Pickett v. Serpentini Chevrolet of Medina

[Cite as Pickett v. Serpentini Chevrolet of Medina, 2026-Ohio-4324.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA ) PAMELA PICKETT C.A. No. 2026CA0023-M Appellant v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE SERPENTINI CHEVROLET OF MEDINA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellee CASE No. 2026CIV0060 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: November 2, 2026 STEVENSON, Judge. {¶1} Appellant Pamela Pickett appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas denying her motion to vacate arbitration award. We affirm. I. {¶2} Ms. Pickett purchased a vehicle from Appellee Serpentini Chevrolet of Medina (“Serpentini”) in February 2025. Ms. Pickett lived out of state and she travelled to Serpentini where she signed purchase documents and completed the purchase of the vehicle. Ms. Pickett later alleged that the documents did not reflect her understanding of the transaction, that the documents were modified after she left the dealership, and that her signature had been forged. She filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association asserting numerous claims, including claims under the Ohio Consumers Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”) and relating to the Dealer Limited Warranty.  2 {¶3} Ms. Pickett and Serpentini waived oral hearing before the arbitrator and the arbitrator issued a final award in January 2026. The arbitrator dismissed with prejudice Ms. Pickett’s OCSPA claims and awarded her $4,323.46 on her Dealer Limited Warranty claim. The arbitrator also awarded Ms. Pickett interest at the Ohio statutory rate. The arbitrator denied all other asserted claims. {¶4} Ms. Pickett then moved the trial court to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10 “on the grounds that the arbitrator (1) exceeded his powers and (2) refused to hear and consider evidence material to the controversy.” She alleged in her motion that the arbitrator failed to “reference, analyze, or address” documentary evidence allegedly showing that Serpentini modified documents post-sale and forged her signature. {¶5} Serpentini opposed Ms. Pickett’s motion to vacate. Citing R.C. 2711.11, it asserted that it was not the role of the trial court to address Ms. Pickett’s “challenge[] [to] the merits of the arbitrator’s decision – i.e., whether the underlying contract between her and Serpentini was valid.” Serpentini maintained that the arbitrator considered the evidence presented and that he “rejected and failed to assign any credibility to that evidence.” It argued that Ms. Pickett had not demonstrated the existence of any corruption, misconduct, refusing to hear evidence, or that the arbitrator exceed his authority under R.C. 2711.10, and it asked the trial court to deny the motion to vacate and to confirm the arbitration award. {¶6} The trial court found that “none of the factors in R.C.[]2711.10 appl[lied]” and it denied Ms. Pickett’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted Serpentini’s motion to confirm the award. Ms. Pickett appeals, asserting three assignments of error for this Court’s review. We address the second and third assignments of error out of order for ease of review.  3 II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [MS. PICKETT’S] MOTION TO VACATE THE ARBITRATION AWARD PURSUANT TO OHIO REV. CODE § 2711.10(C) AND (D), WHERE THE ARBITRATOR FAILED TO CONSIDER MATERIAL EVIDENCE AND RELIED ON A RECONSTRUCTED AND ALTERED CONTRACT THAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VALID, INTEGRATED AGREEMENT. {¶7} Ms. Pickett argues in her first assignment of error that the arbitrator failed to consider material evidence and relied on a reconstructed and altered contract and that, therefore, the trial court erred when it denied her motion to vacate the arbitration award. We disagree. {¶8} Ohio’s public policy strongly favors arbitration and courts give deference to arbitration awards and presume they are valid. Siniscalchi v. K. Hovnanian Meadow Lanes, LLC, 2026-Ohio-1911, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.); Bennett v. Sunnywood Land Dev., Inc., 2007-Ohio-2154, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.).“When parties agree to binding arbitration, they agree to accept the result and may not relitigate the facts as found by the arbitrator.” Bennett at ¶ 9. {¶9} The Ohio Arbitration Act codified in R.C. 2711 governs the trial court’s ability to review an arbitration award. Bennett at ¶ 10; Siniscalchi at ¶ 13. “A trial court’s review is limited as it is precluded from reviewing the actual merits upon which the award was based.” Bennett at ¶ 10, citing Ford Hull-Mar Nursing Home, Inc. v. Marr, Knapp, Crawfis & Assoc., Inc., 138 Ohio App.3d 174, 179 (7th Dist. 2000). However, the trial court may vacate an arbitration award under R.C. 2711.10 if any party to the arbitration demonstrates that: (A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. (B) There was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or any of them. (C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material  4 to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. {¶10} This Court has explained that “‘[m]ere error in the interpretation or application of the law will not suffice [to vacate an arbitration award]. The arbitrators’ decision must ‘fly in the face of clearly established legal precedent’ to support a vacation of the award.’” Bennett at ¶ 11, quoting Automated Tracking Systems, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 130 Ohio App.3d 238, 244 (9th Dist. 1998), quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995). {¶11} “Appellate review of the common pleas court’s decision to deny a motion to vacate an arbitration award is also limited.” Ward v. Ohio State Waterproofing, 2013-Ohio-5560, ¶7 (9th Dist.). “‘The substantive merits of the original arbitration award are not reviewable on appeal.’” Id., quoting Ward at ¶ 9. “‘[T]he arbitrator is the final judge of both law and facts, and . . . an award will not be set aside except upon a clear showing of fraud, misconduct or some other irregularity rendering the award unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable.’” Bennett at ¶ 12, quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local Union No. 200, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 42 Ohio St.2d 516, 522 (1975). “Thus, the pertinent question on review is whether the common pleas court erred as a matter of law in its order.” Ward, at ¶ 7; Bennett at ¶ 12. {¶12} Ms. Pickett argues that the trial court should have vacated the arbitration award under R.C. 2711.10(C) because the arbitrator failed to “[m]eaningfully [c]onsider” the evidence and “reconcile [] documentary inconsistences.” Serpentini argues that Ms. Pickett’s challenge to the arbitrator’s evaluation of the record is not a statutory basis for vacating an arbitration award.  5 {¶13} Ms. Pickett’s arguments that the arbitrator failed to “[m]eaningfully consider” and “reconcile” evidence go to the arbitrator’s credibility determinations and his determinations on the weight of the evidence, not any alleged procedural misconduct. The trial court had addressed Ms. Pickett’s arguments and it found that she “was permitted to present evidence that her signature[] was forged” and that “[i]t is apparent that the arbitrator did not find the claim of forgery to be credible and rather determined that [Ms. Pickett] signed the document(s) in question.” The trial court noted that Ms. Pickett “merely disagree[d] with [the arbitrator’s] findings” and that it could not say that the arbitrator’s findings were erroneous. {¶14} “Our review is limited to whether the common pleas court erred as a matter of law.” Ward, 2013-Ohio-5560, at ¶ 11 (9th Dist.); Bennett, 2007-Ohio-2154, at ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). Ms. Pickett has challenged the factual findings of the arbitrator which is not a statutory basis to vacate an arbitrator award. She has made no showing or argument that the arbitrator “refus[ed] to hear evidence” or “exceeded [his] powers” as required by R.C. 2711.10(C) and (D). Rather, her claim is based on the argument that the arbitrator did not accept her position that the contract was not the same as she signed. The arbitrator heard her evidence and still found a valid contract. This is not a basis for reversal under R.C. 2711.10. {¶15} Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied Ms. Pickett’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. The first assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THAT THE ARBITRATOR CONSIDERED AND REJECTED [MS. PICKETT’S] EVIDENCE, WHERE THE ARBITRATION AWARD DOES NOT ADDRESS MATERIAL EVIDENCE OF CONTRACT ALTERATION AND DOCUMENTARY INCONSISTENCIES, AND THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT SUCH EVIDENCE WAS NOT MEANINGFULLY CONSIDERED.  6 {¶16} Ms. Pickett again argues in her third assignment of error that the arbitrator did not “meaningfully” consider her evidence of alleged contract alteration and documentary inconsistencies. She contends the trial court erred when it presumed that the arbitrator had considered and rejected this evidence. Serpentini argues that Ohio law does not require an arbitrator to specifically address every exhibit, contention, or argument in his or her written award. It maintains that Ms. Pickett failed to establish any grounds under R.C. 2711.10 to support vacating the arbitration award. {¶17} Ms. Pickett raised contract alteration, documentary inconsistencies, and forgery claims at arbitration. The arbitrator stated that, in rendering his award, he “reviewed and considered the written documents submitted to me by the parties[.]” The trial court was required to indulge “‘every reasonable intendment . . . to give effect to [the arbitration] and to favor the regularity and integrity of the arbitrator’s acts.’” Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation and Dev. Disabilities v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn., 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 84 (1986), quoting Campbell v. Automatic Die & Products Co., 162 Ohio St. 321, 329 (1954). The arbitrator was not required to specifically address every claim or defense in his award, and the trial court was to presume that all claims were addressed by the arbitrator. N. Ohio Sewer Contrs., Inc. v. Bradley Dev. Co., 2005-Ohio-1014, ¶ 27-28 (8th Dist.). See also Reynolds v. M/I Homes of Central Ohio, LLC, 2025-Ohio-5818, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.) (appellant “identified no basis for concluding that the arbitrator failed to consider the evidence” where arbitrator had stated in his award that he had “‘heard all proofs, documents, evidence, allegations and arguments’” made by the parties[.]”). We cannot say that the trial court erred when it presumed that all claims were addressed by the arbitrator. The arbitrator heard all the evidence Ms. Pickett submitted and is not required to make findings of fact on every claim raised by a party.  7 {¶18} Further, as set forth above under our analysis of the first assignment of error, Ms. Pickett has not established a statutory basis pursuant to R.C. 2711.10 to support her claim that the arbitrator’s award should have been vacated. Ms. Pickett’s third assignment of error is, accordingly, overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE TRIAL ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT [MS. PICKETT’S] CHALLENGE WAS MERELY A DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ARBITRATOR’S FACTUAL FINDINGS, WHERE THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ARBITRATOR FAILED TO ADDRESS MATERIAL DOCUMENTARY INCONSISTENCIES AND RELIED UPON A RECONSTRUCTED AND NON-INTEGRATED CONTRACT. {¶19} Ms. Pickett argues in her second assignment of error that the arbitrator failed to address alleged inconsistencies and that he relied on a reconstructed and non-integrated contract. She challenges the factual findings of the arbitrator, arguing that he failed to properly consider alleged post-sale documentary evidence. As noted, arbitrators are not required to make specific factual findings on every claim. N. Ohio Sewer Contrs., Inc., 2005-Ohio-1014, at ¶ 27-28 (8th Dist.). Here the arbitrator found the contract valid, implicitly overruling Ms. Pickett’s claim. Again, a challenge to the factual findings of the arbitrator, which are indicative of the arbitrator’s credibility determinations, are not a statutory basis to vacate an arbitrator award. {¶20} For the same reasons set forth under our analysis of Ms. Pickett’s first assignment of error, her second assignment of error is also overruled. III. {¶21} Ms. Pickett’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.  8 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. SCOT STEVENSON FOR THE COURT FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J. MANNING, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: PAMELA PICKETT, pro se, Appellant. JONATHAN W. PHILIPP, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.