State v. Gupton

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 444PA19-2 Filed 14 August 2026 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GARRY JOSEPH GUPTON On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an unpublished, unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA23-661 (N.C. Ct. App. July 16, 2025), affirming an order entered on 5 November 2021 by Judge R. Stuart Albright in Superior Court, Guilford County, denying defendant’s motion for appropriate relief. Heard in the Supreme Court on 14 April 2026. Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Teresa M. Postell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee. Kristen L. Todd and Lauren E. Miller for defendant-appellant. BERGER, Justice. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison in 2017 following his convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree arson. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that no error occurred at his trial. In 2020, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The MAR court concluded that defendant was in a position to adequately raise his claims on direct appeal but failed to do so, and his IAC claims were, therefore, procedurally  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court barred pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419. The Court of Appeals affirmed the MAR court’s order, and defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which was allowed. Because defendant was in a position to adequately raise his claims on direct appeal, defendant’s IAC claims are procedurally barred, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I. Factual and Procedural Background In November 2014, defendant met Stephen White at a nightclub in Greensboro, and the pair later went to a local hotel.1 Later that night, defendant had a confrontation with the night attendant. Shortly thereafter, smoke was seen was seen coming from defendant’s room. When law enforcement and firefighters arrived on scene, defendant’s room was filled with smoke. Mr. White was found in the room lying face down on the floor. His body had smoldering burns, a television was on his head, and furniture covered his upper body. Mr. White suffered extensive burn- related injuries which required multiple surgeries, including amputation of both arms. About a week after the incident, Mr. White died from complications associated with his injuries. Authorities determined that arson was the cause of the fire in the hotel room, and defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and first-degree arson in December 2014. At trial, defense counsel advanced several affirmative defenses, 1 A more detailed recitation of facts can be found in the first decision of the Court of Appeals. See State v. Gupton (Gupton I), No. COA18-818, 2019 WL 5213009 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2019). -2-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court including not guilty by reason of insanity. In addition, the trial court denied multiple motions to dismiss related to sufficiency of the State’s evidence. Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and first-degree arson, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison for first-degree murder and a consecutive term of sixty-four to eighty-nine months in prison for first-degree arson. On direct appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of arson and failed to prove that defendant was sane when he committed the murder, and (2) the short-form indictment charging him with first-degree murder was facially invalid. State v. Gupton (Gupton I), No. COA18-818, 2019 WL 5213009, at *2–4 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2019). The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s arguments and concluded that defendant received a fair trial free from error. Id. at *4. On 30 April 2020, defendant filed an MAR, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel: (1) failed to confront the State’s case against him; (2) made “highly questionable admissions of guilt” and introduced “irrelevant prejudicial evidence”; (3) presented a “legally invalid insanity defense”; and (4) focused on capital sentencing at the expense of the guilt-innocent phase. Defendant also asserted a fifth claim in his MAR, contending that he was afforded “only one trial attorney in violation of his constitutional right to two counsel” in a capital trial. Notably, none of these claims were raised on direct appeal. In support of his MAR, defendant submitted the trial court record and -3-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court transcript and an affidavit from one of his trial attorneys, Mr. Wayne Baucino. The State filed an answer responding to defendant’s MAR and attached an affidavit from defendant’s other trial attorney, Mr. Ames Chamberlin. On 5 November 2021, the MAR court concluded that defendant’s claims were procedurally barred under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 and entered an order denying the MAR. Alternatively, the MAR court determined that defendant’s claims should be denied on the merits as a matter of law based on the unambiguous record. Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari to review the MAR court’s order. See State v. Gupton (Gupton II), No. COA23-661, 2025 WL 1949973 (N.C. Ct. App. July 16, 2025). The Court of Appeals allowed defendant’s petition, but it failed to conduct the straightforward two-step analysis required by our precedent. Id.; see also Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569, 570 (2023) (“When contemplating whether to issue a writ of certiorari, our state’s appellate courts must consider a two-factor test. That test examines (1) the likelihood that the case has merit or that error was committed below and (2) whether there are extraordinary circumstances that justify issuing the writ.” (emphasis added)).2 The 2 We have stressed that “a writ of certiorari should issue only if the petitioner can show merit or that error was probably committed below . . . [and] only if there are extraordinary circumstances to justify it.” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569, 572 (2023) (cleaned up). However, since we decided Cryan, panels of the Court of Appeals have continued to use that court’s pre-Cryan opinions to “serve as guideposts to help [them] exercise [their] discretion and determine in which cases a grant of certiorari is appropriate.” State v. Gardner, 299 N.C. App. 251, 255 (2025). But see id. at 264 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the Court of Appeals “may not ignore binding Supreme Court precedent and label such conduct an exercise of its ‘discretion’ ”). This is error, -4-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court Court of Appeals affirmed the MAR court’s order, reasoning that because defendant was in an adequate position to raise these IAC claims on direct appeal but failed to do so, and because he failed to argue any exceptions to the bar provided by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(b), the MAR court did not err in concluding that defendant’s claims were procedurally barred. Gupton II, 2025 WL 1949973, at *5. We allowed defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of the MAR court. II. Standard of Review This Court reviews decisions of the Court of Appeals to determine “whether the Court of Appeals committed any errors of law,” and we therefore conduct “the same inquiry that the Court of Appeals was called upon to undertake in reviewing the [MAR] court’s order.” Schooldev E., LLC v. Town of Wake Forest, 386 N.C. 775, 785 (2024) (cleaned up). Accordingly, we review the MAR court’s order to determine “whether the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order and we take this opportunity to once again “remind the Court of Appeals that it is bound to apply properly the precedent of this Court.” See In re N.M.W., 389 N.C. 57, 57 (2026) (per curiam). While the Court of Appeals has discretion to allow or deny a petition for writ of certiorari, that court is bound by Cryan when exercising that discretion. See, e.g., State v. Lail, 388 N.C. 431, 433 (2025) (“Although the abuse of discretion standard typically requires a manifestly arbitrary or unreasoned decision, . . . [a] ruling, which applie[s] the wrong legal standard, [i]s an abuse of discretion.” (cleaned up)). The apparent lack of uniform application of our precedent in this sphere is not a mere academic or technical issue. When one party’s petition is assigned to a panel properly applying Cryan, and another party’s functionally identical petition is assigned to a panel improperly applying the lower court’s pre-Cryan cases, there is a very real possibility that those two parties will receive unequal treatment. -5-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court entered by the trial court.” State v. Tucker, 385 N.C. 471, 484 (2023) (cleaned up). “We review issues of law,” such as whether a claim is procedurally barred, “de novo.” Id. III. Discussion A. Motions for Appropriate Relief Post-conviction procedures generally serve two purposes: promoting finality of criminal judgments while at the same time providing a mechanism for relief for legitimate constitutional violations, consequential legal mistakes, newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, sentencing errors, or other substantial defects that affected the fairness or legality of the relevant proceedings. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415 (2025). An MAR must comply with procedural requirements set forth in section 15A-1420, identify the legal basis for the relief requested, and include facts supporting a defendant’s requested relief. Thereafter, an MAR court “must determine the motion without an evidentiary hearing when the motion and supporting and opposing information present only questions of law,” but may conduct an evidentiary hearing if one is “required to resolve questions of fact.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c)(1), (3) (2025). Unlike a direct appeal, an MAR may, consistent with the statute, address issues outside the trial record, and therefore it functions as a broader post-conviction remedy designed to address miscarriages of justice that may not have been fully reviewable on direct appeal. See N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1414 to -1416, -1419 (2025). But -6-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court our post-conviction relief statutes generally bar a defendant from raising a claim in an MAR when “[u]pon a previous appeal the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do so.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3). In such circumstances, “[t]he court shall deny the motion . . . unless the defendant can demonstrate” either: (1) “[g]ood cause for excusing the grounds for denial . . . [and] actual prejudice resulting from the defendant’s claim”; or (2) “[t]hat failure to consider the defendant’s claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(b). “Subsection 15A-1419(a)(3) is not a general rule that any claim not brought on direct appeal is forfeited on state collateral review but rather requires the reviewing court, instead, to determine whether the particular claim at issue could have been brought on direct review.” Tucker, 385 N.C. at 491–92 (cleaned up). A claim could have been brought on direct review if “the direct appeal record . . . contained sufficient information to permit the reviewing court to make all the factual and legal determinations necessary to allow a proper resolution of the claim in question.” State v. Bell, 387 N.C. 262, 274–75 (2025) (cleaned up). Put simply, to avoid this procedural bar, defendants must simply “raise those . . . claims on direct appeal that are apparent from the record.” State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167 (2001). The post-conviction procedure set forth above serves a critical role in our criminal justice system. Not only does it provide for review and potential relief to defendants convicted of crime, but the process also promotes finality. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415, Official Commentary (2021) (“[A]dditional finality has been added in G.S. 15A-1419 by -7-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court making it clear that there is but one choice to raise available matters after the case is over, and if there has been a previous assertion of the error, or opportunity to assert the error, by motion or appeal, a later motion may be denied on that basis.”); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419, Official Commentary (2021) (“[O]nce . . . there has been opportunity to litigate a matter, there will not be a right to seek relief by additional motions at a later date. . . . [I]f there has been an opportunity to have the matter considered on a previous motion for appropriate relief or appeal the court may deny the motion for appropriate relief.”). It is imperative, not only for the parties, but also for federal habeas review, that we strictly and regularly follow our post-conviction procedural requirements. Tucker, 385 N.C. at 486 (alterations in original). Whether a claim is apparent from the record and therefore subject to the procedural bar necessarily depends on the type of claim asserted. For some types of claims, the presence in the record of defense counsel’s objection and the trial court’s ruling on said objection is sufficient to place a defendant in a position to adequately raise that claim on direct appeal. See id. at 492 (concluding the defendant was in a position to adequately raise a Batson claim on direct appeal where the record demonstrated defense counsel “raised a Batson objection at trial, [and] receiv[ed] a ruling from the judge”). For other claims, like IAC claims, the inquiry is more nuanced. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims All defendants in criminal proceedings possess a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Oglesby, 382 N.C. 235, 242 (2022). To -8-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court prevail on an IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance was prejudicial. Id. To satisfy the first prong, a defendant must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984). A defendant satisfies the second prong when he or she proves “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Because a defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice to prevail, “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in . . . order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697. Because the “object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance,” a reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id. When “it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,” the Supreme Court of the United States has instructed “that course should be followed.” Id. Regarding when such claims can be decided by an appellate court, we have stated that “IAC claims brought on direct review will be decided on the merits when -9-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court the cold record reveals that no further investigation is required, i.e., claims that may be developed and argued without such ancillary procedures as the appointment of investigators or an evidentiary hearing.” Fair, 354 N.C. at 166. However, “because of the nature of IAC claims, defendants will likely not be in a position to develop many IAC claims on direct appeal.” Id. at 167. As it “is not the intention of this Court to deprive criminal defendants of their right to have IAC claims fully considered,” when an IAC claim is asserted on direct appeal with an undeveloped record, our appellate courts generally “dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent MAR proceeding.” Id. “Nonetheless, to avoid procedural default under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3), defendants should necessarily raise those IAC claims on direct appeal that are apparent from the record.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Oglesby, 382 N.C. at 245 (“[A]n appellate court’s decision to deny or dismiss an IAC claim depends in part on that court’s confidence in the record produced during the underlying proceeding.”). Put another way, defendants must raise record-apparent IAC claims on direct appeal or the procedural bar applies.3 3 There is no lack of clarity here contrary to the assertions in the dissent.N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3) sets forth the procedural requirements, and Fair, Oglesby, and State v. Long, 354 N.C. 534 (2001), clarified whatever the statute left open. We agree with our colleagues that there is no blanket forfeiture rule for all IAC claims: those not apparent from the record need not be brought on direct appeal. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3). But the dissent conflates “apparent from the record” with the ability to decide an IAC claim. The question is whether a particular claim could have been brought on direct review. When an IAC claim is apparent from the record, it must be raised on direct appeal or else it is subject to the procedural bar. This is essentially a preservation requirement as illustrated -10-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the interplay between IAC claims and subsection 15A-1419(a)(3) in McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2000), which this Court has cited with approval. See Fair, 354 N.C. at 166. In McCarver, the defendant argued that “because [IAC] claims are ordinarily more appropriately raised in collateral proceedings, these claims are not consistently procedurally barred in collateral proceedings in North Carolina.” McCarver, 221 F.3d at 589. But the Fourth Circuit properly understood that for the defendant there to prevail in his argument, “he would need to cite a non-negligible number of cases in which [IAC] claims could have been brought on direct review but were not, and in which the collateral review court nonetheless failed to bar the claim . . . because the claim was an [IAC] claim.” Id. The defendant in McCarver could not make such a showing because “North Carolina courts have held that [IAC] claims that are not brought on direct review can be procedurally defaulted,” and the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant’s assertion “that there is a general ineffective assistance of counsel claim exception to our holding that section 15A-1419(a)(3) is an independent and adequate state procedural bar.” Id. at 589–90. in Fair. If the IAC claim is preserved, the appellate court must then determine whether the record permits resolution of the preserved claim. If the cold record suffices, the appellate court can decide the IAC claim. See Fair, 354 N.C. at 166. If resolving the IAC claim requires evidence outside the record, which is frequently the case, the appellate court should dismiss without prejudice for the defendant to file an MAR in the trial court. See Long, 354 N.C. at 540. The latter is not a preservation issue, but rather a disposition one. Stated another way, a claim that is apparent from the transcript must be brought even if it may ultimately be dismissed for further investigation. -11-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court C. Defendant’s Claims are Procedurally Barred Having established that IAC claims are not exempt from subsection 15A- 1419(a)’s procedural bar merely because such claims are routinely dismissed without prejudice on direct appeal, we turn to defendant’s contention that the MAR court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding his specific IAC claims are procedurally barred because he was in an adequate position to raise them on his direct appeal. Defendant’s arguments turn on his assertion that the lower courts erred because neither court determined that his IAC claims “could have been established without the supporting affidavit” from his trial counsel, which was unavailable to him on his direct appeal, and because neither court determined “that the cold trial record was in fact sufficient in this case or point[ed] to anything that would have allowed [defendant] to present his IAC claims adequately on appeal.” To the extent defendant believes that subsection 15A-1419(a)(3) only operates to bar a claim if that claim could have been “established” on direct appeal, i.e., if the defendant would have prevailed on that claim in his or her appeal, he proceeds from a mistaken premise. Subsection 15A-1419(a)(3) bars claims that the defendant “was in a position to adequately raise,” not perfectly or even persuasively raise, upon a previous appeal. As the State correctly notes, to determine whether an IAC claim is barred we inquire whether a defendant could have made the same claim or claims in his direct appeal, not “whether the defendant [could have] previously raised claims that were worthy of relief.” -12-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court Here, defendant’s MAR consisted of eighty-four pages of background information, twenty-nine pages of argument addressing his five claims, and two exhibits which he incorporated by reference: an affidavit from one of his trial counsel and the pretrial hearing and trial transcripts. Defendant contends his claims are not procedurally barred because they were based on information obtained in, among other things, post-conviction discovery and conflicting affidavits from trial counsel. But as the MAR court correctly noted, counsel’s affidavit was not cited by defendant in his MAR apart from two general references contained in the table of contents and a footnote on the first page. The affidavit was not cited or otherwise relied upon by defendant in the eighty-four pages of background information or the twenty-nine pages of argument in support of his claims. By contrast, defendant’s MAR cites to the transcript, which was available in his direct appeal record, at least two hundred times. Defendant’s arguments in this appeal regarding the relevancy of the affidavit and its explanation of “trial strategy and impressions” fail to address the fundamental fact that the claims articulated in his MAR rely exclusively on information available from the record. Where, as here, a claim in an MAR relies exclusively on information contained in the direct appeal record, the conclusion that such a claim is “apparent from the record,” see Fair, 354 N.C. at 167, is almost inescapable. Because each of defendant’s claims asserted in his MAR were readily apparent -13-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court from the record on his direct appeal, there is no reason why defendant could not have raised identical claims in his previous appeal. This does not mean that it would have been impossible for defendant to raise any IAC claim in his MAR that would have survived the procedural bar. It simply means that “the particular claim[s] at issue,” as articulated by defendant in his MAR, “could have been brought on direct review.” See Tucker, 385 N.C. at 492 (cleaned up). Defendant further argues that “[i]t is precisely because [these] IAC claims could not be decided on the cold trial record alone without further investigation that [defendant] supported his claims with an affidavit from one of his trial attorneys.” But the MAR court’s order, in which it alternatively decided each claim on the merits based on the cold record, demonstrates that each of these claims could be determined based on the record alone. That this determination is unfavorable to defendant does not exempt his claims from the procedural bar. Finally, defendant contends his claims are not subject