In re Guardianship of Foust
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketC-260142
JudgeMoore
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as In re Guardianship of Foust, 2026-Ohio-4615.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF DIXIE L. : APPEAL NO. C-260142
FOUST TRIAL NO. 2024001815
:
: JUDGMENT ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 11/20/2026.
Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to send all parties, or their
counsel if represented, a copy of the court’s judgment and note such action
on the docket.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as In re Guardianship of Foust, 2026-Ohio-4615.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF DIXIE L. : APPEAL NO. C-260142
FOUST TRIAL NO. 2024001815
:
: OPINION
Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 20, 2026
Gregory J. Vincent Law LLC and Gregory J. Vincent, for Appellant Kristian
Guntzelman,
Kevin J. Dinkelacker, Appellee Guardian of the Estate of Dixie L. Foust.
[Cite as In re Guardianship of Foust, 2026-Ohio-4615.]
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Kristian Guntzelman appeals the probate court’s denial of his
Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. We hold that Guntzelman was not
entitled to a hearing on his motion because he failed to demonstrate that he was
entitled to relief under one of the five grounds set forth in Civ.R. 60(B) or that he had
a meritorious claim if relief were granted. Additionally, we reject Guntzelman’s
argument that the probate court misinterpreted the specificity and particularity
requirements of Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) when it denied his motion. Because neither
assignment of error has merit, we affirm the probate court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Kristian Guntzelman is the stepson of Dixie Foust. Foust suffered a
stroke in 2015 and lives at a medical facility. On April 24, 2024, Guntzelman applied
to be his stepmother’s guardian. A short time later, on May 6, 2024, Randy Foust,
Dixie’s brother, filed a competing guardianship application.
{¶3} On July 29, 2024, a magistrate heard testimony from both parties and
their witnesses regarding the applications. The magistrate held a second hearing on
August 9, 2024. There, a Blue Ash police officer testified that he had learned of
suspicious financial transactions made by Guntzelman with his stepmother’s funds.
Guntzelman had access to the funds because he was appointed as an agent under her
2020 durable power of attorney. Specifically, Guntzelman used Dixie Foust’s money
to purchase two large parcels of land in Colorado. One parcel was to be used by him
and his wife to build a house. Guntzelman testified that he borrowed the trust funds
so that he could quickly close the deal. The other parcel was an investment property
for the trust. As compensation for his work managing his stepmother’s trust,
Guntzelman purchased himself a $154,000 car with trust assets.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} On August 20, 2024, the magistrate denied Guntzelman’s guardianship
application, in large part due to his “messy and suspicious” use of Dixie Foust’s trust
money. Guntzelman filed written objections to the magistrate’s decision, alleging that
the decision was contrary to law though he made no objections concerning the
financial transactions. The probate court denied these objections without a hearing on
November 20, 2024.
{¶5} On March 12, 2025, after the probate court appointed independent
guardians of Dixie Foust’s person and estate, Guntzelman filed a notice of appeal. This
court affirmed the probate court’s denial of Guntzelman’s guardianship application.
See In re Guardianship of Foust, 2025-Ohio-5833 (1st Dist.). Following his failed
appeal, Guntzelman filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment on March 2,
2026. In the motion, Guntzelman identified several documents relating to his financial
transactions with Dixie Foust’s funds that he wanted the probate court to consider. On
March 4, 2026, the probate court denied the motion without a hearing. Guntzelman
now appeals.
II. Analysis
{¶6} On appeal, Guntzelman raises two assignments of error. First,
Guntzelman argues that the probate court abused its discretion by denying his Civ.R.
60(B) motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Second, Guntzelman
argues that the probate court misinterpreted Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) by requiring him
to pre-identify his evidence in his objections to the magistrate’s decision.
A. Probate Court’s Denial of Guntzelman’s Motion Without a Hearing
{¶7} We review a trial court’s denial of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for an abuse of
discretion. Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1987). An abuse of discretion
requires more than an error of judgment; it requires that the court’s attitude be
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unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157
(1980).
{¶8} Under Civ.R. 60(B), the trial court may relieve a party from a final
judgment on the following grounds: “(1) [m]istake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect; (2) [n]ewly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) [f]raud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) [t]he judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5)
[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” Though all motions must be
made within a reasonable time, motions filed under subsections (1), (2), and (3) must
be made not more than one year after judgment. Id.
{¶9} To succeed on a motion under this rule, the moving party must
demonstrate (1) a meritorious claim or defense if relief is granted, (2) entitlement to
relief under one of the five grounds in Civ.R. 60(B), and (3) that the motion was timely
made. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150-151
(1976).
{¶10} Nothing in the text of Civ.R. 60(B) requires the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing before ruling on a motion for relief from judgment. Even so, the
Ohio Supreme Court has imposed such a requirement in certain cases: “‘If the movant
files a motion for relief from judgment and it contains allegations of operative facts
which would warrant relief under Civil Rule 60(B), the trial court should grant a
hearing to take evidence and verify these facts before it rules on the motion.’” Coulson
v. Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d 12, 16 (1983), quoting Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d
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97, 105 (8th Dist. 1974). Consequently, a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to
hold a hearing on a motion that sufficiently alleges grounds for relief and is supported
by evidence that would warrant relief from judgment. Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76
Ohio St.3d 18, 19 (1996).
{¶11} Guntzelman argues that he was entitled to a hearing because his Civ.R.
60(B) motion sufficiently alleged grounds for relief and was supported by evidence
warranting relief from judgment. Although Guntzelman’s appellate brief does not
identify which subsections of Civ.R. 60(B) entitle him to relief, his motion claimed that
he was entitled to relief under subsections (1), (2), and (5).
{¶12} First, Guntzelman argues that he was entitled to relief under Civ.R.
60(B)(1) due to a “procedural irregularity” that prevented him from fully presenting
his evidence. To start, Guntzelman is time-barred from relief under this subsection.
Though the probate court denied Guntzelman’s guardianship application on August
20, 2024, Guntzelman did not file his Civ.R. 60(B) motion until March 2, 2026. This
far exceeds the one-year period set by the rule.
{¶13} Even if Guntzelman’s motion was timely made, he still would not be
entitled to a hearing. Civ.R. 60(B)(1) does not cover “procedural irregularities.”
Rather, it covers “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Though he
does not explicitly make this argument, Guntzelman appears to be treating a
procedural irregularity as a type of mistake. Importantly, however, Civ.R. 60(B)(1)
concerns the conduct of the parties to the case. See, e.g., Union Savings Bank v. James
Martin Trucking, LTD, 2012-Ohio-5758, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.) (holding that any mistake,
neglect, or inadvertence committed by an attorney is imputed to their client for the
purposes of Civ.R. 60(B)(1)). It does not concern the conduct of the trial court in
deciding whether to hold a hearing. See Culgan v. Miller, 2011-Ohio-6194, ¶ 12 (9th
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Dist.) (noting that any mistake committed by the trial court is not the type of mistake
contemplated by Civ.R. 60(B)(1)). In cases where the trial court makes a mistake, the
proper remedy is an appeal,1 not a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Id.
{¶14} Even if Civ.R. 60(B)(1) did cover procedural irregularities, no
procedural irregularity occurred in this case. According to Guntzelman, the supposed
irregularity was the probate court’s cancellation of the evidentiary hearing on his
objections to the magistrate’s decision. Guntzelman asserts that the probate court’s
refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding his motion denied him the “sole
procedural vehicle” by which he could introduce “responsive documentary evidence.”
Essentially, Guntzelman is arguing that the probate court made a mistake by
cancelling the objections hearing; this “mistake” then requires the probate court to
hold another evidentiary hearing before deciding his Civ.R. 60(B) motion.
{¶15} The probate court, however, was not required to hold an objections
hearing. Guthrie v. Guthrie, 2024-Ohio-5581, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.) (“[N]either the relevant
rules nor this court’s precedent require a trial court to hold a hearing upon objections
to a magistrate’s decision.”). Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) makes clear that the probate court has
discretion to hold a hearing, but that it is not required to do so: “Before so ruling, the
court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to do so unless the objecting party
demonstrates that the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that
evidence for consideration by the magistrate.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶16} Guntzelman was not entitled to an objections hearing because he did
not demonstrate that he had evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have
been produced for the magistrate’s consideration. In fact, Guntzelman did not
1 Guntzelman already appealed the denial of his guardianship application and lost. See Foust, 2025-
Ohio-5833 (1st Dist.).
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indicate that he had any new evidence at all; his objections consisted solely of legal
arguments relating to R.C. 2111.121(B). Given the absence of any new evidence to
consider, the court likely concluded that an evidentiary hearing would be fruitless. As
a result, it reasonably decided not to hold a hearing. Guntzelman cannot now
retroactively claim that this decision was a “procedural irregularity.”
{¶17} Furthermore, Guntzelman’s repeated argument that the probate court’s
cancellation of the objections hearing denied him the opportunity to get all the facts
into the record is factually incorrect. Guntzelman’s financial transactions with his
stepmother’s funds were the sole subject of the August 9 hearing. Guntzelman and his
attorney provided testimony at that hearing attempting to justify the transactions. In
addition to their oral testimony, they could have presented the documents that they
now wish to have considered, particularly since Guntzelman acknowledged in his
Civ.R. 60(B) motion that at least some of the documents existed at that time. Even if
Guntzelman could not have presented the documents at the August 9 hearing, he could
have mentioned them in his objections and explained why he could not have produced
them earlier for the magistrate’s consideration. Once again, he failed to do so. The fault
for any factual deficiencies in the record lies with Guntzelman, not the probate court.
In conclusion, Guntzelman is not entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1).
{¶18} Next, Guntzelman argues that he is entitled to relief under Civ.R.
60(B)(2) because he has newly discovered evidence. While Guntzelman acknowledges
that some of the documents existed at the time of the August 9 hearing, he argues that
they are new evidence because they did not become material until after the August 9
hearing, which “reframed the financial narrative.”
{¶19} Once again, Guntzelman’s motion cannot succeed under Civ.R.
60(B)(2) because he filed the motion well outside the one-year limit set by the rule.
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Even if his motion was timely, the text of Civ.R. 60(B)(2) clearly states, and case law
confirms, that new evidence is only new if it could not have been discovered within the
time required to move for a new trial. Carnes v. Carnes, 2015-Ohio-2925, ¶ 19 (1st
Dist.). By Guntzelman’s own admission, many of the documents could have been
discovered well before the magistrate entered his judgment on August 20.
Furthermore, Guntzelman admits that the necessity of the documents became
apparent after the August 9 hearing. Once again, this was before the magistrate
entered his judgment on August 20. As a result, Guntzelman failed to demonstrate
that his “new” evidence could not have been discovered before judgment. Thus, he is
not entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(2).
{¶20} Finally, Guntzelman argues that he is entitled to relief under Civ.R.
60(B)(5). This subsection is a catch-all provision, but it should not be used as a
substitute for the rule’s four other, more specific grounds for relief. Caruso-Ciresi, Inc.
v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 (1983). It requires the movant to demonstrate that
there are extraordinary circumstances warranting relief. Westbrook v. Westbrook,
2026-Ohio-2192, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.).
{¶21} Guntzelman suggests that he is entitled to relief under subsection (5)
because this is a guardianship matter dealing with significant liberty and property
interests, and that the probate court’s cancellation of his objections hearing rendered
the record incomplete. As previously stated, the probate court was not required to hold
an evidentiary hearing on Guntzelman’s purely legal objections. Thus, the record is
potentially incomplete because of Guntzelman’s failure to produce relevant evidence
in a timely matter. Furthermore, the mere fact that this is a guardianship matter hardly
makes the case an extraordinary one. Therefore, Guntzelman is not entitled to relief
under Civ.R. 60(B)(5).
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{¶22} Despite his claims to the contrary, Guntzelman’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion
did not contain allegations of operative facts that would warrant relief under any of
the five grounds. For that reason, the probate court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to hold a hearing before ruling on the motion.
{¶23} Even if Guntzelman had successfully alleged operative facts that would
warrant relief, he failed to demonstrate that he has a meritorious claim or defense if
relief were granted. First, Guntzelman already appealed the denial of his guardianship
application and lost. See Foust, 2025-Ohio-5833 (1st Dist.). This is strong evidence
that he does not have a meritorious claim. Second, even if Guntzelman’s “new”
evidence shows that his transactions were legal, it is still unlikely that he would have
a winning claim. The probate court took issue with the financial transactions because
they cast doubt on Guntzelman’s judgment on how to manage his stepmother’s funds.
Even if entirely legal, the transactions were questionable and risky. Therefore, the new
documentary evidence purporting to show that Guntzelman’s transactions were legal
or that he otherwise followed proper procedures in making the transactions is unlikely
to change the probate court’s decision on his application. Because Guntzelman does
not have a meritorious claim or defense, the probate court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to hold a hearing.
{¶24} Guntzelman’s final argument under this assignment of error is that he
is entitled to a hearing because no party would be prejudiced by him having one.
Though this may be true, the probate court has discretion in whether to grant a party’s
request for a hearing. Since Guntzelman’s motion did not contain allegations of
operative facts that would warrant relief under Civ.R. 60(B), the probate court did not
err in denying him a hearing regardless of the lack of prejudice.
{¶25} For these reasons, we overrule Guntzelman’s first assignment of error.
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B. Probate Court’s Interpretation of Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii)
{¶26} In its order denying Guntzelman’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion, the probate
court noted that Guntzelman “made no argument in his objections regarding the
evidence that he now alleges existed at the time.” Guntzelman’s second assignment of
error argues that in denying his motion on this ground, the probate court was
misreading the requirements of Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) (“An objection to a magistrate’s
decision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.”).
Specifically, Guntzelman argues that the probate court was improperly requiring him
to pre-identify the evidence that he would have used to support his objections, above
and beyond the specificity and particularity requirements of the rule.
{¶27} By noting that Guntzelman did not make any objections based on the
financial transactions, the probate court was not misinterpreting the requirements of
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii). It is unlikely that the court was even referring to the rule at all.
Rather, the court was merely noting, correctly, that Guntzelman never raised any
arguments in his objections that related to the financial transactions. He raised purely
legal arguments. It made this observation in support of its ultimate conclusion that
there was no “procedural irregularity” in the court deciding not to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the objections. As a result, the probate court did not err in noting that
Guntzelman first raised arguments relating to the financial transactions in his Civ.R.
60(B) motion, not in his written objections to the magistrate’s decision.
{¶28} Accordingly, we overrule Guntzelman’s second assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶29} The probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Guntzelman’s
Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment without a hearing. Guntzelman was not
entitled to a hearing because his motion failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to
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relief under any of the five grounds in Civ.R. 60(B). Furthermore, Guntzelman failed
to demonstrate that he had a meritorious claim if relief were granted.
{¶30} Additionally, the probate court did not err by noting in its decision
denying Guntzelman’s motion that he failed to make any arguments relating to his
financial transactions with his stepmother’s funds in his objections to the magistrate’s
decision. This observation was not a misinterpretation of the requirements of Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(b)(ii).
{¶31} Because neither of Guntzelman’s assignments of error have merit, we
affirm the judgment of the probate court.
Judgment affirmed.
KINSLEY, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.
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