In re K.P.

[Cite as In re K.P., 2026-Ohio-4363.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) IN RE: K.P. C.A. No. 31971 APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DN 25-02-000101 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: November 4, 2026 HENSAL, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Appellant Mother appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated her parental rights and placed her child in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB” or “the agency”). This Court affirms. I. {¶2} Mother is the biological mother of K.P., born December 8, 2011. In 2008, she relinquished custody of three other children who are now adults. The child’s father has no relationship with K.P., did not participate in the proceedings below, and has not appealed. {¶3} When K.P. was two years old, CSB removed him from Mother’s home based on concerns regarding Mother’s mental health and substance abuse. The child was adjudicated dependent, but ultimately returned to Mother’s legal custody almost two years later. Within four months, CSB again removed K.P. from Mother’s home based on the same concerns, as well as housing instability. The child was adjudicated neglected and dependent. After a year, he was  2 placed in the legal custody of Mother’s maternal cousins. Ten months later, however, the cousins informed the agency that they were no longer willing to keep the child in their home because of his behavioral issues. CSB again removed the child. He was adjudicated dependent. Mother again engaged in reunification services focused on mental health and substance abuse. After 18 months, K.P. was returned to her legal custody. Another 18 months after that, CSB removed the child again from Mother’s care based on mental health and substance abuse concerns. K.P. was again adjudicated dependent, but again returned to Mother’s legal custody after 13 months. By the time K.P. was eleven years old, CSB had removed him four times from his home environment, three of which were removals from Mother’s care, and worked with Mother to address the ongoing mental health, substance use, and basic needs concerns consistently underlying the agency’s involvement with the family. {¶4} The instant underlying case arose when K.P. was 13 years old. Mother flagged down paramedics who were addressing another matter in her neighborhood to report that K.P. was having a serious reaction to a vaccine. When the paramedics investigated, the child was not having any medical issues. As Mother was behaving oddly, police were dispatched to her home. After Mother reported that K.P. was not her child and she did not want him, the police removed him from Mother’s home pursuant to Juv.R. 6. Mother was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for assessment. CSB obtained an emergency order of temporary custody and filed a complaint alleging that K.P. was a dependent child. {¶5} Mother later waived her right to an adjudicatory hearing and stipulated to the child’s dependency. After an initial dispositional hearing, the juvenile court placed K.P. in CSB’s temporary custody and adopted the agency’s case plan as an order. The case plan required Mother to engage in mental health services and follow all treatment recommendations, submit to random  3 drug screens and obtain a substance use assessment if she tested positive, demonstrate the ability to meet the child’s basic needs, and identify relatives and non-blood kin as placement options. The child was required to engage in mental health services. {¶6} Mother initially told the agency caseworker that she did not want to work on her case plan objectives. The guardian ad litem reported that Mother had told her the same thing, revoked her releases of information, and indicated that she was planning to move to California. Within eight months, however, Mother began to engage in services and make some progress. Around the same time, CSB notified the juvenile court about concerns regarding inappropriate conversations Mother was having with the child during visits. Eventually, the agency ended Mother’s twice weekly telephone calls with K.P. due to Mother’s continued attempts to discuss the case with the child. Her weekly two-hour visits at the visitation center remained closely supervised to allow for redirection should Mother attempt to discuss inappropriate topics with K.P. {¶7} Within the first year of the case, CSB moved for permanent custody. Mother moved for legal custody or, alternatively, a first six-month extension of temporary custody. After a two-day hearing, the juvenile court granted the agency’s motion and terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Mother timely appealed, raising two assignments of error for review. This Court consolidates the assignments of error to facilitate review. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB], AS THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.]  