Morris v. Robinson

[Cite as Morris v. Robinson, 2026-Ohio-3450.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA PATRICIA A. MORRIS, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 116159 v. : RONALD J. ROBINSON, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 3, 2026 Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-08-321597 Appearances: Costanzo & Lazzaro, P.L.L., and Raymond J. Costanzo, for appellant. LISA B. FORBES, P.J.: This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. “The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow this court to render a brief and conclusory opinion.” State v. Priest, 2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1.  Appellant Ronald J. Robinson (“Husband”) appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his motion to vacate a qualified domestic-relations order (“QDRO”).1 After a thorough review of the facts and the law, we affirm. I. Procedural History and Factual Background Husband and appellee Patricia A. Robinson (“Wife”) were married on October 14, 1998. On June 6, 2008, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. On October 30, 2008, the trial court granted the parties a divorce, effective September 24, 2008, and incorporated into the divorce decree the terms of a separation and property settlement agreement (“Separation Agreement”). A. Separation Agreement and QDRO The Separation Agreement addressed Husband’s pension with his employer, the Plain Dealer Publishing Co., and stated in pertinent part: The Husband’s interest in and to his Plain Dealer Publishing Co. Pension Fund shall be divided between the parties, with the Wife receiving one-half of the marital portion thereof by means of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to be prepared by the Wife’s attorney. The Parties agree that the marital portion of this Pension Plan is the Husband’s interest earned during the period of October 14, 1 Wife failed to file a responsive brief in this case. We note that when an appellee fails to file a brief, “App.R. 18(C) gives us the discretion to ‘accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues as correct and reverse the judgment if the appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain such action.’” In re S.M.T., 2012-Ohio-1745, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.), quoting App.R. 18(C). App.R. 18(C) does not, however, “impose a form of appellate default judgment where the court of appeals can reverse solely because the appellee failed to file a brief. Reversal is warranted only if the arguments in the appellant’s brief reasonably appear to support a reversal.” Id. at ¶ 3.  1998 through September 24, 2008. Husband shall retain all remaining interests in said Plan not being transferred to the Wife herein. The QDRO referenced in the Separation Agreement includes the following relevant language: 1. Effect of This Order as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order: This Order creates and recognizes the existence of an Alternate Payee’s right to receive a portion of the Participant’s benefits payable under the Advance Pension Plan (the “Plan”), a multi-employer defined benefit pension plan that is qualified and maintained under applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), each as amended to date. ... 7. Amount of Alternate Payee’s Benefit: This order assigns to the Alternate Payee an amount equal to the actuarial equivalent of Fifty Percent (50%) of the marital portion of the Participant’s accrued benefit under the Plan. The Marital portion shall be that part of the Participant’s accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage, which, for this purpose shall be the period of October 14, 1998 through September 24, 2008, inclusive, but shall include any subsequent, retroactive increases in said accrued benefit thereafter approved by the Board of Trustees of the Plan prior to the Alternate Payee’s benefit commencement date hereunder. (Emphasis in original.) The trial court retained jurisdiction with respect to the QDRO “to the extent required to maintain its qualified status and the original intent of the parties.” Appellee is designated as the alternate payee (“Alternate Payee”) in the QDRO. The QDRO was approved by both parties and their counsel without objection and journalized on October 30, 2008. Sixteen years later, on August 20, 2024, Husband filed a motion to vacate qualified domestic relations order entered October 30, 2008 (“Motion to Vacate”). Husband alleged in the Motion to Vacate that the plan administrator (“Plan Administrator”) implementing the QDRO “intended to commence benefits in a manner that is in conflict with the final judgment entry of divorce, QDRO, the parties’ original intent, statutory and case authority, and the Plan Administrator’s own calculations.” Specifically, Husband asserted that the Plan Administrator calculated the marital portion of the pension by, (a) determining the amount of the accrued benefit at the start of the marriage (October 14, 1998), (b) determining the amount of the accrued benefit at [the] end of the marriage (September 24, 2008) and (c) calculating the difference between the accrued benefit at the end of the marriage and the amount of the accrued benefit at the beginning of the marriage.[2] According to Husband, the value of the marital portion of the accrued benefit, and the resulting Alternate Payee portion of $735.74 per month, calculated by using the Plan Administrator’s method — is wrong. Husband requested a clarifying order assigning a different monthly payment to Wife, specifically “the sum of $412.16 per month, being 50% of the marital portion of Defendant’s accrued and now matured pension benefit . . . .” Husband indicated that he arrived at this amount by using the “frozen coverture fraction method to calculate the value of the pension plan earned during the term of the marriage.”3 Husband argued that the 2 This description of the formula used by the Plan Administrator is consistent with the explanation given for the calculation of benefits in the Plan Administrator’s May 8, 2014 letter to Husband, which was admitted as an exhibit at the hearing on the Motion to Vacate. 3 The frozen-coverture method “requires the court to determine the value of the pension account as if it were frozen on the divorce date,” and “‘calculates the value of the participant spouse’s retirement account had he or she retired on the same day the parties divorced, using the then-present base pay and years of service.’” Cook v. Cook, 2017- language used in the Separation Agreement and QDRO “suggests” the parties’ intention to use this method of calculation. Husband asserted that the language of both the Separation Agreement and QDRO “indicate the parties’ intention to preserve Defendant’s premarital separate property interest in the pension plan for the sole benefit of the Defendant and share equally only in the value of the pension plan that was earned during the term of the marriage.” Wife filed a motion to dismiss the Motion to Vacate, and Husband filed a brief in opposition. B. Hearing The magistrate held a hearing on June 4, 2025. Husband and Wife stipulated to six exhibits presented by Husband, which included correspondence between Husband and the Plan Administrator regarding the pension division. During the opening colloquy with the court, Husband’s counsel asserted that the division of property that is in the Separation Agreement and incorporated into the judgment entry of divorce should be “enforced to exactly to what it says.” He further explained that the QDRO was only issued to implement that property division, but contended that it is “not necessary any longer . . . because our information is that [Wife] took a lump sum. So our relief has to come from [the Wife], not a clarifying — or an amended QDRO.” Counsel went on to state that if the court agrees with Husband’s “calculation . . . she owes us money.” Ohio-8848, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.), quoting Cameron v. Cameron, 2012-Ohio-6258, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).  In response, Wife made an oral motion to dismiss, arguing that the Motion to Vacate should be dismissed because Husband was no longer seeking to vacate the QDRO, as initially requested. The court allowed the case to move forward, noting that the Motion to Vacate also included a request for reimbursement from Wife “in the event that she was overpaid from the pension.” The following testimony was presented at the hearing on Husband’s Motion to Vacate. Wife and Husband were the only witnesses to testify. During their testimonies, both Husband and Wife acknowledged signing and initialing all pages of the judgment entry of divorce and the QDRO. 1. Wife’s Testimony Wife testified that she was notified by the Plan Administrator in approximately March 2024 that she would be receiving her proportionate share of Husband’s pension. Wife explained that she was given the option to receive her share as a monthly figure or a lump-sum payment. Wife testified that she elected to take the lump sum, which was “[s]omewhere around $100,000.” 2. Husband’s Testimony Husband testified that he started to work for the Cleveland Plain Dealer in 1975. When he was close to retirement, he contacted Mr. Hnilo (“Hnilo”), an individual who administered the company’s defined-benefit plan on behalf of Advance Local, the Plan Administrator, to learn what his monthly pension would be and how the pension would be divided. In March 2024, Husband learned what his pension amount would be. Husband contacted Hnilo “voic[ing] objections to the amount.” Husband testified that he “believe[d] there [wa]s an error in the calculation of the marital portion of the pension.” Specifically, Husband testified that he believed that the “Plan Administrator shifted [Husband’s] premarital interest, the increase in the premarital interest[,] to the marital portion . . . .” Husband explained that an amount of $323 per month was shifted “from the premarital to the marital.” Husband stated that he did not “consult with anybody to come up with that number.” Husband stated that based on the language in the Separation Agreement, Wife was only supposed to share in part of the pension that was the Husband’s interest earned during their approximately ten years of marriage, which Husband calculated to be $412 (half of $824) per month. At the hearing, Husband did not specify how his formula for calculating the marital portion of the pension was different from the one used by the Plan Administrator. The magistrate denied the Motion to Vacate. In denying the Motion to Vacate, the magistrate found that neither the divorce decree nor the QDRO specify a specific formula to be used in determining the marital portion of the pension. ... The Magistrate further finds that Mr. Robinson has not pointed to a provision in the decree or QDRO that are ambiguous. Instead, he argues that the Court should determine that the proper amount that [the Wife] should receive is $412.16 because the Plan Administrator did the calculation incorrectly. ...  