Candlewood Custom Homes, Inc. v. Saunders

[Cite as Candlewood Custom Homes, Inc., v. Saunders, et al., 2026-Ohio-2038.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PICKAWAY COUNTY CANDLEWOOD CUSTOM HOMES, INC., : Plaintiff-Appellee and : CASE NO. 25CA12 Cross-Appellant, : v. : BRIAN SAUNDERS, et al., DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY : Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees. : ________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: Brian S. Stewart, Circleville, Ohio, for appellants. Joel E. Sechler, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee. ________________________________________________________________ CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:5-27-26 ABELE, J. {¶1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas Court judgment that awarded Candlewood Custom Homes, Inc., plaintiff below and appellee/cross-appellant herein, damages in the amount of $20,544. {¶2} Brian and Melissa Saunders, defendants below and appellants/cross-appellees herein, assign the following errors for review: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, FILED ON OCTOBER 23, 2024.” Pickaway 25CA12 2 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, FILED ON OCTOBER 23, 2024.” THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING PORTIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISIONS OF MARCH 6, 2024 AND JULY 30, 2024 WHICH HELD DEFENDANTS’ [SIC] LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT.” FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING PORTIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION OF MARCH 6, 2024 WHICH DENIED DEFENDANTS’ CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.” FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING PORTIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION OF MARCH 6, 2024 WHICH DENIED DEFENDANTS’ CLAIM FOR SLANDER OF TITLE.” {¶3} Candlewood assigns the following errors for review: FIRST CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE PORTION OF THE MAGISTRATE’S JULY 30, 2024 DECISION REDUCING THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT AWARD AGAINST BRIAN AND MELISSA SAUNDERS (THE ‘SAUNDERS’) AND IN FAVOR OF CANDLEWOOD CUSTOM HOMES, INC. (‘CANDLEWOOD’) BY $5,000.” SECOND CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING CANDLEWOOD’S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.” {¶4} In 2018, the parties entered into a written agreement Pickaway 25CA12 3 for the construction of appellants’ home. The agreement provided, in part, that (1) the estimated cost to build the home would be $346,500, and (2) appellee would manage the construction project in exchange for a $55,000 management fee. {¶5} In July 2020, the parties’ relationship soured, and appellee stopped work on the home. {¶6} Appellee later filed a complaint against appellants that asserted claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent inducement.1 Appellee additionally sought to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien. {¶7} Appellants answered and filed counterclaims and a third-party complaint against Mark Myers, appellee’s sole shareholder. Appellants asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of duty to perform in a workmanlike manner, and slander of title. Appellants’ third- party complaint against Myers sought to hold him jointly and severally liable with appellee. {¶8} In January 2024, the trial court’s magistrate held a bench trial. After the trial, the magistrate issued a decision and recommended that the trial court (1) deny both parties’ claims for breach of contract, (2) deny appellants’ remaining claims, (3) declare the mechanic’s lien invalid, and (4) grant 1 Appellee later abandoned its fraudulent inducement claim. Pickaway 25CA12 4 appellee damages for unjust enrichment. The magistrate recommended that the court award appellee $25,544 in damages, less the value of “punch-out” work, which the magistrate left to be determined after an additional hearing. {¶9} After the additional hearing, the magistrate reduced appellee’s damage award for unjust enrichment by $5,000, the amount that the magistrate determined to be the value of the punch-out work. The magistrate thus determined that appellee is entitled to $20,544 in damages for its unjust enrichment claim. {¶10} Both parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On October 1, 2024, the trial court overruled the parties’ objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. The court first pointed out that the parties did not support their objections with a transcript of the proceedings held before the magistrate. The court stated that without a transcript, it must presume the regularity of the proceedings. The court thus adopted the magistrate’s factual findings, except for a finding that Myers, as opposed to appellee, is entitled to damages for unjust enrichment. {¶11} The trial court additionally overruled the parties’ objections to the magistrate’s conclusions of law. The court determined