Baker Ranches, Inc. v. Burgum

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BAKER RANCHES, INC.; DAVID No. 24-5713 JOHN ELDRIDGE; RUTH D.C. No. ELDRIDGE, as Co-Trustees of the 3:21-cv-00150- David John Eldridge and Ruth GMN-CSD Eldridge Family Living Trust dated January 31, 2007; ZANE JORDAN; JUDEE SCHALEY, OPINION Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. DOUG BURGUM, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; SHAWN BENGE, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the National Park Service; NATIONAL PARK SERVICE; ASHLEY ADAMS, in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Great Basin National Park, Defendants - Appellees. 2 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 24, 2026 Pasadena, California Filed September 30, 2026 Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater, District Judge. * Opinion by Judge Owens; Dissent by Judge Rawlinson SUMMARY ** Sovereign Immunity / McCarran Amendment The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a suit against federal defendants (“the United States”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. In 1934, a Nevada state court entered the Baker- Lehmann Decree, setting out the water rights for the Baker- Lehman Creeks, which flow through what is now the Great Basin National Park. Under the Baker-Lehmann Decree, * The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 3 Plaintiffs, including Baker Ranches, Inc., own downstream water rights. Plaintiffs alleged that the Park engaged in activities that reduced water flow and jeopardized their water rights. They sued the United States to enjoin such activities and enforce their rights under the Decree. Plaintiffs argued that the United States’ sovereign immunity was waived by the McCarran Amendment, which waives the sovereign immunity of the United States “in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights.” 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). The McCarran Amendment was enacted in 1952 but retroactively applies to the administration of previously acquired water rights. The district court determined that sovereign immunity was not waived by the McCarran Amendment and dismissed Plaintiffs’ case for lack of jurisdiction. Reversing, the panel held that the McCarran Amendment waived the United States’ sovereign immunity. First, the McCarran Amendment waives sovereign immunity for the administration of rights determined in a “comprehensive” adjudication, and the Baker-Lehmann Decree was comprehensive. The Baker-Lehman Adjudication was meant to serve as a final determination of all relative water rights upon the Baker-Lehman Creeks. Second, the McCarran Amendment controls in cases adjudicating or administering water rights, and Baker Ranches is suing for the administration of water rights they hold under the Baker- Lehmann Decree. Accordingly, the panel held that the McCarran Amendment waived the United States’ sovereign immunity from this suit. 4 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson would affirm the district court’s determination that the sovereign immunity of the United States was not waived by the McCarran Amendment. Under the language of the McCarran Amendment, expressed legislative intent, Supreme Court authority, and this Court’s precedent, the United States did not waive its sovereign immunity for the Baker-Lehman Creeks adjudication. Thus, the Baker Lehman Decree does not bind the United States. COUNSEL Benjamin J. Hogan (argued), Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Denver, Colorado; Jean-Claude Andre, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Santa Monica, California; Seth M. Reid, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, St. Louis, Missouri; Debbie Leonard, Leonard Law PC, Reno, Nevada; Kole W. Kelley and Ivan L. London, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, Colorado; for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Ezekiel Peterson (argued) and Katharine Laubach, Attorneys, Environment & Natural Resources Division; Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of Justice, Denver, Colorado; Karen Glasgow, Supervisory Attorney-Advisor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of Interior, Denver, Colorado; Andrew M. Bernie and Jason Lee, Trial Attorneys; United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Holly A. Vance, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Reno, Nevada; for Defendants- Appellees.  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 5 J. Gregory Cloward, Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey M. Connor, Chief Deputy Solicitor General; Aaron M. Ford, Nevada Attorney General; Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Carson City, Nevada; for Amicus Curiae State of Nevada. Laura A. Schroeder, Therese A. Ure Stix, and Caitlin R. Skulan, Schroeder Law Offices PC, Portland, Oregon, for Amici Curiae Central Nevada Regional Water Authority, Humboldt County, Humboldt River Basin Water Authority, Nevada Association of County Commissioners, Nevada Land Action Association, Nevada Grazing Board of District No. 4, Pershing County, Pershing County, Pershing County Water Conservation District, The Rose of Snowville LLC, Washoe County, and White Pine County. David H. Rigdon, Taggart & Taggart LTD, Carson City, Nevada, for Amici Curiae Western State Farm Bureau Federations (Nevada Farm Bureau Federation, Idaho Farm Bureau Federation, and California Farm Bureau Federation). Karen A. Peterson and Keith H. Ketola, Carson City, Nevada; Theodore Beutel, Eureka County District Attorney, Eureka, Nevada; for Amicus Curiae Eureka County. 