In re D.J.

[Cite as In re D.J., 2026-Ohio-4490.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA IN RE D.J. : : No. 116337 A Minor Child : : [Appeal by Mother, D.W.-S.] : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2026 Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. FA19105285 Appearances: D.W.-S., pro se. LISA B. FORBES, P.J.: D.W.-S. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s partial grant of her motion to modify legal custody and parenting time of her child, D.J. (“D.J.” or “the Child”). After a thorough review of the facts and the law, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History A. Background and Motion to Modify Legal Custody and Parenting Time This case is about legal custody and parenting time related to D.J., an eight-year-old boy at the time of this dispute. On September 18, 2023, the juvenile court issued a journal entry committing the Child to J.J.’s (“Father”) sole legal custody. Mother was granted supervised visitation every other Saturday from 10:00 a.m. until 11:30 a.m. and was prohibited from “attending any medical appointments, school events, school meetings or extracurricular activities.” On December 2, 2024, Mother filed a motion to modify both her parenting time and legal custody of the Child, requesting that the juvenile court fashion a “50/50 shared parenting plan.” On October 27, 2025, the juvenile court held a hearing before a magistrate concerning Mother’s motion, eliciting the following testimony pertinent to this appeal. B. Hearing Testimony 1. Mother Mother testified that she had “never been involved with” physical abuse of the Child. She had completed an anger-management course after a mental- health specialist recommended that she do so. Through that course, she learned “[h]ow to respond to different things when a child is . . . acting out . . . and how to handle stressful moments . . . trying not to get your emotions mixed in when you’re handling them.” Mother sought mental-health counseling, “not consistently” but “when I . . . felt down or missed my son.” She agreed that her therapist “helped [her] . . . basically cope with different things that were going on.” Concerning Father, the following exchange occurred: Q: [D]id you have concerns about anything happening with father since the date of the last order? A: At the moment I don’t have any concerns for him.  Later, Mother stated, “Every time I discuss something with the father he gets upset and tells the Guardian [ad litem] that I’m accusing him of something . . . so I don’t discuss anything with the father.” Mother testified that Father had sent her “hostile” text messages, in which he had cursed at her, in response to her request that he update her more frequently about the Child’s sports schedule. Mother testified that Father had not told her that the Child was having surgery to get his tonsils removed. Mother had observed a “hit mark” on the Child, about which she had contacted the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services. She did not file a police report, and the Child did not tell her that anyone had hit him. Mother denied that the Child was being abused and reiterated that she did not have issues with how Father was raising the Child. 2. Father Father testified that he gave Mother the Child’s sports schedule as soon as he received it and had not been withholding it from her. He had not told Mother about the Child’s doctor’s appointments because “she got kicked out of [an] appointment” around two years prior. He did not support Mother spending additional time with the Child. He opined that the “standard parenting time is just enough” because the Child “is doing great.” 3. Grandmother T.S. (“Grandmother”) testified that Mother was a “good mother” and that she “goes very hard for her children.” Grandmother had never seen Mother “abuse or neglect” the Child, of whom Mother was “very protective.” Grandmother recalled at least one instance where Father declined to let Grandmother visit with the Child but Grandmother did not know why that had occurred. 4. Guardian ad Litem The guardian ad litem for the Child (“GAL”) testified, “Both parents want to be involved in this child’s life, and there’s no question as to their commitment.” However, the GAL was not aware of any change in the circumstances of the Child or Father. The Child was “a really sweet kid,” was “very friendly,” and “seem[ed] to be thriving.” He seemed “to do well in school,” was “a hard worker,” “dedicated,” and “kind.” The GAL testified, “As for dad, I have no reason to believe that his parenting is anything other than appropriate.” The GAL recommended that Father retain legal custody. The GAL had spoken with Mother’s therapist, who mentioned that Mother was “dedicated to . . . treatment, and that it’s well-received,” but that “she wants more consistent engagement.” The GAL recommended that Father seek mental-health treatment related to post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) but had no reason to believe any of Father’s mental-health issues substantially interfered with his ability to parent the Child. As for why the juvenile court had previously required Mother, but not Father, to seek mental-health counseling, the GAL explained that, when Mother lost custody, there was “a lot of . . . pointing the finger at dad, but not kind of an acceptance of” responsibility. According to the GAL, there were “significant concerns at the time . . . in terms of perhaps delusional thinking” that might be underlying Mother’s behavior.  C. The Juvenile Court’s Rulings and This Appeal On November 5, 2025, the magistrate issued a decision recommending that Mother’s parenting time be increased to “[e]very other weekend Friday after school until Sunday at 5pm” and “[e]very Thursday after school until 7pm.” Father retained legal custody of the Child and remained the Child’s residential parent. Father was “required to keep mother up to date with school or medical appointments” using Our Family Wizard. Mother would “not have access to medical or school appointments,” but would “have access to school and medical records.” Mother was required to have a “full psychological evaluation.” The decision provided that “unsubstantiated claims of abuse by Mother will immediately terminate the visitation order.” Mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on November 18, 2025. Mother asserted that it was an abuse of discretion (1) to recommend that she be “penalized” for making future allegations of abuse or neglect, (2) to recommend requiring her to engage in a mental-health assessment and therapy when Father was not required to do the same, and (3) to recommend that Mother’s parenting time include no overnights during the school week. Mother filed “supplemental objections” on February 16, 2026, that expanded on the same three issues. On March 9, 2026, the juvenile court issued a journal entry that sustained in part and overruled in part Mother’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. Notably, the court found that “there has not been a substantial change in the child’s circumstances” and that the “communication between the parties is not healthy.” The court adopted the magistrate’s recommendations that Father retain legal custody and concerning Mother’s expanded parenting time and psychological evaluation. The court also adopted the magistrate’s recommendation that Mother “not . . . have access to medical or school appointments” but “shall have access to school and medical, dental, and vision records.” The court mandated Father to “notify Mother of appointments and information from appointments through OFW.” Concerning Mother’s objection to the magistrate’s decision regarding unsubstantiated claims against Father, the entry provided If Mother makes a complaint regarding abuse or other failure to provide for [the] child, the father may file a motion citing the unsubstantiated complaint(s) against him and request a hearing. The Court will take appropriate actions based on the results of the hearing. From this entry, Mother appeals, raising the following assignments of error: I. The trial court abused its discretion by materially mischaracterizing Mother’s requested relief where the transcript clearly reflects repeated requests for shared parenting and 50/50 parenting time rather than sole custody. II. The trial court abused its discretion by maintaining substantial parenting restrictions despite expressly finding no substantial change in circumstances. III. The trial court abused its discretion by imposing psychological evaluation and counseling-related conditions upon Mother without sufficient evidentiary support and without imposing similar conditions upon Father despite evidence regarding Father’s PTSD counseling history. IV. The trial court abused its discretion by restricting Mother’s participation in medical and educational matters despite evidence demonstrating Father made unilateral medical decisions affecting the child without notifying Mother. II. Law and Analysis As an initial matter, we note that Mother brings this appeal pro se. Pro se litigants “must follow the same procedures” and “are held to the same standard” as litigants represented by counsel. Thomas v. Salahaldin, 2024-Ohio- 3298, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore, 2009-Ohio-4150, ¶ 5, and Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist. 2001). Mother was represented by an attorney at the hearing on her motion to modify custody and parenting time. An attorney filed Mother’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and Mother’s “supplemental” objections to the magistrate’s decision. A. Legal Standards R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) sets forth a two-part standard — involving changed circumstances and a child’s best interest — that courts apply in ruling on a motion to modify a legal custody arrangement ordered by a prior court decree. “The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds . . . that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child [or] the child’s residential parent.” R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). R.C. 2151.42(B) addresses modification of an order of custody by the juvenile court and provides, “A court shall not modify or terminate an order granting legal custody of a child unless it finds . . . that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the person who was granted legal custody.” See R.C. 2151.23(F)(1) (“The juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody matters in accordance with sections 3109.04 . . . .”). See also In re James, 2007-Ohio-2335, ¶ 26 (applying R.C. 3109.04 to assess biological parents’ motion to modify custody, the majority noted that whether applying R.C. 3109.04 or 2151.42, “the analysis under either statute would be similar”) The change of circumstances necessary to modify a custody arrangement must be based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree awarding custody was issued. In re J.C., 2019-Ohio-107, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.); In re J.T., 2025-Ohio-5349, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). Before modifying a prior decree, the court must also find that modification “is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.” R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) provides that, in determining a child’s best interest in the context of a motion to modify a prior decree, a court “shall consider all relevant factors,” including those enumerated in the statute. Pertinent here, among the enumerated factors, a court shall consider: (c) [t]he child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents . . . and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (d) [t]he child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community . . . [and] (e) [t]he mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c)-(e). A juvenile court decision regarding legal custody of a child must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re T.R., 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.) (A juvenile court awards legal custody following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency using a preponderance of the evidence standard.). See also Stevenson v. Kotnik, 2011-Ohio-2585, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.); In re Z.L.A, 2025-Ohio- 2355, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.); In re S.T., 2025-Ohio-1379 ¶ 17 (6th Dist.) (applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in reviewing a juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to modify legal custody under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)). A preponderance of the evidence is “evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.” (Cleaned up.) A.C. Asset, L.L.C. v. Mitchell, 2022-Ohio-1763, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). “We review a trial court’s decision in child custody matters for an abuse of discretion.” In re J.C., 2019-Ohio-107, at ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. An abuse of discretion “‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” W.A.F.P., Inc. v. Sky Fuel Inc., 2024- Ohio-3297, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Regarding testimony, the finder of fact is in the “best position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections that are critical observations in determining the credibility of a witness and his or her testimony.” State v. Sheline, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 100 (8th Dist.). “[T]he juvenile rules prevent a party from assigning ‘as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion . . . unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b).’” In re R.A., 2021-Ohio-4126, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv). See State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-1026, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.) (“A party cannot raise new issues or arguments for the first time on appeal; failure to raise an issue before the trial court results in a waiver of that issue for appellate purposes.”). “[U]nder Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv), parties who do not properly object to a magistrate’s decision waive all but plain error.” In re R.A. at ¶ 23. “In civil matters, the plain-error doctrine may be applied only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice in exceptional circumstances.” In re A.C.-L., 2026-Ohio-1554, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Seminole Indus. Inc. v. Walthaw, 2026-Ohio-653, ¶ 13, 15 (8th Dist.). B. Application For ease of analysis, we address Mother’s assignments of error out of order. Mother’s first and fourth assignments of error concern issues that were not raised in her objections to the magistrate’s decisions. As such, we review them for plain error. 1. Assignment of Error No. 1 — The Juvenile Court’s Potentially Inaccurate Belief that Mother Sought Full Custody With her first assignment of error, Mother correctly points out that the juvenile court’s March 9, 2026 journal entry inaccurately reflects that Mother sought full custody of the Child. In her appellate brief, Mother argues that the remedy she actually sought — a 50/50 custody arrangement — reflected “a desire for cooperative parenting,” which, if properly understood by the court, could have resulted in a more favorable outcome for her. We do not find that any misunderstanding the juvenile court had about Mother’s desired custody arrangement resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The court heard substantial testimony from Mother indicating that, despite Mother’s apparent good intentions in seeking a 50/50 custody arrangement, the parties had struggled to cooperate. For example, Mother stated, “Every time I discuss something with the father he gets upset and tells the Guardian that I’m accusing him of something . . . so I don’t discuss anything with the father.” We do not find that the court’s misstatement in its journal entry that Mother sought full custody caused the court to deny Mother’s request for a shared custody arrangement in plain error. Rather, the court heard testimony that supported its decision. Accordingly, Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled. 2. Assignment of Error No. 4 — Mother’s Participation in the Child’s Education and Medical Care With her fourth assignment of error, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred in preventing her from attending the Child’s medical or school appointments. Mother argues that the court should have permitted her to attend these appointments because Father had “made unilateral medical decisions without [giving her] notice.” We do not find that the juvenile court committed a miscarriage of justice by not granting Mother’s request to attend the Child’s appointments in person. Father testified that Mother had been “kicked out” of a prior appointment that she had attended. Notably, under the court’s order, Mother can remain updated on the Child’s educational progress and medical status and provide input on those matters without being present at the Child’s appointments. The court required Father to inform Mother about the Child’s appointments and to provide her information resulting from those appointments using Our Family Wizard. Under these circumstances, we do not find that the conditions imposed by the court related to the Child’s education and medical care constituted plain error. Accordingly, Mother’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 3. Assignment of Error No. 2 — Change in Circumstances With her second assignment of error, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by maintaining substantial parenting restrictions “despite finding no change in circumstances.” We disagree. Mother misunderstands the import of a changed-circumstances finding to modifications of custody and visitation and related conditions. Again, “[t]he court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds . . . that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child [or] the child’s residential parent.” R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). Likewise, under R.C. 2151.42(B), “[a] court shall not modify or terminate an order granting legal custody of a child unless it finds . . . that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the person who was granted legal custody.” (Emphasis added.) Rather than amounting to error, an absence of changed circumstances supports maintaining the status quo as relates to a custody arrangement, which the juvenile court did. We note, though, that the juvenile court was not precluded from awarding Mother more visitation rights, as it did, by finding that “there has not been a substantial change in the child’s circumstances.” “‘R.C. 3109.051 governs the modification of parenting time or visitation rights.’” In re A.Z., 2020-Ohio-2941, ¶ 48 (8th Dist.), quoting In re I.A.G., 2016-Ohio-3326, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 44-45 (1999). Under that statute, a modification of parenting time or visitation rights must be in the child’s best interest but “‘[t]he party requesting a change in visitation rights need make no showing that there has been a change in circumstances in order for the court to modify those rights.’” Id., quoting id., citing Lisboa v. Lisboa, 2009-Ohio-5228, ¶ 11; In re Bailey, 2005-Ohio- 3039, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). Father did not appeal the juvenile court’s decision to award Mother additional visitation time, and we do not disturb it. To the extent that Mother challenges the juvenile court’s findings that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father to retain legal custody, we find no abuse of discretion. The GAL recommended the same and testified that, under the current custody arrangement, the Child “seem[ed] to be thriving” and appeared “to do well in school.” The GAL had “no reason to believe that his parenting is anything other than appropriate.” Mother testified that she had no issue with how Father was raising the Child. In the absence of changed circumstances, given this evidence regarding the Child’s interaction with his parents, adjustment to school, and mental health — all “best interest” factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) — the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Father retain legal custody of the Child. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s second assignment of error.  4. Assignment of Error No. 3 — Psychological Evaluation Finally, in her third assignment of error, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred “by imposing psychological evaluation and counseling-related conditions upon Mother without sufficient evidentiary support and without imposing similar conditions upon Father despite evidence regarding Father’s PTSD counseling history.” Because Mother raised this issue among her objections to the magistrate’s decision, we review for an abuse of discretion. We find none. The juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that asymmetrical mental-health obligations were appropriate. The GAL testified that any mental-health issues Father had experienced did not appear to be interfering with his ability to parent. We commend Mother for her participation in an anger- management course and other counseling. However, the GAL concluded that Mother’s mental-health issues had previously affected her parenting, including by inhibiting her from taking accountability for her conduct. And by Mother’s own admission, her engagement with therapy was inconsistent. In light of the foregoing, we do not find that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering Mother but not Father to undergo a psychological evaluation. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s third assignment of error. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.  It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE MARY J. BOYLE, J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR