Armengau v. Barton
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket26AP-127
JudgeJamison
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Armengau v. Barton, 2026-Ohio-4589.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Javier H. Armengau, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 26AP-127
(C.P.C. No. 24CV-4850)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Jennifer L. Barton f.k.a. :
Jennifer L. Young,
:
Defendant-Appellee.
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on November 19, 2026
On brief: Javier H. Armengau, pro se. Argued: Javier H.
Armengau.
On brief: Vernau Law LLC, and Adam K. Vernau, for
appellee. Argued: Adam K. Vernau.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
JAMISON, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Javier H. Armengau, appeals from the January 16, 2026
decision and entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to
dismiss of defendant-appellee, Jennifer L. Barton, formerly known as Jennifer L. Young.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On June 20, 2024, appellant filed a complaint against appellee in the trial
court alleging breach of fiduciary duty, theft, and conversion. In that complaint, appellant
alleged that in 2011, he entered into a lease/purchase agreement with the owner, Aimee
Lambert, of a property on Rays Circle, Dublin, Franklin County, Ohio. That same year,
appellant began a “personal relationship” with appellee. (June 20, 2024 Compl. at ¶ 7.) In
July of 2012, Lambert contacted appellant and asked if it was possible to accelerate the
No. 26AP-127 2
purchase of the property. At the time, appellant was unable to qualify for a mortgage
because his tax returns for 2011 and 2012 were not complete. Appellant met with a
mortgage broker to arrange the purchase of the property. A down payment of $10,000 was
required for the purchase of the property. Appellant issued a check to appellee to cover the
down payment. The loan was subsequently approved. Appellant and appellee attended the
closing and were given keys to the property. The deed was recorded on October 29, 2012.
{¶ 3} Appellant alleged that there was an arrangement between he and appellee
wherein appellant was to purchase the property from appellee at the price of the balance of
the mortgage. In the alternative, if the property was sold, the proceeds were to be paid to
appellant. On July 7, 2014, appellant was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison at
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). During his
incarceration, he was aware that appellee was attempting to sell the Rays Circle property.
Appellant’s girlfriend, Nicole Sill, was communicating with appellee regarding the sale of
the property. Appellant “repeatedly confirmed” that the funds from the sale would be
forwarded to Sill for appellant. (Compl. at ¶ 27.) After closing of the sale, appellee stopped
communicating with Sill. Appellant alleged that he repeatedly attempted to contact
appellee, but appellee ignored his communications. Upon his release from ODRC,
appellant attempted to contact appellee via phone, email, and regular mail. Appellee did
not respond.
{¶ 4} Appellee, through counsel, answered appellant’s complaint on July 16, 2024.
{¶ 5} On August 23, 2024, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellant’s complaint
based on the statute of frauds and the expiration of the statute of limitations. Appellant
filed a memorandum in opposition to appellee’s motion. Appellee replied to appellant’s
memorandum in opposition.
{¶ 6} On January 16, 2026, the trial court issued a decision and entry granting
appellee’s motion to dismiss. The trial court determined that appellant’s claims were
barred by the four-year statute of limitations. It also determined that the alleged oral
agreement between the parties was never reduced to writing as required by the statute of
frauds.
{¶ 7} It is from that decision and entry that appellant now appeals.
No. 26AP-127 3
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 8} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
The trial court erred when it granted Appellee’s Motion to
Dismiss based upon O.R.C. §1335, Ohio’s Statute of Frauds,
and O.R.C. §2305.07 and 2307.09, which limits the claims to
the Statute of Limitations without considering material facts
presented by Appellant that would still entitle Appellant to
recover for his losses.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 9} Generally, “[w]hen reviewing a decision on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this court’s standard
of review is de novo.” Beverly v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 2026-Ohio-3455, ¶ 10 (10th
Dist.). Under a de novo review, we must independently examine the complaint to
determine whether the dismissal was appropriate. Id. In doing so, we use the same
standard that the trial court used, but we do not defer to the trial court’s analysis or
conclusions. Id. A motion filed, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), tests the sufficiency of the
complaint. Id. at ¶ 9. In reviewing such a motion, the court must view the complaint in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff, presuming all factual allegations to be true and making
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. A complaint is properly dismissed
when it appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him or
her to relief. Id. “Although factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true,
‘unsupported conclusions of a complaint are not considered admitted . . . and are not
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.’ ” Justice v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins., 1998 Ohio
App. LEXIS 6250, *6 (10th Dist. Dec. 24, 1998), quoting State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots,
45 Ohio St.3d 324, 324 (1989).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 10} In his sole assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court erred
when it granted appellee’s motion to dismiss based upon the statute of frauds and the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Initially, it should be noted that the statute of frauds
and the expiration of the statute of limitations are affirmative defenses. Galbreath v.
Martin, 2013-Ohio-80, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.); Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 2008-Ohio-
3948, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.). “Because affirmative defenses typically rely on matters outside the
complaint, they normally cannot be raised in a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion.” Cristino v. Bur. of
No. 26AP-127 4
Workers’ Comp., 2012-Ohio-4420, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). “If, however, the existence of an
affirmative defense is obvious from the face of the complaint, a court may grant a Civ.R.
12(B)(6) motion on the basis of the affirmative defense.” Id.
{¶ 11} In response to appellee’s statute of frauds claim, appellant argues, in part,
that he partially performed under the parties’ alleged oral contract. Partial performance
removes an agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds. Gunsorek v. Heartland
Bank, 124 Ohio App.3d 735, 740 (10th Dist. 1997). “[A] party seeking to invoke the doctrine
of part performance must establish that he has performed acts in exclusive reliance on an
oral contract, and that such acts have changed his position to his prejudice.” LHPT
Columbus The, L.L.C. v. Capitol City Cardiology, Inc., 2014-Ohio-5247, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.).
In this matter, appellant’s complaint alleged that as part of the parties’ oral agreement, he
provided $10,000 as a down payment for the property. Taken as true, this is an act of
reliance on an oral contract that changed appellant’s position to his prejudice. Thus, the
application of the affirmative defense of statute of frauds was not obvious on the face of the
complaint and it was inappropriate for the trial court to decide that issue at the motion to
dismiss stage of the proceedings. However, as will be demonstrated below, the application
of the affirmative defense of expiration of the statute of limitations was obvious on the face
of the complaint, and the trial court properly granted appellee’s motion to dismiss in that
regard.
{¶ 12} “Generally, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to
run at the time the wrongful act was committed.” Mattlin Holdings L.L.C. v. First City
Bank, 2o10-Ohio-3700, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). In some cases, the discovery rule, which appellant
attempts to invoke here, applies. Under the discovery rule, “the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered a possible cause of action.” Id. In this matter, the property at issue
was sold on October 24, 2014. Appellant alleged that, pursuant to the parties’ oral contract,
he was entitled to the proceeds of that sale. Appellant’s complaint was not filed until
June 20, 2024. It is undisputed that this action was commenced outside of the four-year
statute of limitations for a contract not in writing, breach of fiduciary duty, theft, and
conversion. R.C. 2305.07(A); R.C. 2905.09(B) and (D).
No. 26AP-127 5
{¶ 13} Appellant makes several arguments in support of his claim that the trial court
erred in ruling that his complaint was barred by the aforementioned statute of limitations.
First, he argues that pursuant to the discovery rule, the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until January 2024. Appellant reasons that it was reasonable for him to believe that
appellee was holding his money until he was released from prison. Thus, according to
appellant, he was not aware of his claims until appellee did not return his money after his
release on December 27, 2023. Appellant’s argument is belied by the face of his complaint.
Appellant was aware that appellee was selling the property during his incarceration. The
proceeds from the sale were to be forwarded to appellant “immediately” upon closing.
(Compl. at ¶ 25.) It is undisputed that closing on the sale of the property occurred on or
about October 24, 2014. Following the sale of the property, appellant’s then-girlfriend was
communicating with appellee about the funds. Nowhere in appellant’s complaint does he
allege that appellee said she would forward him the money upon his release. Thus, allowing
a reasonable amount of time for the proceeds to be forwarded to appellant, he was clearly
aware of his claims by January 1, 2015, at the latest. As previously noted, appellant’s
complaint was not filed until June 20, 2024, long after the expiration of the four-year
statute of limitations. It follows that the discovery rule does not save appellant’s claims
from the statute of limitations.
{¶ 14} Second, appellant claims that the statute of limitations does not bar his
claims because the continuing tort doctrine applies. In support of this argument, appellant
contends that the most recent tortious conduct occurred in January 2024 when he
demanded the proceeds and they were not turned over to him. Additionally, appellant
alleges that there is “constant, new damage” until he receives the proceeds from the
property’s sale. (Appellant’s Brief at 11.) For example, appellant alleges that because the
funds were not provided to him, appellant’s daughter was forced into homelessness. This
argument fails for several reasons. First, the face of appellant’s complaint does not
establish a continuing tort. Although appellant’s complaint alleges that appellee’s
“withholding of [appellant’s] funds continues to cause irreparable harm,” the complaint
fails to specifically identify the harm. (Compl. at ¶ 37.) Indeed, the complaint makes no
mention of his daughter’s homelessness.
No. 26AP-127 6
{¶ 15} Second, even if we were to accept the complaint’s conclusory statement of
continuing harm as true, this continuing harm appears to be solely affecting appellant’s
children who are not parties to this action. Moreover, the complaint fails to identify his
children, their ages, and the specific harm they suffered. Finally, appellant’s argument fails
because the continuous tort doctrine simply does not apply. In Columbus Bd. of Edn. v.
Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 89 Ohio App.3d 846, 856 (10th Dist. 1993), we found
that the continuous tort doctrine did not apply even though the plaintiff alleged that
asbestos remained in the building. In so holding, we found that the property damage
caused by the asbestos was not a continuing injury. Id. “[T]he most equitable and rational
method of determining when the cause of action accrued is when the [claimant] knew or
should have known it was injured.” Id. at 856-857. Just like the continuing presence of
asbestos in the building at issue in Columbus Bd. of Edn., the alleged continued deprivation
of the property’s sales proceeds from appellant did not constitute a continuing injury. By
the face of the complaint, appellant knew or should have known he was injured as soon as
he was not immediately, or shortly thereafter, provided with the sale proceeds.
{¶ 16} Furthermore, if we were to accept appellant’s continuous tort argument, it
would effectively eliminate the statute of limitations in cases alleging conversion or theft of
money. By appellant’s logic, any claimant could circumvent the statute of limitations in
these cases by simply alleging that the theft or conversion caused them to have insufficient
funds for expenses years after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Based on the
foregoing, we find that the continuous tort doctrine does not apply in this case.
{¶ 17} Finally, appellant alleges that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents
appellee from asserting the affirmative defense of the expiration of the statute of
limitations. More specifically, appellant asserts that appellee misrepresented that she
would release the funds from the property’s sale to appellant, and appellant detrimentally
relied on that misrepresentation. Again, appellant’s argument fails for multiple reasons.
First, the only legal authorities appellant cites in support of his arguments are from the
Eighth District Court of Appeals, Moore v. Schiano, 117 Ohio App.3d 326 (8th Dist. 1996),
and the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Doe v. Fairfield School Dist., 2003 Ohio
Misc. LEXIS 121 (C.P. 2003). Neither of these cases are controlling on this court.
Furthermore, both of those cases found that equitable estoppel did not apply.
No. 26AP-127 7
{¶ 18} Second, appellant misapplies the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Appellant
asserts that the misrepresentation that creates an equitable estoppel issue is appellee’s
alleged promise to forward him the proceeds of the property sale. However, in order to
invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel regarding the statute of limitations, the
misrepresentation must prevent the claimant from filing a complaint within the statute of
limitations period. Cain v. Panitch, 2018-Ohio-1595, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). Equitable estoppel
does not apply when the misrepresentation is “related to the merits of plaintiff’s claims”
and “ ‘in no way . . . concern[] the statute of limitations or a promise of settlement.”
Lottridge v. Gahanna-Creekside Invests., L.L.C., 2015-Ohio-2168, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.),
quoting Kegg v. Mansfield, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2035, *15 (5th Dist. Apr. 30, 2001).
Here, the alleged misrepresentation cited by appellant relates to the merits of his claims,
not the statute of limitations or potential settlement. As such, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel does not apply in this case.
{¶ 19} Based on the foregoing, although the trial court erred in dismissing
appellant’s complaint, in part, due to the statute of frauds, it correctly dismissed the
complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is
overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 20} Although the trial court erred in its application of the statute of frauds, it
correctly applied the statute of limitations in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss. As
such, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Joyce v.
General Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1990) (“We have consistently held that a
reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous
reasons were assigned as the basis thereof.”).
Judgment affirmed.
BOGGS, P.J., and MENTEL, J., concur.
_____________