. 2. See State v. No. 25AP-161 11 Rush, 1998-Ohio-423, paragraph two of the syllabus (“The amended sentencing provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 apply only to those crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996.”); State v. Thomas, 2016-Ohio-5567, ¶ 12. {¶ 30} At the time Chavis committed the offenses in question, aggravated murder “carried a mandatory sentence of life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years.” State ex rel. Davis v. Janas, 2020-Ohio-1462, ¶ 7, citing former R.C. 2929.03(A), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 9, effective October 19, 1981.1 On the other hand, “a conviction for aggravated murder with an aggravating circumstance called for one of three sentences” as set forth under former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2). Davis at ¶ 7, fn. 2. That statute provided: If the indictment or count in the indictment contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, and if the offender is found guilty of both the charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be death, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment. . . . (Emphasis added.) Former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2). See Davis at ¶ 7 (stating that under former R.C. 2929.03, “[a]n offender could be sentenced to life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 full years only if [the offender] was convicted of aggravated murder with an aggravating circumstance” (emphasis in original)). {¶ 31} Aside from the number of years, the difference between life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years and life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 or 30 full years “is the offender’s ability to reduce the base sentence by earning certain types of credit.” Davis at ¶ 8. Sentences in which the offender is eligible for parole after 20 years without the “full” time designation “are subject to diminution for certain types of good behavior and prison-program participation,” whereas sentences of life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 or 30 full years are not subject to such diminution and “may be reduced only by the amount of jail-time credit awarded.” Id. See Adm.Code 5120-2-06(N) (“No inmate may earn days of credit pursuant to this rule if the inmate is serving a 1 All references to “former” statutes in this decision are to those in effect at the time Chavis committed the offenses in the underlying case. No. 25AP-161 12 sentence of imprisonment for an offense, committed before July 1, 1996, of: . . . (3) Life with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years for the offense of aggravated murder with one of the specifications enumerated in section 2929.04 of the Revised Code.”); State v. Rembert, 2014-Ohio-300, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (stating that “[t]he word ‘full’ is significant in that it determines whether a prisoner’s term can be reduced for good behavior or earned credit”). {¶ 32} Chavis argues that the December 20, 2001 sentencing entry is not ambiguous. Chavis contends that under the terms of the entry, the common pleas court “did not impose a sentence with a ‘full sentence’ designation as claimed by [the bureau].” (Chavis’s Brief at 6.) {¶ 33} DRC, which includes the bureau as an administrative division of DRC, is under a clear legal duty to carry out the sentence imposed by a sentencing court. See State ex rel. Fraley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-4410, ¶ 18; State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 21 (stating that “[i]t is the responsibility of the [Adult Parole Authority] to carry out the sentence after the court imposes it, not to interpret the law and facts and impose its own sentence based on information in the sentencing entry”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 6. See also State ex rel. Keith v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2014-Ohio-4270, ¶ 26 (holding that “in any parole determination involving indeterminate sentencing, the [Adult Parole Authority] may not rely on information that it knows or has reason to know is inaccurate”). In Fraley, DRC lengthened the offender’s sentence contrary to the express language contained in the offender’s sentencing entries based on DRC’s interpretation of the law. Regardless of whether the sentencing “entries contained a legal error favoring [the offender],” the Supreme Court of Ohio found that “DRC’s role is not to correct a sentencing court’s errors and impose the sentence it believes the court should have imposed.” Fraley at ¶ 17. Rather, “DRC is obliged to execute the sentence imposed by the court.” Id. As a result, the Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering DRC to correct its records in order to apply the sentence actually imposed by the sentencing court. {¶ 34} The bureau admits that “nowhere in the documentation of [Chavis’s] sentence, does the term ‘full sentence’ appear.” (Bureau’s Brief at 4.) Nonetheless, the bureau argues that Chavis “is not eligible to earn any good time credit regardless of No. 25AP-161 13 whether his sentence is designated as ‘full time.’ ” Id. The bureau argues that Chavis “was convicted of Aggravated Murder with specifications under R.C. 2929.04 and sentenced to life in prison with parole eligibility after serving 30 years.” (Emphasis added.) Id. {¶ 35} Contrary to the bureau’s contention, the December 20, 2001 amended judgment entry does not state that Chavis was convicted of specifications under R.C. 2929.04. Rather, the entry reflects that Chavis was found “guilty of Count One of the indictment, to-wit: Aggravated Murder with Specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, . . . and guilty of Count Two of the indictment, to-wit: Aggravated Murder with Specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.01.” (Emphasis added.) (Bureau’s Am. Evid. at 8; Chavis’s Evid. at 9.) In this way, the entry refers to a specification—singular—for both counts without distinguishing between the firearm specifications or specifications under R.C. 2929.04. While the entry specifically imposes a sentence for the firearm specifications for both counts, the entry does not include any mention of the R.C. 2929.04 specifications that were charged in the indictment. Thus, the common pleas did not specify whether Chavis’s sentence was for full years or specifically incorporate findings regarding whether Chavis had been found guilty of one of the specifications for the aggravating circumstances under R.C. 2929.04 that were charged in the indictment. {¶ 36} Nevertheless, Chavis has not established a clear legal right to the requested relief because the only term of imprisonment for 30 years authorized under former R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) was for full years. This is unlike a circumstance involving a 20-year sentence for aggravated murder, as the former sentencing statute included potential sentences for 20 years and 20 full years depending on whether the offender was found guilty of one of the aggravating circumstances under R.C. 2929.04. Compare Rembert, 2014-Ohio-300, at ¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (stating that “pursuant to the aggravated murder sentencing statute, when a defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after . . . 30 years, the years are necessarily ‘full’ years, because ‘full’ years are the only available punishment authorized by the statute when a defendant is ordered to serve . . . 30 years before becoming eligible for parole” (emphasis in original)) with Davis, 2020-Ohio-1462, at ¶ 16 (finding that court of appeals erred in dismissing mandamus complaint challenging jurisdiction of trial court judge where trial court issued nunc pro tunc entry that changed offender’s sentence from life in prison with parole eligibility after No. 25AP-161 14 20 years to life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 full years). Furthermore, Chavis included with his evidentiary materials a portion of the transcript from his sentencing. The transcript reflects a statement by the common pleas court that Chavis “was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder . . . and he was also found guilty of the specifications to those counts and also found guilty of the firearm specifications on each of those counts.” (Chavis’s Evid. at 2.) {¶ 37} Because the common pleas court sentenced Chavis to a term of imprisonment for 30 years for the offense of aggravated murder under the former sentencing statute, and a term of 30 years for such offense was necessarily 30 full years, Chavis has not demonstrated a clear legal right to have the bureau adjust his records to reflect a sentence of 30 years imprisonment without the “full” sentence designation, or a clear legal duty on the part of the bureau to provide such relief. D. Conclusion {¶ 38} Accordingly, it is the decision and recommendation of the magistrate that Chavis’s request for a writ of mandamus should be denied. The magistrate also recommends denying Chavis’s December 2, 2025 motion to exclude evidence. /S/ MAGISTRATE JOSEPH E. WENGER IV NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision.