Castaneda v. Hopper
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-3500
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 20 2026
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: ARMIDA CASTANEDA RAMIREZ No. 25-3500
Debtor.
----------------------------------------------- D.C. No.
24-1122
FERMIN CASTANEDA,
MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
J. MICHAEL HOPPER, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Gary A. Spraker, Scott H. Gan, and Frederick Philip Corbit, Bankruptcy Judges,
Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Fermin Castaneda appeals from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”),
which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s invocation of Rule 60(a) to correct an earlier
judgment. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history
of this case, we need not recount it here.
We review the BAP’s decision de novo and “apply the same standard of
review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling.” In re Ahaza Sys.,
Inc., 482 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we review for abuse of
discretion. In re Cohen, 656 B.R. 798, 805 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a corrected
judgment under Rule 60(a), incorporated by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9024. The “touchstone” of Rule 60(a) is “fidelity to the intent behind the original
judgment.” Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012). At the
conclusion of the first adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court entered judgment
in the trustee’s favor, ordering the transfer in question “avoided pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)” and “preserved for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 550.” Though the court did not expressly state that the interest was
recovered, it referred to the recovery statute, section 550, in its judgment. In its oral
ruling after the adversary proceeding, the court also acknowledged that the Chapter
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7 trustee sought recovery alongside avoidance in count one of the complaint. The
court declined to order a forced sale of the marital home under 11 U.S.C. § 363(h),
but it suggested that a forced sale would be the next step for the trustee and that the
preambular requirements of section 363(h) were already satisfied. The discussion
of a forced sale under section 363(h) was premised on the estate’s recovery of the
one-half interest in the home. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (allowing trustee to sell
estate’s interest and interest of a co-owner if certain conditions are met).
Castaneda’s counsel even conceded that the estate of Castaneda’s wife, the debtor,
now “own[ed]” an interest in the marital home. Thus, the record confirms that the
court intended to order the interest recovered under section 550(a).1
We are not persuaded by Castaneda’s arguments that the court had no such
intent. As Castaneda notes, the bankruptcy court stated in its oral ruling that it was
avoiding the transfer and denying “all other relief requested.” However, the court
immediately clarified that it was denying counts two, three, and four of the
complaint. Thus, the court did not suggest that it was denying recovery, which the
1
The court also intended to conclude that the trustee succeeded to
Castaneda’s wife’s rights under the marital settlement agreement. In its oral ruling,
the court explained that the tenancy was “controlled by” the marital settlement
agreement, and Castaneda’s counsel stated that he was “fine with the [settlement
agreement] being the property of the estate.” On appeal, Castaneda does not
appear to dispute that the court intended to make this determination.
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trustee pled in the first count, alongside avoidance. The bankruptcy court also
explained that the “benefit of the estate” had not been decided in the proceedings,
but it was referring to the “benefit of the estate” language in section 363(h), not
section 550(a). As the BAP noted in its opinion, section 550(a) does not require a
trustee to quantify the exact benefit to the estate. See In re Acequia, Inc., 34 F.3d
800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Courts construe the ‘benefit to the estate’ requirement
[under section 550(a)] broadly.”).
Nor are we persuaded that the bankruptcy court made an error of law in its
original judgment such that a correction under Rule 60(a) would be inappropriate.
See Garamendi, 683 F.3d at 1077. Castaneda contends that the court mistakenly
thought that preservation of the interest under section 551 was sufficient and
recovery under section 550(a) was unnecessary. However, the court referred to the
recovery statute, section 550, not the preservation statute, section 551, in its original
judgment. The court also acknowledged that the trustee was seeking avoidance and
recovery in count one of the complaint.
Our conclusion disposes of Castaneda’s argument that the statute of
limitations under 11 U.S.C. § 550(f)(1) is applicable. Section 550(f)(1) requires a
recovery action to be brought within one year of avoidance. Here, the trustee
sought avoidance and recovery in the same action, and the court intended to enter
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judgment in the trustee’s favor avoiding the transfer and recovering the interest
following the first adversary proceeding. To the extent that Castaneda argues that
the bankruptcy court’s corrected judgment does not “solve” the purported
timeliness issue because it was not an “actual 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) judgment,” we
reject that argument. In the memorandum accompanying its corrected judgment,
the bankruptcy court clearly stated that it intended to order the interest recovered
under section 550(a).
Castaneda’s remaining arguments are not properly before us in this appeal.
“If the . . . court properly acted under Rule 60(a), then the correction did not start a
new appeal time running.” Garamendi, 683 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Harman v.
Harper, 7 F.3d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993)). “Any attempt to appeal the original . . .
judgment[] would now be untimely.” Id. Castaneda failed to appeal from the
original judgment, and he cannot now challenge the bankruptcy court’s holdings
about the validity or enforceability of the marital settlement agreement. We lack
jurisdiction to reach Castaneda’s arguments about the bankruptcy court’s
interlocutory judgment in the second adversary proceeding because Castaneda has
not appealed from the BAP’s decision in that case. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1);
Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(1).
AFFIRMED.
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