The Magistrate finds that the decree does not divide the pension using a coverture fraction, nor does it express use of a frozen coverture fraction to divide the pension. As pointed out by the Plan Administrator in Defendant’s Exhibit E the use of a coverture fraction or some other methodology could not be use [sic] by the Plan Administrator because the use of such methodology was neither required nor permitted under the specific language of the QDRO. ... The Magistrate finds that if the Court did what Mr. Robinson is requesting, it would amount to a modification of the terms of the division of property. R.C. 3105.17(I) does not permit the court to modify the terms of a property division absent agreement of the parties. The Magistrate further finds that the ambiguity is not found in the language of the decree or the QDRO. The issue may be that beyond defining the term of the marriage, the parties did not provide further direction as to how the term of the marriage should be calculated within the entirety of the [sic] Mr. Robinson’s years of service with the Plain Dealer. Husband filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On January 21, 2026, the trial court issued its judgment entry adopting the magistrate’s decision, and issued its own opinion. The trial court stated that while the Husband “claims there was an ambiguity in the language of the parties’ Separation Agreement and QDRO . . . the real issue is the calculation of the benefit, not the agreed upon language.” The court further noted that it did not find the language in the document(s) that “suggests the parties’ intention to use the frozen coverture fraction method to calculate the value of the pension plan earned during the term of the marriage.” The trial court found that the “Plan Administrator came up with the monthly pension amount and Husband disputes the accuracy of that amount. Husband disagrees with the formula used by the Plan Administrator. Wife argues that the Court cannot interpret what the math should be.” The trial court further found that “there are no ambiguous terms in the parties’ judgment entry and Separation Agreement,” noting that the Husband is “requesting the Court fill in the gaps as to the method of calculating [the] formula for his pension plan.” The court found that while it is permitted to “implement the terms of the division of benefits,” it cannot “modify the terms of the property division.” Husband appeals, raising the following assignment of error: The trial court erred in refusing to resolve the parties’ conflicting interpretations of the phrase “earned during the term of the marriage” incorporated in their agreement dividing Appellant’s defined benefit pension plan and failing to enforce the decree. II. Law and Analysis Because the crux of Husband’s appeal is a challenge to the trial court’s journal entry adopting the magistrate’s decision, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Butcher v. Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing O’Brien v. O’Brien, 2006-Ohio-1729, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “Pension or retirement benefits earned during the course of a marriage are marital assets and a factor to be considered in the division of property.” Wilson v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-6056, ¶ 5, citing Hoyt v. Hoyt, 53 Ohio St.3d 177, 178- 179 (1990). When dividing pension and retirement benefits, a domestic relations court enters a QDRO, which is an order that “creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(L); see also Butcher at ¶ 9. That is, a QDRO is an order in aid of execution on the property division ordered in the divorce decree dividing retirement or pension assets. Id. at ¶ 9, citing McKinney v. McKinney, 142 Ohio App.3d 604, 608 (2d Dist. 2001). “A trial court cannot modify or amend a marital property division incident to a divorce or dissolution decree, absent expressed consent by the parties.” Butcher at ¶ 8, citing R.C. 3105.171(I). However, it has the “authority to clarify and construe its original property division in order to effectuate its judgment.” Adkins v. Bush, 2003-Ohio-2781, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.), citing Peterson v. Peterson, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3267, *4 (12th Dist. July 12, 1999). “When parties dispute the meaning of a clause in their separation agreement, a trial court must first determine whether the clause is ambiguous.” Adkins at ¶ 26. This court has previously held that “[i]f the decree and separation agreement are ambiguous regarding the division of . . . retirement and pension accounts, the court can properly clarify their meaning without violating the prohibition of R.C. 3105.171(I).” Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550, at ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing Gordon v. Gordon, 144 Ohio App.3d 21, 24 (8th Dist. 2001). If there is no ambiguity in the terms of the separation agreement, a “court may not clarify or interpret those terms.” Butcher at ¶ 11, citing Adkins at ¶ 27. A. Terms of Separation Agreement and QDRO On appeal, Husband argues that the trial court erred by refusing to resolve “the parties’ conflicting interpretations of the phrase ‘earned during the term of the marriage . . . .’” In other words, Husband argues that the language in the Separation Agreement and QDRO is ambiguous and should have been clarified by the trial court. Husband also argues that this court should “find the Plan failed to comply with the QDRO” by assigning an improper sum to Wife and “remand the matter back to the trial court with instructions to enforce the assignment of benefits to [Wife] consistent with the Court’s finding on remand.” The essence of Husband’s appeal is that the Plan Administrator used an improper formula to calculate the marital portion of the plan and that to remedy this error, the trial court should clarify the “contested clause” — “earned during the term of the marriage.” We find Husband’s argument to be unpersuasive. The Separation Agreement defines the “marital portion” of the plan as “Husband’s interest earned during the period of October 14, 1998 through September 24, 2008.” The QDRO follows the language of the Separation Agreement, noting that the marital portion of the pension plan “shall be that part of [Husband’s] accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage . . . .” Husband acknowledges that the QDRO aligns with the language of the Separation Agreement.  On appeal, Husband takes exception with the way the Plan Administrator calculated the amount due Wife as having been “earned during the term of the marriage.” Husband argues that the Plan Administrator incorrectly interpreted the language in the QDRO in a way that determined “the marital portion of his monthly benefit to be the increase in value of his accrued monthly benefit from the date of his marriage on October 14, 1998 through the date of his divorce on September 24, 2008, instead of the accrued monthly benefit he earned during the term of the marriage.”4 (Emphasis added.) The parties did not dispute the numbers included in the Plan Administrator’s formula, including the years of service Husband worked for his employer and the number of years the parties were married. They only dispute the formula used to calculate the marital portion of Husband’s pension. Husband argues that “[n]ormal rules of contract interpretation” apply here. Kmet v. Kmet, 2019-Ohio-2443, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Keeley v. Keeley, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3139 (12th Dist. July 21, 1997). We agree. See id., citing id. (“In interpreting a divorce decree that incorporates the parties’ separation agreement, the normal rules of contract interpretation generally apply . . . .”). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the legal standards for contract interpretation are well established, noting that “[w]e seek primarily to give 4 As noted, Husband asserted, in his Motion to Vacate, that the language in the Separation Agreement and QDRO suggest the “parties’ intention to use the frozen coverture fraction method to calculate the value of the pension plan earned during the term of the marriage.” However, he does not explain his reasoning, or provide case law in support. effect to the intent of the parties, and we presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the plain language of the contract.” Beverage Holdings, L.L.C. v. 5701 Lombardo, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-4716, ¶ 13, citing Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003- Ohio-5849, ¶ 11. “Common words will be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results or unless some other meaning is clear from the face or overall contents of the agreement.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Anders, 2003-Ohio-3048, ¶ 34, citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus. “[I]f the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, we enforce the terms as written, and we may not turn to evidence outside the four corners of the contract to alter its meaning.” Beverage Holdings, L.L.C., at ¶ 13, citing Galatis at ¶ 11. The Supreme Court has noted that “no clear standard has evolved to determine the level of lucidity necessary for a writing to be ambiguous.” State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 11. However, courts have repeatedly held that mere silence on an issue or a failure to address an issue does not create an ambiguity where none otherwise exists. Earnest v. Earnest, 2023-Ohio-1803, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.); Keller v. Keller, 2018-Ohio-3141 (5th Dist.). We find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the language of the QDRO is unambiguous. The phrase at issue in the QDRO states that “[t]he Marital portion shall be that part of the Participant’s accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “accrued” as “accumulated over a period of time.”5 It defines “benefit” as “a payment or service provided for under an annuity, pension plan, or insurance policy.”6 To “earn” is “to receive as return for effort and especially for work done or services rendered.” 7 Therefore, the “accrued benefit earned” under a pension plan means the amount that an employee is entitled to at a given moment in time. Other Ohio courts confirm this understanding of the phrase, explaining that in the context of pension plans, “‘accrued benefits’ refers to retirement benefits a party would be entitled to receive as of a particular date . . . ”8 Cox v. Cox, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 227, *1, 9 (12th Dist. Feb. 1, 1999). It stands to reason that the “accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage” is determined by subtracting the “accrued benefit earned” at the beginning of the marriage from the “accrued benefit earned” at the end of the marriage. Although Ohio courts have acknowledged that varied approaches exist in determining property division in this context, we have found no Ohio authority addressing the precise language used here, calling for the division of the 5 Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ accrued (accessed Aug. 7, 2026) [https://perma.cc/VPR8-EX26]. 6 Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ benefit (accessed Aug. 7, 2026) [https://perma.cc/5V2W-B8PB]. 7 Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/earn (accessed Aug. 14, 2026) [https://perma.cc/CG3T-DC34]. 8 Other jurisdictions similarly hold that “‘accrual’ refers to the amount of benefits to which an employee is entitled.” Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan, 826 F.Supp.2d 25, 28, fn. 2. (D.C. Dist. 2011); see also McDonald v. Pension Plan of the Nysa-Ila Pension Trust Fund, 320 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2003), citing 29 U.S.C. 1002(23)(A). “accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage.” See Hoyt, 53 Ohio St.3d at 180 (explaining that “flat rules have no place in determining a property division”). This language, however, aligns with what is known in the literature and across other jurisdictions as the “accrual-of-benefits approach,” a recognized method of dividing retirement plans at divorce. Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Valuation, Allocation, and Distribution of Retirement Plans at Divorce: Where Are We?, 35 Fam. L.Q. 469, 476 (Fall 2001). “Under this method, the accrued benefit at the date of the marriage is subtracted from the accrued benefit at the date of the divorce to arrive at the benefit to be divided.” Id. at 476 (describing the different approaches to allocating pensions between former spouses, including the “accrual-of-benefits” method); Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 905 So.2d 1, 13 (Ala.App. 2004) (Murdock, G., concurring specifically) (describing the “accrual-of-benefits” approach as a recognized method of determining the benefit to be divided); see also Marriage of Swanson, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2565, *14-18 (Mont.D.C., Feb. 28, 2003) (describing the “accrual-of-benefits” approach to calculating the marital property interest in a pension plan); Thomasi v. Thomasi, 181 Conn.App. 822, 832-833 (2018) (recognizing the various methods for calculating the “marital portion” of a pension plan, including the “subtraction” method; the “accrual-of-benefits approach” has also been called the subtraction method). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the disputed terms of the Separation Agreement and QDRO are unambiguous based on the plain language of the documents. Moreover, when viewed through the lens of marital-property division, the terms used in these documents align with a recognized methodology for allocating pension benefits.9 Finally, we note that the parties, through their attorneys, agreed to the language in the QDRO that determined the “marital portion shall be that part of the Participant’s accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage . . . .” No mention was made of any possible problems with the QDRO until 16 years later, when Husband determined that he was dissatisfied with the amount going to Wife. The substitution of another method of calculation or specific monthly amount to be paid to Wife would be an expansion and modification of the agreement, which is prohibited by R.C. 3105.171(I). See Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550, at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). Husband has not demonstrated that the method used to calculate Wife’s portion of the pension was inconsistent with the Separation Agreement and QDRO. Nor has he demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Vacate the QDRO. Husband’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellant pay the costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 9 We also note that mere failure to include a formula for the division of marital property, such as pension benefits, does not deem a separation agreement ambiguous. See Robins v. Robins, 2005-Ohio-4969, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).  It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR