State v. Taylor

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2026-Ohio-4338.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY STATE OF OHIO, CASE NOS. 2026-P-0050 2026-P-0052 Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeals from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas BOYD W. TAYLOR, Trial Court Nos. 2005 CR 00660 Defendant-Appellant. 2015 CR 00599 OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: November 2, 2026 Judgment: Reversed and remanded Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Timothy P. Bogner, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). Joshua J. Baumann, Community Legal Aid Services, Inc., 25 East Boardman Street, Suite 520, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Defendant-Appellant). MATT LYNCH, P.J. {¶1} In these consolidated appeals, appellant, Boyd W. Taylor, challenges the trial court’s denial of his applications for expungement and sealing of records and requests for waiver of fees and cancellation of costs. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand this matter for further proceedings. {¶2} On April 17, 2026, appellant filed in both underlying criminal cases an Application for Expungement and Sealing of Records and Waiver of Fees and Cancellation of Costs, accompanied by a Financial Disclosure/Fee-Waiver Affidavit. Appellant requested the trial court to issue an order expunging and sealing, as appropriate, the records in case Nos. 2005 CR 00660 and 2015 CR 00599, and to waive the fees for the application and cancel the unpaid balance of costs due to his indigence. {¶3} The State did not file a response to appellant’s applications. {¶4} On May 13, 2026, the trial court entered a journal entry in each case denying appellant’s applications on the basis that the filing fee had neither been paid nor waived. {¶5} Appellant timely appealed, and the appeals were consolidated. {¶6} Appellant submits three issues for review under one assignment of error (“The trial court erred in denying Mr. Taylor’s application for expungement and record sealing.”). Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his applications without first (1) considering his indigency affidavit and fee-waiver request, (2) providing the 30-day notice and opportunity to pay that is required by R.C. 2323.311 after any denial of a fee-waiver request, and (3) setting and holding the hearing required by R.C. 2953.32. The State concedes that appellant’s assignment of error “seems to have merit” due to the trial court’s apparent failure to provide appellant with notice or an opportunity to be heard before denying his applications based on nonpayment and nonwaiver. {¶7} Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to deny an application to seal a record of conviction under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Talameh, 2012-Ohio- 4205, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.). It is also within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether indigency status is proper in a particular case. Trumbull Mem. Hosp. v. Karnofel, 2009- Ohio-1488, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.). However, where the dispute is whether the trial court’s application of the relevant statutes was erroneous, this is purely a question of law that we review de novo. See Talameh at ¶ 20, citing State v. Futrall, 2009-Ohio-5590, ¶ 6. PAGE 2 OF 6 Case Nos. 2026-P-0050, 2026-P-0052  {¶8} Appellant filed his applications under R.C. 2953.32, which provides that “an eligible offender may apply to the sentencing court if convicted in this state . . . for the sealing or expungement of the record of the case that pertains to the conviction, except for convictions listed in division (A)(1) of this section.” R.C. 2953.32(B)(1). R.C. 2953.32 expressly provides that “the applicant, unless the applicant presents a poverty affidavit showing that the applicant is indigent, shall pay an application fee . . . .” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2953.32(D)(3). {¶9} R.C. 2953.32(B) provides for the times an application for expungement or sealing may be made, dependent upon the offense(s) of which the applicant was convicted. “In this regard, an application to seal a record of conviction is a separate remedy, completely apart from the criminal action, and is sought after the criminal proceedings have concluded.” State v. LaSalle, 2002-Ohio-4009, ¶ 19, citing State v. Nichols, 11 Ohio St.3d 40 (1984). Thus, the sealing or expungement of the record of conviction under R.C. 2953.32 is a postconviction remedy that is civil in nature. Id., citing State v. Bissantz, 30 Ohio St.3d 120, 121 (1987). {¶10} R.C. 2323.311 provides a mechanism for an indigent litigant to seek a waiver of the advance deposit or security for fees or costs as set forth in a civil action or proceeding. The applicant is required to file an affidavit of indigency in a form approved by the Supreme Court, 2323.311(B)(1); the clerk of court is required to accept the filing, 2323.311(B)(3); and the judge or magistrate is required to review the affidavit of indigency and approve or deny the application to qualify as an indigent litigant, 2323.311(B)(4). {¶11} Approval of the application to qualify as an indigent litigant is mandated if the applicant’s gross income does not exceed 187.5% of the federal poverty guidelines PAGE 3 OF 6 Case Nos. 2026-P-0050, 2026-P-0052 and the applicant’s monthly expenses equal or exceed the applicant’s liquid assets. R.C. 2323.311(B)(4) (when these requirements are met, “[t]he judge or magistrate shall approve the application” (emphasis added)). “If the application is approved, the clerk shall waive the advance deposit or security and the court shall proceed with the civil action or proceeding.” Id. “If the application is denied, the clerk shall retain the filing of the action or proceeding, and the court shall issue an order granting the applicant whose application is denied thirty days to make the required advance deposit or security, prior to any dismissal or other action on the filing of the civil action or proceeding.” Id. {¶12} Here, in each of the underlying cases, appellant filed an R.C. 2323.311 poverty affidavit in a form approved by the Supreme Court concurrent with his R.C. 2953.32 applications for expungement and sealing, and the clerk of court accepted the filings. The trial court was required to either (a) approve appellant’s request to qualify as an indigent litigant and proceed under R.C. 2953.32 or (b) deny appellant’s request to qualify as an indigent litigant and issue an order granting appellant 30 days to make the required advance deposit. The court did neither; instead, it summarily denied appellant’s applications due to nonpayment and nonwaiver of the filing fee. That procedure contravenes the mandatory directives of R.C. 2323.311 as well as the requirements of due process. {¶13} While this specific application of R.C. 2323.311 appears to be an issue of first impression, it is fundamentally understood that “[d]ue process requires that a complainant be given notice and a hearing prior to dismissal of the case when that dismissal is based on questions about the complainant’s indigence.” Yeager v. Moody, 2012-Ohio-1691, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.), citing Guisinger v. Spier, 2006-Ohio-1810, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). PAGE 4 OF 6 Case Nos. 2026-P-0050, 2026-P-0052  {¶14} Appellant’s sole assignment of error has merit. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s applications for expungement and sealing without first reviewing his poverty affidavit and determining whether he qualifies to proceed as an indigent litigant. {¶15} The trial court’s judgment in each case is reversed. {¶16} This matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to (1) review appellant’s affidavit of indigency and rule on his fee-waiver request under R.C. 2323.311; (2) if the fee-waiver request is denied, issue an order granting appellant 30 days to make the required advance deposit or security before any dismissal or other action, consistent with R.C. 2323.311(B)(4); and (3) upon resolution of the fee-waiver issue, proceed with appellant’s applications under R.C. 2953.32. ROBERT J. PATTON, J., SCOTT LYNCH, J., concur. PAGE 5 OF 6 Case Nos. 2026-P-0050, 2026-P-0052  JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, it is the judgment and order of this court that the judgments of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas are reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Costs to be taxed against appellee. PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON, concurs JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. PAGE 6 OF 6 Case Nos. 2026-P-0050, 2026-P-0052