Baker v. Reynolds

[Cite as Baker v. Reynolds, 2026-Ohio-3461.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY CHRISTINE BAKER : : C.A. No. 30808 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 05626 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas ZACHARY W. REYNOLDS : Court) : Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 4, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur.  OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30808 CHRISTINE BAKER, Appellant, Pro Se JOHN M. WILLIAMS, Attorney for Appellee LEWIS, P.J. {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Christine Baker appeals from the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee Zachary W. Reynolds on Baker’s complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 2} This appeal involves a series of unfortunate events that began on September 19 and 20, 2023, when Baker, an Ohio attorney, mistakenly sent two payments totaling $550 to Reynolds through the Zelle app. Reynolds was an Illinois resident that Baker did not know at the time she sent the two payments. The mistakes were somewhat understandable given that Baker meant to send the payments to her husband’s bank account, her husband had the same first and last name as Reynolds, and her husband’s email address was very similar to Reynolds’s email address. {¶ 3} Baker realized her mistakes the day after she sent the second payment to Reynolds. Baker then used the internet to identify Reynolds and find his contact information, as well as the contact information of his wife and his co-workers. On September 22, 2023, Baker sent multiple communications to Reynolds by email, text message, and LinkedIn, a social media platform. Notably, Baker sent an aggressive email to Reynolds that included the threat of litigation if he did not return the $550 within 24 hours. Baker sent a similar message to Reynolds via text message. Reynolds refused to 2 immediately transfer money to a stranger based on his bank’s advice and the fear that he was possibly the target of a financial scam. Instead, Reynolds suggested that Baker contact his bank, Charles Schwab, to get the matter resolved. {¶ 4} Baker escalated matters by contacting Reynolds’s wife and several of his work colleagues about Reynolds’s failure to immediately return the money. Baker also continued to send messages to Reynolds threatening to sue him and his wife if he did not return the $550. Baker then emailed the Kettering Police Department about Reynolds’s failure to immediately return the $550 and copied Reynolds on the email. Apparently, Reynolds responded to the email and made statements about Baker’s allegations against him. Reynolds also hired an attorney in Illinois to communicate with Baker about her threats of litigation. Ultimately, the $550 was transferred back to Baker on October 3, 2023, a mere two weeks after Baker mistakenly deposited the money into Reynolds’s bank account. {¶ 5} Reynolds filed a grievance against Baker with the Dayton Bar Association due to the aggressive tactics she had employed after mistakenly depositing money into his bank account. Once Baker learned of the grievance, she filed a lawsuit against Reynolds in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court alleging claims of conversion, defamation per se, and defamation per quod. Reynolds hired Ohio counsel to represent him, and the action was removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. In January 2024, Baker voluntarily dismissed the federal action without prejudice. {¶ 6} In September 2024, the Dayton Bar Association sent Baker notice of its intent to file a formal disciplinary complaint against her based on the tactics she employed after she mistakenly sent money to Reynolds. On October 30, 2024, Baker refiled her civil complaint against Reynolds in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. In her complaint, Baker raised the following causes of action: defamation per se, defamation per 3 quod, conversion, abuse of process, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. She sought compensatory and exemplary damages, attorney fees, and costs. The refiled complaint is the one at issue in this appeal. {¶ 7} Baker alleged that her defamation per se claim was based on false statements Reynolds made to the Dayton Bar Association and his attorney. But the only statement Baker identified that Reynolds made to his attorney was that “before [Baker] could be reimbursed, [Baker] was required to prove the rightness of [her] cause to Charles Schwab.” Complaint, ¶ X. Baker did not identify in her complaint any statements that Reynolds made to the Dayton Bar Association that she believed constituted defamation per se. In her claim for defamation per quod, Baker alleged that Reynolds made false statements during the grievance process, to the Kettering Police Department, and to his attorney. But Baker did not identify the content of any of these statements. {¶ 8} Baker based her claim of conversion on Reynolds’s alleged wrongful acceptance of two separate payments and failure to take any steps to return the $550 to Baker. Regarding her claim of abuse of process, Baker alleged that Reynolds perverted the grievance proceeding and Baker’s original lawsuit by: (1) providing an incomplete record of text messages; (2) failing to correct his grievance with the Dayton Bar Association after learning that Baker’s husband was not her client; (3) misstating to the Dayton Bar Association circumstances surrounding Baker’s reimbursement; and (4) employing a non- Ohio attorney to represent him and threaten Baker. In her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, Baker alleged that Reynolds “had a duty to refrain from negligently inflicting emotional harm in his participation in the grievance process, his statements to the Kettering Police Department, and his statements and direction to Illinois attorney Eric P. Sparks.” Complaint, ¶ YY. 4  {¶ 9} Reynolds filed an answer to the complaint and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. Baker filed a memorandum in opposition to Reynolds’s motion to dismiss. She attached to her memorandum a copy of the Dayton Bar Association’s first amended complaint against her and a copy of her response to the misconduct allegations made by the Dayton Bar Association. It does not appear the trial court ruled on Reynolds’s motion to dismiss. {¶ 10} On July 14, 2025, Reynolds moved for summary judgment on Baker’s complaint, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Baker’s five claims for relief. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Reynolds submitted (1) the transcript of the evidence from the hearing and proceedings before the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme Court of Ohio and (2) the exhibits and facts stipulated by Baker or otherwise admitted by the professional conduct panel at the hearing and proceedings. In his motion, Reynolds cited relevant case law and record evidence in support of his argument that all of Baker’s claims failed as a matter of law. {¶ 11} Baker filed a memorandum in opposition to Reynolds’s motion for summary judgment. Baker argued that discovery was incomplete, genuine issues of material fact and law remained, the disciplinary decision cited by Reynolds was not final, and summary judgment violated her right to a jury trial. Baker did not submit any evidence in support of her memorandum and did not cite any record evidence to identify a genuine issue of material fact on any of her claims for relief. {¶ 12} On February 27, 2026, the trial court granted Reynolds’s motion for summary judgment on Baker’s complaint. Baker filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment. 5  II. Our Standard of Review and The Requirements of App.R. 16 {¶ 13} Before resolving Baker’s four assignments of error, it is important to consider the standard of review we must apply in this appeal and App.R. 16’s requirements for an appellant’s brief. a. Standard of Review {¶ 14} “When reviewing a decision granting summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of review.” State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2020-Ohio 2973, ¶ 8, citing Esber Beverage Co. v. Labatt USA Operating Co., L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9. Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) “‘it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.’” Id., quoting Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). {¶ 15} The moving party carries the initial burden of affirmatively demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115 (1988). To this end, the movant must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to consider in rendering summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107, ¶ 17-18. {¶ 16} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings. Id. at ¶ 17. Rather, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to respond, with affidavits or as otherwise permitted by Civ.R. 56, setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id., citing Civ.R. 56(E). “[I]f the nonmovant does not so respond, 6 summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party.” Id. at ¶ 18. b. App.R. 16 {¶ 17} App.R. 16(A) requires an appellant to file a brief that includes, among other things: (1) a statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected; (2) a statement of the issues presented for review, with references to the assignments of error to which each issue relates; (3) a statement of facts relevant to the assignments of error presented for review, with appropriate references to the record; and (4) an argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. App.R. 16(A)(3), (4), (6), and (7). {¶ 18} “The court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based . . . .” App.R. 12(A)(2). “An appellate court is not required to comb through the record on appeal to search for error when an appellant fails to specify precisely where error occurred.” State v. Cassell, 2010-Ohio-1881, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing App.R. 12(A)(2). Moreover, “[i]t is well-settled that it is not the duty of an appellate court to comb the record in search of the evidence necessary to sustain an appellant’s claimed error.” Grein v. Grein, 2010-Ohio-2681, ¶ 50 (11th Dist.), citing Kitchen v. Welsh Ohio, LLC, 2002-Ohio-4012, ¶ 49 (10th Dist.). 7  III. Baker Failed to Meet Her Reciprocal Burden Under Civ.R. 56 and Failed to Comply with App.R. 16 {¶ 19} Baker’s four assignments of error are interrelated and state: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact existed. The trial court improperly weighed evidence and resolved credibility in favor of the moving party. The trial court misapplied absolute privilege beyond its lawful scope. The trial court violated my constitutional rights to due process and free speech. {¶ 20} In its decision granting summary judgment to Reynolds, the trial court explained that Baker’s defamation claims failed as a matter of law because the statements Reynolds made to the Dayton Bar Association, Kettering Police Department, and his attorney were protected by privilege, were truthful, or were opinions. Regarding Baker’s conversion claim, the trial court found the evidence established that Reynolds did not wrongfully obtain or retain control over Baker’s $550 and that Baker did not suffer any damage because of the claimed conversion. The trial court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact remaining on Baker’s abuse of process claim because Baker neither alleged nor provided any evidence to demonstrate that Reynolds abused the grievance process to accomplish an ulterior motive. Finally, the trial court concluded that an absolute privilege applied to Reynolds’s statements made during the grievance process, which precluded Baker’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court also found that the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim must fail because the record was “completely devoid of even an allegation from [Baker], let alone any evidence to 8 demonstrate, that she either witnessed or experienced a dangerous accident such that she was subjected to actual physical peril.” Decision, p. 17. {¶ 21} Reynolds met his initial burden under Civ.R. 56 by submitting evidence that established the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on Baker’s claims for relief. Baker failed to submit any evidence in opposition to Reynolds’s motion for summary judgment. Civ.R. 56(E). Further, on appeal, Baker fails to point to evidence in the record that supports her position that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of Reynolds. Instead, Baker states in conclusory fashion that the trial court ignored evidence, made improper credibility determinations, and erroneously concluded that there remained no genuine issues of material fact. For example, Baker’s entire argument in support of her first assignment of error is as follows: Summary judgment is a gatekeeping rule meant to prevent courts from doing exactly what happened here. The record in this case is not one of undisputed facts; it is a record of competing accounts, disputed motives, and sharply contested facts that should be resolved by a factfinder, not waved off by judicial fiat. Yet the trial court treated the contested assertions as settled truth, adopted Defendant’s version, and ignored evidence undermining the court’s preferred account. These are not peripheral details. They go directly to credibility, intent, and abuse of process. These are precisely the kind of disputes that preclude summary judgment. Appellant’s Brief, p. 6-7. {¶ 22} In her first assignment of error, Baker does not include any citations to legal authorities or parts of the record on which she relies. Baker also fails to identify in the 9 record where the trial court committed an error and what record evidence supports her position that the trial court committed an error. Although we conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s summary judgment decision, it is not our duty to craft arguments for the parties on appeal. “‘[O]ur judicial system relies on the principle of party presentation, and courts should ordinarily decide cases based on issues raised by the parties.’” Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4, quoting Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-4989, ¶ 15. “Under the principle of party presentation, ‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’” Id., quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008). Similarly, it is not our duty to comb through the record to search for error or the evidence necessary to sustain an appellant’s claimed error. {¶ 23} In her second assignment of error, Baker argues in conclusory fashion that the trial court made credibility determinations when it “accepted Defendant’s explanations as ‘proper’, adopted his timelines as fact, and discounted contrary evidence without analysis.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 7, citing Decision, p. 11, 14. Baker does not cite any evidence in the record in support of her position and does not identify what contrary evidence the trial court “discounted” without analysis. Baker raised five claims for relief in her complaint. The trial court identified the facts and reasons why each of her claims failed as a matter of law. Nowhere in her second assignment of error does Baker identify record evidence that establishes any genuine issues of material fact relating to her five claims for relief. {¶ 24} Notably, in the statement of facts section of her appellate brief, Baker does not present any facts that support her complaint’s claims for relief. Instead of setting forth record facts relevant to this appeal, Baker devotes the entire statement of facts section of her appellate brief to complaining about other grievances allegedly filed against her. It is 10 unclear why Baker decided to address these other alleged grievances in this appeal rather than the facts of the case before us. Her decision is fatal to her assignments of error. {¶ 25} In her third assignment of error, Baker argues that “[t]he record supports a reasonable inference that [Reynolds] did not simply participate in a grievance process, but used it as a tool—mischaracterizing my private speech as professional misconduct and enlisting an out-of-state attorney to amplify that pressure.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 8. According to Baker, the trial court’s application of absolute privilege to Reynolds’s statements based on Hecht v. Levin, 1993-Ohio-110, was too broad and “legally unsustainable.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. {¶ 26} Once again, Baker fails to identify any evidence in the record that supports her position. Rather, Baker complains broadly about the trial court’s application of a privilege to Reynolds’s unidentified statements. As the appellant, Baker was required to frame the issues on appeal and provide citations to the record identifying the trial court’s error and how she was prejudiced by such error. Baker did not identify the specific statements made by Reynolds that should not have been protected by an “absolute privilege.” She also did not identify which statements by Reynolds supported her claims for relief. Further, Baker did not address whether any genuine issues of material facts existed in the event we agreed with her general statement that the trial court incorrectly applied a privilege. In short, Baker did not explain how she was prejudiced by the trial court’s application of any privilege in this case. For example, the trial court found that Baker’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress must fail because Reynolds’s statements to the Dayton Bar Association were privileged and because the record was “completely devoid of even an allegation from Plaintiff, let alone any evidence to demonstrate, that she either witnessed or experienced a dangerous accident such that she was subjected to actual physical peril.” Decision, p. 17. 11 Moreover, the trial court found that Reynolds’s statements made in the grievance proceedings, to the police, and to his attorney were either true or opinions, which precluded Baker’s defamation claims. Therefore, even if we decided to comb through the record and piece together an argument for Baker that the trial court incorrectly applied a privilege to some of Reynolds’s statements, Baker’s negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims would still fail for the independent reasons provided by the trial court, which Baker does not challenge on appeal. {¶ 27} Finally, in her fourth assignment of error, Baker contends that the trial court relied on “contested, extra-record determinations that have not been subjected to final review” when it referenced disciplinary findings on pages 2 and 3 of its decision. Appellant’s Brief, p. 9. Baker is correct that the trial court referenced disciplinary proceedings on pages 2 and 3 of its decision. This is not surprising given that both parties had submitted information related to the disciplinary proceedings to the trial court for its consideration. In its decision, the trial court identified facts that it believed were undisputed based on the testimony and evidence submitted at the disciplinary proceedings, during which Baker and Reynolds testified under oath. The fact that the disciplinary proceedings had not been completely resolved at the time the trial court decided the motion for summary judgment does not mean the testimony provided by Baker and Reynolds at the proceedings was not appropriate Civ.R. 56 evidence that could be considered by the trial court. Further, Baker fails to identify any facts that the trial court identified as undisputed that Baker believes were in dispute. Rather, Baker once again complains in generalities about being wronged rather than identifying specific errors made by the trial court or specific genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. 12  {¶ 28} Baker also argues in her last assignment of error that the court violated due process principles when it “declared ‘no evidence whatsoever’” on page 14 of its decision. Appellant’s Brief, p. 9. On page 14 of its decision granting summary judgment to Reynolds, the trial court stated that Baker “has failed to provide any evidence whatsoever to raise a question of fact” as to whether Reynolds wrongfully obtained or retained control over Baker’s $550. Baker presented no evidence in opposition to Reynolds’s motion for summary judgment. She cited no evidence in the record that established a genuine issue of material fact of whether Reynolds wrongfully obtained or retained control over Baker’s $550. Rather, she simply stated in her memorandum opposing summary judgment that the following contested issues remained: liability, damages, causation, and privilege. The uncontroverted evidence established that Baker was reimbursed the $550 within two weeks of when Baker deposited the money into his account. The trial court explained why the evidence before it established that Baker’s conversion claim must fail. Baker fails to identify any evidence in the record that establishes a genuine issue of material fact on her conversion claim. {¶ 29} Baker failed to satisfy her reciprocal Civ.R. 56 summary judgment burden at the trial court level and failed to comply with App.R. 16 on appeal. Consequently, her four assignments of error are overruled. IV. Conclusion {¶ 30} Having overruled the assignments of error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ............. TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur. 13