Kundtz v. Berea

[Cite as Kundtz v. Berea, 2026-Ohio-4376.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA ELLEN KUNDTZ, : Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 116216 v. : CITY OF BEREA, ET AL., : Defendants-Appellees. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 5, 2026 Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-123590 Appearances: Ellen Kundtz, pro se. BAKER | DUBLIKAR, Andrea K. Ziarko, and Brittany A. Bowland, for appellee City of Berea. TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J.: Plaintiff-appellant Ellen Kundtz (“Kundtz”) appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint against defendant-appellee the City of Berea (“the city”).1 For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Factual and Procedural History On August 27, 2025, Kundtz filed a pro se complaint against the city. The top of the document stated that it was a complaint for monetary damages. The plaintiff was listed as Kundtz, and the defendant was listed as “The City of Berea et [al].” The entire body of the complaint stated: Now comes the plaintiff Ellen Kundtz and claims that a search warrant was served after the enforcement entered my property at 285 University St. with no affidavit attached. My animals were injured or killed by the negligence of Michael Court, Laura Takas and Janet Ritenaur by the preliminary authorizing of Mayor Kleem and the city of Berea, Ohio et and all [sic]. On September 30, 2025, the city filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint. The city’s motion to dismiss was based on two arguments: (1) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and (2) the city was entitled to political-subdivision immunity pursuant to R.C. Ch. 2744 et seq. The same day, Kundtz filed a motion for summary judgment, for the first time alleging facts apparently supporting her complaint. On October 7, 2025, Kundtz filed a response in opposition to the city’s motion to dismiss. The same day, the city filed a reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss. On October 28, 2025, the city filed a combined response in opposition to Kundtz’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a Civ.R. 56(F) 1 Although the case caption is Ellen Kundtz v. City of Berea, et al., and that is how the defendant was listed on the complaint, the only defendant in this case is the City of Berea. motion. Attached to the city’s response was an affidavit from Brittany Bowland (“Bowland”), legal counsel for the city. The court held a telephonic-case-management conference on December 10, 2025; Kundtz failed to appear. The court set numerous deadlines and scheduled a telephonic pretrial hearing for February 2, 2026. On January 14, 2026, Kundtz filed a “more definite statement (reduced)” “pursuant to Civ.R. 12(E) in response to [the city’s] motion alleging vagueness.” On January 20, 2026, the city filed a motion to strike Kundtz’s more definite statement. The court held a telephonic-pretrial hearing on February 2, 2026; Kundtz again failed to appear. On February 6, 2026, the court granted the city’s motion to strike and its motion to dismiss. In its corresponding opinion, the court concluded that Kundtz failed to state a cognizable claim upon which relief can be granted. The court stated that instead of setting forth a short and plain statement of her claim or claims, Kundtz’s complaint “instead reads as a grievance against the City of Berea, and, presumably, employees of the City of Berea.” On February 11, 2026, Kundtz filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. The city opposed this motion. On February 18, 2026, Kundtz filed a second motion for relief from judgment; the city again opposed this motion. On March 8, 2026, Kundtz filed a “court conference accommodation statement” in which she stated that due to disabilities including a traumatic-brain injury and autism, she experiences difficulties participating in court conferences early in the day. Kundtz stated that she had communicated this to court officers and requested that case-management conferences be scheduled in the afternoon to accommodate her. Kundtz further stated that “[d]espite these accommodations, Plaintiff experienced confusion regarding the December 10, 2025 discovery deadline and the subsequent communications, which were impacted by her reliance on the accommodation and the representations of Defendant’s counsel.” Kundtz asserted that these circumstances should be considered by the court in determining excusable neglect and granting her relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). The same day, Kundtz filed a third motion for relief from judgment. The next day, March 9, 2026, Kundtz filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s February 6 judgment dismissing her complaint. Kundtz now raises three assignments of error for our review: I. The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). II. The trial court abused its discretion by striking appellant’s more definite statement and refusing to allow clarification or amendment of the complaint. III. The trial court erred by dismissing appellant’s claims where additional facts became available through body-camera evidence and police records obtained after the initial filing. II. Law and Analysis As an initial matter, we note that Kundtz represented herself pro se at the trial court and continues to act pro se on appeal. This court has recognized that  a pro se litigant may face certain difficulties when choosing to represent oneself. Although a pro se litigant may be afforded reasonable latitude, there are limits to a court’s leniency. Henderson v. Henderson, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.). Pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel. In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 2013-Ohio- 5478, ¶ 22. Saeed v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2017-Ohio-935, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Thus, we presume that Kundtz had knowledge of the law, legal procedures, and appellate process. A. Civ.R. 12(B)(6) In her first assignment of error, Kundtz argues that the trial court erred in granting the city’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss under a de novo standard. Jenkins v. Fields, 2026-Ohio-2545, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), citing Hersh v. Grumer, 2021-Ohio-2582, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). In a de novo review, this court affords no deference to the trial court’s decision and independently reviews the record to determine whether the trial court’s judgment is appropriate. Id., citing Hollins v. Shaffer, 2009-Ohio-2136, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). “‘A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint . . . . Under a de novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting NorthPoint Props. v. Petticord, 2008-Ohio-5996, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss “‘can only be granted when it appears beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief.’” Id., quoting Grey v. Walgreen Co., 2011-Ohio-6167, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.). Civ.R. 8(A) requires that a complaint include “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.” Further, the rule requires that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Civ.R. 8(E)(1). Civ.R. 8 is a liberal pleading rule, and under the rule’s liberal requirements, “a plaintiff must merely set forth operative facts in the complaint ‘which give fair notice of the action . . . .’” Jenkins at ¶ 9, quoting Truax v. Arora, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2059, *5 (9th Dist. Apr. 7, 1993); Bowers Constr. Co., Inc. v. Chuparkoff, 2010-Ohio-419, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). If a complaint does not comply with Civ.R. 8(A), it may be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Here, Kundtz’s complaint consists of two sentences. It does not contain a short and plain statement of her claim showing that she is entitled to relief, nor does it contain a demand for judgment for the relief to which she claims to be entitled. Even liberally construing the complaint, it does not appear that the complaint contained any legal claim that would entitle her to relief, nor does it contain any factual support for any such claim. For these reasons, the trial court properly granted the city’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Kundtz’s first assignment of error is overruled. B. More Definite Statement In Kundtz’s second assignment of error, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by striking her “more definite statement” and refusing to allow clarification or amendment of the complaint. We disagree. A court’s ruling on a motion to strike will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Moore v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 2026-Ohio-2293, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Ebbing v. Ricketts, 2012-Ohio-4699, ¶ 13. In this case, as discussed in our analysis of the first assignment of error, Kundtz’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief. In its motion to dismiss, the city correctly argued that the complaint failed to set forth a plain and short set of facts establishing a claim. The city’s motion to dismiss made numerous inferences and assumptions based on Kundtz’s complaint. At no point in the motion to dismiss, or elsewhere in the record, did the city request or did the court order a more definite statement from Kundtz. Kundtz’s more definite statement contained additional facts and allegations that were not included in her original complaint. Civ.R. 15(A) allows a plaintiff to amend a complaint either “‘within (1) 28 days of service of the complaint, or (2) the earlier of 28 days of service of (a) a responsive pleading or (b) a motion to dismiss, to strike, or for a more definite statement.’” King v. Divoky, 2021-Ohio- 1712, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.), quoting Hunter v. Rhino Shield, 2019-Ohio-1422, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). Kundtz did not attempt to amend her complaint within the bounds of Civ.R. 15. Therefore, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to strike her “more definite statement.” Additionally, we note that in striking Kundtz’s “more definite statement,” the trial court noted that even if it had not struck the pleading, the court’s analysis as to the city’s motion to dismiss would be the same. For these reasons, Kundtz’s second assignment of error is overruled. C. Additional Facts and Evidence In her third assignment of error, Kundtz argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims where additional facts became available through body-camera evidence and police records obtained after the initial filing. App.R. 16 sets forth the requirements for appellate briefs. App.R. 16(A)(7) requires the appellant to include in their brief “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” Further, App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that “[t]he court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).” Cleveland Hts. v. Watts, 2026-Ohio-126, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Manning v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 2025-Ohio-4751, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).  Here, Kundtz has failed to separately argue this assignment of error or identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based. For this reason, we decline to address Kundtz’s third assignment of error. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. _________________________ TIMOTHY W. CLARY, JUDGE MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR