In re: T.M.N. & A.J.N.R.
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-303
JudgeJudge Julee Flood
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA26-303
Filed 18 November 2026
Forsyth County, Nos. 22JA000163-330, 23JA000168-330
IN THE MATTER OF:
T.M.N.
A.J.N.R.
Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 7 January 2026 by Judge
Artrese Ziglar in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14
October 2026.
Robinson & Lawing, LLP, by Christopher M. Watford, for respondent-appellant
father.
Holly M. Groce, for petitioner-appellee Forsyth County Department of Social
Services.
Brittany T. McKinney, for appellee guardian ad litem.
FLOOD, Judge.
Respondent-Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. On
appeal, Father argues, first, several key findings of fact made by the trial court are
not supported by the evidence, and second, the trial court erred in terminating
IN RE: T.M.N. & A.J.N.R.
Opinion of the Court
Father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). Upon careful
review, we conclude, first, the challenged findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence, and second, the trial court did not err in terminating
Father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), where the minor
children had previously been adjudicated neglected, and the trial court found there
was a likelihood of future neglect.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Father is the biological father to A.J.N.R. (“Andy”), born in February of 2022,
and T.M.N. (“Tim”), born in July of 2023 (collectively, “the minor children”). 1 When
Andy was nearly four months old, Forsyth County Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) received a report involving a domestic violence incident between Father and
Mother2 (collectively “Respondents”) in which Father was alleged to have “threatened
to shoot [] Mother and would assure she never sees [Andy] again.” The report also
alleged that Father “uses and sells drugs.” Over the next several weeks, DSS received
other incident reports alleging that “Mother broke into [Father’s] home and assaulted
his girlfriend” while Mother was holding Andy, and that Father and Mother made
“derogatory statements against each other via [a] social media platform.” On 19 July
2022, DSS found that “[t]here was sufficient information to support the allegations of
1 These pseudonyms have been agreed upon by the parties and are used to protect the identity
of the juveniles in accordance with N.C. R. App. P. 42(b) (2025).
2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
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domestic violence and injurious environment” and that the family was in need of
services.
On 16 August 2022, Mother called the social worker assigned to the family’s
case from the Forsyth County Jail and stated that she had been arrested after a
dispute with Father. Mother explained that she and Father were in an argument,
and alleged that Father “spit on her[,] so she pepper sprayed him[.]” In a subsequent
interview with Father, he explained “that [Mother] was in a car accident earlier that
day and she intentionally crashed the car while [Andy] was in the car” and had told
her friend “that she did not want to live anymore, and [Andy] would be better without
her.” Father admitted he did get “physical” with Mother during their argument but
claimed it was because of “her getting pepper spray on [Andy].” That same day, DSS
requested and received nonsecure custody of Andy and placed Andy with his maternal
great aunt.
On 17 January 2023, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Andy to be
a neglected juvenile. The trial court ordered Andy to remain in DSS’s custody,
granted Respondents supervised visitation, and directed Respondents to, inter alia,
complete several parenting and domestic violence related classes.
Around six months later, Tim was born, testing positive for marijuana;
subsequently, DSS opened an “In Home Services” case. On 24 August 2023, DSS
learned that Father sought and received involuntary commitment for Mother after
reporting that Mother had “held a kitchen knife and stated, ‘I will kill you and lay
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Opinion of the Court
your son beside you.’” Upon Father and DSS’s discussion regarding Mother’s
upcoming return home, Father “refused to follow the safety interventions” and
“stated he would not leave the home and intended to remain and act as [Mother’s]
caregiver.” Shortly thereafter, DSS filed a verified juvenile petition alleging Tim was
a neglected juvenile. The court entered an order granting DSS nonsecure custody,
and DSS placed Tim in a licensed foster home. On 27 November 2023, the trial court
adjudicated Tim as a neglected juvenile.
For the next year and a half, the trial court held several permanency planning
hearings; however, on 6 August 2025, DSS filed a motion to terminate Respondents’
parental rights, contending that Respondents had neglected Andy and Tim and had
“willfully left the minor children in []DSS custody for more than 12 months without
showing to the satisfaction of the Court” that they had made reasonable progress in
correcting the conditions that led to the children’s removal. In its motion, DSS further
explained:
Throughout this matter, [Mother] and [Father] have given
inconsistent statements about their intent to remain
together in a relationship and have on several occasions
claimed an intent to separate only to resume their
relationship, continuing the cycle of violence. The most
recent domestic violence incident between the Respondents
occurred on or about April 10, 2025 when the Winston-
Salem Police Department responded to a call about an
incident in which [Mother] attempted to use a knife against
[Father]. While this resulted in [Mother’s] arrest and
[Father] obtained an initial ex parte protective order,
[Father] did not assist in prosecution or pursue a 1-year
protective order.
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Opinion of the Court
On 7 January 2026, the trial court entered an order terminating Respondents’
parental rights to Andy and Tim pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 (a)(1) and (2). Father
timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review the termination of Father’s parental
rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b)(2) and 7B-1001(a)(7) (2025).
III. Standard of Review
“On appeal, the standard of review from a trial court’s decision in a parental
termination case is whether there existed clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of
the existence of grounds to terminate [the] respondent’s parental rights.” In re
Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439 (1996) (citation omitted); see N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1109(f) (2025) (providing that “all findings of fact shall be based on clear and
convincing evidence”). “The trial court’s findings in this regard are binding on appeal
even though there may be evidence to the contrary.” In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 8
(2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Further, where the trial
court finds multiple grounds on which to base a termination of parental rights, and
an appellate court determines there is at least one ground to support a conclusion
that parental rights should be terminated, it is unnecessary to address the remaining
grounds.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re M.C., 381
N.C. 832, 838 (2022) (“Because a finding of a single statutory ground is sufficient to
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Opinion of the Court
support termination of [the] respondent-father’s parental rights, we decline to
address his arguments challenging the trial court’s adjudication of other grounds[.]”
(citation omitted)).
IV. Analysis
On appeal, Father argues that the trial court erred because (A) several findings
of fact are not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and (B) grounds
do not exist to terminate his parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) or (2).
We address each argument, in turn.
A. Findings of Fact
Father argues that the “[k]ey Findings relevant to the two grounds adjudicated
by the trial court are not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and are
not the products of logical inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.”
Father first challenges Findings of Fact 53 and 54 as mere recitations of
testimony rather than findings made by the trial court, as they “essentially describe
the testimony received from Dr. Bennett who conducted the Parenting Capacity
Evaluations[.]” Findings of Fact 53 and 54 state:
53. In his testimony, Dr. Bennett indicated that what was
significant or noteworthy about the [Parenting Capacity
Evaluation]s for [Mother] and [Father] was the picture the
two evaluations created when read together: Two
individuals who have a pattern of having conflict, which
repeatedly escalates to physical violence, followed by a
period of separation and cooling off, and then they end up
together again.
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Opinion of the Court
54. Per Dr. Bennett’s testimony, unless something clearly
disrupts the cycle of violence and aggression, the
environment created by these two individuals will be
dangerous for children.
As our Supreme Court has explained, “recitations of the testimony of each
witness do not constitute findings of fact by the trial judge[,]” and, if such recitation
occurs, we are compelled “to disregard these findings of fact in ascertaining whether
the trial court did or did not err in determining that . . . parental rights in [the minor
child] were subject to termination on the basis of neglect.” In re A.C., 378 N.C. 377,
383–84 (2021) (citation modified) (disregarding findings that simply stated “that a
witness either ‘testified,’ ‘contends,’ or ‘indicated’ that something was true” since that
“fail[ed] to satisfy the trial court’s obligation to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses who testified at the adjudication hearing and to resolve any contradictions
that existed in the evidence”). But “this sort of referential finding is sufficient if it
also includes an indication concerning whether the trial court deemed the relevant
portion of the testimony credible.” In re H.B., 384 N.C. 484, 490 (2023) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a trial court makes a credibility
determination about recited evidence, that transforms the recited evidence from a
‘mere recitation’ into a proper ‘evidentiary finding.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court found, in the relevant portion which Father does not
challenge, that
[t]he [c]ourt accepts Dr. Bennett’s conclusion and
description that these two individuals are in a cycle of
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violence and the environment created by the conflict and
violence between them is not a safe environment for
children. While the parents have been given the resources
to learn new ways to manage conflict, they have not
demonstrated a willingness or ability to change these
dangerous conditions, as domestic altercations between the
two have continued to erupt in the months leading up to
the Termination of Parental Rights Hearing.
Accordingly, because the trial court made a credibility determination about the
recited testimony of Dr. Bennett, Findings of Fact 53 and 54 are proper evidentiary
findings. See id.
Father next contends that the last sentence of Finding of Fact 67 is not
supported by the evidence. Finding of Fact 67 provides: “In January 2025, there was
an argument between [Mother] and [Father], and both Respondents admitted that
[Mother] obtained a knife and threatened [Father] with it. The confrontation
escalated, and both Respondents punched each other in the face.”
Upon review of the Record, this finding seems to contain a typographical error
regarding the date of 2025, because a police report admitted at trial provides that,
during an incident on 19 January 2024, both Father and Mother alleged that they
punched each other in the face. Thus, we conclude this finding is supported by
competent evidence, though we disregard the finding insofar as it incorrectly
communicates the incident occurred in 2025.
Father next contends that all, or portions, of Findings of Fact 65, 70, 78, and
79 are not supported by the evidence. These relevant findings are as follows:
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65. The Respondents have not adequately applied the skills
imparted to them in those service programs so as to correct
the conditions that led to the removal of [Tim] . . . and
[Andy]. Most notably, they have not adequately corrected
issues related to domestic violence, and for [Mother]
specifically, issues related to inadequately treated mental
health.
....
70. While the Respondents have each completed or
substantially complied with treatment for domestic
violence, both as victims and aggressors, the fact that
assaultive incidents continue to occur between them on a
regular basis leads the [c]ourt to conclude that the classes
have not had the intended effect, as the Respondents have
failed to incorporate the teachings from those programs
into their everyday lives.
....
78. Less than a month prior to the first day of this
Termination of Parental Rights hearing, the Respondents
were together and engaging in a domestic violence
incident. They have a history of reporting separations to
[]DSS only to be found together again after another episode
of domestic violence erupts.
79. . . . no meaningful behavioral change has resulted.
Father argues that these findings “center around the central issue of this case,
which is the perception that [Father] engages in domestic violence with [Mother] and
that, despite his participation in, and successful completion of, DSS-required and
Court-ordered services, [Father] is hopelessly doomed and is somehow
unredeemable.” Instead, he contends that “the evidence at trial demonstrated
[]Father asserted that he ended his relationship with []Mother in April of 2025, a full
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four months before [DSS] filed the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights[,]” and
“[t]here was no evidence of domestic violence between April 2025 and the September
2025 attack for which []Father was the victim.”
At trial, when asked whether she had seen “improvement with the behaviors
around domestic violence specifically[,]” Social Worker Kylie Summers responded,
“No. There was always a domestic violence incident reported.” Furthermore,
Summers testified that Father has not taken responsibility for any domestic violence.
She explained that one of her reports documented that Father “stated that he is only
completing these domestic violence classes because the Court and the agency is
telling him to[,]” and that he told her “[h]e is not the perpetrator; he is a victim, and
he has constantly blamed [Mother] for the reason why these kids are in care.”
Father testified at trial that he was not a perpetrator of domestic violence:
Q. [Father], do you maintain the position that you are only
a victim of domestic violence?
A. I didn’t put my hands on nobody.
Q. [Father], do you recall a video that was played
previously in this court that showed a domestic violence
conflict between yourself and [Mother]?
A. Yeah. It showed me restraining her when she attacked
me.
Q. So you did put your hands on her, correct?
A. If that’s what you want to call it.
Q. Sir, you were ordered to complete domestic violence
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services both for victims and for perpetrators, correct?
A. And I did.
Q. But your position is that you have never perpetrated
domestic violence at any time?
A. Nope.
Q. Sir, law enforcement has come out to each of the
residences that you have shared with [Mother] since this
case began, correct?
A. Yep.
Q. And they’ve come out due to conflicts between yourself
and [Mother]?
A. They’ve come. Yeah. You can say it that way.
Q. Most recently they came out to your home in September
of 2025?
A. Yeah.
Father additionally does not challenge the trial court’s finding that, “[s]ince
2024, there have been at least five reported domestic violence incidents between
[Mother] and [Father], some of which have been acknowledged by the Respondents.”
See In re K.H., 281 N.C. App. 259, 266 (2022) (“Unchallenged findings of fact are
deemed supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal.” (citation omitted)).
This testimony and evidence support the challenged findings such that Father, even
if not the aggressor, continued to remain involved in domestic disputes with Mother
and put the minor children in an unsafe environment. Accordingly, we conclude
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Findings of Fact 65, 70, 78, and 79, as challenged, are supported by competent
evidence.
Finally, Father challenges Finding of Fact 85, which provides that Father “is
unfit to have the care, custody, and control of [Tim] or [Andy], based upon all the
finding of grounds for termination of parental rights as detailed above and the facts
found in support of the same.” Father contends that, “[d]espite the language of
Finding 85, the evidence at trial supported the fact that [Father] had made a major
change in his life that built on the housing and employment stability he had already
maintained.” While there may be evidence showing Father had made progress, there
was still evidence, as supported above, that “no meaningful behavioral change has
resulted.” See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. at 8 (“The trial court’s findings in this regard
are binding on appeal even though there may be evidence to the contrary.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude the findings of fact
are supported by competent evidence, and we turn to address the termination of
Father’s parental rights.
B. Grounds to Terminate
Father next argues that grounds do not exist to terminate his parental rights
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). “In termination of parental rights
proceedings, the trial court’s finding of any one of the enumerated grounds [in
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)] is sufficient to support a termination[,]” In re N.T.U., 234 N.C.
App. 722, 733 (2014) (citation modified); we therefore need only discuss grounds
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under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) where, for the reasons below, we conclude the trial
court properly terminated Father’s parental rights for neglect.
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), “the trial court may terminate the
parental rights to a child upon a finding that the parent has neglected the child.” In
re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 633, 636 (2018) (citation modified). A “neglected juvenile”
is defined, in relevant part, as a juvenile whose parent “[d]oes not provide proper care,
supervision, or discipline”; “[h]as abandoned the juvenile”; or “[c]reates or allows to
be created a living environment that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-101(15)(a), (b), (e) (2025).
“A finding of neglect sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on
evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Young, 346
N.C. 244, 248 (1997) (citation omitted). If, however,
there is no evidence of neglect at the time of the
termination proceeding[,] parental rights may nonetheless
be terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication
of neglect and the trial court finds by clear and convincing
evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile
were returned to her parents.
In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. at 637 (citation modified).
In assessing a prior adjudication of neglect,
there is no requirement that the parent whose rights are
subject to termination on the grounds of neglect be
responsible for the prior adjudication of neglect. As we have
previously explained, in determining whether a child is
neglected, the determinative factors are the circumstances
and conditions surrounding the child, not the fault or
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culpability of the parent.
In re S.D., 374 N.C. 67, 75 (2020) (citation modified); see also In re M.A.W., 370 N.C.
149, 153–54 (2017) (holding that a prior adjudication of neglect based upon the
mother’s substance abuse and mental health problems was “appropriately
considered” by the trial court as “relevant evidence” in determining whether the
parental rights of the respondent-father, who had been incarcerated at the time of
the initial adjudication, should be terminated).
To determine a probability of future neglect, “the trial court must consider all
evidence of relevant circumstances or events which existed or occurred either before
or after the prior adjudication of neglect.” In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797, 802 (2020)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A parent’s failure to make progress
in completing a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of future neglect[,]” and progress
in a case plan may be insufficient where evidence demonstrates it “was only sporadic
and inadequate.” In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. at 637 (citation omitted). Further,
our Supreme Court has provided that, even where a respondent parent engaged in
classes and assessments as required by his or her case plan, a probability of future
neglect may be shown where the respondent parent has “failed to demonstrate that
sustained behavioral change of the type necessary to ensure [the juvenile’s] safety
and welfare[.]” In re R.L.R., 381 N.C. 863, 875 (2022).
Here, Father does not challenge the trial court’s determination of Andy’s and
Tim’s prior neglect adjudications; instead, Father argues the trial court erred in
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finding there was a probability of future neglect, contending this is “not supported by
the evidence[.]” Father specifically contends the evidence shows he made progress
where he “completed two courses of domestic violence education, substantially
complied with his judicially-adopted case plan, maintained employment, maintained
housing”; “lived free of mental health issues and substance abuse addiction”;
“maintained the relationship with his children”; and, in April 2025, “obtained his own
residence” away from Mother.
As discussed above, however, the trial court’s supported findings of fact show,
in relevant part, that
[w]hile the Respondents have each completed or
substantially complied with treatment for domestic
violence, both as victims and aggressors, the fact that
assaultive incidents continue to occur between them on a
regular basis leads the Court to conclude that the classes
have not had the intended effect, as the Respondents have
failed to incorporate the teachings from those programs
into their everyday lives.
This finding, along with the others discussed above, shows that Father has
“failed to demonstrate that sustained behavioral change of the type necessary to
ensure [the minor children’s] safety and welfare[.]” See id. Thus, upon our review, as
Andy and Tim were priorly adjudicated as neglected juveniles, and the trial court’s
binding findings of fact support a likelihood of future neglect, we conclude that the
trial court properly found grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights for neglect
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). See In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. at 636; In re
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P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. at 8. As the trial court properly determined one ground to
terminate Father’s parental rights, we need not address Father’s challenges to the
other ground, and the trial court’s order is affirmed. See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App.
at 8.
V. Conclusion
Upon careful review, we conclude, first, the challenged findings of fact are
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and second, the trial court did
not err in terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)
where the minor children had previously been adjudicated neglected, and the trial
court found there was a likelihood of future neglect.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STROUD and GRIFFIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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