Full Opinion

[Cite as J.T. v. W.T., 2026-Ohio-4604.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY J.T. : : C.A. No. 30842 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2025 DV 00944 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- W.T. : Domestic Relations) : Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30842 CARA J. WILLIAMS, Attorney for Appellant W.T., Pro Se Appellee EPLEY, J. {¶ 1} J.T. appeals from the trial court’s judgment overruling her objections to the magistrate’s decision and dismissing with prejudice her petition for a domestic violence civil protection order (DVCPO). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} J.T. and W.T. were married on December 21, 2021. The next day, December 22, their child was born. On August 15, 2023, J.T. and W.T. were divorced in Texas where they were living. The Texas court order granted custody to mother J.T. and ordered the parties to use the AppClose coparenting application to communicate regarding their child. The court also granted an injunction that prevented W.T. from being within one hundred feet of J.T.’s home. {¶ 3} J.T. relocated to Ohio with the couple’s child. W.T. remained in Texas but visited the child in Ohio in September 2024. J.T. allowed W.T. in her home, but W.T. refused to leave after the visit. Police were called, and W.T. left. The next month, W.T. came to Ohio without notice to J.T. After visiting, W.T. again refused to leave her residence, and J.T. contacted the police. No charges were filed against W.T. for his refusal to leave. {¶ 4} Regarding the September 2024 visit, J.T. was asked if W.T. had been trespassed from her home. She replied, “I believe so, because he was – when I had asked him to leave in September, he refused to leave then as well. He was visiting. At that time, we were not on the same terms, but I had asked him to leave, and he refused to leave then 2 also.” No further details were provided about the September visit. J.T. said she trespassed him from her property after the October visit. {¶ 5} J.T. moved to a different home but did not notify W.T. of the address to avoid future contact. In October 2024, J.T. also petitioned for a DVCPO in Ohio. An ex parte DVCPO was granted and remained in place until February 2025, when it was voluntarily dismissed because the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). The MOU was not a court order and was referred to as a “side agreement” by the court. There was no testimony of events or incidents between October 2024 and May 2025. {¶ 6} On June 9, 2025, J.T. filed another petition for a DVCPO. An ex parte order was denied. A full hearing before a magistrate was held on January 23, 2026. J.T. appeared with counsel; W.T. did not appear. W.T.’s request to appear remotely was denied. {¶ 7} At the full hearing, J.T. testified that on June 1, 2025, W.T. called J.T. through AppClose. J.T. did not answer because she was driving home from her sister’s house. W.T. then repeatedly called J.T., starting at 6:01 p.m. When asked how many times he had called, J.T. responded, “I believe it’s 32, but I’m not positive without counting them.” J.T. found the calls “disruptive and distracting,” and she did not answer them. {¶ 8} Prior to the incessant calls, W.T. messaged J.T. that she was “refusing to answer the phone during the time [she] set in motion.” This referred to the MOU, which provided that he was to call at 6:00 p.m. to speak with their daughter. W.T. indicated in the AppClose message that he was calling multiple times as proof for his lawyer that J.T. was not answering. Three hours later, at 9:08 p.m., J.T. responded to W.T. on AppClose. She testified that she has severe anxiety, bouts of depression, weight loss, insomnia, and nightmares. She also has PTSD from the two-year marriage. {¶ 9} On February 4, 2026, the magistrate denied J.T.’s petition. J.T. filed objections 3 to the magistrate’s ruling. On March 26, 2026, the trial court found no error in the magistrate’s decision, overruled J.T.’s objections, and dismissed her petition. {¶ 10} J.T. assigns three errors to the trial court’s decision, which we will review together. Analysis {¶ 11} J.T.’s assignments of error state: [1.] The Court erred in denying J.T. a domestic violence civil protection order because it goes against the manifest weight of the evidence. [2.] The Trial Court held J.T. to a higher standard of review than preponderance of the evidence when it added an immediacy requirement for her to obtain a protection order. [3.] The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of J.T. by failing to liberally construe R.C. 3113.31 which is a remedial statute. {¶ 12} Domestic violence civil protection orders are granted when there is an existence or threatened existence of domestic violence. “DVCPOs are governed by R.C. 3113.31, which permits a person to seek a protection order against anyone who has committed domestic violence (as defined in R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)) against them or a dependent.” B.H. v. C.H., 2024-Ohio-1803, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). Under R.C. 3113.31(E)(1), a court may grant a DVCPO to bring about a cessation of domestic violence against family or household members if the “petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner or petitioner’s family or household members are in danger of domestic violence.” Felton v. Felton, 1997-Ohio-302, paragraph two of the syllabus, citing R.C. 3113.31(D). “A preponderance of the evidence is defined as that measure of proof that convinces the judge 4 or jury that the existence of the fact sought to be proved is more likely than its nonexistence.” State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 2011-Ohio-6117, ¶ 54. {¶ 13} When reviewing the denial of a petition for a DVCPO, an appellate court must determine whether the necessary elements were established by a preponderance of the evidence and, thus, whether a protection order should have been granted. T.O. v. T.G., 2024-Ohio-4510, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.). This standard is, in essence, a review as to whether the denial of the DVCPO was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id., citing Caban v. Ransome, 2009-Ohio-1034, ¶ 7 (7th Dist.). {¶ 14} When evaluating whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). When applying this analysis, “the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21; State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 28. {¶ 15} “Ordinarily, courts must have conflicting evidence to conduct a manifest-weight review.” Reillo at ¶ 30. A reversal based on the weight of the evidence is ordered only in exceptional circumstances. Thompkins at ¶ 25. {¶ 16} Pursuant to R.C. 3113.31(A)(1), domestic violence is defined as the occurrence of one of the following against a family or household member: (i) attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury; (ii) placing another by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing a violation of R.C. 2903.211 or 2911.211; (iii) committing certain acts against a child that would result in the child being an abused 5 child as defined in R.C. 2151.031; or (iv) committing a sexual oriented offense. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a). A menacing by stalking offense is defined by R.C. 2903.211, which states: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person . . . or cause mental distress to the other person.” {¶ 17} A “pattern of conduct” means “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). Explicit threats are not necessary to meet the elements of menacing by stalking. State v. Crawl, 2025-Ohio-2799, ¶ 11. For example, expressing love for an elementary school classmate you have not seen in over a decade, inappropriate social-media messages, asking if a video showed the victim’s home, showing up at the victim’s home and turning the doorknob, and continuing to contact the victim after a confrontation by a police officer about appearing at the victim’s apartment uninvited, all within a month, constituted a pattern of conduct closely related in time. Id. {¶ 18} “Mental distress” includes “[a]ny mental illness or condition that involves some temporary substantial incapacity[.]” R.C. 2903.211(D)(2)(a). In Crawl, the victim’s mental distress was established through her testimony, her actions following the incident at her apartment, and the police officer’s observation of the victim after the incident. Id. In particular, the victim testified about her significant anxiety that prompted her to install cameras, ensure she was on her phone when she came home late at night with her daughter, have her boyfriend stay over more than usual, and look for another place to live. While testifying, she felt like she was going to throw up and that her heart was pumping out of her chest. Id. {¶ 19} In her brief, J.T. states that the trial court “found evidence going to each of the elements of menacing by stalking for the purposes of issuing a protection order.” In 6 contradistinction, though, the court found that W.T.’s behavior in the first week of June 2025 did not constitute menacing by stalking. It explained that “[J.T.] simply testified that [W.T.] causes her mental distress when he contacts her, period.” The trial court further found that the two 2024 incidents were not “indicative of [J.T.] being in immediate danger of domestic violence,” noting that they occurred eight months before the filing of the petition and J.T. did not elaborate on W.T.’s actions outside of his refusal to leave. {¶ 20} On the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. J.T. testified about W.T.’s pattern of refusing to leave her home: (1) in 2023, during the pendency of the divorce; (2) in September 2024, when he came to Ohio to visit their child; and (3) in October 2024, when he returned unannounced. J.T. filed for a protection order in October 2024 but later dismissed it after signing an MOU with W.T. However, the trial court reasonably concluded that the incidents in 2023 and 2024 were not close in time to the 2025 allegations and did not support the issuance of a DVCPO. {¶ 21} The trial court also did not lose its way in concluding that W.T.’s behavior in June 2025 did not constitute menacing by stalking. On June 1, 2025, W.T. began calling J.T. at 6:00 p.m. (which was presumably the time he called to talk with their child). In addition to multiple calls, W.T. texted on the AppClose program: “its 6pm,” “why is my call being declined,” “I don’t mean to call so many times but I have to record these for my lawyer so he sees how many times I call during the hours you set up and don’t get a answer.” At 9:08 p.m., J.T. eventually responded, “Please reread the agreement you signed before threatening your lawyer.” At 9:17 p.m., W.T. wrote: “adding a clause about you staying out of my personal dating life will be in the new one. 3 relationships you have stuck your nose in and ruined. Please leave me be. I just want to focus on my daughter.” 7 {¶ 22} The trial court found it significant that J.T. did not elaborate on W.T.’s frustration with contacting his daughter or his complaint about J.T. interfering with his personal relationships. J.T. admitted an exhibit showing the AppClose contacts (Exhibit 4) to show how often W.T. called during the first week of June, but she did not discuss the text messages that were admitted with it. Because of that, the trial court found that J.T. was not forthcoming with her testimony. There was scant testimony about incidents between the visits in 2024 and the calls in June 2025. J.T. stated that W.T. would call her often, sometimes from a second phone or a number that she did not recognize (but there was no testimony about the time of day or frequency). The trial court’s conclusions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we find no error in the trial court’s denial of J.T.’s petition for a DVCPO. {¶ 23} The assignments of error are overruled. III. Conclusion {¶ 24} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ............. LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. 8