that the magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts. The court thus adopted the magistrate’s decision and awarded appellee $20,544. Pickaway 25CA12 5 {¶12} Appellee subsequently filed a motion for prejudgment interest. {¶13} Shortly thereafter, appellants filed a motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A) or, alternatively, for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Appellants asserted that the court should either grant a new trial or grant relief from judgment. Appellants alleged that they were entitled to a new trial or to relief from judgment because the magistrate should have disqualified herself from presiding over the trial due to a $100 contribution that she made to the campaign of appellants’ counsel’s election opponent in the 2024 Republican primary for a seat in the Ohio House of Representatives. {¶14} On December 10, 2024, the trial court overruled appellants’ motion for a new trial or for relief from judgment. The court did not agree with appellants that the magistrate should have disqualified herself from presiding over the trial due to the $100 campaign contribution. {¶15} Later, the trial court denied appellee’s motion for prejudgment interest. The court determined that R.C. 1343.03(C)(1) applied to appellee’s request for prejudgment interest and concluded that appellee did not satisfy the statutory requirements to be entitled to prejudgment interest. The court thus denied appellee’s motion for prejudgment interest. This appeal followed. Pickaway 25CA12 6 I {¶16} We initially observe that appellants’ brief does not separately argue the first and second assignments of error. App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant’s brief to include “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” App.R. 12(A)(2) permits us to “disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it . . . fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).” {¶17} Consequently, in light of appellants’ failure to argue each assignment separately in the brief, we would be well within our discretionary authority to summarily overrule appellants’ first and second assignments of error. See Mtge. Electronic Registrations Sys. v. Mullins, 2005-Ohio-2303, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.). We generally prefer, however, to decide cases on their merits rather than procedural technicalities. See DCI Rentals, LLC v. Sammons, 2024-Ohio-1962, ¶ 7, fn. 2 (4th Dist.); see also Barksdale v. Van’s Auto Sales, Inc., 38 Ohio St.3d 127, 128 (1988) (noting that a “basic tenet of Ohio jurisprudence [is] that cases should be determined on their merits and not on mere procedural technicalities”). We will therefore address Pickaway 25CA12 7 appellants’ first and second assignments of error, but, for ease of discussion, we consider them separately. II {¶18} In their first assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a new trial. Appellants contend that they are entitled to a new trial pursuant to (1) Civ.R. 59(A)(1), which allows a court to grant a new trial based upon an “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court,” or (2) Civ.R. 59(A)’s catch-all provision, “for good cause shown.” A {¶19} When “a trial court is authorized to grant a new trial for a reason which requires the exercise of a sound discretion, the order granting a new trial may be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Rohde v. Farmer, 23 Ohio St.2d 82 (1970), paragraph one of the syllabus; accord Harris v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 2007-Ohio-5587, ¶ 35. When, however, “a new trial is granted by a trial court, for reasons which involve no exercise of discretion but only a decision on a question of law, the order granting a new trial may be reversed upon the basis of a showing that the decision was erroneous as a matter of law.” Rohde, paragraph two of the syllabus; see also Sydnor v. Qualls, 2016-Ohio-8410, ¶ 41 (4th Dist.). Pickaway 25CA12 8 {¶20} Civ.R. 59(A)(1) authorizes a trial court to grant a new trial based upon an “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, magistrate, or prevailing party, or any order of the court or magistrate, or abuse of discretion, by which an aggrieved party was prevented from having a fair trial[.]” Ohio appellate courts routinely state that “Civ.R. 59(A)(1) provides a trial court with discretion to grant a new trial when an irregularity in a court proceeding prevents a party from having a fair trial.” Wright v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 2005-Ohio-3494, ¶ 114 (4th Dist.); see Westfield Ins. v. Chapel Elec. Co. LLC, 2024-Ohio-2736, ¶ 134 (2d Dist.); Wood v. Harborside Healthcare, 2012-Ohio-156, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). Appellate courts thus review trial court decisions regarding a Civ.R. 59(A)(1) new trial motion for an abuse of discretion. See Koch v. Rist, 89 Ohio St.3d 250, 252 (2000) (reviewing a new trial motion under Civ.R. 59(A)(1) and the catch-all provision for an abuse of discretion);2 Gilbert v. Welter, 2025-Ohio-4887, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.); Gallagher v. Fast, 2024-Ohio-1003, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.); Waechter v. Laser Spine Institute, LLC, 2023-Ohio-3715, ¶ 34 2 We observe that in Jones v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2020-Ohio-3780, ¶ 28-33, the court seemingly independently reviewed whether an irregularity occurred that warranted a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(1). Yet the court’s opinion did not explicitly state whether the court applied a de novo or an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to its review of the Civ.R. 59(A)(1) new trial motion. Absent more explicit guidance, we will continue to apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review to Civ.R. 59(A)(1) new trial motions. Pickaway 25CA12 9 (8th Dist.); Cullimore v. Cullimore, 2022-Ohio-3208, ¶ 44 (4th Dist.). {¶21} Civ.R. 59(A) also contains a catch-all provision that gives a trial court discretion to grant a party a new trial “for good cause shown.” A trial court’s decision regarding a motion for a new trial based upon the catch-all provision is a discretionary decision that a reviewing court will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2020-Ohio-3780, ¶ 33. {¶22} Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision regarding appellants’ motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(1) and the catch-all provision for an abuse of discretion. A decision constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Hicks v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-4582, ¶ 23. Moreover, when applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Whitt v. Wolfinger, 2015-Ohio-2726, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), citing Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169 (1990). B {¶23} In the case at bar, appellants assert that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the magistrate’s failure to disqualify herself from hearing the matter did not constitute an irregularity in the proceeding or good cause to Pickaway 25CA12 10 warrant a new trial. {¶24} “In the context of a motion for new trial, an ‘irregularity’ is a departure from the due, orderly, and established mode of proceeding, whereby a party, through no fault of his own, is deprived of some right or benefit otherwise available to him.” Gill v. Grafton Corr. Inst., 2011-Ohio-4251, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.). “The rule preserves the integrity of the judicial system when the presence of serious irregularities in a proceeding could have a material adverse effect on the character of and public confidence in judicial proceedings.” Wright v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 2005-Ohio-3494, ¶ 114 (4th Dist.). {¶25} A magistrate’s failure to disqualify himself or herself in accordance with the mandatory disqualification provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct may constitute an irregularity that warrants a new trial. See James v. James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668 (2d Dist. 1995). As relevant here, Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(1) requires a judge or magistrate to “disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including” in circumstances when “[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer. . . .”3 3 “As judicial officers, both full- and part-time magistrates appointed by judges in municipal, common pleas, or appellate courts are subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. Jud.Cond.R., Application.” Board of Professional Conduct Opinion No. 2018-04, at 2. Pickaway 25CA12 11 1 {¶26} In the case sub judice, appellants first contend that Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(1) required the magistrate to disqualify herself because a reasonable person would have questioned the magistrate’s impartiality due to the $100 campaign contribution that she made to appellants’ counsel’s opponent in the 2024 Republican primary. Appellants assert that the magistrate’s failure to disqualify herself constituted an irregularity that warrants a new trial. Appellants thus contend that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling their motion for a new trial. {¶27} “‘The proper test for determining whether a judge’s participating in a case presents an appearance of impropriety is . . . an objective one.’” In re Disqualification of Gallagher, 2024-Ohio-6136, ¶ 45, quoting In re Disqualification of Lewis, 2004-Ohio-7359, ¶ 8. Under this test, “‘[a] judge should step aside or be removed if a reasonable and objective observer would harbor serious doubts about the judge’s impartiality.’” Id., quoting Lewis at ¶ 8. {¶28} To support their argument that the magistrate was required to disqualify herself to avoid an appearance of impropriety, appellants cite James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668, and In re Disqualification of Miller, 2022-Ohio-4674. In James, defense counsel and the magistrate who presided over the Pickaway 25CA12 12 proceedings previously practiced law together. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision that had denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial based upon an irregularity in the proceedings. {¶29} The James court noted that former Canon 3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct required a judicial officer to “‘disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” James, 101 Ohio App.3d at 676, quoting former Jud.Cond.Canon 3(C). The court noted that this provision required disqualification when a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the circumstances, would reasonably question the judicial officer’s impartiality. Id. {¶30} The James court also observed that former Canon 3(C)(1)(b) of the Code of Judicial Conduct required a judicial officer to “disqualify himself from hearing a case in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including a situation where ‘a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer on the matter.’” Id., quoting former Jud.Cond.Canon 3(C)(1)(b). The court explained that the Code of Judicial Conduct recognized that “if a judge were to hear a case that was handled by the judge’s former legal associate during the time of their association, the ability of the judge to be impartial would reasonably be questioned.” Id. The court thus indicated that Pickaway 25CA12 13 disqualification in this situation was mandatory “to avoid suspicion of the fairness and the integrity of the judicial process that might result from the judge’s involvement in such a case.” Id. {¶31} The James court additionally concluded that the “general disqualification standard” contained in former Canon 3(C) likewise required the magistrate to disqualify himself. The court clarified, however, that a judicial officer need not “disqualify himself every time a former associate appears before him.” Id. at 677. Instead, the court indicated that disqualification in this situation involves considering “the totality of the facts surrounding the association . . . including the nature and extent of the prior association, the length of time since it has been terminated, and any tangential personal association that may have sprung from the professional association.” Id. {¶32} Thus, the James court determined that the totality of the facts surrounding the association between the magistrate and the former associate indicated that the magistrate should have disqualified himself. The court found that only seven months had elapsed since the prior association ended and that this amount of time was “not a sufficient lapse in time between the time that the [magistrate] practiced law with [the attorney] and the time that he acted in a formal judicial capacity in the Pickaway 25CA12 14 case.” Id. The court further observed that “[t]he association clearly had not been severed in the eyes of the public, as evidenced by the advertisement for their law firm, which ran throughout the entire year of 1992.” Id. {¶33} The James court thus decided “that the public’s confidence in the [magistrate]’s impartiality in this case has been undermined to an extent requiring reversal of the result” and that disqualification was mandatory. Id. The court also recognized that nothing in the record “suggest[ed] that the [magistrate]’s prior association with defense counsel actually influenced his disposition of the case in any way.” Id. The court nevertheless determined that “the appearance of impartiality . . . ha[d] been compromised to an impermissible extent.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. The court therefore concluded that the magistrate’s failure to disqualify himself in accordance with the mandatory disqualification provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituted an irregularity that warranted a new trial. Consequently, the court determined that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the appellant’s motion for a new trial. {¶34} We do not, however, agree with appellants that James dictates the outcome in the case at bar. James involved a different set of facts than those present in the case sub judice. In James, the magistrate who presided over the Pickaway 25CA12 15 proceedings previously practiced law with one of the lawyers involved in the case. The case at bar involves a magistrate’s $100 campaign contribution to appellants’ counsel’s election opponent. We do not believe that James supports an argument that the magistrate in the case at bar was required to disqualify herself and that her failure to do so constituted an irregularity that warrants a new trial. {¶35} Appellants additionally contend that Miller, 2022- Ohio-4674, shows that the magistrate was required to disqualify herself. In Miller, the court recognized that it had decided disqualification requests that involve “‘political and campaign issues . . . on a case-by-case basis.’” Id. at ¶ 5, quoting In re Disqualification of Burt, 2015-Ohio-5670, ¶ 6. The court observed that “[u]nder longstanding precedent, it is unreasonable to question a judge’s impartiality merely because counsel or a litigant contributed to the judge’s election campaign or because a lawyer campaigned for the judge’s election opponent.” Id. at ¶ 5, citing In re Disqualification of Breaux, 2017-Ohio-7374, ¶ 10. {¶36} The Miller court further stated, however, that certain “political circumstances” may require disqualification “to avoid an appearance of impropriety.” Miller, 2022-Ohio-4674, at ¶ 6. For instance, “‘[w]hen a lawyer’s campaign activities evidence a substantial political relationship with a judge, Pickaway 25CA12 16 disqualification is warranted during the campaign fundraising period.’” Id., quoting Board of Professional Conduct Opinion No. 2014-1.4 {¶37} In the case at bar, appellants contend that Miller means that “a magistrate must be disqualified during a campaign cycle in which that magistrate donated money against the attorney appearing in front of her.” Appellants’ argument, however, seems to overlook the important qualifying language in Miller that the campaign activity must evidence “‘a substantial political relationship with a judge.’” Id., quoting Board of Professional Conduct Opinion No. 2014-1. Thus, even though we agree that Miller recognized that judges must disqualify themselves “‘[w]hen a lawyer’s campaign activities evidence a substantial political relationship with a judge,’” the facts in the case at bar do not reveal a substantial political 4 The Advisory Opinion lists several factors that are “relevant to determining if a lawyer’s campaign activity creates a substantial political relationship with the judge,” such as “[a]ny political ties between the lawyer and judge occurring outside the campaign relationship” and the length and level of campaign involvement, including whether the lawyer has campaign management responsibilities, the extent of the lawyer’s fundraising activities, whether the lawyer’s name appears on solicitation letters, emails, and the like, whether the election is contested, and the type of election (statewide, multi-county, or local). Opinion No. 2014-1, at 5. The Advisory Opinion further suggests that “[a] lawyer’s title in a judicial campaign may be indicative of a substantial political relationship with the judge, but is not a determining factor in a disqualification analysis.” Pickaway 25CA12 17 relationship between the magistrate and appellants’ counsel’s primary opponent. Instead, the facts indicate that the magistrate contributed $100 to appellants’ counsel’s primary opponent. Nothing about this de minimis campaign contribution suggests a substantial political relationship so as to mandate the magistrate’s disqualification. See In re Disqualification of Wallace, 2019-Ohio-5452, ¶ 7 (“the agency’s attorney’s $100 contribution to Judge Wallace’s campaign does not create any inference of an appearance of impropriety.”). 2 {¶38} Appellants also assert that Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(1) required the magistrate to disqualify herself because her $100 campaign contribution suggested that she had “a negative opinion” of their lawyer and, hence, “a personal bias or prejudice” concerning their lawyer. {¶39} We recognize that preserving “public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system is vitally important,” and that “[a]n appearance of bias can be just as damaging to public confidence as actual bias.” In re Disqualification of Murphy, 2005-Ohio-7148, ¶ 6. We further observe, however, that “‘[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.’” In re Disqualification of Saffold, 2006-Ohio-7225, ¶ 11, quoting In re Disqualification of Pickaway 25CA12 18 George, 2003-Ohio-5489, ¶ 5. The term “bias or prejudice” “implies a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.” In re Disqualification of O’Neill, 2002-Ohio-7479, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463 (1956), paragraph four of the syllabus. {¶40} “A determination of whether a judge is biased or prejudiced is based on the judge’s words and/or actions and whether those words and/or actions convey that the judge is predisposed to a particular outcome of a case.” In re Disqualification of Gallagher, 2024-Ohio-6136, ¶ 43. Thus, “‘[a]llegations that are based solely on hearsay, innuendo, and speculation . . . are insufficient to establish bias or prejudice.’” In re Disqualification of Breaux, 2017-Ohio-7374, ¶ 11, quoting In re Disqualification of Flanagan, 2009-Ohio- 7199, ¶ 4. {¶41} In the case sub judice, appellants did not present any specific evidence to suggest that the magistrate exhibited hostile feelings, a spirit of ill-will, or undue favoritism so as to require disqualification. They assert that the magistrate’s act of contributing $100 to their lawyer’s opponent’s campaign evidences the magistrate’s bias or Pickaway 25CA12 19 prejudice. Appellants do not cite any authority for this proposition, however. {¶42} Additionally, the supreme court appears to have rejected the proposition that a party may establish the level of bias or prejudice necessary for disqualification through supposition. See generally In re Disqualification of Hurley, 2014-Ohio-5874, ¶ 7 (“absent some evidence of bias, the fact that a party may have opposed a judge’s bid for elected office is insufficient to require the judge’s disqualification”); In re Disqualification of Osowik, 2006-Ohio-7224, ¶ 6 (“The fact that the defendant may have opposed the judge’s bid for elected office is insufficient to warrant disqualification, absent some evidence of actual bias.”); In re Disqualification of Cleary, 77 Ohio St.3d 1246, 1247 (1996) (“Affiant speculates that his support of Judge Cleary’s opponent was the cause of the adverse ruling on the motion for a continuance (see paragraphs 1 and 7 of the affidavit), but he fails to substantiate this assertion.”); In re Disqualification of Krueger, 74 Ohio St.3d 1267, 1268 (1995) (“Affiant has failed to demonstrate the existence of bias or prejudice based on the fact that she and Judge Krueger were opponents in the previous election”). {¶43} Consequently, we do not believe that appellants have established that the magistrate’s failure to disqualify herself constituted an irregularity or good cause so as to warrant a new Pickaway 25CA12 20 trial. We therefore disagree with appellants that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion for a new trial. C {¶44} Within their first assignment of error, appellants further argue that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by independently investigating campaign contributions made to another candidate, evidence that neither party had submitted. {¶45} Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the trial court improperly considered outside evidence, we do not believe that appellants can establish that this alleged error affected the outcome of the proceedings. See App.R. 12(B) (requiring affirmance when “the trial court committed no error prejudicial to the appellant”); Civ.R. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). {¶46} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellants’ first assignment of error. III {¶47} In their second assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief from judgment. They assert Pickaway 25CA12 21 that the magistrate’s failure to disqualify herself constitutes “any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” {¶48} A trial court has discretion to grant a party relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Thus, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s decision regarding a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment unless the court abused its discretion. See Lundeen v. Turner, 2022-Ohio-1709, ¶ 11, citing Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 21 (1988) (noting that the “court reviews a decision denying a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for an abuse of discretion”). {¶49} To prevail on a motion under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted, (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5), and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150 (1976). A court must overrule the motion if the moving party fails to establish any of these requirements. Rose Chevrolet, 36 Ohio St.3d at 20. {¶50} In the case sub judice, appellants assert that they are entitled to relief under the ground specified in Civ.R. 60(B)(5). That provision permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Pickaway 25CA12 22 {¶51} We, however, do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellants’ Civ.R. 60(B)(5) motion for relief from judgment. As we explained in our discussion of appellants’ first assignment of error, appellants did not establish that the magistrate was required to disqualify herself from hearing the matter. Thus, appellants have not demonstrated any reason that would justify relief from the judgment. {¶52} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellants’ second assignment of error. IV {¶53} In their third assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred by adopting the magistrate’s decision that found appellants liable for unjust enrichment. Appellants assert that the trial court found that a valid contract existed, and, thus, the court could not award damages for unjust enrichment. Appellants further argue that the trial court’s judgment to award appellee damages for unjust enrichment constitutes an error of law subject to de novo review. {¶54} We initially do not agree with appellants that our standard of review for this issue is de novo. The trial court’s judgment arose from its adoption of the magistrate’s decision. Appellants filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, but appellants did not support their objections with a transcript of Pickaway 25CA12 23 the proceedings. {¶55} When a matter is tried to a court magistrate, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) requires an objection to a factual finding to “be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available.” If an objecting party fails to submit a transcript or affidavit, “a trial court is required to accept the magistrate’s findings of fact and may only determine the legal conclusions drawn from those facts.” (Citations omitted.) Hopkins v. Hopkins, 2014-Ohio-5850, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.); accord M.S. v. J.S., 2020-Ohio-5550, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.), quoting In re M.W., 2012-Ohio-2959, ¶ 6 (6th Dist.) (stating that “[w]ithout a transcript, ‘the trial court is required to accept the magistrate’s findings of fact as true, and is permitted to examine only the legal conclusions based on those facts’ ”); Allread v. Allread, 2011-Ohio-1271, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), quoting Dayton Police Dept. v. Byrd, 2010-Ohio-4529, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.) (if the objecting party does not file a proper transcript of all relevant testimony or an affidavit of evidence, “‘a trial court’s review is necessarily limited to the magistrate’s conclusions of law’”). {¶56} An objecting party’s failure to object to a magistrate’s decision in accordance with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) further limits appellate review. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) states, Pickaway 25CA12 24 Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). {¶57} Consequently, if a party fails to support objections to a magistrate’s factual finding with a transcript or affidavit, “that party waives any appeal as to those findings other than claims of plain error.” State ex rel. Pallone v. Ohio Court of Claims, 2015-Ohio-2003, ¶ 11, citing Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv); compare State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees, 73 Ohio St.3d 728, 730 (1995) (when a party fails to file a transcript of evidence or a Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) affidavit, appellate review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion when applying the law to the facts). The lack of a transcript or affidavit ordinarily does not, however, “‘preclude appellate review of a legal determination, so long as the appellant complied with the objection requirements of the applicable magistrate rule.’” Redmond v. Wade, 2017-Ohio-7192, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), quoting App.R. 9 2013 Staff Notes. {¶58} We additionally observe that Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) requires objections to be “specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.” The failure to state with particularity all grounds for objection results in a “[w]aiver” Pickaway 25CA12 25 of those particular issues on appeal. See Redmond, 2017-Ohio- 2877, at ¶ 31 (4th Dist.); accord State ex rel. Muhammad v. State, 2012-Ohio-4767, ¶ 3 (a party waives an argument on appeal if the party failed to specifically raise that issue in objections to the magistrate’s decision). {¶59} In the case at bar, appellants did not object to the magistrate’s decision based upon the assertion raised in their third assignment of error, i.e., the magistrate found the existence of a valid contract, which precluded an award of damages for unjust enrichment. Instead, appellants objected to the magistrate’s unjust enrichment award based upon the argument that appellee did not complete the services required under the contract, and, thus, it would not be unjust to deny appellee damages for any benefit conferred. Consequently, because appellants did not state with particularity the ground now asserted on appeal, that issue has been waived for purposes of appeal. See Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). {¶60} We may, however, arguably consider appellants’ third assignment of error for plain error. See id. For the plain- error doctrine to apply, the party claiming error must establish (1) that “‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule’” occurred, (2) that the error was “‘an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings,’” and (3) that this obvious error affected substantial rights, i.e., the error “‘must have affected the Pickaway 25CA12 26 outcome of the trial.’” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002); Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209 (1982) (“A ‘plain error’ is obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverse [e]ffect on the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings.”). {¶61} The plain-error doctrine is not, however, readily invoked in civil cases. Instead, an appellate court “must proceed with the utmost caution” when applying the plain-error doctrine in civil cases. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). The Ohio Supreme Court has set a “very high standard” for invoking the plain-error doctrine in a civil case. Perez v. Falls Financial, Inc., 87 Ohio St.3d 371, 375 (2000). Thus, the doctrine is sharply limited to the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challen