Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CARMEN ASTRID BERGERON, No. 25-2947 D.C. No. 2:24-cv-00929-JLR Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Indenture Trustee for New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 17, 2026** Before: CHRISTEN, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Carmen Astrid Bergeron appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders granting Carrington Mortgage Services as servicing agent for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Indenture Trustee * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). for New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1’s (“Deutsche Bank”) motion for relief from the automatic stay and denying Bergeron’s post-judgment motions for reconsideration and for a stay. To the extent we have jurisdiction, it is under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standards of review applied by the district court. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm in part and dismiss in part. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bergeron’s motion for reconsideration because Bergeron failed to demonstrate any basis for such relief. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(2); United States v. Fowler (In re Fowler), 394 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth standard of review). We lack jurisdiction over the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting relief from the automatic stay because Bergeron filed the notice of appeal more than thirty days after entry of judgment, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), 6(b)(1), and Bergeron’s untimely motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) did not extend the appeal period, see Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(2)(A); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(1) (providing that a motion for rehearing must be filed within 14 days); see also Theodore v. Daglas (In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc.), 42 F.3d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that untimely motion 2 25-2947 for rehearing in bankruptcy appeal did not extend period to appeal district court’s final order). We do not consider Bergeron’s contentions regarding the district court’s order denying the motion for an emergency stay because that issue is beyond the scope of this appeal. See El Paso City v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc. (In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc.), 217 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, we generally will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, although we have discretion to do so.”). Bergeron’s contentions that Deutsche Bank defaulted and that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to rule on the motion for relief from the automatic stay are not properly before us. AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part. 3 25-2947