Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DOMENEQUE PERRY, No. 26-3501 D.C. No. 2:26-cv-00502-SMB Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* TIFFANY & BOSCO, PA; MARK BOSCO, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 17, 2026** Before: CHRISTEN, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Domeneque Perry appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Watison v. Carter, 668 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Perry’s Title VII retaliation claim because Perry failed to allege facts sufficient to show that her employer knew about her report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before terminating her. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 782 (9th Cir. 2025) (setting forth elements of a Title VII retaliation claim, including the requirement to show a causal connection between engaging in a protected activity and an adverse employment action). The district court properly dismissed Perry’s retaliatory termination claim under the Arizona Employment Protection Act because Perry failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she was terminated for engaging in a protected activity. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c) (listing the circumstances in which an employee has a claim against an employer for termination, including when an employee is terminated for disclosing “that the employer . . . has violated . . . the Constitution of Arizona” or Arizona statutes). Contrary to Perry’s contentions, the district court was not required to direct service of the operative complaint because the action was dismissed prior to 2 26-3501 service on defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any time if the court determines that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Perry’s motion for reconsideration because Perry failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)). All pending motions are denied. AFFIRMED. 3 26-3501