to the procedural bar because in the absence of counsel’s affidavit, the result of such an undeveloped claim in the Court of Appeals would have been dismissal without prejudice to his right to file an MAR in the trial court. But the inquiry is not the potential disposition of such a claim by the Court of Appeals but instead, whether the particular claim could have been adequately raised. Again, the substance of the claims in defendant’s MAR relies on material contained in the record, and it is uncontroverted that defendant failed to raise these -14-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court claims on direct appeal. Where, as here, the claims articulated rely entirely on material contained in the direct appeal record, it is abundantly clear that these claims were “apparent from the record.” See Fair, 354 N.C. at 167. Accordingly, because defendant was in a position to adequately raise each of these claims in his previous appeal and defendant failed to argue that exceptions to the procedural bar provided by subsection 15A-1419(b) apply, both the MAR court and the Court of Appeals correctly determined that defendant’s claims are procedurally barred. IV. Conclusion North Carolina’s post-conviction procedure “serves a critical role in our criminal justice system” by providing “potential relief to defendants” and “promot[ing] finality.” Tucker, 385 N.C. at 486. One of the ways our statutes promote finality is by putting defendants and attorneys on notice that “there is but one chance to raise available matters after the case is over, and if there has been a previous assertion of the error, or opportunity to assert the error, by motion or appeal, a later motion may be denied on that basis.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415, Official Commentary (2025). Here, the IAC claims articulated in defendant’s MAR were based entirely on information contained in the direct appeal record, and he therefore had the opportunity to assert these claims on direct appeal but failed to do so. Defendant’s claims are procedurally barred, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. -15-  STATE V. GUPTON Opinion of the Court AFFIRMED. -16-  STATE V. GUPTON Earls, J., dissenting Justice EARLS dissenting. Today the Court announces a new rule that the procedural bar in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (2025) is actually a preservation requirement. Defense counsel must assert ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims on direct appeal to preserve those for future collateral review. See majority supra n. 3. The Court does not explain how this preservation requirement is consistent with the text, structure, or legislative intent of North Carolina’s post-conviction review statutes. It does not explain why it is justified in overturning this Court’s precedent in State v. Hyman, 371 N.C. 363 (2018), or modifying the Court’s recent decision in State v. Bell, 387 N.C. 262 (2025), among others. It does not even explain why it is fair to change the rules in this very case. Defendant Garry Gupton filed his direct appeal under the procedural bar standard as clarified in Hyman, but this Court now abandons Hyman and retroactively holds Mr. Gupton to a very different standard. The majority purports to apply this Court’s precedent while doing anything but. The effect is to unfairly penalize criminal defendants who had no notice of this change and to prematurely close the courthouse doors to even meritorious claims that a conviction has been obtained in violation of constitutional rights. Because I would apply existing precedent to hold that Mr. Gupton’s claims are not procedurally barred, I dissent. I. Mr. Gupton’s IAC Claims Mr. Gupton’s 118-page motion for appropriate relief (MAR) carefully detailed -17-  STATE V. GUPTON Earls, J., dissenting the procedural and factual history of his convictions for arson and first-degree murder in support of five claims of IAC. Each claim basically arose from a central premise: trial counsel, he alleged, provided constitutionally ineffective counsel by failing to confront the State’s case against him. In essence, he alleged, counsel decided early on that Mr. Gupton had done what the State accused him of, even before seeing the substance of the State’s evidence, and concluded that the best defense was insanity. This threshold strategic choice caused defense counsel to fail to meaningfully challenge whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove its case: counsel failed to thoroughly investigate, introduce affirmative exculpatory evidence, and vigorously subject the State’s case to adversarial testing, thereby prejudicing Mr. Gupton. These allegations were supported by examples in the cold record, including where trial counsel failed to cross-examine the State’s witnesses, to move to dismiss charges in light of “gaps” in the State’s case, and to challenge or try to keep out prejudicial and inadmissible evidence. They were also supported by specific references to evidence not in the record. For example, his motion alleged: • Trial counsel did not make efforts to locate, interview, or subpoena any witnesses from the crime scene, the Battleground Inn, who described what had been seen and heard the early morning of 9 November 2014. That was so even as police investigators had spoken with a witness who had seen an unidentified man with a clean-shaven head fleeing the hotel after the fire alarm went off but did not capture the witness’s name or information, and -18-  STATE V. GUPTON Earls, J., dissenting other witnesses heard items being thrown and yelling about the “KKK” at the time of the crimes. • Trial counsel failed to elicit testimony showing substantial disruptions to the crime scene in between when firefighters arrived and investigators arrived. They failed to challenge the lack of information on ingress and egress into the hotel room or the presence of unexplained items found in the hotel room. Indeed, counsel in closing argument stated that one such item belonged to the victim, Mr. Stephen White, even though no record evidence supported that assertion. • Counsel did not have Mr. Gupton’s blood tested for common date rape drugs including Rohypnol and MDMA, even though Mr. Gupton and Mr. White had met that night drinking at a nightclub and investigators testified that Mr. Gupton appeared to be “diaphoretic” or profusely sweating, a common side effect of such drugs. A third-party had informed trial counsel that “confirmation testing could be performed on Mr. Gupton’s blood which would reveal whether Rohypnol (a known date-rape drug) was one of the benzodiazepines which had been detected by the hospital’s urine screen and the NMS Labs blood test,” yet no such testing was performed. • Counsel failed to hire or consult with an arson expert or to meaningfully cross-examine the State’s arson expert. For example, counsel took no actions to meaningfully challenge that expert’s circular reasoning that a -19-  STATE V. GUPTON Earls, J., dissenting short-circuit did not cause the fire because the fire caused the short-circuit. • Counsel failed to seek to admit the victim’s statements to his doctors when he was in critical condition and likely not to survive that he “recall[ed] checking into a room on the fourth floor of the Battleground Inn, that he had been drinking that night, that he was with a friend he had known for two years, that they did not get into a fight or disagreement, that he did not recall getting hit in the head or the room being on fire, that they went to sleep in the motel room, and that the next thing he remembered was waking up in the hospital.” On top of these specific allegations, the MAR attached and incorporated by reference an affidavit from Mr. Gupton’s primary trial counsel, Wayne Baucino. Mr. Baucino corroborated that he “never considered that Mr. Gupton might not have committed these offenses” and “created in [his] mind early on an idea of what had happened in that hotel room, which included a sexual assault triggering a psychotic break leading to Mr. Gupton lighting the bedspread on fire.” As a result of that choice, he never interviewed any witnesses from the hotel’s fourth floor, did not “hire or consult any fire expert in this case or do anything to challenge the State’s fire investigator’s findings,” determine how the fire was extinguished, or consult a forensic toxicologist. He “assumed NMS [Labs] tested Mr. Gupton’s blood for everything.” In retrospect, “[he] certainly believe[d] that at the very minimum [he] should have investigated the State’s case and put the State more to the test than [he] -20-  STATE V. GUPTON Earls, J., dissenting did.” The substance of the MAR thus alleged that trial counsel for the guilt- innocence phase prematurely decided to defend Mr. Gupton on the basis of insanity, even before counsel received the State’s discovery and realized how little evidence the State had of who was in the hotel room, what happened in the hotel room, or how the fire started—and even as Mr. Gupton’s own recollection of what happened was inconsistent with physical evidence at the crime scene and varied over time. Mr. Gupton’s IAC claims particularly challenged that trial counsel wrongly focused on a legally invalid insanity defense at the expense of challenging the State’s case, made highly questionable admissions of guilt and admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and focused on the capital sentencing portion of the proceedings at the expense of trying to prove Mr. Gupton’s innocence. These allegations drew from the record as well as evidence not admitted at trial but contained in trial counsel’s files and trial counsel’s own reflections as to defense strategy. Mr. Gupton’s MAR was accompanied by a second motion for post-conviction discovery, for state funding to hire a psychiatrist and fire expert, and to test any remaining samples of Mr. Gupton’s blood for certain drug substances. Mr. Gupton’s first motion for post-conviction discovery had been denied because he had not yet filed an MAR. II. The Procedural Bar Standard The narrow question presented is whether Mr. Gupton’s IAC claims are procedurally barred because “[u]pon a previous appeal the defendant was in a -21-  STATE V. GUPTON Earls, J., dissenting position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do so.” See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (2025). The particular contours of this procedural bar have not been a model of clarity. Indeed, more than twenty-five years ago, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, hearing a petition for habeas corpus from another defendant, Ernest McCarver, whose claims were subject to this procedural bar, remarked that “North Carolina courts have not undertaken to construe this statutory language so as to provide the needed clarity” for when IAC claims must be raised on direct appeal. McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 599 (4th Cir. 2000) (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment). Although the “general practice in North Carolina [is to] hear[ ] ineffective assistance claims at the post-conviction stage,” there were undefined exceptions that created confusion. See id. The opinion noted, Is a defendant “in a position to adequately raise” a claim whenever there are facts in the record to support it, or only when the facts as to the claim are undisputed? Must the representation that was assertedly ineffective have taken place prior to trial or prior to sentencing? Is a defendant “in a position to adequately raise” an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal when the defendant is being represented on the appeal by his assertedly ineffective trial counsel? We simply do not know, because the scope of the exception, as well as the scope of the procedural rule that purportedly derives from it, have neve