Lopez v. Lopez

[Cite as Lopez v. Lopez, 2026-Ohio-3479.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY Amber Lopez Court of Appeals No. L-25-00301 Appellee Trial Court No. DR 2018-0568 v. Eugolio Lopez DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: September 4, 2026 ***** Julianne R. K. Pickard, for appellee. Jeremy W. Levy and Anthony J. Richardson, II., for appellant. ***** OSOWIK, J. {¶ 1} The matter before this court involves disputed child support between defendant-appellant, Eulogio Lopez, and plaintiff-appellee Amber Lopez. Appellant appeals the November 21, 2025, Judgment Entry on Objections of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. For the following reasons we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this judgment.  I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} The parties in this case were married in 2012 and had three children during the marriage. The parties were divorced on January 8, 2019. At the time of the divorce, appellee was designated the residential parent and legal custodian of all the children, but the parties had an even 2-2-3 schedule for parenting time. At that time, appellant was ordered to pay $210.27 a month in child support for the three children based on his income of $6,834.00, and appellee’s income of $24,336.00. The parties agree that this arrangement was the status quo for approximately five years when appellant finished graduate school and began making more money as an engineer. The Administrative Review {¶ 3} Due to the change of circumstances, this case went before the Lucas County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“LCCSEA”) on January 5, 2024 for an administrative review of the child support. At that time, LCCSEA found that appellant’s income was $51,622.00 and appellee’s income was $33,280.00. LCCSEA ordered appellant to pay an increased support amount of $1,028.20 a month for the three children ($780.95 in child support, $59.08 in cash medical support, and $168.01 in arrearages), effective November 1, 2023. The Magistrate’s Decision {¶ 4} Appellant challenged this amount through a Mistake of Fact filing on January 16, 2024 in the Domestic Relations Court. A hearing was held before Magistrate Pettee on September 27, 2024. On October 15, 2024, the Magistrate issued a decision finding that parenting time would remain evenly split but that the finances of the parties 2. had changed with appellant now making $86,000 and appellee now making $24,059, annually. Based on that income and a reasonable deviation as permitted by statute, the magistrate ordered appellant to pay $929.22 a month for the three children, ($726.33 in child support, $99.67 in cash medical support, and $85.00 in arrearages), effective June 1, 2024. The Trial Court’s Decision {¶ 5} Appellee filed objections to the Magistrate’s Decision, making four arguments: 1. Plaintiff contends the Magistrate erred in the percentage of downward deviation granted: an automatic 10% downward deviation because Defendant has more than 90 overnights visits with the children, R.C. 3119.051(A), plus an additional 50% downward deviation for Defendant’s extended parenting time; 2. The Magistrate erred in the sole reliance on R.C. 3119.23(C) – Defendant’s extended parenting time - in granting the additional 50% downward deviation without consideration of the significant disparity in income in the determination of the additional deviation; 3. The Magistrate erred in not considering and utilizing the parties’ original child support downward deviation of 14% under their court ordered parenting plan which the Court found the parties currently maintain; and 4. The Magistrate erred in setting the effective date of the modification as June 1, 2024 which is seven months after the effective date of November 1, 2023 set by the Administrative Adjustment Review without an explanation to justify the use of that effective date. No transcript was provided to the court. {¶ 6} On November 21, 2025, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry on Objections. The court acknowledged that because the only matters before it were issues 3. of law and because no transcript had been filed, the court was bound by the Magistrate’s findings of facts, and could only examine the legal conclusions based on those facts. The trial court then went on to find that appellee’s income was $18,460 instead of the $24,059 found by the magistrate. Based on the newly-calculated income and the reasonable deviation permitted by R.C. 3119.231(B), the trial court ordered appellant to pay $1,475.21 a month for the three children ($1,256.28 in child support, $105.00 in cash medical support, and $85.00 in arrearages), effective January 1, 2024. {¶ 7} Appellant appealed this decision and assigned the following errors for our review: (1.) THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FINDING FACTS CONTRARY TO THE MAGISTRATE’S FINDINGS WITHOUT A TRANSCRIPT OR RECORD TO SUPPORT THE NEW FINDINGS. (2.) THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE’S DEVIATION WHICH WAS APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF APPELLEE’S INCOME AND STATUS QUO SINCE THE TIME OF DIVORCE. (3.) THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY OVERTURNING THE MAGISTRATE’S INCOME FINDING WHERE APPELLEE NEVER CHALLENGED IT OR SPECIFICALLY ARGUED AGAINST IT. II. Analysis {¶ 8} For ease of analysis, this court reviews appellant’s first and third assignments of error together. {¶ 9} In the instant matter, when calculating child support, the Magistrate utilized appellant’s projected income for 2024 and appellee’s income for 2023. Specifically, the Magistrate made the findings that appellant was on track to make $86,000.00 in 2024; 4. and that in 2023, appellee made $24,059.00 while working as an hourly employee making $17.75 per hour and working approximately 20 hours a week and going to school part-time.1 These numbers were the basis for the Magistrate’s calculation of child support. {¶ 10} Appellee filed her objections to the Magistrate’s Decision with the trial court, however, as previously noted, she did not include a transcript with the objections. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) governs a party’s objections to a magistrate’s decision, and provides in relevant part: (ii) Specificity of Objection. An objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection. (iii) Objection to Magistrate’s Factual Finding; Transcript or Affidavit. An objection to a factual finding, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available. With leave of court, alternative technology or manner of reviewing the relevant evidence may be considered. The objecting party shall file the transcript or affidavit with the court within thirty days after filing objections unless the court extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript or other good cause. If a party files timely objections prior to the date on which a transcript is prepared, the party may seek leave of court to supplement the objections. {¶ 11} Thus, if no transcript is provided, the trial court is required to accept the magistrate’s findings of facts, and can only examine the legal conclusions based on those facts. Beaverson v. Beaverson, 2007-Ohio-3560, ¶ 3 (6th Dist.). Therefore, while a party is permitted to file objections without including a transcript, “[w]here no transcript is 1 While appellee’s income is not specifically referenced in the Magistrate’s Decision, it is provided in the attached Child Support Computation Worksheet. 5. provided, the trial court must accept the magistrate’s findings of facts, and can examine only the legal conclusions based on those facts.” Head v. Head, 2018-Ohio-1236, ¶ 32 (6th Dist.), citing Beaverson at ¶ 3. {¶ 12} On appellate review, where an objecting party failed to provide a transcript or affidavit to the trial court in support of objections to a magistrate’s findings, this court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying or adopting the magistrate’s decision. State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees, 73 Ohio St.3d 728, 730 (1995); Helmke v. Helmke, 2005-Ohio-1388, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.). Therefore, this court can “only review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether, in adopting the magistrate’s report, ‘the court’s attitude [was] unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Helmke at ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 107 (1995), and Proctor v. Proctor, 48 Ohio App.3d 55, 63 (3d Dist. 1988). {¶ 13} In its Judgment Entry, the trial court made note that appellee was not required to file a transcript because she challenged only conclusions of law. The trial court then went on to acknowledge that because there was no transcript, it “must accept the magistrate’s findings of facts, and can examine only the legal conclusions based on those facts.” {¶ 14} Despite this acknowledgment, the trial court found that the Magistrate erred when it used appellee’s 2023 income while simultaneously using appellant’s 2024 projected earnings for purposes of calculating child support—“the Magistrate erred in determining Plaintiff’s 2024 income to be $24,059 ($19,947.72 wage earnings plus 6. $4,111 distribution from ABLE account) based on Plaintiff’s 2023 income tax return.” The court went on to find that appellee’s “gross 2024 income which may be attributed to [appellee] at the time of the hearing is $18,460 (Findings of Fact No. 12, that Plaintiff is employed at an hourly rate of $17.75 working 20 hours weekly, while currently pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in social work as a part time student at The University of Toledo, Findings of Fact No. 13).” {¶ 15} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that appellee’s gross 2024 income was $18,460 and subsequently used that new calculation to calculate the parties’ child support requirements. First, while the trial court contended that the magistrate erred when using appellee’s 2023 income, to this court’s knowledge, the trial court used those same findings—the Magistrate’s Findings of Fact No. 12—i.e., the 2023 income—to make its own determination of what appellee’s 2024 income was. Additionally, even assuming that this calculation is correct, the record is completely absent of any documentation of, or even any reference to appellee’s 2024 income. Based on a review of the record provided to this court, the most recent information concerning appellee’s income are her 2023 tax documents (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 and 2 in the Magistrate’s Decision). Nothing in the record supports the trial court’s finding that appellee made and/or was projected to make $18,460.00 in 2024 beyond what we presume is the trial court’s assumption that appellee would continue to work 20 hours a week for $17.75 an hour. {¶ 16} Without a transcript before it, the trial court was required to accept the Magistrate’s findings of fact and make its conclusions of law based solely off those 7. findings. By finding that the Magistrate erred in its calculation of appellee’s income and replacing that calculation with its own without a transcript or evidence in the record of appellee’s 2024 income, the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we find appellant’s first and third assignments of error well-taken. {¶ 17} Turning now to appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when modifying the magistrate’s deviation decision under R.C. 3119.231(B) without a transcript to review and where the deviation was reasonable and appropriate in light of the testimony and status quo of appellee and the parties’ three children. {¶ 18} We review matters concerning child support for an abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). “After determining the guideline support amount, the court may deviate from the guideline amount if it determines that the amount ‘would be unjust or inappropriate and therefore not be in the best interest of the child’ based on the factors in R.C. 3119.23. R.C. 3119.22” Bohannon v. Lewis, 2022-Ohio- 2398, ¶ 42 (1st Dist.). Three statutes work in conjunction to provide trial courts with guidelines for deviation determinations—R.C. 3119.22, R.C. 3119.23, and R.C. 3119.231. {¶ 19} R.C. 3119.22 authorizes courts to deviate from the guideline amount: The court may order an amount of child support that deviates from the amount of child support that would otherwise result from the use of the basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet if, after considering the factors and criteria set forth in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, the court determines that the amount calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet would be unjust or inappropriate and therefore not be in the best interest of the child. 8.  If it deviates, the court must enter in the journal the amount of child support calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet, its determination that the amount would be unjust or inappropriate and therefore not in the best interest of the child, and findings of fact supporting that determination. {¶ 20} R.C. 3119.23 provides a list of factors that a court may consider in its deviation determination. And specific to this case, R.C. 3119.231(B) applies in cases where the court-ordered parenting time is “equal to or exceeds one hundred forty-seven overnights per year.” In those cases, like the one before this court, the trial court “shall specify in the order the facts that are the basis for the court’s decision.” R.C. 3119.231(B) (Emphasis added.). Read together, the plain language of R.C. 3119.22, R.C. 3119.23, and R.C. 3119.231(B) make clear that when determining whether a deviation from the guideline amount is appropriate, the trial court must first explain whether it is granting or denying a deviation, and then explain factual basis for that decision. {¶ 21} Turning to the case at hand, in granting appellant a 50% downward deviation in child support, the Magistrate contended that: 4. R.C. §3119.22 allows the Court to grant a deviation after considering the factors set forth in R.C. §3119.23, and if the Court determines the amount of child support calculated would be unjust or inappropriate and therefore not in the best interest of the children. 5. The Court has considered all factors enumerated in §3119.23, specifically (E) The relative financial resources, including the disparity in income between parties or households and (Q) Any other relevant factor. While Defendant’s income has substantially increased since the prior order, it was undisputed the parties are operating under the same parenting time share schedule as previously ordered. 6. Therefore the Court finds the amount of child support calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and pursuant to the applicable worksheet is unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the minor children due to the parties’ relative gross incomes and the fact 9.  they are operating under an equal timeshare. Defendant is granted a 50% deviation in child support. {¶ 22} In making its deviation determination in the Judgment Entry on Objections, the trial court looked to its own calculation of the parties’ incomes, and made a downward deviation of 15% instead of a 50%. The trial court reasoned that the new deviation percentage was warranted based on Defendant’s extended parenting time with the three minor children in excess of 147 overnights per year, R.C. 3119.23(C), consideration of the relative financial resources, including the disparity in income between parties or households, R.C. 3119.23(E), and the standard of living the children would have enjoyed had the marriage continued, R.C. 3119.23(K). Moreover, any further reduction in child support payments would not be in the best interest of the children as it enhances the outstanding disparity in the parties’ household incomes and negatively affect Plaintiff’s ability to support and care for the children…. {¶ 23} However, as previously discussed, appellee failed to include a transcript to the trial court when objecting to the Magistrate’s findings. Therefore, the trial court was bound to the findings of fact made by the Magistrate. Here, the trial court erroneously made its own factual determinations concerning the parties’ income. It then relied on those erroneous facts to make a different deviation determination than the Magistrate. “We must find an abuse of discretion if a trial court orders a deviation that is not supported by findings of fact journalized in the record.” Mahlerwein v. Mahlerwein, 2005-Ohio-1835, ¶ 40 (4th Dist.), citing DePalmo v. DePalmo, 78 Ohio St.3d 535, 538 (1997). Because the trial court abused its discretion when modifying the Magistrate’s deviation decision without a transcript to review, we find appellant’s second assignment of error well-taken. 10.  III. Conclusion {¶ 24} Upon due consideration, we find appellant’s assignments of error well- taken, reverse the November 21, 2025, Judgment Entry on Objections of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this judgment. Appellee is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24. Judgment reversed and remanded. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. Thomas J. Osowik, PJ. JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, J. CONCUR. JUDGE This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/. 11.