Stein v. Hall

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA No. COA25-652 Filed 16 September 2026 Wake County, No. 23CV029308-910 JOSHUA H. STEIN, in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff, v. DESTIN C. HALL, in his official capacity as SPEAKER OF THE NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; and PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE NORTH CAROLINA SENATE, Defendants, and DAVE BOLIEK, in his official capacity as NORTH CAROLINA STATE AUDITOR, Intervenor-Defendant. Appeal by Defendants from order entered 23 April 2025 by Judges Edwin G. Wilson, Jr., Lori I. Hamilton, and R. Andrew Womble in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 February 2026. Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Daniel F.E. Smith, Jim W. Phillips, Jr., and Eric F. Fletcher; and Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, by W. Swain Wood, for Plaintiff-Appellee. Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Matthew F. Tilley, Michael A. Ingersoll, and Emmett Whelan; Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, by Noah H. Huffstetler, III, and D. Martin Warf, for Defendants-Appellants. Ward & Smith, P.A., by Alexander C. Dale, and Mark S. Wigley, for Intervenor- Defendant-Appellant. WOOD, Judge.  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court Destin C. Hall, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives and Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate (collectively “Legislative Defendants”), along with Dave Boliek, in his official capacity as North Carolina State Auditor (“Auditor” or collectively with Legislative Defendants, “Defendants”) appeal from the order entered on 23 April 2025 by a divided three-judge superior court panel (the “three- judge panel”). The order granted Joshua H. Stein’s (“Governor”), in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, motion for summary judgment; denied the Governor’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as moot; denied Legislative Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; and declared Sections 3A.3.(b), (c), (d), (f), (g), and (h) of Session Law 2024-57 unconstitutional. I. Factual and Procedural Background The North Carolina State Board of Elections (“State Board”) is responsible for the enforcement of laws governing elections, campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics and has the “authority to make such reasonable rules and regulations with respect to the conduct of primaries and elections as it may deem advisable . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-22 (Powers and duties of State Board of Elections). The State Board also advises and monitors for compliance the state’s county boards of election (“County Boards”). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-22(e). The North Carolina General Assembly (“General Assembly”) created the first -2-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court State Board in 1899; all members of the State Board were appointed by the General Assembly. See An Act to Regulate Elections, ch. 507, § 4, 1899 Sess. Laws 659. In 1901, the General Assembly transferred to the Governor the duty to appoint all members to the State Board. See An Act to Provide for the Holding of Elections in North Carolina, ch. 89, § 5, 1901 Sess. Laws 244. Since 1901, the Governor has retained the duty to appoint all members to the State Board. Additionally, the Governor has appointed the chair of each County Board since 2018. On 10 October 2023, the General Assembly succeeded in its efforts to override Former Governor Roy Cooper’s (“Governor Cooper”) veto and enacted Session Law 2023-139 (“SB 749”) which transferred the State Board “administratively to the Department of the Secretary of State.” Further, SB 749 increased the number of State Board members from five to eight and transferred the duty to appoint all members of the State Board from the Governor to the General Assembly. On 17 October 2023, Governor Cooper filed a complaint alleging that the changes to the State Board within SB 749 were unconstitutional. On 6 November 2023, Governor Cooper filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the challenged portions of SB 749 from going into effect on 1 January 2024. On 8 November 2023, the matter was transferred to a three-judge panel in the Superior Court of Wake County as required when there is a facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General Assembly. The three-judge panel granted the motion for preliminary injunction; the legislative defendants filed an answer and motion to -3-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim; and the three-judge panel entered a case management order. On 9 February 2024, the legislative defendants filed a motion to dismiss and, alternatively, motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(c) asserting that Governor Cooper’s claims are political questions and nonjusticiable, thus, the three-judge panel should dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On 9 February 2024, Governor Cooper filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. On 11 March 2024, the three-judge panel1 granted Governor Cooper’s motion for summary judgment and denied the legislative defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings. The three-judge panel determined Governor Cooper’s claim to be justiciable as a matter of law and found a separation of powers issue to exist which Cooper I controlled. See generally Cooper v. Berger (Cooper I), 370 N.C. 392, 809 S.E.2d 98 (2018); State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger (McCrory), 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 256 (2016). The three-judge panel concluded in part: 12. Because the State Board and County Boards exercise executive functions, the question becomes whether the Governor, under the Session Law, has sufficient control. Again, Cooper I is controlling. Our Supreme Court has held that “Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina Constitution requires ‘the Governor to have enough control over’ commissions or boards that ‘are primarily administrative or executive in character’ ‘to perform his or her constitutional duty,” Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 414, 809 1 Judges Edwin Wilson, Lori Hamilton, and Andrew Womble. -4-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court S.E.2d at 111 (quoting McCrory, 368 N.C. at 645-46, 781 S.E.2d at 256). The degree of control depends on the ability to appoint members, supervise their activities, and remove them from office. Id. 13. The constitutional provision “also contemplates that the Governor will have the ability to affirmatively implement the policy decisions that executive branch agencies subject to his or her control are allowed, through delegation from the General Assembly, to make as well.” Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 415, 809 S.E.2d at 112. 14. Without explicitly defining “control,” it is still clear that the Session Law infringes upon the Governor’s constitutional duties. First, all appointment powers were removed from the Governor and given to the General Assembly for the State Board and the County Boards. Second, Defendants have the final decision on the Chair and Executive Director of the State Board if the members are unable to reach a majority decision. Similarly, if the County Board members cannot reach a decision on their Chair, the General Assembly selects the Chair. Finally, the Governor has no power to remove members of the State Board and County Boards, whether for lack of attendance or for cause. Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 416, 809 S.E.2d at 112- 13 (concluding the statute at issue left the Governor with little control over the Board because, in part, it “significantly constrain[ed] the Governor’s ability to remove members”). Defendants’ actions are the most stark and blatant removal of appointment power from the Governor since McCrory and Cooper I. Cooper I and McCrory control, and the Session Law must be permanently enjoined. On 5 November 2024, Democratic candidate Joshua H. Stein won the North Carolina Governor election and Republican candidate David Boliek won the North Carolina Auditor election. -5-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court While the appeal of SB 749 was still pending, Senate Bill 382 (“SB 382”) was introduced on 19 November 2024 and passed in both chambers of the General Assembly before being presented to the Governor. Governor Cooper vetoed SB 382 on 26 November 2024. The Governor’s veto was overridden by a Republican super- majority vote on 11 December 2024. SB 382, in relevant part, transferred the State Board administratively from an independent agency under the Governor to the Department of the State Auditor; relieved the Governor entirely of his duty to appoint and remove State and County Board members; assigned all of the Governor’s former appointment duties to the Auditor along with the duty to fill vacancies or remove members who fail to attend meetings; and assigned the Auditor to direct and supervise the budgeting functions of the State Board. S.B. 382 Sec. 3A.1-3A.3 of S.L. 2024-57, Legis. Analysis Div., N.C. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 2 (9 Jan. 2025). SB 382 effectively repealed the challenged and enjoined portions of SB 749. On 28 January 2025, the parties2 jointly moved for an order vacating the 11 March 2024 final judgment pursuant to Rule 60 to “permit supplemental amendment of [Governor Cooper’s] complaint pursuant to Rule 15(d), as requested in [Governor Cooper’s] 23 December 2024 motion; and to establish a briefing schedule for 2 Now the named parties to the case: Governor Joshua H. Stein, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina, Plaintiff, vs. Destin C. Hall, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of North Carolina House of Representatives; and Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, Defendants. -6-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court dispositive motions on [Governor Cooper’s] supplemental complaint.” That same day, the Governor filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. On 11 February 2025, the three-judge panel filed an amended consent order granting the joint motion to vacate the 11 March 2024 final judgment. That same day, the Governor filed a supplemental complaint pursuant to Rules 15(d) and 19, seeking a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions challenging Sections 3A.3.(b), (c), (d), (f), (g), and (h) of SB 382. Notably, the Governor has not challenged the administrative move of the State Board to the Department of the Auditor nor that the budgeting functions shall be performed under the supervision and direction of the Auditor. On 25 February 2025, Legislative Defendants filed their answer to the Governor’s supplemental complaint and asserted that the Governor’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On 25 February 2025, Legislative Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 on all claims raised in the supplemental complaint. On 26 February 2025, the Governor filed a motion for summary judgment as to the supplemental complaint pursuant to Rule 56. On 6 March 2025, the Auditor filed a motion and memorandum in support of his motion to permissively intervene as a defendant and subsequently filed his proposed answer to the Governor’s supplemental complaint. -7-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court On 7 March 2025, the trial court entered an order transferring the matter to a three-judge panel. On 11 March 2025, the three-judge panel filed a consent order allowing the Auditor to permissively intervene under Rule 24(b). On 14 March 2025, the Governor filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The matter came on for hearing on 14 April 2025. On 23 April 2025, the three-judge panel filed its order granting the Governor’s motion for summary judgment, denying Legislative Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and denying as moot the Governor’s motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On 24 April 2025, Legislative Defendants filed a motion to stay the 23 April 2025 order while their appeal was pending. That same day, Legislative Defendants filed notice of appeal of the 23 April 2025 order; the Auditor filed notice of appeal two days later. On 28 April 2025, the three-judge panel denied Legislative Defendants’ motion for an appellate stay. On 12 May 2025, this Court entered an order allowing the petition for writ of supersedeas and motion for temporary stay filed by Legislative Defendants. The order stayed the matter until further order by this Court; therefore, SB 382 took effect notwithstanding the three-judge panel having found the challenged portions of SB 382 unconstitutional. The Governor appealed this Court’s order to our Supreme Court which on 21 May 2025 filed an order concluding this Court did not abuse its discretion. See Stein v. Berger (Stein Stay Order), 387 N.C. 575, 915 S.E.2d 146 (2025). The order from our Supreme Court concluded: -8-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court The constitutionality of [SB 382] remains vigorously contested. Given that defendants have already exercised their appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals—and that the outcome of their appeal is still pending—the three- judge panel will not have the final say on the law’s enforceability. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ ruling was not manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. The Governor’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas and Petition for Writ of Certiorari are denied, and his Motion for Temporary Stay is dismissed as moot. Id. at 579, 915 S.E.2d at 149. The vigorously contested question regarding the constitutionality of SB 382/ Session Law 2024-57 is now before this Court. II. Analysis The case before us presents a matter of first impression regarding the General Assembly’s ability to reassign certain duties prescribed by law among Council of State members within the executive branch. N.C. Const. art. III, § 7(2). Legislative Defendants argue the three-judge panel erred by declaring the challenged sections of SB 382 unconstitutional because: SB 382 represents “a legitimate exercise of the General Assembly’s express and plenary power to structure agencies of State government and assign duties to the ‘other elective officers’ who serve as members of the Council of State”; our constitution expressly authorizes the General Assembly to distribute duties among the members of the executive branch; the cases McCrory, Cooper I, and Cooper Confirmation are inapposite to the issue presented; SB 382 does not interfere with the Governor’s constitutional duties; and the Governor’s challenge -9-  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court to SB 382 is nonjusticiable. See generally McCrory, 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 256; Cooper I, 370 N.C. 392, 809 S.E.2d 98; Cooper v. Berger (Cooper Confirmation), 371 N.C. 799, 822 S.E.2d 286 (2018). The Auditor further supports Legislative Defendants’ arguments by contending that our constitution’s reorganization clause “expressly permits this kind of intra-executive branch restructuring—full stop,” and that regardless, the reorganization clause of Article III, § 5(10) renders the Governor’s challenge to SB 382 nonjusticiable. In contrast, the Governor argues the three-judge panel did not err by declaring the challenged sections of SB 382 unconstitutional because a violation of the separation of powers clause occurs not only when “one branch exercises power that the constitution vests exclusively in another branch,” but also equally forbids “one branch from ‘prevent[ing] another branch from performing its constitutional duties.’” McCrory, 368 N.C. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256. By enacting SB 382, the Governor asserts that the General Assembly has prevented him from performing his constitutional duties, i.e., ensuring the State Board faithfully executes the law. After a careful review of the record and applicable law, we conclude the Governor has presented a justiciable question of law, and the General Assembly has not violated the separation of powers. A. Standard of Review This Court reviews an order granting or denying summary judgment containing constitutional arguments de novo, considering the matter anew and freely - 10 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court substituting its own judgment for that of the lower court. Stein v. Berger (Stein Commissions), __ N.C. App. __, __, 923 S.E.2d 579, 584 (2025). In our review, we must “presum[e] that legislation is constitutional and that a constitutional limitation on the General Assembly must be explicit in the text and demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.” McKinney v. Goins, 387 N.C. 35, 42, 911 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2025) (citing Harper v. Hall, 384 N.C. 292, 323-24, 886 S.E.2d 393, 414 (2023)). “[W]e will not declare a law invalid unless we determine that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stein Commissions, __ N.C. App. at __, 923 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting McCrory, 368 N.C. at 639, 781 S.E.2d at 252). The Governor, as the challenging party, “bears the burden of overcoming our presumption of validity.” McKinney, 387 N.C. at 44, 911 S.E.2d at 9. “[A] claim that a law is unconstitutional must surmount the high bar imposed by the presumption of constitutionality and meet the highest quantum of proof, a showing that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Harper, 384 N.C. at 324, 886 S.E.2d at 414-15. For an act to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, “the constitutional violation must be plain and clear. To determine whether the violation is plain and clear, we look to the text of the constitution, the historical context in which the people of North Carolina adopted the applicable constitutional provision, and our precedents.” McCrory, 368 N.C. at 639, 781 S.E.2d at 252. Therefore, if the Governor here has “fail[ed] to meet his burden beyond a reasonable doubt, ‘we must uphold the statute regardless of whether we agree with the General Assembly’s public - 11 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court policy choices.’” McKinney, 387 N.C. at 44, 911 S.E.2d at 9 (quoting Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore, 384 N.C. 194, 212, 886 S.E.2d 16, 32 (2023)). “Under our Constitution, ‘power remains with the people and is exercised through the General Assembly, which functions as the arm of the electorate. An act of the people’s elected representatives is thus an act of the people and is presumed valid unless it conflicts with the Constitution.’” Holmes v. Moore, 384 N.C. 426, 435, 886 S.E.2d 120, 129 (2023) (quoting Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 546, 556 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2001)). Additionally, our Supreme Court precedent makes clear: [t]he Legislature alone may determine the policy of the State, and its will is supreme, except where limited by constitutional inhibition, which exception or limitation, when invoked, presents a question of power for the courts to decide. But even then the courts do not undertake to say what the law ought to be; they only declare what it is. Holmes, 384 N.C. at 435, 886 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting State v. Revis, 193 N.C. 192, 195, 136 S.E. 346, 347 (1927) (recently quoted in substantial part in McKinney, 387 N.C. at 42, 911 S.E.2d at 7). It is this Court’s task now to set aside whatever the General Assembly’s public policy choices may have been and consider the constitutional limitations of the General Assembly’s authority by looking at “the plain text of the constitution just as [we] would look to the plain text of a statute” and consider whether the Governor has met the high bar in overcoming the presumption of constitutionality afforded to the challenged provisions of SB 382. Harper, 384 N.C. at 324, 886 S.E.2d at 414. - 12 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court B. Justiciability First, we address Defendants’ argument that the Governor’s lawsuit presents a nonjusticiable political question. Legislative Defendants contend the case sub judice “does not involve [a] separation of powers, but instead the General Assembly’s express (and plenary) authority to assign unreserved official duties among Council of State members within the executive branch under Article III, Section 7(2).” In contrast, the Governor argues the question is justiciable and similar to the issue in Cooper I that was held as such. The Governor does not challenge “the General Assembly’s decision to ‘prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State,’” but rather he contends that “the General Assembly has impermissibly exceeded a defined, textual limit on the power that may be assigned to the State Auditor and encroached on the Governor’s executive authority.” The political question doctrine “‘excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for the resolution to the’ legislative or executive branches of government.” Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 407-08, 809 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 717, 549 S.E.2d 840, 854 (2001)). “Purely political questions are those questions which have been wholly committed to the ‘sole discretion’ of a coordinate branch of government, and those questions which can be resolved only by making ‘policy choices and value determinations.’” N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. - 13 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court Moore, 382 N.C. 129, 141, 876 S.E.2d 513, 524 (2022) (quoting Bacon, 353 N.C. at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854). Our Supreme Court has recognized general justiciability principles including “two criteria of political questions: (1) where there is a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue’ to the ‘sole discretion’ of a ‘coordinate political department’; and (2) those questions that can be resolved only by making ‘policy choices and values determinations.’” Id. at 141, 876 S.E.2d at 525-26 (cleaned up) (quoting Bacon, 353 N.C. at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854). “The political question doctrine controls, essentially, when a question becomes ‘not justiciable because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.’” Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 407, 809 S.E.2d at 107 (cleaned up) (quoting Bacon, 353 N.C. 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854). “The judicial branch is designed to resolve legal disputes and to ensure that the other branches do not violate the constitution.” Harper, 384 N.C. at 298, 886 S.E.2d at 399. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 408, 809 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S. Ct. 691, 706 (1962)). Consequently, our Supreme Court has consistently held it necessary to first “undertake a separation of powers analysis in order to - 14 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court determine whether the political question doctrine precludes judicial resolution of a particular dispute.” Id. Our Supreme Court in Cooper I contrasted Bacon v. Lee (“Bacon”) and News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Easley (“News & Observer”) to illustrate distinctions between cases involving nonjusticiable political questions and those that do not. Id. Bacon and News & Observer both dealt with clemency; the first addressed “the constitutionality of the Governor’s exercise of his clemency power under Article III, Section 5(6),” and the latter whether News & Observer was entitled under the public records law to certain clemency records within the possession of the Governor. Bacon, 353 N.C. at 698, 549 S.E.2d at 843; News & Observer Pub. Co. v. Easley, 182 N.C. App. 14, 19, 641 S.E.2d 698, 702 (2007). In Bacon, our Supreme Court stated a “question may be held nonjusticiable under this doctrine if it involves ‘a textually demonstratable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.’” Bacon, 353 N.C. at 717, 549 S.E.2d at 854 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 216, 82 S. Ct. at 710). Since Article III, § 5(6) “expressly commits the substance of the clemency power to the sole discretion of the Governor,” it determined that “judicial review of the exercise of clemency power would unreasonably disrupt a core power of the executive.” Id. In the case of News & Observer, this Court held the parties’ arguments did not “involve judicial review of the Governor’s exercise of clemency power,” but “[i]nstead the question before the Court [was] whether the [News & Observer] [was] entitled, - 15 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court under the Public Records Law, to certain clemency records within the possession of the Governor.” News & Observer Pub. Co., 182 N.C. App. at 19, 641 S.E.2d at 702. To answer the question, this Court determined that the “question turns not on a political question, but on the meaning of our constitution’s proviso that the Governor’s power is subject to legislation relative to the manner of applying for pardons.” Id. (cleaned up). Further, this Court stated, “[t]he principle that questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the judiciary is just as well established and fundamental to the operation of our government as the doctrine of separation of powers.” Id. Thus, in order to resolve the justiciability issue, we must decide whether the Governor is seeking to have the judicial branch interfere with an issue committed to the sole discretion of the General Assembly or whether the Governor is seeking to have the Court undertake the usual role performed by a judicial body, which is to ascertain the meaning of an applicable legal principle, such as that embodied in N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(4). Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 409, 809 S.E.2d at 108. Here, the Governor has not challenged the administrative transfer of the State Board to the department of the Auditor and concedes in his supplemental complaint that “[i]t is undisputed that the General Assembly has considerable authority to restructure the agencies of North Carolina government and assign, modify, and remove powers, functions, and duties.” The Governor asserts in his supplemental complaint that a statute restructuring an executive board—leaving the Governor - 16 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court without any “direct or indirect powers of appointment, supervision or removal over any members”—prevents the Governor from performing his constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and “treat[s] the State Auditor and Governor as if they were interchangeable for constitutional purposes.” The Governor reasons that a statute structured in this manner “impermissibly, facially, and beyond a reasonable doubt interferes with the Governor’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed as required by Article III, Section 5(4) of the North Carolina [Constitution].” Id. at 418, 809 S.E.2d at 114. Because the challenged statutory provisions allegedly violate his constitutional duty to take care, the Governor asserts the statute violates the separation of powers. Thus, we consider the General Assembly’s reassignment of duties between the Governor and the Auditor and not the restructuring of functions, powers, and duties between “administrative departments, agencies, and offices of the State.” Our focus is narrowly tailored to address any potential conflict between Article III, § 7(2) and Article III, § 5(4) and does not require us to examine Article III, § 11 at length in our analysis. This case presents the question of whether the General Assembly by enacting the statute at issue pursuant to Article III, § (7)(2) has prevented the Governor from being able to perform his constitutional duty to take care the laws be faithfully executed pursuant to Article III, § 5(4), that is, whether the General Assembly’s authority to prescribe Council of State members their respective duties is limited by - 17 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court the Governor’s duty to take care the laws be faithfully executed. Id. at 412, 809 S.E.2d at 110. This question “requires us to examine the constitutional provisions enacting a system of government founded on principles of popular sovereignty and democratic self-rule and to then determine if those provisions limit the authority of legislators who” seek to remove duties assigned to the Governor over an executive board or commissions. N.C. State Conf. of NCAAP, 382 N.C. at 145, 876 S.E.2d at 526. Therefore, the question before us is not excluded from judicial review. C. Reassignment of Elected Officer Duties The case before us presents a matter of first impression regarding the General Assembly’s ability to reassign certain duties prescribed by law among Council of State members within the executive branch. N.C. Const. art. III, § 7(2). Accordingly, the three-judge panel erred by concluding it “makes no difference to the constitutional analysis” that the duties at issue here were transferred from the Governor to the Auditor rather than the General Assembly. Specifically, this case considers to what extent the General Assembly may reassign duties that the General Assembly had delegated to the Governor for more than one hundred years, but now the General Assembly desires to delegate to a different elected officer within the Council of State under the authority granted pursuant to Article III § 7(2) of our constitution. Article III § 7(2) of our constitution states that Council of State members’ “respective duties - 18 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court shall be prescribed by law,” i.e., prescribed by the General Assembly. N.C. Const. art. III, § 7(2). The Governor argues the General Assembly violated the separation of powers by reassigning duties because, in his words, “[i]f the General Assembly can freely allocate responsibility for administering elections among Council of State members, it can effectively control elections administration itself.”3 “When a branch is accused of violating separation of powers by encroaching upon the executive branch’s authority, we consider whether the accused branch’s actions ‘unreasonably disrupt a core power of the executive.’” Stein Commissions, __ N.C. App. at __, 923 S.E.2d at 3 We also note the following argument from the Governor’s brief on appeal: the General Assembly cannot assign the responsibility to administer elections to the Auditor. Administering elections is wholly unrelated to the Auditor’s core constitutional function. And, equally importantly, for the entire life of this State, the Auditor has never played a meaningful role in our State’s elections. . . . The General Assembly’s decision nevertheless to appoint the Auditor as our State’s chief elections administrator also violates the Separation of Powers Clause. If the General Assembly can freely allocate responsibility for administering elections among Council of State members, it can effectively control elections administration itself. The Constitution forbids that result. And because the General Assembly cannot task the Auditor with administering elections, that responsibility must revert to the Governor, who enjoys any residual executive authority. Because Senate Bill 382 adopts a contrary regime, the provisions challenged here are unconstitutional. It is important to note that despite this argument from the Governor on appeal, the Auditor is not the Executive Director of the State Board nor the chief elections official for the state. In fact, the members of the State Board appoint the Executive Director who is “responsible for staffing, administration, and execution of the State Board’s decisions and orders and shall perform such other responsibilities as may be assigned by the State Board.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-27. Further, “[t]he Executive Director shall be the chief State elections official,” not the Auditor. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163- 27(d). - 19 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court 584 (quoting McCrory, 368 N.C. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256). Generally, a core power of the executive is disrupted and a separation of powers violation has occurred when the “accused branch ‘retains some control’ over the executive branch’s functions.” Id. at __, 923 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting McCrory, 368 N.C. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256). As our Supreme Court previously has noted: the State Board “clearly performs primarily executive, rather than legislative or judicial, functions” as it is responsible for “the enforcement of laws governing elections, campaign finance, lobbying, and ethics.” Cooper I, 370 N.C. at 415, 809 S.E.2d at 112. However, there is no “categorical rule that would resolve every separation of powers challenge,” and because “each statutory scheme varies,” we must examine the “specific factual and legal context” of each challenge. Stein Commissions, __ N.C. App. at __, 923 S.E.2d at 584-85 (recognizing separation of powers violations “can be ‘more nuanced’ and occur ‘when the actions of one branch prevent another branch from performing its constitutional duties.’”) (quoting McCrory, 368 N.C. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256). “Asserted separation of powers violations are analyzed on a case-by-case basis with a flexible and pragmatic approach.” Cooper v. Berger, 256 N.C. App. 190, 196, 807 S.E.2d 176, 180 (2017). Further, “[e]very constitutional inquiry examines the text of the relevant provision, the historical context in which the people of North Carolina enacted it, and this Court’s precedents interpreting it.” McKinney, 387 N.C. at 45, 911 S.E.2d at 9. “A violation of separation of powers only occurs when one branch of government - 20 -  STEIN V. HALL Opinion of the Court exercises, or prevents the exercise of, a power reserved for another branch of government.” Harper, 384 N.C. at 322, 886 S.E.2d at 413 (emphasis added). Consequently, our task is to determine whether by reassigning the duties within the challenged sections of SB 382 the General Assembly has exercised, or prevented the exercise of, a power reserved only for the executive branch.4 1. Separation of Powers The separation of powers clause in our constitution states, “[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 6. While Legislative Defendants assert that the “separation of powers only deals with the balance of power between branches, not the allocation of duties within a single branch,” they fail to recognize separation of powers violations can be more nuanced. 4 Our Supreme Court in the Stein Stay Order indicates that “[i]n cases of first impression, the presumption of constitutionality is especially strong,” and further explains in a footnote: This is because cases of first impression inherently lack precedential guidance and require the reviewing court to conduct a novel constitutional analysis. Accordingly, it is particularly inappropriate for courts in such cases to declare an act of the General Assembly unconstitutional unless a rigorous examination of text and history revea