Full Opinion

[Cite as In re Guardianship of Shingler, 2026-Ohio-4347.] IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF Case No. 26CA025 DEBORAH SHINGLER (TIMOTHY KEIL, APPELLANT) Opinion And Judgment Entry Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case No. PG20250024 Judgment: Affirmed Date of Judgment Entry: November 2, 2026 BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges APPEARANCES: TIMOTHY KEIL, PRO SE, for Appellant King, P.J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Timothy Keil, appeals the May 19, 2026 entry of the Fairfield County Probate Court denying his motions to vacate void order and for Civ.R. 60(B) relief from judgment regarding an order prohibiting him from contacting Deborah Shingler. We affirm the trial court. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 2} On April 2, 2025, Fairfield County Adult Protective Services sought a guardianship over Deborah Shingler ("Ward"), age 71, due to cognitive issues and dementia. Ward has a daughter, Taylor, sisters, Linda and Kathy, and several other siblings. {¶ 3} On April 3, 2025, Amanda R. Morris, Esq. was appointed as emergency guardian to the person and estate of Ward. A hearing to continue the guardianship was held on April 4, 2025. By judgment entry filed on the same date, Attorney Morris's emergency guardianship was extended until May 4, 2025. {¶ 4} On April 8, 2025, Attorney Morris filed an application to be appointed guardian of Ward's person and estate. {¶ 5} On April 28, 2025, Kathy and her then fiancée, Keil, appellant herein, filed a motion to contest Attorney Morris's appointment as guardian. They argued family was adequately caring for Ward and she did not need a guardian. {¶ 6} On April 28, 2025, the trial court appointed Dave Tawney, Esq. to represent Ward. {¶ 7} On April 29, 2025, Linda's daughter and Ward's niece, Melissa, filed an application to be appointed guardian of Ward's person. {¶ 8} On April 30, 2025, Attorney Morris filed a motion for a no-contact order, seeking no contact between Ward and Keil as it was in the best interest of Ward. Attorney Morris argued Keil was a registered sex offender and Ward lacked competency and the ability to self-report; further, Keil had inserted himself into the guardianship proceedings and the affairs of Ward against the family's wishes. By entry filed on the same date, the trial court granted the motion and ordered Keil to have no contact with Ward. {¶ 9} A hearing was held on April 30, 2025. By letters of guardianship filed on the same date, the trial court appointed Attorney Morris as the guardian of Ward's person and estate for an indefinite period of time. {¶ 10} On May 5, 2025, Keil filed a motion to contest the no-contact order, arguing his underlying offense was committed eighteen years prior and has "no demonstratable relationship to the current family matter." {¶ 11} On May 16, 2025, the trial court replaced Ward's attorney due to a conflict, appointing Angie Seimer, Esq. to represent Ward. {¶ 12} On July 2, 2025, Keil filed a ten-page letter complaining about the trial court's statement that he was not related by blood or marriage and outlining how much he has helped Ward and the family. Keil indicated he and Kathy were now married. {¶ 13} On July 10, 2025, Keil filed a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the no-contact order. {¶ 14} On August 13, 2025, Keil filed a motion to object to Ward's newly appointed counsel, arguing there was a conflict of interest because Attorney Seimer served as a guardian ad litem in other cases in the Probate Court. {¶ 15} On August 22, 2025, Keil filed a motion to disqualify the trial court judge on "grounds of bias, prejudice, and conduct that creates an appearance of impropriety." {¶ 16} On August 28, 2025, Keil filed a motion to vacate the no-contact order. Keil argued a voluntary separation from Ward was already established, and the order was issued without a hearing, evidence, or due process. {¶ 17} A hearing was held on August 28, 2025; the trial court noticed Keil of this hearing. By judgment entry filed on the same date, the trial court appointed Melissa guardian of Ward's person and Attorney Morris as guardian of Ward's estate. By entry filed September 4, 2025, the trial court denied Keil's motion to contest Attorney Morris's appointment as guardian, noting Keil withdrew the motion; denied Keil's motion to contest the no-contact order, noting Keil was a registered sex offender and Ward was unable to protect herself; ruled on Keil's motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law that it found a guardianship was in the best interest of Ward based on two expert evaluations and recommendations; denied Keil's motion to object to Ward's appointed counsel, noting no conflict existed; denied Keil's motion to disqualify the trial court judge; and denied Keil's motion to vacate the no-contact order in order "to protect the safety of the ward." {¶ 18} On April 9, 2026, Keil filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, arguing he had a meritorious claim and defense, relief was warranted because the order was no longer equitable, and the motion was filed within a reasonable time. Also on April 9, 2026, Keil filed a motion to vacate void order, arguing the order exceeded the trial court's statutory authority, was issued without due process or evidence, and was punitive in nature instead of protective to Ward. By entry filed May 19, 2026, the trial court denied Keil's motions, finding it held various hearings in 2025 pertaining to the guardianship and Keil actively participated in the proceedings, it had previously ruled on Keil's arguments made in numerous filings in a September 4, 2025 entry, and its orders are within the best interest of Ward. {¶ 19} Keil filed an appeal with the following assignments of error: I {¶ 20} "THE PROBATE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING AND MAINTAINING A NO-CONTACT ORDER WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY BASIS, WITHOUT SWORN TESTIMONY, AND IN RELIANCE ON REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY AN INDIVIDUAL WHO NO LONGER HELD AUTHORITY OF THE WARD'S PERSONAL WELFARE." II {¶ 21} "THE PROBATE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO PROCEDJURAL DUE PROCESS BY IMPOSING AND MAINTAINING A NO- CONTACT ORDER WITHOUT NOTICE, WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, AND WITHOUT PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD." III {¶ 22} "THE PROBATE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO TIMELY AND PROPERLY RULE ON APPELLANT'S MOTIONS CHALLENGING THE NO-CONTACT ORDER, AND BY DISMISSING THEM SUMMARILY WITHOUT ANALYSIS OR MEANINGFUL CONSIDERATION." IV {¶ 23} "THE PROBATE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY IMPOSING AND MAINTAINING A NO-CONTACT ORDER WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN VIOLATION OF OHIO'S GUARDIANSHIP STATUTES AND THE LIMITS OF PROBATE COURT JURISDICTION." V {¶ 24} "THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE PROBATE COURT'S ERRORS DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR PROCEEDING AND REQUIRES REVERSAL." I, II, III, IV, V {¶ 25} In Keil's assignments of error, he claims the trial court erred in imposing the no-contact order. We disagree. {¶ 26} A probate court's decision on guardianship matters will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In re Cottrell, 2025-Ohio-4917, ¶ 16. "Abuse of discretion" means an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985). Most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An unreasonable decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process which would support that decision. Id. "It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result." Id. {¶ 27} At the outset, we note Keil never filed an appeal on the no-contact order. The no-contact order in this case was a final appealable order. In re Guardianship of Dickerhoof, 2024-Ohio-2628, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.) ("a no-contact order issued restricting a ward's fundamental right to associate with another consenting adult is a final appealable order"). The order was issued on April 30, 2025. Instead of filing an appeal, Keil filed a motion to contest the no- contact order on May 5, 2025. Keil then filed a flurry of motions, culminating in a motion to vacate the no-contact order on August 28, 2025. A hearing on guardianship was held on August 28, 2025. Keil was listed as a person receiving notice of the hearing. See Notice of Hearing filed August 8, 2025. We have no idea what transpired during the hearing as Keil has failed to include a transcript from the hearing. In Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980), the Supreme Court of Ohio held the following: The duty to provide a transcript for appellate review falls upon the appellant. This is necessarily so because an appellant bears the burden of showing error by reference to matters in the record. See State v. Skaggs, 53 Ohio St.2d 162 (1978). This principle is recognized in App.R. 9(B), which provides, in part, that " * * * the appellant shall in writing order from the reporter a complete transcript or a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as he deems necessary for inclusion in the record. * * *." When portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court's proceedings, and affirm. (Footnote omitted.) {¶ 28} If a transcript was unavailable, Keil could have filed an App.R. 9(C) statement. {¶ 29} After the hearing, the trial court denied Keil's motion to contest the no-contact order, noting Keil was a registered sex offender and Ward was unable to protect herself, and denied his motion to vacate the no-contact order. See Entry filed September 4, 2025. Again, Keil did not file an appeal. Instead, he waited seven months and filed motions on April 9, 2026, for Civ.R. 60(B) relief and to vacate void order. Both motions were based on the same arguments. "A Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment cannot be used as a substitute for a timely appeal or as a means to extend the time for perfecting an appeal from the original judgment." Key v. Mitchell, 81 Ohio St.3d 89, 90-91 (1998). "In other words, to raise mistakes allegedly committed by the trial court, one must appeal rather than attempt to use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion." State v. Brown, 2014-Ohio-5824, ¶ 50 (7th Dist.). In reviewing Keil's Civ.R. 60(B) motion, his meritorious claim and defense arguments do not fall under any of the grounds enumerated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5) and could have been argued on direct appeal. See Motion for Relief from Judgment filed April 9, 2026. His void arguments, that the no contact order was issued without statutory authority or due process, lack merit. The trial court noted it "held various hearings in 2025 on all issues pertaining to the guardianship, and Mr. Keil participated actively in these proceedings." See Entry filed May 19, 2026. {¶ 30} The probate court "is the superior guardian of wards who are subject to its jurisdiction." R.C. 2111.50(A)(1). The probate court is required to act in the best interest of the incompetent person. Matter of Guardianship of Baker, 2024-Ohio-2350, ¶ 37 (4th Dist.), citing In re Guardianship of Smith, 2014-Ohio-2119, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). "'Best interests' means the permanent welfare of the ward in his relation to society in view of all the circumstances." In re Briggs, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3050, *7 (9th Dist. July 9, 1997). If issuing a no-contact order is in the best interest of a ward, the trial court has the statutory authority to issue it. R.C. 2111.13(A)(1); R.C. 2111.50(C)(1). {¶ 31} On April 3, 2025, Attorney Morris was appointed emergency guardian to the person and estate of Ward. As guardian to the person, Attorney Morris was required to "protect and control the person of the ward." R.C. 2111.13(A)(1). {¶ 32} On April 30, 2025, Attorney Morris, as emergency guardian to Ward's person, filed a motion for a no-contact order, seeking no contact between Ward and Keil as it was in the best interest of Ward. In the motion, Attorney Morris stated: For cause, Guardian states that Mr. Keil is a registered sex offender and has been inserting himself into the guardianship and family business, against the requests of the family. Mr. Keil is NOT family to the Ward, by blood or marriage, yet he appeared on the Zoom hearing on April 4, 2025, against the wishes of the family. Further, against the wishes of the family, Mr. Keil made phone calls to attorneys seeking to hire someone to represent the Ward in the guardianship. Likewise, Mr. Keil is making phone calls to nursing facilities, new[s] stations, and many others regarding the guardianship, against the requests and wishes of the family. The Guardian is uncomfortable with the way that Mr. Keil has inserted himself into the affairs of the Ward, without regard for the family. The Guardian is further concerned about his status as a registered sex offender and the Ward's lack of competency or ability to self- report. {¶ 33} Attached to the motion was a printout from the Fairfield County Sheriff's Office Offender Watch of Keil's sex offender status containing a registration number. {¶ 34} The trial court granted the no-contact order the same day. See Entry filed April 30, 2025. The trial court noted "[f]or good cause shown and in the best interests" of Ward. Id. {¶ 35} Keil had an opportunity to be heard and the trial court determined he "has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief from these orders, nor has he demonstrated that these orders are no longer in the best interest of the ward." See Entry filed May 19, 2026. {¶ 36} As for Keil's cumulative errors argument, "[w]here we have found that the trial court did not err, cumulative error is simply inapplicable." State v. McCauley, 2025-Ohio-3158, ¶ 96 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Carter, 2003-Ohio-1313, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.). {¶ 37} Based upon the procedural deficiencies in this case and the lack of any transcripts, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Keil's motions for relief from judgment and to vacate void order. {¶ 38} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the Fairfield County Probate Court is AFFIRMED. {¶ 39} Costs to Appellant. By: King, P.J. Montgomery, J. and Gormley, J. concur.