In re V.W.

[Cite as In re V.W., 2026-Ohio-4494.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA IN RE V.W. : : No. 116632 [Appeal by V.R., Father] : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2026 Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD24912693 Appearances: Dawn Snyder Law LLC and Dawn Snyder, for appellant. Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS. MARY J. BOYLE, J.: Appellant V.R. (“Father”) appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court awarding permanent custody of his son, V.W., to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “agency”). Father raises the following three assignments of error for our review: Assignment of Error I: The trial court erred when it denied Father’s request for a continuance of permanent custody trial.  Assignment of Error II: The trial court erred when it entered a disposition based on withdrawn allegations from the complaint. Assignment of Error III: The trial court erred when it awarded permanent custody to [CCDCFS]. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History In December 2024, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that V.W., born in December 2018, was neglected and dependent and requesting a dispositional order of temporary custody to CCDCFS. The complaint alleged V.W.’s mother (“Mother”) had substance-abuse issues that prevented her from providing appropriate care for V.W. and his younger sibling.1 With regard to Father, the complaint claimed that “[a]lleged father of V.W., [Father], has failed to establish paternity and has failed to support, visit, or communicate with V.W. on a consistent basis.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) The same day, an emergency custody hearing was held and V.W. was committed to the emergency temporary custody of CCDCFS. In February 2025, CCDCFS amended the complaint to remove allegations that Father “had failed to support, visit, or communicate with V.W. on a consistent basis.” The only remaining allegation specifically against Father was that he had not established paternity of V.W. In March 2025, the juvenile court adjudicated V.W. dependent and ordered him committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS. 1 Mother has not appealed the juvenile court’s judgment. Therefore, the facts and findings related to Mother will be discussed only where relevant. V.W.’s younger sibling was also involved in the juvenile court proceedings, but that child is not the child of Father and is not involved in this appeal.  In September 2025, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody because of both Mother’s and Father’s lack of commitment, support, consistent communication, and provision of adequate housing and basic needs for V.W. In April 2026, a permanent custody hearing was held before a juvenile court judge. Neither Mother nor Father were present and both of them failed to provide prior notice of their absence. Counsel for both Mother and Father moved for a continuance. The juvenile court overruled the requests and the trial proceeded. The following is a summary of the relevant testimony adduced at trial. Following V.W.’s removal, CCDCFS implemented a case plan to promote the permanency plan of reunification. Father’s only case-plan objective was to establish paternity of V.W., which Father did in April 2025. CCDCFS case worker Kayla Schoonover (“Schoonover”) testified that, following his removal, V.W. was placed with his maternal step-grandmother (“Step-grandmother”). Schoonover explained that, at the time of V.W.’s removal, Father indicated that V.W. “would be better off with grandma. And if later down the road he was needed, then he would step in.” (Tr. 19.) Schoonover testified that during summer 2025, the agency “needed him to step in” and contacted Father “to see if he would be willing to take legal custody of [V.W.] That way we could get visits established, and he could create a relationship with [V.W.].” (Tr. 20.) At that time, CCDCFS “had started talking about filing a motion for permanent custody of [V.W.] and wanted to give him the opportunity to be able to get legal custody of [V.W.] if that’s what he wanted.” (Tr. 23.) Even then, Schoonover described her contact with Father as “[v]ery minimal. He doesn’t always respond. Or if I do get a response, it would be days later.” (Tr. 21.) Schoonover testified she was able to visit Father’s home in August 2025, at which time she learned that Father had eight other children living with him. Since that home visit, her subsequent efforts to see Father in his home were unsuccessful. Schoonover testified she could no longer confirm Father could provide appropriate housing for V.W. Schoonover further testified that despite CCDCFS’s offers to facilitate visitation, Father failed to visit V.W. at all and failed to consistently communicate with V.W. According to Schoonover, Father had only “one or two phone calls” with V.W. in 2025, and he never established a relationship with V.W. (Tr. 24.) Schoonover testified that Father had not provided any support for V.W. since the child’s removal in December 2024. Schoonover testified that despite V.W.’s recent autism diagnosis, Father had never inquired about V.W.’s needs or participated in any of V.W.’s medical appointments, nor had he been involved at all in V.W.’s educational experience. Schoonover testified that she had not had any contact with Father since his last appearance at court in January 2026, nearly four months prior, despite her efforts to contact him. Schoonover testified, for these reasons, she would not “feel comfortable with [Father] assuming legal custody of [V.W.]” (Tr. 24.) V.W. had remained in placement with his Step-grandmother since his removal. Schoonover confirmed V.W. is “very connected” with his Step- grandmother, they “like to do everything together,” and V.W. “states that he wants to be with his [Step-]grandma.” (Tr. 43.) V.W. “is aware of [Father]. But as far as both [Mother] and [Father], he’d prefer to be with grandma.” (Tr. 66.) Schoonover testified that discussions were had with V.W.’s Step-grandmother about her interest in legal custody or adoption of V.W. At the conclusion of trial, V.W.’s guardian ad litem (the “GAL”) confirmed the recommendation in her report in favor of CCDCFS’s permanent custody of V.W. The GAL’s report explained that neither Father nor Mother had “shown commitment in wanting and/or being able to parent [V.W.] The parents have not remedied the conditions leading to the removal of [V.W.] from their care and/or custody.” (GAL Report, Apr. 16, 2026.) The GAL further noted in her written report that “[Father] has visited [V.W.] twice since his removal from [Mother]. His last visit occurred in December 2024. [Father] is not in communication with his child. [He] does not contact the caregiver to inquire as to the wellbeing of his child and does not provide any support. [Father] is evasive with CCDCFS and this GAL.” (GAL Report, Apr. 16, 2026.) The GAL also wrote that “V.W. is very bonded to his [Step-]grandmother and has expressed that he wants to stay with her. His [Step-]grandmother is interested in permanency of the child.” (GAL Report, Apr. 16, 2026.) In May 2026, the juvenile court granted the motion for permanent custody to CCDCFS pursuant to R.C. 2151.414, finding that the allegations made in the motion were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that permanent custody was in V.W.’s best interests. It is from this judgment that Father now appeals. II. Law and Analysis A. Motion to Continue In his first assignment of error, Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied the joint motion for continuance of the April 2026 hearing and proceeded with the trial, granting permanent custody to CCDCFS in his absence. The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance lies within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the decision on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981), citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964); State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73 (1976). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. Additionally, “‘[t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’” Unger at 67, quoting Ungar at 589. When a nonincarcerated parent fails to appear at a hearing and challenges the trial court’s refusal to continue a permanent custody hearing to accommodate the parent’s circumstances, appellate courts have applied the factors set forth in Unger to determine whether the court abused its discretion. In re A.H., 2026-Ohio-467, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing In re D.K., 2015-Ohio-546, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). The Unger factors include: [T]he length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case. Id. at 67-68. Loc.R. 35(C) of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, also provides: No case will be continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good cause shown, which cause was not known to the party or counsel prior to the date of trial or hearing, and provided that the party and/or counsel have used diligence to be ready for trial and have notified or made diligent efforts to notify the opposing party or counsel as soon as he/she became aware of the necessity to request a postponement. This rule may not be waived by consent of counsel. With the foregoing in mind, we review the denial of Father’s counsel’s oral motion to continue. When trial began as scheduled, Father was not present, and his counsel joined Mother’s counsel in requesting a continuance of trial. No reason was given for Father’s absence at trial, and there was no indication that Father had contacted either his trial attorney or the court in relation to his absence. CCDCFS objected to the motion for continuance based on the Unger factors and Loc.R. 35(C), noting that Father had missed multiple hearings before. The GAL also recommended that trial proceed as scheduled. In consideration of the Unger factors, our review of the record reflects that the length of delay needed to secure Father’s appearance was not specified; the juvenile court granted no other continuances; there were several attorneys and staff in attendance that would have been inconvenienced if the trial were rescheduled; no legitimate reasons were provided for Father’s failure to appear; and Father provided no justification as to why the circumstances of his absence were beyond his control. Additionally, the juvenile court issued a prior notice of the importance of Father’s attendance and continued communication and that trial would proceed without him if he failed to appear. Nonetheless, Father contends that the juvenile court’s denial of his motion for continuance was arbitrary because he had attended some hearings before, he had accomplished his case plan objective of establishing paternity of V.W., CCDCFS was aware that Father had transportation difficulties in the past, and CCDCFS’s characterization of Father as “uncommunicative” was unfair because it did not monitor all potential communication Father had with V.W. and his caregiver. But none of the proffered reasons excuse his unexplained absence on the day of trial or relieve the difficulties that would be caused if the court rescheduled the trial. Thus, we cannot find that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his day-of-trial continuance request. Father’s first assignment of error is overruled.  B. Permanent-Custody Determination Based on Allegations in Complaint In his second assignment of error, Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding Father failed to support, visit, or communicate with V.W. as the basis for granting permanent custody because CCDCFS’s original allegations that Father failed to support, visit, or communicate with V.W. were later removed in its amended complaint. Father’s argument is unpersuasive. First, Father relies on In re A.P., 2024-Ohio-5985 (3d Dist.), to support his contention that the juvenile court cannot rely on allegations not made in the complaint when granting modifying temporary custody to permanent custody. A.P., however, reversed an adjudication of abuse because it was based on allegations that were not made in the complaint for abuse and temporary custody. Id. A.P. did not involve a subsequent modification of temporary custody to permanent custody and thus is not dispositive of the issue here. Next, there are several provisions of R.C. 2151.414(E) that require the juvenile court to consider how circumstances have changed between the time of the complaint and the resolution of a motion for permanent custody when determining whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) (consideration of whether parent “has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home”); R.C. 2151.414(E)(3) (consideration of whether parent committed abuse or neglect of child “between the date that the original complaint alleging abuse or neglect was filed and the date of the filing of the motion for permanent custody”); R.C. 2151.414(E)(12) (consideration of whether parent “is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing”). Each illustrates that a parent that may not have abandoned their child prior to the complaint for temporary custody may nevertheless be deemed to have abandoned the child in the time between the disposition of temporary custody and grant of permanent custody. Thus, the fact that CCDCFS removed the allegations of Father’s failure to support, visit, and communication with V.W. from the complaint does not preclude the juvenile court from later finding the same occurred in the more than year that passed between the time CCDCFS amended the complaint and the disposition of permanent custody. Father’s second assignment of error is overruled. C. Award of Permanent Custody In his third assignment of error, Father argues the juvenile court’s disposition of permanent custody was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Initially, we recognize that the right to raise one’s own child is “an ‘essential’ and ‘basic civil right.’” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); In re B.B.C., 2024-Ohio-588, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). This right, however, is not absolute. “‘The natural rights of a parent are not absolute, but are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.App. 1974). In the case of In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, the Supreme Court of Ohio reexplained the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, stating that [w]hen reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. [Eastley v. Volkman, 2012- Ohio-2179, ¶ 20]. “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 Ohio B. 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “‘If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978). Id. at ¶ 14. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) sets forth a two-pronged analysis for juvenile courts to apply when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody. Permanent custody may be granted to the agency if the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) any one of the five factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) exists, and (2) permanent custody is in the best interest of the child after considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). “‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re Z.C. at ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. i. Permanent Custody — R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) In this case, the juvenile court found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (b) that V.W. “cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent” and “[t]he child is abandoned.” (Journal Entry, May 15, 2026.) “When assessing whether a child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), a juvenile court must consider the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E).” In re L.H., 2024-Ohio-2271, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing In re A.V., 2014-Ohio-5348, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.). R.C. 2151.414(E) provides that if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one of the enumerated factors set forth in (E)(1)-(E)(16) exists as to each of the child’s parents, then the court must find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents. Here, the juvenile court determined that at least three of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E) applied,2 specifically: 2 The juvenile court cited (E)(1), (4), (10), and (14) as the bases for its permanent- custody determination without identifying which parent they applied to. Father contends that only (E)(4) and (10) apply to him, while (E)(1) and (14) apply only to Mother. Because  (4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child[.] (10) The parent has abandoned the child. (14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect. In support of its determination, the juvenile court found that: [Father] was not willing to provide care for the child. [Father] did not make contact with the social worker until the summer of 2025. The Agency asked [Father] if he wanted to establish a relation with his son and later to take legal custody of the child. However, [Father] made minimum effort to contact the social worker. The social worker last visited his home in August of 2025. [Father] has eight other children living in his home. The social worker has unsuccessfully attempted to visit his home again and could not say that the home was appropriate for the child. The social worker testified that [Father] has not visited with the child throughout the life of this case despite the social worker’s effort to facilitate visits. [Father] has only had two phone calls with the child in 2025. He has not provided any type of support, has not participated in the child’s medical needs, school or financial support for the child since his removal. The social worker[’s] las[t] contact with [Father] was in January of 2026, after a court hearing. (Journal Entry, May 15, 2026.) Father disagrees with these findings and contends that the court’s findings under those clauses were supported by conflicting evidence. As to the lack of commitment and support findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), Father argues the juvenile court erred in relying on the the juvenile court contemplated Father’s inability to provide appropriate housing for V.W., and Father attempts to rebut those findings in his argument, we find that the juvenile court’s findings of (E)(4), (10), and (14) apply to Father and analyze the propriety of each. withdrawn allegations from the complaint that Father had failed to support, visit, or communicate with V.W. As explained above, the court’s findings for purposes of the permanent-custody disposition are not improper merely because they were struck from the complaint. Further, the record reflects that Father had not provided any support for V.W. since the child’s removal, never inquired about V.W.’s needs, and failed to visit or stay in communication since V.W. entered agency custody beyond one or two phone calls. Thus, the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) is supported by clear and convincing evidence. As to the abandonment findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10), Father contends the juvenile court did not explicitly find that he failed to visit or contact V.W. for more than 90 consecutive days, which was required to establish abandonment under R.C. 2151.011(C). R.C. 2151.011(C) provides: “a child shall be presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days.” Father further argues that Schoonover’s testimony that she had not been in contact with Father until summer 2025 is contradicted by Father’s appearance at hearings in December 2024, January and February 2025, and January 2026. Finally, Father argues that Schoonover’s testimony was inconclusive because she did not have contact with Father since January 2026 so she could not have knowledge of the full extent of Father’s effort to contact V.W. and Schoonover did not testify to monitoring all possible communication between Father and V.W.  None of Father’s arguments, however, disprove the juvenile court’s findings of Father’s abandonment of V.W. Here, the record reflects Father had not visited V.W. since at least December 2024 and had only one or two phone calls with V.W. between V.W.’s removal from Mother and trial. Father presented no contrary evidence for the juvenile court to consider. Father’s appearance at hearings in early 2025 and 2026 does not support that he had contact with V.W. in the year between those dates. Contrary to Father’s argument, the absence of the juvenile court’s explicit finding that Father had not been in contact with V.W. for at least 90 consecutive days does not preclude finding that Father abandoned V.W. Father only contacted V.W. twice in nearly a year and a half. Therefore, he went at least 90 days without contacting V.W. even if the juvenile court did not explicitly indicate it. The juvenile court need not make express findings that a parent went longer than 90 days without contacting the child where the record supports such conclusion when presuming a child is abandoned within the meaning set forth in R.C. 2151.011(C). See In re L.T., 2023-Ohio-4329, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). Based on the foregoing, clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s determination that Father had abandoned V.W. under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10). Finally, as to the provision of V.W.’s basic needs under R.C. 2151.414(E)(14), Father argues Schoonover testified that she found no safety concerns during her visit to his home in summer 2025. Father also contends that the fact that he was living there with eight other children leads to an inference that he cannot be deemed unwilling or unable to provide for V.W. Again, Father’s arguments do not refute the fact that he failed to permit CCDCFS to reassess his home in 2026, which precluded CCDCFS from finding his home was appropriate and safe for V.W. The record further reflects that, regardless of if he had provided for his other eight children, Father did not provide for V.W.’s medical care, educational and financial support, or other basic needs. Thus, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(14) by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court was only required to find one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors present in order to enter a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent. In re D.H., 2022-Ohio-2780, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing In re L.W., 2019-Ohio-1343 (8th Dist.). In this case, the juvenile court found three factors were present as to Father. Consequently, the trial court properly determined the first prong of the permanent custody analysis under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) was satisfied and we turn to Father’s arguments that it was not in the best interest of V.W. to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). ii. Best-Interest Determination — R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires that the juvenile court consider all relevant factors in determining whether the child’s best interests would be served by granting the permanent-custody motion. These factors include (a) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, and out-of-home providers; (b) the child’s wishes, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s GAL; (c) the child’s custodial history; (d) the child’s need for a legally secured permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (e) whether any of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). When making that determination, a juvenile court must consider each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors, but no one factor is given greater weight than the others. In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. Furthermore, only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody. In re D.H., 2022-Ohio-2780, at ¶ 46 (8th Dist.), citing In re G.W., 2019-Ohio-1533, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.). The juvenile court explained that it had considered all R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors and summarized its findings as follows: The Guardian ad Litem for the child recommends permanent custody to the Agency as being in the best interest of the child. The child has been with the [Step-]grandmother since removal. The child is very bonded to the [Step-]grandmother. All of the child’s basic needs, medical needs and educational needs are being met. The [Step-]grandmother wishes to adopt the child. (Journal Entry, May 15, 2026.) Thus, the court granted the modification of temporary custody to permanent custody as being in the best interest of the child. The record reflects V.W. had no contact or substantive relationship with Father or Mother. Father had only had one or two phone calls with V.W. since the beginning of these proceedings and did not visit V.W. after December 2024. V.W. has remained with his Step-grandmother since his removal and has a strong relationship with her. V.W. has also expressed his preference to remain with his Step-grandmother rather than with Mother or Father. The GAL also expressed that permanent custody to the agency would be in V.W.’s best interests. Finally, as previously discussed, the juvenile court determined Mother and Father abandoned V.W., and the record supports that finding by clear and convincing evidence. In light of the foregoing, we find that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the court’s determination that permanent custody to CCDCFS is in V.W.’s best interest. Accordingly, we find that the court’s decision to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS is not against the weight of the evidence as Father contends. Therefore, Father’s third assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR