Perry v. Tiffany and Bosco, Pa
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-3501
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOMENEQUE PERRY, No. 26-3501
D.C. No. 2:26-cv-00502-SMB
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TIFFANY & BOSCO, PA; MARK
BOSCO,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2026**
Before: CHRISTEN, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Domeneque Perry appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing
her employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291. We review
de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Watison v. Carter, 668
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Perry’s Title VII retaliation claim
because Perry failed to allege facts sufficient to show that her employer knew
about her report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before
terminating her. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 782 (9th Cir. 2025) (setting forth
elements of a Title VII retaliation claim, including the requirement to show a
causal connection between engaging in a protected activity and an adverse
employment action).
The district court properly dismissed Perry’s retaliatory termination claim
under the Arizona Employment Protection Act because Perry failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that she was terminated for engaging in a protected activity. See
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c) (listing the circumstances in which an
employee has a claim against an employer for termination, including when an
employee is terminated for disclosing “that the employer . . . has violated . . . the
Constitution of Arizona” or Arizona statutes).
Contrary to Perry’s contentions, the district court was not required to direct
service of the operative complaint because the action was dismissed prior to
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service on defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring a district court
to dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any time if the court determines that the
action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to
amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment
would be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049,
1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave
to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the
complaint” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Perry’s motion for
reconsideration because Perry failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist.
No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.
1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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