In re R.K.

[Cite as In re R.K., 2026-Ohio-4353.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In the matter of R.K., : No. 25AP-913 (C.S., : (C.P.C. No. 23JU-1990) Appellant). : (REGULAR CALENDAR) : ______________________________________ D E C I S I O N Rendered on November 3, 2026 On brief: John T. Ryerson, for appellant. On brief: Hanna Mitchell, for appellee Franklin County Children Services. APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch BOGGS, P.J. {¶ 1} Appellant, C.S., appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, which granted appellee, Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”), permanent custody of C.S.’s minor child, R.K. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 2} C.S. gave birth to R.K., a baby girl, on August 18, 2021. On February 22, 2023, FCCS filed a complaint alleging R.K. to be an abused, neglected, dependent child. The complaint stated that, on June 8, 2022, FCCS received a referral that officers had been dispatched “on a call of a baby crying all day and the family living in a vacant garage. The garage contained a mattress, couch, clothing, and drug paraphernalia including little baggies and cut straws. Ten swords were found in a barrel.” (Feb. 22, 2023 Compl. at 1.) The complaint further alleged that the garage lacked some basic utilities, such as water. R.K. had a cigarette burn on her chest and various scratches. The complaint stated that No. 25AP-913 2 C.S. admitted to inflicting the cigarette burn: “she had done it when she was holding [R.K.] and then put her down. She stated somehow [R.K.] got burned but [C.S.] didn’t even realize it until the next day.” Id. at 2. {¶ 3} On December 7, 2022, the trial court granted a temporary order of custody to FCCS. On May 1, 2023, the trial court magistrate found R.K. to be an abused minor as defined in R.C. 2151.031(C) and adopted case plans for C.S. and Z.K., the alleged father of R.K. The case plan required C.S. and Z.K. to complete alcohol and drug assessment and follow all recommendations of all service providers, complete a mental health assessment, complete an agency approved parenting program and provide proof of completion, submit to random drug/alcohol screens, and obtain safe and permanent housing. {¶ 4} On June 5, 2024, FCCS filed a motion for permanent court commitment of R.K. The motion stated that R.K. had been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and argued that permanent commitment is in the best interests of R.K. {¶ 5} Over the course of five days in March and April 2025, the trial court held a hearing over FCCS’s motion. The trial court heard testimony from C.S., Z.K., Juanita Ramsey, a supervisor for Permanent Family Solutions Network, Kevin Everhart, an area manager at Averhealth, R.K.’s foster mother, and Victoria Booth, the guardian ad litem for R.K. {¶ 6} On October 22, 2025, the trial court issued a decision granting FCCS’s motion for permanent custody. The trial court found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the removal of R.K. from her home and that R.K. had been adjudicated an abused child. The trial court further found that the circumstances and behaviors giving rise to the case had not been abated and that C.S. had not made sufficient progress in meeting her case- plan objectives. The trial court noted the testimony of Kevin Everhart that C.S. did not appear for 113 drug screens, had one negative screen and 29 positive screens, with 27 of those times for suboxone and 6 for fentanyl. The trial court also noted that C.S. had testified that she did drug screens during her scheduled visits with Immediate Care, where she receives suboxone treatment, but, as those were not random drug screens, that testing was not in compliance with her case-plan objectives. FCCS and R.K.’s guardian ad litem both had concerns over C.S.’s substance use, with FCCS expressing that it was not safe for R.K. No. 25AP-913 3 to be returned to C.S. The trial court also looked to the testimony of R.K.’s foster mother, who testified that C.S.’s visits were inconsistent and that there were two large gaps—from September 2022 until December 2022, and from February 2023 until June 2023—when C.S. did not visit R.K. {¶ 7} The trial court also noted that C.S. struggled with homelessness and had not provided any evidence of income during the pendency of the case. C.S. had been living with a family friend in exchange for cleaning but did not have a lease or other evidence that she would be able to legally continue living there. During trial, C.S. was approved for an apartment through Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority. The guardian ad litem was able to visit the apartment and testified that children could visit but were not permitted to live in that apartment. In one year, C.S. would be able to apply for a voucher for a different apartment where R.K. could live. The court stated, “Nevertheless, it remains that mother does not have a suitable home for [R.K.] at this time and it would be a significant time before she would potentially have a home suitable for her.” (Oct. 22, 2025 Decision & Jgmt. Entry at 10.) The court further found that C.S. had not provided any evidence of income throughout the case. C.S. had testified that she earned approximately $450-500 a month cleaning homes and hoped to start her own cleaning business but had not taken any steps toward that goal. The court stated that C.S.’s decision “not to seek stable employment during the pendency of this case is concerning.” Id. {¶ 8} The trial court also rejected C.S.’s arguments that FCCS did not make diligent enough efforts to provide sufficient services in helping her achieve her case-plan objectives. The court found that, based on the testimony at trial, C.S. failed to complete case-plan objectives in order to reunify with R.K.1 Ultimately the trial court found that C.S. “failed to complete the essential components of the case plan to allow reunification with [R.K.]. The issues that initiated the Child’s removal have not been alleviated or mitigated.” Id. at 11. {¶ 9} The trial court, having established that R.K. had been in custody of FCCS for over 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), proceeded to examine whether granting permanent custody of R.K. to FCCS was in her best interest. The trial court concluded it was noting that R.K. was closely 1 Similarly, although less pertinent to C.S.’s appeal before us now, the trial court also found that Z.K. failed to complete the essential components of his case plan. No. 25AP-913 4 bonded to her foster parents, whom she calls “mom” and “dad,” but did not appear to be closely bonded to C.S. or Z.K. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that R.K. had a need for a legally secure permanent placement and that C.S. was not a secure permanent placement, as she did not have appropriate housing, failed to seek stable employment, and as the trial court expressed serious concerns about her drug use and found her testimony of sobriety not credible. The trial court ultimately granted FCCS’s motion for permanent custody. {¶ 10} C.S. now appeals the trial court’s decision. II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶ 11} On appeal, C.S. argues the following assignments of error. [1.] Appellant mother had substantially completed her reunification case plan, addressing the conditions which led to the removal of her child. [2.] To the extent appellant mother has not completed every requirement of the reunification case plan, Permanent Family Solutions Network (PFSN) did not provide reasonable efforts to assist mother in her reunification case planning efforts. [3.] There is nothing in the record that demonstrates that appellant mother’s drug use affected or affects her ability to properly function and parent her child. III. ANALYSIS {¶ 12} We begin our discussion with the recognition that parents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. In re H.D., 2014-Ohio-228, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.), citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Nevertheless, parental rights are subject to the child’s ultimate welfare. In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979). The state may terminate parental rights under certain circumstances, when termination is in the best interest of the child. In re A.P., 2023-Ohio-2463, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing H.D. at ¶ 10. {¶ 13} “Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court determines, ‘by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child’ to do so and that one of five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies.” In re Z.C., 2023- No. 25AP-913 5 Ohio-4703, ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” Id., quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 14} The determination whether to grant permanent custody of a child to a public children services agency involves a two-step process. In re K.L., 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), citing In re R.G., 2013-Ohio-914, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.). The juvenile court must first determine whether any factor set out in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies. As applicable here, “[t]he child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). If the juvenile court concludes that one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factors applies, it must then determine whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. {¶ 15} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) offers guidance for evaluating the best interest of the child and requires the court to “consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to, the following:” (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of- home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period . . . ; (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; No. 25AP-913 6 (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child. {¶ 16} C.S. does not contest that R.K. has been in the custody of FCCS for over 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, but rather, C.S.’s arguments center around the grant of permanent custody not being in the best interests of R.K. A. Assignment of Error No. 1 {¶ 17} In her first assignment of error, C.S. argues that she has substantially remedied the conditions that led to the removal of R.K. and, therefore, the trial court erred in granting permanent custody, as it was not in the best interests of R.K. {¶ 18} Even assuming arguendo that C.S. had substantially completed her case-plan objectives and remedied the circumstances leading to R.K.’s removal, we still note that substantial compliance with a case plan does not mandate the denial of a motion for permanent custody. “R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require courts to deny a children services agency’s motion for permanent custody solely by virtue of a parent’s substantial compliance with the case plan,” as substantial compliance with a case plan is “but one of many factors the court may find relevant . . . in rendering its judgment.” In re Brooks, 2004-Ohio-3887, ¶ 62-63 (10th Dist.). “Thus, while evidence of case plan compliance is relevant to a best- interest determination, it is not dispositive of it.” In re T.W., 2011-Ohio-903, ¶ 55 (10th Dist.); In re T.M., 2020-Ohio-815, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.); In re Conn, 2003-Ohio-5344, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.). {¶ 19} Our review of the evidence before us, however, indicates that C.S. had not substantially completed her case-plan objectives, particularly completing randomized drug screens, obtaining housing, and providing proof of a stable income, and that many of the circumstances leading to R.K.’s removal remained unresolved. {¶ 20} C.S. argues that she substantially completed her case-plan objectives relative to drug use, as she was receiving treatment at a suboxone clinic for four years. She states that treatment included weekly urinalysis, visits with a doctor, and a prescription for suboxone. However, testimony from FCCS noted that the urinalysis screens with the suboxone clinic were not random and therefore did not satisfy the case-plan objectives. For the drug screens that were random, C.S. missed nearly all of them. For the drug screens she did complete, C.S. mostly tested positive, despite her testimony that she had been sober for nine years. No. 25AP-913 7 {¶ 21} The evidence in the record also shows that C.S. had not secured housing for her and R.K. While C.S. argues that she did in fact obtain housing right at the time of the trial court’s hearing, the record reflects that the apartment C.S. had obtained did not allow children for more than occasional overnight visits. While C.S. could potentially apply for a larger apartment that would allow children, she would have to wait a year to do so. C.S. also argues that she has been employed at various times cleaning houses and is planning to start her own business cleaning houses. However, C.S. never provided proof of income to FCCS and had not made any steps toward starting her business. {¶ 22} It is under these circumstances, as reflected in the record before us, that we determine that the trial court’s findings that C.S. did not substantially comply with her case plan, nor did she remedy the circumstances that led to the removal of R.K, were supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We therefore overrule C.S.’s first assignment of error. B. Assignment of Error No. 2 {¶ 23} In C.S.’s second assignment of error, she argues that FCCS did not provide reasonable efforts to assist C.S. in reuniting with R.K. {¶ 24} The trial court previously found that FCCS made reasonable efforts toward reunification and did not need to do so again at the hearing on the motion for permanent custody. In an entry dated September 7, 2023, the trial court stated that “reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of said child from the child’s own home” and that “Placement and casework services were provided by [FCCS] to the family of the child.” Those findings were again stated in a January 18, 2024 entry of the trial court. {¶ 25} C.S. argues that these previous findings by the trial court are conclusory and are not supported by evidence in the record. She cites In re D.D., 2023-Ohio-4147 (10th Dist.), where this court found that a trial court’s finding that there were reasonable efforts made by the child services agency toward family reunification was not supported by the evidence. Similarly, C.S. argues that FCCS did not make reasonable efforts, pointing to four different caseworkers being assigned to the case, the lack of a home study being performed, that FCCS staff had not observed a visit with C.S. and R.K., as well as testimony from FCCS staff that the agency wasn’t moving toward reunification. No. 25AP-913 8 {¶ 26} FCCS argues that the trial court did not have to make a reasonable efforts finding here, as the trial court had already made its reasonable efforts finding prior to the hearing on the motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.419 states, in part: (A)(1) Except as provided in division (A)(2) of this section, at any hearing held pursuant to section 2151.28, division (E) of section 2151.31, or section 2151.314, 2151.33, or 2151.353 of the Revised Code at which the court removes a child from the child’s home or continues the removal of a child from the child’s home, the court shall determine whether the public children services agency or private child placing agency that filed the complaint in the case, removed the child from home, has custody of the child, or will be given custody of the child has made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, or to make it possible for the child to return safely home. The agency shall have the burden of proving that it has made those reasonable efforts. . . . In determining whether reasonable efforts were made, the child’s health and safety shall be paramount. (Emphasis added.) {¶ 27} The statutory sections listed in R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) involve “adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused, neglected, or dependent children, all of which occur prior to a decision transferring permanent custody to the state.” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 41. “The statute makes no reference to a hearing on a motion for permanent custody. Therefore, ‘[b]y its plain terms, the statute does not apply to motions for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or to hearings held on such motions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.’ ” Id., quoting In re A.C., 2004-Ohio-5531, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.). {¶ 28} As the Supreme Court of Ohio stated in In re C.F., however, the inapplicability of R.C. 2151.419(A) to motions for permanent custody does not relieve the agency of the duty to make reasonable efforts toward family reunification. “[E]xcept for some narrowly defined statutory exceptions, the state must still make reasonable efforts to reunify the family during the child-custody proceedings prior to the termination of parental rights. If the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it must demonstrate such efforts at that time.” Id. at ¶ 43. No. 25AP-913 9 {¶ 29} As FCCS argues, the trial court had already made its finding of reasonable efforts by the agency, which are supported by the record, and therefore did not need to do so again. Further, FCCS points out that it made referrals and linked C.S. to receive services in accordance with her case-plan objectives. The agency also gave C.S. bus passes to facilitate transportation for C.S. to the random drug screens and visits with R.K. We also note that C.S. was afforded ample time to meet her case-plan objectives and remedy the conditions that caused the removal of C.S., as temporary custody was extended twice and, even after FCCS filed for permanent custody, the hearing was delayed for a year. We do not agree with C.S. that FCCS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family or that the trial court made such a finding without supporting evidence in the record. {¶ 30} We therefore overrule C.S.’s second assignment of error. C. Assignment of Error No. 3 {¶ 31} In her last assignment of error, C.S. argues that the record does not demonstrate that her drug use affected her ability to properly function and parent R.K. We are not persuaded by this argument. C.S. directs us to In re A.V., 2021-Ohio-3873 (12th Dist.), wherein the Twelfth District found that a trial court erred in finding that a child was dependent based on the drug use of a parent when no evidence was offered that the drug use had an actual adverse impact on the child. Further, she points to In re A.M., 2025- Ohio-4435 (10th Dist.), where this court reversed a trial court’s decision granting FCCS permanent custody of a child, as there was not clear and convincing evidence that the child was a dependent child, even considering the father’s occasional drug use and other factors. {¶ 32} We find these cases distinguishable. In A.V., the caseworker testified that, despite the father’s methamphetamine usage, the children’s basic needs were met. As C.S. has not resolved instability with her drug use, housing, and income, R.K.’s basic needs have not been met. We also recognize that other courts have recognized the inherent risks and dangers of Schedule II Controlled Substances, like fentanyl, compared to other drugs, such as marijuana or alcohol. FCCS directs us to In re J.D., 2025-Ohio-5116, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.) wherein the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that a parent’s use of a Schedule II substance presented inherent risks to the wellbeing of their child. The court stated: Given the drug at issue here, an inherent risk to the children’s wellbeing can be inferred from Mother’s ongoing use of methamphetamine. Methamphetamine is a Schedule II No. 25AP-913 10 controlled substance. See Adm.Code 4729:9-1-02(C)(2). Its inherent risks and dangers were considered in its inclusion in the list of Schedule II Controlled Substances. The Controlled Substances Act defines a Schedule II drug as one that has “a high potential for abuse[,]” has an acceptable medical use “with severe restrictions[,]” and “may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.” 21 U.S.C. 812(b)(2)(A)-(C). Mother’s possession and use of methamphetamine posed a risk to herself and to her young children who were unable to care for or protect themselves. Id. {¶ 33} This court has also previously rejected arguments that a parent’s drug addiction has not had an adverse effect on children. See In re C[t].M., 2026-Ohio-3243 (10th Dist.). In C[t].M., this court noted the need for children to have a “legally secure placement” under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) and that a parent who could not maintain sobriety presents a safety risk to the children. “[A] legally secure permanent placement is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.” (Internal quotation marks deleted and citations omitted.) In re E.B., 2017-Ohio- 2672, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.). {¶ 34} The trial court found the need for a legally secure placement for R.K. and that placement could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to FCCS. We agree. The evidence in the record shows that C.S. missed most of her randomized drug screens and for a portion of those that she did attend, she tested positive for fentanyl, including drug screens mere months before the hearing on the motion for permanent custody despite being in treatment for four years. C.S. had also not secured housing that would allow for R.K. to live with her or established an income to show that she could provide for R.K.’s needs in a legally secure placement. We overrule C.S.’s third assignment of error. IV. CONCLUSION {¶ 35} Having overruled all three of C.S.’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch. Judgment affirmed. BEATTY BLUNT and JAMISON, JJ., concur.