Lynn v. Lynn

[Cite as Lynn v. Lynn, 2026-Ohio-4346.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY JAMES LYNN, : : Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 25CA9 : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY BRITTANIE LYNN, : : Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED : 10/26/2026 ________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: William B. Summers, Parkersburg, West Virginia, for appellant.1 ________________________________________________________________ Wilkin, J. {¶1} This is an appeal from a Washington County Common Pleas Court judgment that granted James Lynn, plaintiff below and appellee herein, a divorce from Brittanie Lynn, defendant below and appellant herein. Appellant raises the following assignments of error for review: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT- APPELLANT’S PROCEDURAL DUE-PROCESS RIGHTS BY PROCEEDING TO THE FINAL CUSTODY HEARING WITHOUT ADEQUATE NOTICE AND BY WAIVING THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM’S LIVE APPEARANCE, DEPRIVING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.” SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DENIED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL BY GRANTING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S 1 Neither appellee nor appellee’s trial counsel has entered an appearance in this appeal. Washington App. No. 25CA9 2 MOTION TO WITHDRAW ON THE MORNING OF THE FINAL CUSTODY HEARING AND PROCEEDING IMMEDIATELY IN HER ABSENCE.” THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND INFRINGED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTAL RIGHTS BY IMPOSING AN INDEFINITE ‘ZERO-CONTACT’ ORDER WITHOUT CURRENT, SPECIFIC BEST-INTEREST FINDINGS OR A REUNIFICATION PLAN.” FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPUTING FULL-TIME FLORIDA MINIMUM-WAGE INCOME TO DEFENDANT- APPELLANT AND BY ASYMMETRICALLY TREATING CHILD-SUPPORT ARREARS WITHOUT THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED FINDINGS AND DOCUMENTATION.” FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT’S PROPERTY DIVISION VIOLATED R.C. § 3105.171 BY FAILING TO CLASSIFY, VALUE, AND APPLY THE STATUTORY FACTORS, RESULTING IN AN INEQUITABLE, ONE-SIDED AWARD.” SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SUMMARILY DENYING SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND FAILING TO RETAIN JURISDICTION, WITHOUT MAKING THE FACTOR-BASED FINDINGS REQUIRED BY R.C. § 3105.18(C)(1).” SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY WAIVING THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM’S LIVE APPEARANCE AND RELYING ON A STALE REPORT AT THE FINAL CUSTODY HEARING.” EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: Washington App. No. 25CA9 3 “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ISSUING A NATIONWIDE BENCH WARRANT AND SHIFTING ENFORCEMENT COSTS TO PLAINTIFF, CONTRARY TO DUE-PROCESS REQUIREMENTS AND CONTEMPT-COSTS LAW.” NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: “THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY RECORD MULTIPLE HEARINGS AS REQUIRED BY RULE, DEPRIVING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF A COMPLETE RECORD AND DENYING MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW.” {¶2} The parties married in October 2015, and a few years later, had a child. {¶3} Approximately five years after the child’s birth, appellee filed a complaint for divorce against appellant. Appellant subsequently answered and filed a counterclaim for divorce. {¶4} On January 29, 2025, the trial court’s magistrate held a final divorce hearing. Appellant, however, did not appear. The court found that she had instead absconded with the child and issued a bench warrant for appellant’s arrest. {¶5} On February 5, 2025, the magistrate entered a decision that granted the parties a divorce and awarded appellee custody of the child. On that same date, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, granted the parties a divorce, and awarded appellee custody of the child. This appeal followed. {¶6} Before we consider appellant’s assignments of error, we first observe that appellant did not object to the magistrate’s decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). Washington App. No. 25CA9 4 {¶7} “In essence, the rule is based on the principle that a trial court should have a chance to correct or avoid a mistake before its decision is subject to scrutiny by a reviewing court.” Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2002-Ohio-4094, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.). If a party fails to comply with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), appellate review is limited to plain error. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv); Barnett v. Barnett, 2008-Ohio-3415, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.); see also State ex rel. Target Auto Repair v. Morales, 2022-Ohio-2062, ¶ 15; State ex rel. Booher v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 88 Ohio St.3d 52, 53-54 (2000). {¶8} In order for the plain-error doctrine to apply, a party who claims error must establish that (1) “‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule’” occurred, (2) the error was “‘an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings,’” and (3) this obvious error affected substantial rights, i.e., the error “‘must have affected the outcome of the trial.’” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002); Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209 (1982) (“A ‘plain error’ is obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverse [e]ffect on the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings.”). However, the plain-error doctrine is not readily invoked in civil cases. Instead, an appellate court “must proceed with the utmost caution” when applying the plain-error doctrine in civil cases. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). The Ohio Supreme Court has set a “very high standard” for invoking the plain-error doctrine in a civil case. Perez v. Falls Financial, Inc., 87 Ohio St.3d 371 (2000). Thus, “the doctrine is sharply limited to the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where the error, left unobjected to at the trial court, rises to the level of challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” (Emphasis in Washington App. No. 25CA9 5 original.) Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d at 122; accord Jones v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2020-Ohio-3780, ¶ 24; Gable v. Gates Mills, 2004-Ohio-5719, ¶ 43. Moreover, appellate courts “‘should be hesitant to decide [forfeited errors] for the reason that justice is far better served when it has the benefit of briefing, arguing, and lower court consideration before making a final determination.’” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Nat. Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 2015-Ohio-3731, ¶ 28, quoting Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 332, fn. 2 (1983). Additionally, “[t]he plain error doctrine should never be applied to reverse a civil judgment . . . to allow litigation of issues which could easily have been raised and determined” in the trial court. Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d at 122; accord Mark v. Mellott Mfg. Co., Inc., 106 Ohio App.3d 571, 589 (4th Dist.1995) (“Litigants must not be permitted to hold their arguments in reserve for appeal, thus evading the trial court process.”). {¶9} In the case at bar, appellant has not argued that she lacked notice of the magistrate’s decision or the requirement to file objections within 14 days of the magistrate’s decision.2 Moreover, the record indicates that appellant was served with a 2 We observe that the magistrate’s decision incorrectly referenced Civ.R. 53(D)(2). However, even if the magistrate’s decision technically did not comply with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii), the notice that the court sent with the magistrate’s decision fully notified appellant of the consequences of failing to file timely objections to the magistrate’s decision. Additionally, we question the continuing validity of the rule that relieves a party from the waiver rule when a magistrate’s decision fails to include the conspicuous language contained in Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii). See, e.g., Frase v. Frase, 2024-Ohio-2481, ¶ 9-10 (9th Dist.); Danford Health Care, Inc. v. Wilson, 2021-Ohio-1737, ¶¶ 35-37 (2d Dist.); Marble Builder Direct Internatl., Inc. v. Hauxhurst, 2012- Ohio-1674, ¶ 17-18 (11th Dist.); Rockey v. Rockey, 2008-Ohio-6525, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.). That conspicuous language was added because “the original version of Civ. R. 53 imposed no waiver at all and even the 1985 version imposed waiver only as to findings of fact by referees.” Civ.R. 53, 2003 Staff Notes. Thus, in 2003, the rule was amended to require conspicuous language. Notably, however, the 2003 Staff Notes state that this amendment was not “intended to modify the substantive scope or effect of the waiver rule contained in sentence four of former Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(b).” The 2003 Staff Notes further provide, “It is ordinarily assumed that rule language that prescribes a procedural requirement (see, e.g., sentence six of Civ. R. 51(A), which is analogous to the waiver rule of Civ. R. 53(E)(3)) constitutes sufficient notice to counsel and to pro se litigants of that requirement.” We thus question whether parties should be allowed to circumvent the waiver rule when a magistrate’s decision fails to include the conspicuous language informing parties of the requirement to file timely Washington App. No. 25CA9 6 copy of the magistrate’s decision, and the notice explicitly advised appellant of the consequences of failing to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. The notice stated the following: CIVIL RULE 53 PROVIDES THAT A PARTY MAY FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO A MAGISTRATE’S DECISION WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF THE FILING OF THE DECISION, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS ADOPTED THE DECISION DURING THAT FOURTEEN (14) DAY PERIOD AS PERMITTED BY CIVIL RULE 53(D)(3). AN OBJECTION TO A MAGISTRATE’S DECISION SHALL BE SPECIFIC AND STATE WITH PARTICULARITY ALL GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION. EXCEPT FOR A CLAIM OF PLAIN ERROR, A PARTY SHALL NOT ASSIGN AS ERROR ON APPEAL THE COURT’S ADOPTION OF ANY FACTUAL FINDING OR LEGAL CONCLUSION, WHETHER OR NOT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AS A FINDING OF FACT OR CONCLUSION OF LAW UNDER CIVIL RULE UNLESS THE PARTY HAS OBJECTED TO THAT FINDING OR CONCLUSION AS REQUIRED BY THIS RULE. {¶10} Consequently, we believe that appellant is limited to arguing plain error on appeal. Appellant does not, however, recognize that she failed to object to the magistrate’s decision and is limited to arguing plain error on appeal. Thus, none of her assignments of error specifically asserts that the trial court plainly erred by adopting the magistrate’s decision. We will not create those arguments for her. See State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 17-20 (appellate courts need not formulate a plain- error argument on behalf of a party who fails to properly assert plain error); Seminole Industries Inc. v. Walthaw, 2026-Ohio-653, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (refusing to create a plain- error argument for an appellant); In re C.C., 2024-Ohio-5013, ¶ 8, 10-11 (1st Dist.) (a court need not create a plain-error analysis if an appellant fails to develop one); In re D.K., 2024-Ohio-1149, ¶ 33 (4th Dist.) (“[t]his court ordinarily declines to develop a objections to preserve error for appeal. Washington App. No. 25CA9 7 plain-error argument for an appellant who fails to do so”). {¶11} In any event, nothing in the record indicates that the case at bar is one of the exceptional cases that demands application of the plain-error doctrine. Consequently, even if the trial court obviously erred in any of the respects that appellant alleges, we do not believe that any of the alleged errors “seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d at 122 {¶12} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s nine assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Washington App. No. 25CA9 8 JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the costs. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion For the Court BY:__________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.