4 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MOTHER’S MOTION FOR A FIRST SIX-MONTH EXTENSION OF TIME WHEN, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE EXTENSION WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, THERE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE CASE PLAN OF THE CHILD, AND THERE WAS REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHILD WOULD BE REUNIFIED WITH [MOTHER] OR OTHERWISE PERMANENTLY PLACED WITHIN THE PERIOD OF THE EXTENSION. {¶8} Mother argues that the juvenile court’s judgment awarding permanent custody of K.P. to CSB, in lieu of granting her motion for legal custody or a six-month extension of temporary custody, is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees. {¶9} This Court recognizes the distinction between sufficiency and manifest weight within the context of a permanent custody determination. “Sufficiency and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct.” In re D.J., 2024-Ohio-1876, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 23. “‘[S]ufficiency is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a [judgment] is a question of law.’” In re D.J. at ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). {¶10} In determining whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Eastley at ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.  5 {¶11} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under Revised Code Section 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under Section 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). {¶12} The best interest factors include: the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the child, the custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence and whether that can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in Section 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see In re R.G., 2009- Ohio-6284, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Clear and convincing evidence is that which will “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶13} As to the first prong, CSB alleged, and the juvenile court found, that K.P. had been adjudicated a dependent child three or more times under Section 2151.414(B)(1)(e). Mother does not challenge this first-prong finding, and the record supports it. {¶14} Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that an award of permanent custody was in the child’s best interest. She emphasizes the strong bond between Mother and K.P., as well as the child’s wish to return to Mother’s custody. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) and (b).  6 Many witnesses, including two caseworkers and the guardian ad litem, testified to the strength of the mother-child bond. Mother was consistent in attending visits. She brought thoughtful items and activities to engage the child. K.P. was always excited to spend time with Mother and reported to his therapist, the caseworker, and guardian ad litem that he missed Mother and wanted to be with her. In addition, the caseworker and guardian ad litem opined that severing contact with Mother would be difficult for K.P. A strong parent-child bond and the child’s wish for reunification, while relevant, do not solely drive the best interest determination, however. {¶15} It is well settled that Section 2151.414(D) requires the juvenile court to weigh the enumerated best interest factors, as well as all other relevant factors, in making its determination. In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 64. No single factor carries greater weight than any other(s). Id. at ¶ 56. In this case, while there is evidence of a strong bond between Mother and K.P., and the child has expressed the desire to return home, the juvenile court did not err, after weighing the totality of the evidence, by finding that permanent custody meets the best interest of the child. {¶16} The juvenile court considered the child’s custodial history under subsection (D)(1)(c) to be a significant factor that is borne out by the evidence. At 14 years old, K.P. had spent more than seven years, over half of his life, outside of Mother’s legal custody. In addition, he was under CSB’s protective supervision for an additional year and a half during two prior cases. This Court shares the juvenile court’s concern about the child’s repeated removals and significant period of time in the agency’s custody throughout his life. {¶17} Additionally concerning are Mother’s ongoing struggles to maintain stability relating to both her mental health and housing. While the evidence clearly demonstrated that Mother maintained her sobriety throughout this case, Mother’s therapist and the guardian ad litem testified that the psychotic event that led to Mother’s hospitalization at the beginning of the case  7 was drug-induced. Mother’s prior psychiatrist, who had stopped treating her six months before the hearing due to insurance issues, testified that Mother suffered a brief and isolated psychotic episode due to external stressors. The caseworker testified, and Mother agreed, that the stress underlying Mother’s hospitalization arose when Mother saw videos of wildfires in California. The caseworker testified that Mother suffered from hallucinations, believing she was on fire and trying to extinguish herself in her bathtub. Mother clarified that the fires were taking place where her father and stepmother used to live and that was very stressful for her. {¶18} Mother has no current diagnosis for psychosis. Both her prior psychiatrist and current therapist testified that she was being treated for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), depression, and anxiety. Her substance abuse disorders were in sustained remission. Mother argues that, because she was compliant with medication management and attending therapy sessions as scheduled, she had successfully completed her mental health case plan objective. “Although case plan compliance is relevant to the best interest of the child, this Court has repeatedly recognized that it is not dispositive of that issue.” In re C.A., 2026-Ohio-2284, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), citing In re M.S., 2023-Ohio-1558, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.) Here, although Mother was participating in mental health services, she had not made sufficient progress to demonstrate that she had remedied the long-term concerns that compelled CSB to remove the child from her care for the fourth time. {¶19} Both caseworkers and the guardian ad litem testified that Mother’s participation in mental health services had not alleviated the symptoms that interfered with her ability to appropriately parent K.P. The supervising caseworker, Ms. K., was the caseworker assigned to the family during two prior cases and the supervisor on three cases, so she was familiar with the family’s history with the agency, including concerns, Mother’s progress, and the child’s repeated  8 removals. She testified that Mother’s mental health issues and unstable housing were concerns in every case, while substance abuse played a role in several cases. Ms. K. cited the concern that Mother gets “fixated” on things about which she is misinformed or issues that have already been resolved. For example, Mother disputed certain mental health diagnoses for herself and the child, she accused Foster Mother of drugging and neglecting the child, and she accused everyone involved in the case of illegal acts and perjury. In fact, Mother made reports to the Sheriff’s Office, FBI, and Ohio Supreme Court alleging misconduct by multiple persons associated with the case. In addition, Ms. K. testified that, unlike in prior cases, Mother denies that she has any current mental health issues and is unwilling to discuss how her pattern of on-again, off-again treatment has led on multiple occasions to housing instability and the inability to meet K.P.’s basic needs. {¶20} The current caseworker, Ms. O., testified that she has seen a decline in Mother’s mental health stability throughout the case and an increase in Mother’s hyper fixation on unsubstantiated concerns. Ms. O. echoed Ms. K.’s testimony that Mother believes that K.P. is not receiving proper care in the foster home, that Foster Mother is drugging the child, that all witnesses throughout the case have committed perjury, and that CSB and the juvenile court are conspiring against Mother. Regarding the child’s health, Mother consistently complains that Foster Mother is giving K.P. Trazadone to cause him to overdose and is physically abusing the child. To alleviate Mother’s concerns, Ms. O. had the child’s psychiatrist explain why she prescribed Trazadone to help K.P. sleep and that it was safe for him to take. Ms. O. also had the child’s hematologist explain to Mother that K.P. has a genetic blood disorder that causes him to bruise easily, he is being monitored, and a protocol is in placed to prevent and address any injuries. Notwithstanding these explanations, Mother continued to fixate on her beliefs of misconduct by others.  9 {¶21} The guardian ad litem also testified that Mother evidences symptoms of unresolved mental health issues that call into question her ability to parent the child. The guardian ad litem reported that Mother left a mental health provider because she did not like the diagnoses she received there. She echoed the caseworkers’ testimony that Mother reports that Foster Mother is poisoning K.P. with Trazadone and otherwise abusing him; and that Mother believes that the caseworkers, guardian ad litem, juvenile court, and all attorneys involved in the case are collaborating to prevent her reunification with the child. Moreover, the guardian ad litem testified that Mother has reported everyone involved in the case to various law enforcement offices. She added that Mother has sent numerous text messages to her raising unsubstantiated concerns. {¶22} While visits go well in many ways, the caseworkers and guardian ad litem testified that Mother engages in inappropriate conversations with the child. Specifically, she talks to K.P. about the case despite their repeated admonishments and attempts to redirect Mother. Foster Mother testified that she routinely has to tell Mother to change the subject during phone calls with the child when Mother begins talking about the case. After Mother continued to provide information and misinformation about the case to K.P., the agency and the guardian ad litem ended her phone calls with the child. {¶23} The testimony of the caseworkers and guardian ad litem that Mother dwelled on the case and her belief of ongoing misconduct by everyone involved was supported by the testimony of Mother’s therapist. The therapist estimated that Mother spends about 80 percent of each session discussing the custody case, and only 20 percent of each session focusing on developing coping skills to manage her PTSD, depression, and anxiety. In addition, the therapist testified that Mother calls her frequently, often on a daily basis, to discuss the case and the stress it is causing her.  10 {¶24} Mother had been in treatment with her current therapist for seven months by the time of the hearing. The counselor testified that she uses dialectical behavioral therapy (“DBT”) and cognitive behavioral therapy (“CBT”) techniques to help Mother work on changing her behaviors and thought patterns, but that it is typically a long process before results are evident. In fact, behavioral changes under DBT do not begin to arise until after a year in treatment. The therapist added that she has been focusing primarily on CBT with Mother. {¶25} Mother’s counselor further testified that she believes that Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (“EMDR”) therapy would be most beneficial to address Mother’s PTSD. While she would like to begin EMDR therapy with Mother, it is not feasible for a client “who is actively being traumatized.” The therapist testified that Mother’s PTSD is “recurrently activated” by the ongoing custody case and, until the case has ended and that trigger has been resolved, Mother is not a candidate for EMDR, the therapy most likely to help her address her trauma. {¶26} Although Mother’s counselor testified that she does not believe that Mother’s mental health is a barrier to reunification with the child, she admitted that Mother remains very focused on the custody case instead of developing coping skills, that Mother remains anxious and has not realized any behavioral changes, and that the therapy likely to benefit Mother the most is not yet a viable option due to ongoing triggering stressors. The counselor has had discussions with the guardian ad litem about Mother’s belief that everyone involved in the case is lying and conspiring to prevent her reunification with the child. The therapist testified, however, that she collaborated with Mother’s current psychiatrist and the two determined that Mother’s behavior could be attributed to her PTSD, rather than paranoia or any psychosis. Even so, the evidence  11 showed that Mother would not likely make any progress addressing her PTSD until she could begin EMDR therapy, which was not viable until after the custody case was over. {¶27} In addition to ongoing mental health concerns, Mother’s housing situation was precarious. She was evicted from subsidized housing for failure to pay rent. She owed approximately $6,000 for past due rent and was precluded from obtaining additional subsidized housing until that debt was paid. Mother then moved into JoAnna House, transitional recovery housing, but was kicked out in less than a month for disruptive behavior. She then lived in a shelter for six months until she was approved for housing through Hope and Healing (“HH”). {¶28} Ms. P.-M., Mother’s supportive services manager at HH, testified that the organization pays Mother’s full rent for one year based on her admission into the Steps to Independence program. Rent assistance is contingent on the terms of the program, including that Mother must regain custody of the child. Ms. P.-M. testified that Mother asserted in her application that housing was her only barrier to reunification, and the caseworker told her that custody would be determined as of the date of the hearing. Ms. P.-M. testified that if Mother did not regain custody that day, her rent assistance would end immediately. She clarified that neither a continuance nor an extension of temporary custody to allow Mother additional time to work on her case plan objectives would prolong HH’s rent assistance. She asserted that she had discussed that with Mother who indicated she understood. {¶29} The hearing could not be completed on the day Ms. P.-M. testified, and Mother would not regain custody that day. Accordingly, Mother’s rent assistance was set to end as of that date. Mother’s combined monthly Social Security benefits were equal to the rent on her home, with no funds left over for utilities, debts owed, or other living expenses, although she also received food assistance. Mother testified that she had spoken with her landlord who agreed to reduce her  12 rent, but she provided no verification of that. Under the circumstances, the evidence established that Mother stood to lose her housing at the end of the month due to the impending loss of her rent assistance. {¶30} Mother testified that she could likely return to a factory job where she used to work, but she had not applied there or anywhere else. She did not testify to how many hours she could work due to her disability or how much money she would reasonably earn. The caseworker and Mother both testified that any employment income would reduce the amount Mother received from Social Security. {¶31} After a thorough review, this Court concludes that the record demonstrates that the evidence is legally sufficient to support an award of permanent custody of K.P. to CSB. See Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 11, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386. In addition, this is not the exceptional case indicating that the juvenile court clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding that CSB met its burden of proof regarding both prongs of the permanent custody test. See Eastley at ¶ 20. The evidence established that Mother was not in a position to provide a stable home for K.P. Although she was engaged in mental health services, including counseling and medication management, those services had not resulted in alleviating the symptoms and behaviors that continued to put the child at risk for instability. Mother continued to fixate on misinformation about the child’s health and well-being, as well as her belief that everyone involved in the case was conspiring against her. Mother’s counselor testified that, until the custody case was resolved and CSB’s involvement was no longer actively triggering her trauma, Mother would not be able to begin EMDR treatment, which would give her the greatest opportunity for addressing her mental health issues. Mother has a long history of engagement in mental health services. Unfortunately, she has not been able to sustain the progress she made over  13 the years, which has resulted in repeated removals of K.P. each time Mother experienced a new mental health crisis. {¶32} Although Mother maintained her sobriety during this case, evidence showed that her psychosis immediately preceding this case was drug-induced. Notwithstanding the testimony of her current mental health provider that drug use preceded her psychosis, Mother denied using any substances and maintained that she had been sober for four years. Accordingly, in addition to failing to recognize the significance of her mental health issues, Mother continued to deny the role that her substance use has played in exacerbating her inability to maintain a stable home for the child. {¶33} Moreover, the evidence showed that Mother was again at risk for losing her housing, an issue seen in at least one prior case involving the child. The HH supportive services manager testified that Mother would immediately lose her financial assistance for her rent on the day of the hearing, should the child not be returned to her custody that day. Mother’s monthly income was inadequate to pay her rent, let alone any other expenses necessary for basic needs. She maintained a debt from a past eviction, precluding her from being able to obtain subsidized housing. She was unemployed and did not bring forth evidence of any employment prospects. Accordingly, Mother faced the likelihood of losing her housing. {¶34} Finally, K.P. has experienced instability throughout his life. Although there is a strong bond between Mother and the child, Mother’s circumstances have resulted in multiple custodial disruptions for K.P. In fact, the child has been in the agency’s custody or under the care of others for more than half his 14-year life. He deserves stability without the looming prospect of another crisis-driven removal. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not err by finding that an award of permanent custody was in the child’s best interest.  14 {¶35} This Court further rejects Mother’s argument that the juvenile court erred by denying her motion for a first six-month extension of temporary custody. Mother failed to meet her burden of proving that an extension was warranted. {¶36} The juvenile court “may” extend temporary custody for up to six months under certain circumstances. R.C. 2151.415(D). We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a request for an extension for an abuse of discretion. In re P.H., 2021-Ohio-3726, ¶ 25 (9th Dist.), citing In re A.S., 2017-Ohio-8984, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). The juvenile court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). The trial court has authority to exercise its discretion to grant a first six- month extension of temporary custody, however, only if the moving party has proved by clear and convincing evidence all of the following: “the extension is in the best interest of the child, there has been significant progress on the case plan of the child, and there is reasonable cause to believe that the child will be reunified with one of the parents or otherwise permanently placed within the period of extension.” R.C. 2151.415(D)(1); In re A.S. at ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). As the requirements are conjunctive, the failure of proof on any precludes the juvenile court from granting the extension. See In re A.G., 2024-Ohio-3091, ¶ 54 (9th Dist.). {¶37} This Court concluded above that the juvenile court did not err by finding that an award of permanent custody was in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, extending the agency’s temporary custody and maintaining the child in custodial limbo necessarily was not in the best interest of K.P. See In re P.W., 2023-Ohio-4830, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.). Moreover, the evidence established that Mother had not made significant progress on her case plan objectives. She stood to lose her housing within the month due to the inability to afford it without assistance. Despite engagement in mental health services, Mother had not demonstrated any changes in her thought  15 processes or behaviors, continuing to harbor conspiracy theories and fixating on issues that never existed or had already been resolved. Moreover, there was no reasonable cause to believe reunification could occur during the period of extension. Mother’s therapist testified there was no anticipated discharge date for her and that the therapy most likely to help Mother resolve her underlying trauma would not be feasible until after the custody case had ended. After a thorough review of the record, this Court concludes that Mother failed to meet her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a first six-month extension of temporary custody was warranted under Section 2151.415(D)(1). Accordingly, the juvenile court had no authority to exercise its discretion to grant her request. {¶38} Based on the above discussion, the juvenile court did not err by denying Mother’s motion for a six-month extension of temporary custody and instead granting CSB’s motion for permanent custody and terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to K.P. Mother’s two assignments of error are overruled. III. {¶39} Mother’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.  16 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT FLAGG LANZINGER, J. MANNING, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: RONALD T. GATTS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and ASHLEE JAMES, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee. BENJAMIN AYERS, Attorney at Law, for Minor Child. JOSEPH KERNAN, Guardian ad Litem.