Morgan v. Recklaw

[Cite as Morgan v. Recklaw, 2026-Ohio-3782.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COLUMBIANA COUNTY CATHERINE MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH RECKLAW, Defendant-Appellant. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 26 CO 0002 Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Columbiana County, Ohio Case No. 2023 DR 448 BEFORE: Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Katelyn Dickey, Judges. JUDGMENT: Affirmed. Atty. Ashley E. Stowers, Stowers Law Office, LLC, for Plaintiff-Appellee and Joseph Recklaw, Pro se, Defendant-Appellant. Dated: September 24, 2026  –2– HANNI, J. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Recklaw, appeals from a Columbiana County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, judgment overruling his “motion to set aside custody judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B).” Appellant raises various arguments on appeal mostly centered around the allegations that he was never served with the complaint for divorce filed by Plaintiff-Appellee, Catherine Morgan, and therefore the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. He claims all judgments issued by the trial court are void. Because Appellant never raised this defense in the trial court and because Appellant voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. {¶2} The parties were married on October 4, 2018. They share one child, D.R. (d.o.b. 1/30/16). On November 27, 2023, Appellee filed a complaint for divorce. The magistrate issued temporary orders the next day, naming Appellee as residential parent, granting Appellant the standard order of visitation, and ordering Appellant to pay child support of approximately $119 per month during the pendency of this matter. Temporary orders were later modified twice by agreement of the parties giving Appellant significantly more parenting time. {¶3} Pretrial proceedings and temporary orders continued until February 2025. Appellant actively participated in the proceedings. During this time, Appellant was represented by three different attorneys. {¶4} The parties eventually entered into a separation agreement and shared parenting plan, which was approved and adopted by the trial court. The court entered the decree of divorce on February 28, 2025. Pursuant to the shared parenting plan, during the school year Appellant has parenting time from Thursday at 4:00 p.m. until Monday at 7:15 a.m. and on alternating weeks from Thursday at 4:00 p.m. until Friday at 7:15 a.m. During the summer, the parties alternate parenting time weekly. Neither party is to pay child support to the other. During the divorce proceedings both parties were represented by counsel. {¶5} On May 9, 2025, Appellee filed a notice of intent to relocate from Salem, Ohio to Atwater, Ohio due to her upcoming marriage. Appellant requested a hearing to Case No. 26 CO 0002  –3– modify the visitation order. Both parties appeared before the magistrate pro se. The magistrate found that all of the issues Appellant brought up occurred before the divorce, so they were not relevant. Also, the magistrate found that both parties had moved since the divorce but the geographical distance between them remained approximately the same. Therefore, the magistrate found that the shared parenting plan was to remain in effect. {¶6} On September 24, 2025, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a “motion to set aside custody judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B).” He asserted that he was never personally served with the divorce complaint because it was handed to a third-party at a residence where he did not reside but only spent some time. He further asserted that because he was never personally served he “had no notice of the divorce filing and no opportunity to be heard before the Court entered custody and child support orders.” Appellant claimed, therefore, that all custody and child support orders were void. Appellant further argued that he signed the separation agreement under “extreme duress”, he was berated by his own counsel, and the magistrate was biased against him. {¶7} The trial court issued its judgment entry overruling Appellant’s motion on December 29, 2025. The court noted that this was an atypical Civ.R. 60(B) case because the case was decided on its merits. It further pointed out, other than citing the rule itself, Appellant’s motion did not address the requirements of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment such as asserting a meritorious defense. It stated: When the pending motion as well as the affidavit of Mr. Recklaw are considered, it appears that Mr. Recklaw is simply giving voice to his dissatisfaction with the decisions of Magistrate Allison, the purported conduct of opposing counsel, as well as the conduct of his last counsel . . . The legally available remedy for dissatisfaction with the outcome of a proceeding is an objection and/or an appeal, not relief from judgment. (December 29, 2025 JE). The trial court then reviewed Appellant’s arguments finding the court did in fact have jurisdiction over Appellant, Appellant waived any claim that the magistrate was biased, and Appellant had not asserted any viable grounds for relief. {¶8} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 8, 2026. Case No. 26 CO 0002  –4– {¶9} The standard of review used to evaluate a trial court's decision to deny or grant a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is abuse of discretion. Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Rock N Horse, Inc., 2004-Ohio-2122, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court set out the controlling test for Civ.R. 60(B) motions in GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. Arc Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), where the court stated: To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶11} As the trial court pointed out, Appellant’s motion is not the typical use of Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment as this case was resolved based on the merits (including a separation agreement and shared parenting plan). Appellant has not presented a meritorious defense or any entitlement to relief in accordance with the rule. Moreover, his assignments of error do not make any arguments related to the GTE test or the standard for reviewing Civ.R. 60(B) motions on appeal. Therefore, while we will address the merits of Appellant’s assignments of error, they are not in the context of a GTE analysis. {¶12} Appellant, still proceeding pro se, now raises six assignments of error. {¶13} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE NOVEMBER 28, 2023 TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND SUPPORT ORDER BECAUSE THE ORDER WAS ENTERED UPON FILING AND Case No. 26 CO 0002  –5– BEFORE ANY SERIVCE WAS ATTEMPTED, RENDERING THE ORDER VOID AB INITIO. {¶14} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the magistrate’s November 28, 2023 temporary order is void ab initio because it was entered before service was perfected on him. He points out that the magistrate issued this temporary order the day after Appellee filed the complaint for divorce. {¶15} Civ.R. 75(N) provides: (N) Temporary Orders of Spousal Support, Child Support, and Custody. (1) When requested in the complaint, answer, or counterclaim, or by motion served with the pleading, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit duly filed with the clerk of the court, the court or magistrate, without oral hearing and for good cause shown, may grant a temporary order regarding spousal support to either of the parties for the party's sustenance and expenses during the suit and may make a temporary order regarding the support, maintenance, and allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children of the marriage, whether natural or adopted, during the pendency of the action for divorce, annulment, or legal separation. (2) Counter affidavits may be filed by the other party within fourteen days from the service of the complaint, answer, counterclaim, or motion, all affidavits to be used by the court or magistrate in making a temporary spousal support order, child support order, and order allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children. Upon request, in writing, after any temporary spousal support, child support, or order allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children is journalized, the court shall grant the party so requesting an oral hearing within twenty-eight days to modify the temporary order. A request for oral hearing shall not suspend or delay the commencement of spousal support or other support payments previously ordered or change the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities until the order is modified by journal entry after the oral hearing. Case No. 26 CO 0002  –6– (Emphasis added). {¶16} Thus, the Rule gives the magistrate permission to grant temporary orders regarding spousal support and allocation of parental rights based solely on the affidavit of the moving party upon filing the complaint for divorce. The Rule does not contain a requirement that the magistrate wait for 14 days to see if counter affidavits are filed. Instead, the magistrate may modify the temporary orders upon request and hold a hearing. {¶17} Moreover, Columbiana County Local Rule 9.1(A) titled “Temporary Orders in Domestic Relations Cases” provides: All temporary orders filed pursuant to this Rule will be filed as a Magistrate’s Order. At the time of filing of a divorce or legal separation, the attorney for the plaintiff or person representing themselves as a plaintiff shall file with the complaint a proposed judgment entry to be approved by the Court, which entry shall order the following: [parental rights and temporary support.] {¶18} Thus, like Civ.R. 75(N), the local rule contemplates the court will issue temporary orders when the complaint for divorce is filed. {¶19} The Twelfth District addressed the same issue as Appellant raises here (but under an earlier version of Civ.R. 75). In Crank v. Crank, 1984 WL 3365, *1 (12th Dist. June 29, 1984), the husband argued on appeal that the trial court improperly awarded wife temporary alimony based solely on wife’s motion and supporting affidavit. Husband asserted the trial court should not have issued the temporary alimony award until affidavits on the matter had been submitted by both parties. The appeals court determined: “the temporary alimony awarded below solely on the basis of the affidavit submitted by appellee is not void ab initio, as suggested by appellant, but merely voidable or subject to adjustment if the counter-affidavits filed within fourteen days and/or the subsequent hearing provided for by Civ. R. 75(M)(2) indicate that such action is necessary and proper.” Id. at *2. {¶20} In addition to the above, Appellant actively participated with Appellee and their respective counsel to modify the temporary orders twice during the pendency of the proceedings. See Magistrate’s Orders dated February 2, 2024 and April 22, 2024. Case No. 26 CO 0002  –7– {¶21} Based on the rules, the case law, and Appellant’s agreement in modifying the temporary orders, Appellant’s claim here is unfounded. {¶22} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. {¶23} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: THE LATER THIRD-PARTY SERVICE ATTEMPT DID NOT CURE THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT, BECAUSE SERVICE WAS ATTEMPTED AT AN ADDRESS THAT WAS NOT APPELLANT’S ADDRESS, AND THE DOCKET CONTAINS RETURNED MAIL CONFIRMING THE ADDRESS USED WAS INCORRECT. {¶24} Appellant contends here that Appellee never perfected service of the divorce complaint. He asserts he did not file his corrected address with the court until March 25, 2024. So Appellant seemingly contends anything mailed to him before that date never reached him. {¶25} Personal jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Menges v. Strunk, 2025-Ohio-252, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.), citing Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 2010-Ohio-2551, ¶ 27. {¶26} “Personal jurisdiction can be obtained through service of process, waiver or voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.” Young v. Young, 2001-Ohio-3248 (7th Dist.), citing Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984). {¶27} Appellant’s argument here belies the facts. {¶28} On December 5, 2023, the Portage County Sheriff’s Department left a copy of the complaint at the address listed on the complaint in Diamond, Ohio with a woman who was at the residence. {¶29} On December 22, 2023, Appellant’s counsel entered an appearance on Appellant’s behalf. {¶30} On January 8, 2024, Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim. He did not assert any defenses nor did he claim in any way that he had not been served with the divorce complaint. {¶31} The matter proceeded for almost two years during which time Appellant, through counsel, actively participated in the litigation and, ultimately, resolved the case Case No. 26 CO 0002  –8– by way of a separation agreement and shared parenting plan. It was not until after the final judgment was entered that Appellant raised the issue of personal jurisdiction. {¶32} In addressing this issue, we have explained: More specifically, “Civ.R. 12(B) requires that a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction must be presented either in the defendant's answer or by a motion prior to the filing of defendant's answer. Franklin v. Franklin (1981), 5 Ohio App.3d 74, 75-76, 5 OBR 186, 187-189, 449 N.E.2d 457, 458-460. Civ.R. 12(H) states that if the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is not made in accordance with subsection (G) or made by motion under Civ.R. 12 or in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A), such defense is waived.” (Footnote omitted.) State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. [v. Kupanoff Imports, Inc.], 83 Ohio App.3d at 281, 614 N.E.2d 1072. In other words, if a defendant files an answer without raising the defense of personal jurisdiction, then he or she has waived personal jurisdiction and voluntarily assented to the jurisdiction of the court. Snyder Computer Sys., Inc. v. Stives, 2008-Ohio-1192, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.). {¶33} Based on the above, Appellant waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. {¶34} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. {¶35} Appellant’s third assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF CUSTODY AND IMPOSED CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, TESTIMONY, OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS, VIOLATING DUE PROCESS AND RENDERING THE ORDERS VOID. {¶36} In this assignment of error, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in entering temporary orders and entering judgment on the issue of custody without holding any evidentiary hearings. {¶37} Appellant’s argument here disregards the fact that he participated in negotiating both the temporary orders and the shared parenting plan. Case No. 26 CO 0002  –9– {¶38} Appellant agreed to the two modifications of temporary orders relating to parenting time. See Magistrate’s Orders dated February 2, 2024 and April 22, 2024 (stating, “[t]he parties advised the court that they had reached an agreement to modify parenting time”). And then Appellant entered into a shared parenting agreement with Appellee. {¶39} “It has long been the rule in Ohio that if the parties voluntarily enter into a separation agreement, the agreement becomes a valid and binding contract between the parties.” Russell v. Russell, 1999 WL 437003, *1 (5th Dist. June 7, 1999), citing Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio St. 187 (1941). A shared parenting agreement will not be set aside based on a change of heart or poor legal advice. Haas v. Bauer, 2004-Ohio-437, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). It is disingenuous for Appellant to now argue the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the matter of parenting time. The court would have no need to hold an evidentiary hearing when the parties were able to settle the matter. {¶40} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. {¶41} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE RECORD ARE MATERIALLY INCOMPLETE BECAUSE MULTIPLE HEARINGS WERE MARKED “HEARD/NO RECORD,” AND THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S GOOD FAITH EFFORTS TO CORRECT AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD PREVENTS MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW. {¶42} Appellant claims here the trial court held numerous hearings that were not recorded. {¶43} After he filed his notice of appeal, on January 8, 2026, Appellant filed what he terms “Appellant’s statement of the evidence pursuant to App.R. 9(C)” in this Court. It simply lists dates for seven hearings that Appellant stated were not recorded. Then on February 23, 2026, he filed with this Court “Appellant’s statement of the evidence and proceedings.” In this filing, Appellant rehashes his arguments, claims he was not permitted into certain hearings, argues he was coerced into signing the separation agreement, and talks about motions he states the trial court did not rule on. He also Case No. 26 CO 0002  – 10 – attached affidavits from various friends/family members in an attempt to support his claims. {¶44} Appellant seems to confuse this assignment of error with his attempt at appellate practice. {¶45} App.R. 9(C) provides a means for an appellant to provide the appellate court with the evidence presented before the trial court when no recording was made or when a transcript of the proceedings is not available. Pursuant to the rule: (1) If no recording of the proceedings was made, if a transcript is unavailable, or if a recording was made but is no longer available for transcription, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant's recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee no later than twenty days prior to the time for transmission of the record pursuant to App.R. 10 and the appellee may serve on the appellant objections or propose amendments to the statement within ten days after service of the appellant's statement; these time periods may be extended by the court of appeals for good cause. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be forthwith submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval. The trial court shall act prior to the time for transmission of the record pursuant to App.R. 10, and, as settled and approved, the statement shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. (Emphasis added); App.R. 9(C)(1). {¶46} Appellant did not follow the procedure set out in the rule. Appellant did not submit any factual statement to the trial court “for settlement and approval” in accordance to the appellate rules. {¶47} If no transcript is available, then it is the Appellant's duty to present this court with one of the transcript substitutes as provided for in App.R. 9(C). App.R. 9(B). Since Appellant failed to file a transcript or transcript substitute, we are left to consider this appeal based solely on the information in the record. Appellant makes no further discernable argument in this assignment of error. Case No. 26 CO 0002  – 11 – {¶48} Additionally, we note that on August 27, 2026 while this appeal was pending, Appellant filed with this Court a document labeled “defendant-appellant Joseph Recklaw’s response concerning record integrity, demand for correction and preservation of the record, demand for production of the complete affidavit of truth, and request for independent review.” For the same reasons set forth in this assignment of error, Appellant’s request is overruled. {¶49} Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. {¶50} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT HAS FAILED TO RULE ON APPELLANT’S DECEMBER 22, 2025 MOTION REQUESTING A MANDATORY JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION, WHICH CONFIRMS THAT JURISDICTION REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND THAT FURTHER ACTIONS ON THE MERITS IS IMPROPER. {¶51} On December 22, 2025, Appellant filed a “motion to compel jurisdictional determination, restore custody, order repayment of unlawfully collected CSEA funds, and compel preservation and production of the complete record.” {¶52} Appellant contends in this assignment of error that the trial court’s failure to rule on this motion confirms that the issue of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved. {¶53} First, as has been addressed in Appellant’s other assignments of error, jurisdiction has been resolved. {¶54} Second, generally “if a trial court fails to issue a written ruling on a pending motion, the presumption is the motion was overruled or it was the intention of the trial court to deny the motion.” Wilson v. Gannett Co., 2020-Ohio-3643, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.). {¶55} Accordingly, Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. {¶56} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error states: BECAUSE THE ORDERS AT ISSUE ARE VOID, NOT MERELY VOIDABLE, SUBSEQUENT LABELS SUCH AS “TEMPORARY” DO NOT Case No. 26 CO 0002  – 12 – CURE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION, LACK OF NOTICE, OR LACK OF DUE PROCESS. {¶57} In his final assignment of error, Appellant once again argues the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and so all of its orders are void. {¶58} As discussed in detail earlier, Appellant never asserted the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and he voluntarily participated in all proceedings. Thus, he has waived this issue. {¶59} Accordingly, Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. {¶60} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed. Waite, P.J., concurs. Dickey, J., concurs. Case No. 26 CO 0002 [Cite as Morgan v. Recklaw, 2026-Ohio-3782.] For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived. A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution. NOTICE TO COUNSEL This document constitutes a final judgment entry.