6 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM OPINION OWENS, Circuit Judge: Baker Ranches, Inc., David John Eldridge, Ruth Eldridge, Zane Jordan, and Judee Schaley (collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal from the district court’s dismissal of their suit against federal defendants (“the United States”) for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand. I. BACKGROUND In 1934, a Nevada state court entered a decree that set out the water rights for the Baker-Lehman Creeks, which flow through what is now Great Basin National Park (“the Park”), created in 1986. Under the so-called “Baker- Lehman Decree” (“Decree”), Plaintiffs own downstream water rights. Baker Ranches has long used the water to support its extensive ranch operations. Plaintiffs allege that the Park has engaged in activities— ranging from water diversion to planting vegetation—that have reduced water flow and jeopardized their downstream water rights, threatening to put Baker Ranches out of business. Plaintiffs sued the United States to enjoin such activities and enforce their rights under the Decree. After extensive litigation in multiple forums, the district court held that the United States enjoyed sovereign immunity, meaning the state and federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Decree against the United States. Plaintiffs have contended throughout that sovereign immunity was waived by the McCarran Amendment, which was enacted in 1952 but retroactively applies to the  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 7 administration of previously acquired water rights. See State Eng’r v. S. Fork Band of the Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev. (Te-Moak), 339 F.3d 804, 811–13 (9th Cir. 2003). We agree. To understand why, we begin with a brief history of the development of water rights in the West and the role of the McCarran Amendment. A. Development of Federal and Nevada Water Law Water rights—crucial to the development of the land- rich, water-poor American West—were initially adjudicated through individual private actions. See 1 Robert E. Beck, Waters & Water Rights § 15.01 (2026). A claimant would file a complaint asserting rights to a particular water source and alleging interference by defendants, who would file answers and cross-complaints asserting their own rights. But because the rights of all claimants to a particular water source are closely interrelated, “[e]ach claimant is therefore directly and vitally interested, not only in establishing the validity and extent of his own claim, but in having determined all of the other claims” to that water source. Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Or. Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 449 (1916) (citation omitted). As settlement boomed in the West, conflicts over water rights increased, resulting in voluminous piecemeal litigation. The rights of all claimants to a particular water source are “so closely related that the presence of all is essential” for a final determination of any rights to that water source. Id. But joinder of the “hundreds or thousands” of individual claims to a water source would have been “extremely cumbersome and inefficient.” United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 763–64 (9th Cir. 1994). Several Western states, including Nevada, attempted to solve the problem by 8 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM establishing statutory procedures to adjudicate all water rights on entire stream systems at once. In 1913, Nevada created its present statutory system for the mass adjudication of surface water rights. See Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192 (codified as amended at Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 533) (“1913 Nevada Water Law”). Under this system, adjudication would proceed as follows. The State Engineer initiates the process. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.090. He provides notice of the proceedings, gathers relevant stream flow data, collects proofs of appropriation, hears objections, and enters an order of determination “defining the several rights to the waters of the stream or stream system.” Id. §§ 533.090, 533.095, 533.100, 533.160. After further notice and hearings, the state district court affirms or modifies the Engineer’s order in a decree setting out a “final” and “conclusive” distribution of water rights. Id. §§ 533.185, 533.210. The rights set out in that decree may then be enforced and administered by the Engineer and state water commissioners acting as officers of the court. Id. § 533.220. But one issue remained. “While these statutory adjudications seemed to promise an end to the confusing and conflicting adjudication of water rights in multiple cases, the system was impaired by the refusal of the federal government to participate.” Oregon, 44 F.3d at 765. The United States claimed extensive water rights in the West, yet—shielded by sovereign immunity—could refuse states’ attempts to adjudicate and administer those rights. States found themselves unable to secure a final and conclusive determination of rights whenever the United States appeared in a watershed. See S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1951). And the United States’ refusal to submit to state  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 9 court adjudication and administration provoked significant political backlash. 1 In 1952, Congress took action. It passed the McCarran Amendment, which waives the sovereign immunity of the United States “in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights.” 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). The statute “applie[s] retroactively and thus waive[s] the United States’ immunity from suit for the administration of water rights acquired before the law came into effect.” Am. Indian Law Deskbook § 8:18 (2024) (citing Te-Moak, 339 F.3d at 813); see also 1 One notable example was the federal government’s attempt to acquire water rights in the Santa Margarita River watershed to support the military establishment at Camp Pendleton. Locals who depended on the water felt “subversively exploited” by the federal government’s water grab. A Bill to Authorize Suits Against the United States to Adjudicate & Administer Water Rights: Hearings on S.18 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 77 (1951) (letter of George F. Yackey, general manager of the Fallbrook Public Utility District). The matter resulted in public outcry, spawning multiple articles and even a short film produced and directed by Frank Capra. See, e.g., Stanley High, Washington Tyranny: Another Case Study, Reader’s Digest, Dec. 1951, reprinted in 98 Cong. Rec. 124 (1952); Frank Capra, The Fallbrook Story (1952). The United States was also involved in highly contentious water controversies on the Quinn River in Nevada, and in several Colorado water districts. See Hearings on S.18, 82d Cong. 47 (1951) (statement of W.T. Mathews, Attorney General of the State of Nevada); id. at 26– 27 (statement of Glenn G. Saunders, representing the National Reclamation Association). These controversies, caused by the United States’ use of its sovereign immunity to preclude the adjudication and administration of the water rights it claimed, formed the backdrop to Congress’ consideration of the McCarran Amendment. 10 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM United States v. Puerto Rico, 287 F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he McCarran Amendment applies to water rights acquired prior to 1952 . . . .”); United States v. Dist. Ct. in & for Eagle Cnty. (Eagle Cnty.), 401 U.S. 520, 522–23 (1971) (applying the McCarran Amendment when the United States claimed reserved rights acquired in 1905). The McCarran Amendment was introduced to correct the “chaotic condition” caused by the United States’ refusal to participate in the statutory procedures designed to adjudicate and administer at once all the interlocked water rights on a stream system, which threatened “a throw-back to the conditions that brought about the enactment of the statutory water laws.” S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951). Being focused on the “evils growing out of [the United States’] immunity” from proceedings in which “all water users on a stream . . . are interested and necessary parties,” the bill was not intended to waive the United States’ immunity from private suits. Id. For instance, in response to concerns that individuals might use the bill to block the construction of projects by the Bureau of Reclamation, Senator Pat McCarran—the bill’s Senate sponsor and namesake—assured that it was “not intended to be used for the purpose of obstructing or delaying Bureau of Reclamation projects.” Id at 9. Indeed, he clarified that the Amendment’s waiver of immunity was “not intended to be used for any other purpose than to allow the United States to be joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners on a given stream.” Id. at 9. Adopting this intended limit, our courts have since held that the McCarran Amendment only allows the United States to be joined in suits involving a “comprehensive water right adjudication.” Oregon, 44 F.3d at 766 (quoting United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 9 (1993)).  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 11 B. Water Rights on the Baker-Lehman Creeks 1. The Baker-Lehman Adjudication and Decree More than two decades before the passage of the McCarran Amendment, the State Engineer of Nevada in 1925 initiated a determination of water rights on the Baker- Lehman Creeks (“Baker-Lehman Adjudication”). The adjudication took place according to the procedures laid out in the 1913 Nevada Water Law, Nevada’s statutory system for the mass adjudication of water rights. See Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 533. The United States did not participate or assert any claims. After publishing notices and collecting claimants’ proofs of appropriation, the State Engineer issued his order of determination nearly eight years after the adjudication began. A copy of the order of determination was mailed to all claimants, and to the United States. After the State Engineer filed the order of determination in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Nevada, the state court scheduled a hearing for interested parties to raise exceptions to the order of determination. Copies of the scheduling order were mailed to the claimants and to the United States, and published in a local newspaper. Again, the United States did not participate. Finally, on October 16, 1934, the state court entered the Baker-Lehman Decree. Applications to modify the decree were to be submitted within three years of its entry. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.210. Under Nevada law, this decree was to be a final determination of water rights on the Baker- Lehman Creeks. Id. Any future rights claimed on the Baker- Lehman Creeks could only be adjudicated in a “supplemental adjudication,” which under state law may not disturb any existing rights under the 1934 Baker-Lehman Decree. See Mineral County v. Lyon County, 473 P.3d 418, 12 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 429 (Nev. 2020) (observing that Nevada’s water law “expressly prohibits reallocating adjudicated water rights”). The Baker-Lehman Decree provided, in part, that “each and every water user of the Baker and Lehman Creeks stream system . . . be perpetually enjoined and restrained” from “diverting or using or preventing or obstructing the flow . . . of any of the water” except in the manner provided for by the Decree. It further required every water user to “keep . . . the main stream channel through his land[ ] reasonably clean of weeds, vegetation, and deposits of silt” and “maintain” the channels to facilitate “minimum loss of conveyed water.” 2. The Parties’ Water Rights Under the Baker-Lehman Decree, Baker Ranches holds adjudicated water rights with a priority date between 1872 and 1904; David John Eldridge and Ruth Eldridge hold rights with a priority date of 1872; and Zane Jordan and Judee Schaley hold water rights with a priority date of 1876. The United States claims two types of water rights on the Baker-Lehman Creeks. First, it holds appropriative rights set out in the Baker-Lehman Decree, which it acquired from private appropriators. Second, the United States now claims reserved water rights, which it never asserted before the instant litigation and were not adjudicated or recognized in the Baker-Lehman Decree. These reserved water rights stem from various reservations of land made in the twentieth century. 2 The earliest of these reservations dates to 1909, 2 When the United States withdraws land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, we understand it to reserve enough water to carry out the purpose of the reservation. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). Reserved water rights vest, or have a  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 13 when the federal government reserved approximately 556,000 acres to establish the Nevada National Forest. See Proclamation No. 839, 35 Stat. 2220 (Feb. 10, 1909). Additional reservations were made in 1922, for the Lehman Caves National Monument, and in 1986, to create Great Basin National Park. See Proclamation No. 1618, 42 Stat. 2260 (Jan. 24, 1922); Great Basin National Park Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-565, § 2, 100 Stat. 3181 (Oct. 27, 1986). 3. The Instant Litigation When Plaintiffs first began appropriating water from the Baker-Lehman Creeks, the streams flowed through land in the public domain. Now, the streams originate in and run through Great Basin National Park. Plaintiffs allege that the Park’s activities—diverting water for campgrounds and dust suppression, felling logs that block creek channels, and planting vegetation—have reduced water flow, impairing the rights of downstream water users like themselves. In 2021, Plaintiffs filed suit in Nevada state court to enjoin these activities and enforce the water rights they hold under the Baker-Lehman Decree. The United States removed the suit to federal district court and claimed sovereign immunity, and litigation commenced regarding the proper forum for the case. In an earlier unpublished disposition, we held that the state court had prior exclusive jurisdiction only if the United States had waived sovereign immunity, and directed the district court to consider whether sovereign immunity was waived under the McCarran Amendment. See Baker Ranches, Inc. v. Haaland, Nos. 22- priority date, on the date of the federal reservation. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). 14 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 15765, 22-15846, 2023 WL 6784357 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2023). 3 The district court determined that sovereign immunity was not waived by the McCarran Amendment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that because the United States did not participate in the 1934 Baker- Lehman Adjudication, it was not a “comprehensive adjudication” for which the McCarran Amendment waives sovereign immunity. It did not reach the United States’ separate argument that the McCarran Amendment did not apply because Plaintiffs’ suit was not one for the “administration” of water rights. Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s dismissal. We take up the question of whether the McCarran Amendment waives the United States’ sovereign immunity in this case, and we hold that it does. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “We review de novo the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity.” Harger v. Dep’t 3 Litigation has since proceeded concurrently in federal and state court. The state court found that the McCarran Amendment waived sovereign immunity and ultimately issued orders holding the United States in contempt of the Baker-Lehman Decree and granting Baker Ranches access to Park land to maintain the streams. The United States appealed these orders to the Nevada Supreme Court, which held that it lacked jurisdiction due to this court’s previous decision vacating the district court’s remand to state court. See Haaland v. Baker Ranches Inc., 560 P.3d 664 (Nev. 2024) (unpublished table decision). It dismissed the appeal without prejudice, and the United States may move for reinstatement should the case be remanded back to state court from the federal district court. Id.  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 15 of Lab., 569 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2009). A waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed,” and the party suing the United States “bears the burden of pointing to such an unequivocal waiver of immunity.” Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). B. The Baker-Lehman Decree Was Comprehensive The McCarran Amendment waives sovereign immunity only for the administration of rights determined in a “comprehensive” adjudication. See Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 524 (“‘[T]he administration of such rights’ in § 666(a)(2) must refer to the rights described in” § 666(a)(1).); Idaho, 508 U.S. at 3 (the United States may be joined “as a defendant in a comprehensive water right adjudication”). Plaintiffs sued to enforce rights determined by the Baker- Lehman Adjudication between 1925 and 1934, years before the passage of the McCarran Amendment would have required the United States to participate. Because the United States was not a party and the reserved rights it asserts today were not determined in the adjudication, the United States and the dissent argue that the Baker-Lehman Adjudication was not “comprehensive.” But this reasoning distorts the meaning and purpose of the requirement that adjudications be “comprehensive.” This requirement—which does not appear in the text of the statute—was imposed by courts to reflect the purpose of the McCarran Amendment. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963) (citing S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951)); see also Oregon, 44 F.3d at 766. “The clear federal policy evinced by [the McCarran Amendment] is the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a 16 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM river system . . . . [T]he McCarran Amendment bespeaks a policy that recognizes the availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication of water rights as the means for achieving these goals.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976) (emphasis added). Because the McCarran Amendment exists to support “comprehensive state systems for adjudication,” its waiver of sovereign immunity is construed to extend only to adjudications that take place in that context. Id. By contrast, “piecemeal, private water rights litigation”—the types of suits that the McCarran Amendment was intended to help comprehensive state systems replace—sit outside the scope the McCarran Amendment. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 768. The 1913 Nevada Water Law is clearly one of those “comprehensive state systems” that the McCarran Amendment was meant to support. Our caselaw has recognized it as such. See Te-Moak, 339 F.3d at 811 (describing the law as “Nevada’s comprehensive system for adjudicating water rights”). It replaced piecemeal adjudications by providing a comprehensive procedure for the collection, adjudication, and final determination of all rights to water on a stream system. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 533.087-533.320. Those claiming a right to water must submit proof of their claim, or the claim will be deemed abandoned. See id. § 533.087. Nor could the system function any other way: claims that are not asserted cannot be allowed to linger, as that would undermine the certainty and finality that these adjudications were meant to establish. Over the course of nine years, the Baker-Lehman Adjudication was conducted scrupulously according to the procedures laid out in the 1913 Nevada Water Law. The State Engineer and the Seventh Judicial District Court of Nevada repeatedly provided notice to all claimants and to the  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 17 United States. The United States chose not to assert any claims, raise any exceptions, or apply for any modifications to the resulting Baker-Lehman Decree. A claimant’s failure to assert its alleged water rights during an adjudication does not render the adjudication any less “comprehensive,” in the sense that the drafters of the McCarran Amendment intended. Regardless of the United States’ failure to claim the reserved rights that it alleges today, the Baker-Lehman Adjudication was meant to serve as a final determination of all relative water rights upon the Baker-Lehman Creeks, meaning it was “necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners” to avoid the sort of piecemeal litigation that existed before such statutory mass adjudications were possible. Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 525 (quoting S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 9). It was therefore precisely the sort of “comprehensive” adjudication that the McCarran Amendment was meant to support. See id. According to the United States, an adjudication is not comprehensive unless it is “able to determine all claims in a river system, including those of the United States where it has some water rights.” The dissent goes even further, asserting that an adjudication is not comprehensive unless it in fact did “resolve the rights of all claimants to a stream of water.” Under these readings, the Baker-Lehman Adjudication was not comprehensive because it took place while the United States still enjoyed sovereign immunity from water rights adjudications, and the United States’ reserved water rights went unadjudicated. The United States argues that applying the McCarran Amendment here would be unfair, as it would “cause the retroactive forfeiture of all federal claims and defenses . . . that the United States could 18 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM have presented had there been a waiver of sovereign immunity at the time of the adjudication.” But the United States’ argument runs headlong against the purpose of the McCarran Amendment and our caselaw, which has repeatedly warned against narrowing the Amendment based on “extremely technical” constructions of the comprehensiveness requirement. Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 525; see also Oregon, 44 F.3d at 768. The McCarran Amendment was motivated by Congress’ concern that “the United States not be subjected to piecemeal, private water rights litigation,” and “[t]he comprehensiveness standard requires the consolidation of existing controversies, not the reopening of settled determinations.” Oregon, 44 F.3d at 768 (first citing Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 525; and then citing United States v. Dist. Ct. for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529 (1971)). The United States would instead have us reopen a settled determination that has stood for decades. Indeed, sixty- seven decrees in Nevada pre-date the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity, and the United States’ argument undermines the finality of each of them. The United States suggests that because these adjudications took place before the passage of the McCarran Amendment, it has the right to assert, at any time—even centuries from now—any previously-unadjudicated claim to water rights, regardless of how long it has sat on those alleged rights. This would mean that none of those sixty-seven pre-McCarran Amendment decrees can be considered settled. It would be absurd to wring this result out of a requirement crafted by courts to further the McCarran Amendment’s purpose of ending piecemeal adjudications and the interminable water rights conflicts they engendered. See, e.g., Oregon, 44 F.3d at 768; Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 525.  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 19 Furthermore, retroactively applying the McCarran Amendment is no issue. The United States argues that it cannot be bound to respect water rights determined in an adjudication where it did not have the opportunity to raise potential claims and defenses. But the Supreme Court rejected that argument in Eagle County, holding that the United States could be joined in a supplemental adjudication despite not being a party to the preceding adjudication. See 401 U.S. at 525-26. Because the supplemental adjudication could not unsettle rights determined in the preceding adjudication, the United States was bound to respect the water rights determined in the preceding adjudication, where it—like here—did not have the opportunity to raise potential claims or defenses. 4 See id. Moreover, we have squarely held, for decades, that “the McCarran Amendment waives the United States’s immunity from suit, not only for the administration of water rights acquired after the statute’s enactment, but also for the 4 That supplemental adjudications may not unsettle rights determined under previous mass adjudications further undermines the United States’ argument that it is unfair to bind it to the results of an adjudication it chose not to take part in. The United States suggests that anyone who owns water rights under the sixty-seven pre-McCarran Amendment decrees should simply seek a supplemental adjudication to determine the United States’ reserved rights. But because rights determined in those supplemental adjudications could not supplant any previously adjudicated rights, this would place the United States in precisely the same position—bound to respect the results of the preceding adjudications, which it did not participate in. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.210(1) (decrees entered pursuant to the 1913 Water Law are “final” and “conclusive”); Mineral County, 473 P.3d at 429 (Nevada’s water law “expressly prohibits reallocating adjudicated water rights that have not been abandoned, forfeited, or otherwise lost pursuant to an express statutory provision”). 20 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM administration of water rights acquired before the law came into effect.” Te-Moak, 339 F.3d at 813. In that case, we found no issue with applying the McCarran Amendment to waive the United States’ immunity from administration of the pre-McCarran Amendment Humboldt Decree. Id. at 811-13. The Supreme Court likewise found the McCarran Amendment applicable even when the underlying federal water rights were acquired in 1905, nearly a half-century before the passage of the McCarran Amendment. See Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 523. And the First Circuit has independently come to a similar conclusion, holding that “the McCarran Amendment applies to water rights acquired prior to 1952, as long as the suit against the government is commenced subsequent to that date.” Puerto Rico, 287 F.3d at 217. The dissent acknowledges that Te-Moak holds “that the McCarran Amendment applies retroactively.” But it claims that Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004), a case that “[t]ellingly . . . did not discuss or distinguish Te- Moak,” constitutes binding precedent requiring “that the McCarran Amendment does not apply absent adjudication of the claims of all parties.” Orff and Te-Moak are in fact distinguishable for an important reason: Orff, unlike Te-Moak, is not a McCarran Amendment case. The plaintiffs in Orff “did not even plead jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment.” 358 F.3d at 1144. Tellingly, neither the United States nor the district court found it necessary to discuss Orff’s implications on the instant litigation. Orff involved a 1963 contract between the Westlands Water District and the United States. See id. at 1141. The dispute was whether the United States had waived its  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 21 sovereign immunity under a different statute, 43 U.S.C. § 390uu. See id. at 1144. We discussed the McCarran Amendment solely to reject the plaintiffs’ argument that a prior McCarran Amendment case precluded the United States from asserting sovereign immunity under this different statute. 5 See id. at 1142-43. We explained that the McCarran Amendment did not apply in Orff because it concerned a “private lawsuit for damages between the farmers and the government.” Id. at 1143. Simply put, we conclude that the clear retroactivity language of Te-Moak, which is a McCarran Amendment case, speaks far louder than anything in Orff, which is not. The dissent cites Metropolitan Water Dist. and Dugan for the same proposition as Orff: that the McCarran Amendment applies solely to adjudications of the rights of all claimants on a stream. But those cases clarify only that, consistent with the McCarran Amendment’s purpose, the private lawsuits involved in those cases were not comprehensive. See Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the McCarran Amendment “does not authorize private suits to decide priorities between the United States and particular claimants”); Dugan, 372 U.S. at 618 (holding that the McCarran Amendment does not apply to “a private suit to determine water rights solely between the respondents and the United States”). Neither case imposes a requirement that a comprehensive adjudication include all possible claimants. These cases did not involve adjudications of the rights of 5 In that prior case, the district court applied the McCarran Amendment, rejecting the United States’ argument that it did not apply “because all of the claimants to water from a given stream [were] not defendants in the action.” Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 491 F. Supp. 263, 266 (E.D. Cal. 1980). 22 BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM multiple parties like those at issue in Te-Moak and Eagle Cnty. Like the dissent, the United States also attempts to limit Te-Moak, arguing that it applies only to cases in which the United States is a later purchaser of previously adjudicated rights. It insists that the McCarran Amendment cannot be retroactive in the instant case, where the United States is claiming unadjudicated reserved rights. This argument fails twice over. First, the United States is a later purchaser of previously adjudicated rights, which it holds in addition to the reserved rights it now claims. In Te-Moak, the United States acquired rights that had previously been adjudicated under the Humboldt Decree, so it was subject to suits for the administration of the Humboldt Decree; here, the United States acquired rights that had been previously adjudicated under the Baker-Lehman Decree, so it should be subject to suits for the administration of the Baker-Lehman Decree. 6 See Te-Moak, 339 F.3d at 807. Indeed, forcing the United States to take the bitter with the sweet was one of the key purposes of the McCarran Amendment: in stripping the United States of sovereign immunity in state water rights 6 The district court found the United States’ acquisition of decreed rights “irrelevant to this case” because Baker Ranches’ claims “relate[d] to the United States’ reserved water rights” and “do not stem from the United States’ acquired decreed rights.” We disagree with this reasoning. Plaintiffs are suing to enforce their own rights under the Baker-Lehman Decree. Plaintiffs are not bringing any claims regarding the United States’ reserved rights; it is the United States that now alleges the existence of reserved water rights to claim that the Baker-Lehman Adjudication was not comprehensive. The water rights that Plaintiffs seek to enforce are interconnected with all other water rights on the Baker-Lehman Creeks.  BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM 23 proceedings, Congress sought to prevent it from receiving the protection of state water law on one hand while flouting it with impunity on the other. See, e.g., Hearings on S.18, 82d Cong. 44 (1951) (statement of Rep. Yorty) (the United States “should take the same disabilities as well as take the benefits” of private appropriators). The United States’ own water rights enjoy the protection of the Baker-Lehman Decree; the United States must therefore respect the water rights of others under the very same Decree. Second, even if the United States had not purchased rights adjudicated under the Baker-Lehman Decree, the distinction that the United States attempts to draw between reserved rights and adjudicated rights is untenable. The Supreme Court had no issue applying the McCarran Amendment when the United States held pre-McCarran Amendment reserved rights, just as it does here. See Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. at 523 (holding that the McCarran Amendment waived sovereign immunity where the United States held “reserved waters for the White River National Forest, withdraw