Full Opinion

[Cite as In re M.W., 2026-Ohio-4578.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA IN RE M.W., ET AL. : No. 116123 Minor Children : [Appeal by J.R., Father] : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 19, 2026 Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD-24902998, AD-24902999, and AD-24903000 Appearances: Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant. Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Aaron K. Pinsoneault, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS. KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: Appellant-father J.R. (“father”) appeals the juvenile court’s decision terminating Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services’ (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) temporary custody and granting legal custody, with protective supervision, of the minor children, M.W., J.R. Jr., and M.R. (collectively “the children”) to mother. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision. I. Procedural History and Background Father received legal custody of the children in April 2023, pursuant to a private custody matter.1 In February 2024, the children were removed from father’s custody and committed to the emergency custody of CCDCFS. In March 2024, the agency filed a complaint for neglect and temporary custody of the children pursuant to R.C. 2151.03(A)(2), alleging that father had anger-management issues, had a pending case for domestic violence where one of the children was the alleged victim, and that a protection order existed against father, prohibiting father from having contact with the children and mother. The complaint further alleged that father lacked stable housing and failed to establish paternity for one of the children. Regarding mother, the complaint alleged that mother lacked stable housing and had an active misdemeanor warrant in Georgia. In July 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated the children neglected and committed them to the temporary custody of CCDCFS. A case plan was developed, requiring father to complete parenting and anger-management programs and obtain stable housing. Mother’s case plan required her to obtain and maintain housing and clear the Georgia warrant. 1 Father is the biological father of M.R. and J.R. Jr., and the legal custodian of M.W.; mother is the biological mother of all three children. In February 2025, the juvenile court extended temporary custody, finding that mother had made substantial progress on her case plan. The court noted that mother’s visits had been unsupervised and that she had obtained housing, but it needed to be inspected by the agency. Regarding father, the court noted that he had completed parenting education, but that he had not completed an anger-management program and that concerns about that objective remained; his visits with the children had been supervised. In April 2025, the agency updated father’s case plan because father made verbal threats to the assigned case worker and exhibited aggressive behavior toward juvenile court staff and the agency. The agency suspended father’s visitation with the children and requested that he receive a mental-health assessment. In May 2025, father moved to terminate temporary custody and requested legal custody of the children, contending that he had successfully completed his case-plan objectives and could provide a safe and stable home for the children. He stated that the agency could monitor the family under protective supervision. The agency opposed father’s motion, contending that granting legal custody to father was not in the children’s best interests. The agency stated that although father engaged in both parenting and anger-management classes, he had failed to demonstrate any benefit. The agency stated that father consistently demonstrated volatile and aggressive behavior throughout the case, including making verbal threats to agency workers, court staff, and staff at the children’s school. This behavior caused the agency to suspend father’s visitation. The agency further stated that father had not provided proof of stable housing. In June 2025, CCDCFS moved to modify temporary custody to legal custody to mother, with protective supervision by the agency. CCDCFS stated that it was in the best interest of the children to be committed to the legal custody of their mother because mother had substantially complied with her case plan and had reduced the risk that initially caused the children’s removal. Specifically, the agency stated that mother had obtained safe and appropriate housing sufficient to meet her needs and the needs of the children and consistently engaged in extended successful visits with her children. CCDCFS noted that although mother had not addressed her outstanding misdemeanor theft warrant in Georgia, the agency believed that it did not present an immediate risk of harm to the children. CCDCFS stated, however, that the family would benefit from continued involvement by the agency and court. On August 4, 2025, following a hearing on both father’s and the agency’s motions, at which testimony was received from both parties, the magistrate issued a decision denying father’s motion for legal custody, but granting the agency’s motion to modify temporary custody to legal custody to mother with protective supervision by the agency. The magistrate determined that mother had made “significant progress on the case plan . . . and progress has been made in alleviating the cause of removal of the [children] from the home.” The magistrate further found that “the [children’s] continued residence in or return to the home of father, at this time, will be contrary to the [children’s] best interest. . . . Continued temporary custody of the [children] is not necessary and is not in the [children’s] best interest.” The magistrate noted that the agency had made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan, including: Father’s case plan objectives include anger management, domestic violence [counseling], and housing. Father completed anger management and domestic violence [counseling] but with limited benefit. Father’s visits are suspended due to anger issues with case worker and school staff. Father does not have verified housing nor income. Mother’s case plan objectives include housing and resolving an out of state warrant in Georgia. Mother has housing and is in the process of resolving her warrant issues. Basic needs of mother’s other four children are being met, and mother will be able to meet the basic needs of all her children. Father filed timely objections, requested a transcript at the State’s expense, and requested leave to supplement the objections upon receipt of the transcript. The juvenile court granted father’s transcript request and further granted him leave to supplement the objections after the filing of the transcript. Nevertheless, father did not file a transcript and did not supplement his objections. Father’s objections related to the evidence presented at the hearing, contending that CCDCFS did not satisfy its burden because the evidence showed that mother had not completed her case-plan objectives nor had she resolved her warrant in Georgia. He contended that the evidence showed that he had completed his case-plan objectives, but that the guardian ad litem had failed to verify his income or housing. According to father, it would have been in the children’s best interests to deny the agency’s motion for legal custody to mother and grant father’s motion for legal custody. CCDCFS opposed father’s objections, highlighting that father had not substantially complied with his case-plan objectives or substantially remedied the conditions that led to the children’s removal. The agency noted that mother’s warrant could be addressed during the period of protective supervision. In January 2026, the juvenile court considered father’s objections.2 The court noted that father objected to the magistrate’s factual findings and conclusions and thus was required to file a transcript of the magistrate’s hearing pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3). The court found that although father received an audio recording of the hearing, the transcript was not filed with the court prior to its consideration of father’s objections. Accordingly, the juvenile court overruled father’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision, granting legal custody to mother with protective supervision by the agency. 2 The juvenile court initially reviewed and considered father’s objections in October 2025. Father appealed from that judgment, but this court dismissed the appeal, finding that the juvenile court’s judgment was not a final, appealable order because it merely adopted the magistrate’s decision without entering its own judgment. See In re M.W., No. 115731 (8th Dist. Nov. 13, 2025). Prior to the juvenile court issuing a final, appealable order regarding father’s objections and the magistrate’s decision, the agency filed a motion with the juvenile court seeking to terminate the protective-supervision restriction on mother’s custody because of mother’s continued cooperation with the agency and her providing proper care for the children. II. The Appeal Father appeals, raising as his sole assignment of error that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it modified the order of temporary custody and granted mother legal custody with protective supervision because the decision was not supported by the evidence in the record. Father alternatively asks this court to review the juvenile court’s decision for plain error. Upon adjudicating a child abused, neglected, or dependent, the juvenile court may award legal custody of a child to either parent. R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). “Legal custody” is a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). When a juvenile court considers an award of legal custody following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency, “‘it does so by examining what would be in the best interest of the child based on a preponderance of the evidence.’” In re T.R., 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.), quoting In re M.J.M., 2010-Ohio-1674, ¶ 11, 14 (8th Dist.). A “preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that is “‘more probable, more persuasive, or of greater value.’” In re C.V.M., 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), quoting In re D.P., 2005-Ohio-5097, ¶ 52 (10th Dist.). However, we review the juvenile court’s ultimate determination of whether legal custody is in the children’s best interest for an abuse of discretion. In re B.H., 2011-Ohio-1967, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. “There is no ‘specific test or set of criteria’ that must be applied or considered when determining what is in a child’s best interest on a motion for legal custody.” In re J.T., 2022-Ohio-4747, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.), quoting In re T.R. at ¶ 48. Nevertheless, this court has held that the R.C. 2151.414(D) best-interest factors may be “instructive” in making that determination. In re V.P., 2020-Ohio-5626, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). Courts have also looked at the best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F) as a potential guide in determining what is in a child’s best interest for the purpose of a motion for legal custody. In re J.T. at ¶ 40. Father concedes on appeal, unlike in his objections, that the juvenile court properly denied his motion for legal custody of the children, stating that “it cannot be argued that the father, on the date of trial, was an appropriate caregiver.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) He contends, however, that mother was equally unsuitable for legal custody of the children. In support, he makes the following arguments: (1) mother had not resolved her misdemeanor warrant in Georgia; (2) the juvenile court’s conclusion that mother could provide for the children’s basic needs did not take into account that a total of seven children lived in mother’s household, with mother’s 17-year-old child caring for the children when mother was unavailable; and (3) the juvenile court did not expressly state in its judgment entry that returning the children to their mother would be in the children’s best interests nor did the court specify what facts it relied upon in reaching a best-interest conclusion. Our review of father’s arguments is hindered, however, because he failed to file a transcript of the magistrate’s hearing with the juvenile court. Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii) provides that a party objecting to a magistrate’s factual findings is required to support the objection with the transcript of the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding. Where an objecting party fails to file a transcript, the juvenile court is required to adopt the magistrate’s findings, and thus is limited to reviewing the conclusions of law. In re A.G., 2025-Ohio-4371, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Although both parties cite to the transcript because it was filed with this court, the juvenile court expressly stated when it addressed father’s objections that no transcript was provided. Where an objecting party fails to provide the trial court with the transcript of the proceedings, an appellate court is precluded from considering the transcript of the magistrate’s hearing submitted with the appellate record. In re A.L., 2013-Ohio-5120, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees, 1995-Ohio-272. Except for a claim of plain error, a party may not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any of the magistrate’s factual findings or legal conclusions unless the party has timely filed objections and a transcript of the proceedings. In re N.R., 2026-Ohio-1873, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.); Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii)-(iv). Based on our review, and even reviewing for plain error as requested by father, we find no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in adopting the magistrate’s factual findings and granting legal custody to mother with agency protective supervision. Based on the record and the judgment entry, the court found that mother had made significant progress on her case plan and that she made progress in alleviating the conditions causing the children’s removal. The court noted that mother was in the process of resolving her warrant issues and that the basic needs of mother’s four other children were being met while being in mother’s custody and care. The court concluded that mother would be able to meet the basic needs of all of her children. Without a transcript, we accept these factual findings. Father’s final challenge is to the juvenile court’s conclusion of law that granting legal custody to mother was in the children’s best interest. He contends that the trial court was required to specifically state that granting legal custody to mother was in the children’s best interest. Our review of the juvenile court’s judgment entry reveals that the juvenile court made such a finding. First, the court acknowledged mother’s significant progress on her case plan, including meeting all substantive objectives. The court then noted that returning the children to father’s residence was not in the children’s best interest, but that continued temporary custody of the children was also not necessary and not in the children’s best interests. As such, the court granted the agency’s motion for legal custody to mother with protective supervision by the agency. Although the court did not explicitly state “legal custody to the mother with protective supervision by the agency is in the children’s best interest,” the totality of the juvenile court’s order allows this court to reach such conclusion. We find no abuse of discretion, nor do we find that the juvenile court committed plain error such that its decision undermines the basic fairness of the judicial process.3 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in overruling father’s objections and adopting the magistrate’s decision that granted mother legal custody of the children with protective supervision by the agency. The assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. 3 “[I]n appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 1997-Ohio-401, syllabus; see also In re A.P., 2019-Ohio-139 (2d Dist.) (applying Goldfuss to a custody dispute). A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR