Federal Trade Commission v. Hoskins

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, No. 24-5747 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:11-cv-00283- v. JCM-NJK BENJAMIN E. HOSKINS, individually and as officer of OPINION Defendants Dream Financial; Logic Solutions, LLC; Oxford Debt Holdings, LLC Sell It Vizions, LLC; and Global Finance Group, LLC; LEANNE RODGERS, F/K/A Leanne Hoskins, Defendants - Appellees, and IVY CAPITAL, INC., DREAM FINANCIAL, OXFORD FINANCIAL, LLC, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS Argued and Submitted October 22, 2025 Phoenix, Arizona Filed August 4, 2026 Before: Susan P. Graber, Bridget S. Bade, and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Lee; Partial Dissent and Partial Concurrence by Judge Bade SUMMARY* Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act / FTC The panel reversed the district court’s rulings blocking the Federal Trade Commission’s efforts to collect on a money judgment it obtained against Benjamin Hoskins and his wife Leann Rodgers stemming from a telemarketing scam, and remanded for further proceedings. The FTC obtained a money judgment of over $130 million against Hoskins and about $1.5 million against Rodgers, who received proceeds from the scam. The FTC later obtained a writ of execution under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (“FDCPA”) to levy on their house in Las Vegas. The district court blocked the FTC’s collection efforts, ruling that enforcement was barred by the Nevada * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 3 statute of limitations. The district court also quashed the writ of execution, holding that under Nevada law the FTC had to file a separate action to establish that the trust holding the house is Rodgers’s alter ego. The panel held that the district court erred in ruling that Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations precluded the FTC from enforcing the judgment against Rodgers. The FDCPA, which has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by writ of execution, preempts state statutes of limitations for enforcement of judgments. The panel rejected the district court’s reasoning that the FDCPA does not apply because a “debt” under the statute must be owed to the United States—and here the proceeds from the judgment will ultimately be disbursed to the victims. The judgment against Rodgers on its face states that $1.5 million is payable to the FTC, and is thus a “debt” owing to the United States under the FDCPA. The panel held that the district court erred in quashing the writ of execution because, contrary to the district court’s ruling, the FTC need not show that the trust holding the house was Rodgers’s alter ego under Nevada law. Under the FDCPA, the FTC may levy any property, however held, in which Hoskins and Rodgers have a substantial nonexempt interest. They have such an interest in the house because of their status as trustees and beneficiaries of the trust. Judge Bade dissented in part and concurred in part. She dissented from the majority’s decision to reverse the order quashing the writ of execution because she disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the FDCPA applied to the enforcement of a disgorgement decree entered in favor of the FTC. Because the disgorgement decree at issue did not fall within the statutory definition of debt, the FDCPA did not 4 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS apply, and Nevada law governed the procedures of the writ of execution sought by the FTC. She concurred, however, in the majority’s decision to reverse the district court’s order precluding future enforcement of the judgment. As an incident of sovereignty, the United States and its instrumentalities are not bound by general statutes of limitations unless expressly named. The Nevada statute of limitations for the enforcement of a judgment does not expressly apply to the federal government. Therefore, the district court erred in forbidding the FTC from enforcing the disgorgement decree by means under than the particular writ of execution sought below. COUNSEL Matthew M. Hoffman (argued), Crystal Ostrum, and Matthew B. Weprin, Attorneys; H. Thomas Byron III, Deputy General Counsel; Anisha S. Dasgupta and Lucas Croslow, General Counsel; Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellant. Caleb Kruckenberg (argued) and Christian Clase, Center for Individual Rights, Washington, D.C.; David R. Koch, King Scow Koch Durham LLC, Henderson, Nevada; Jeffrey Willis, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Tucson, Arizona; for Defendants-Appellees.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 5 OPINION LEE, Circuit Judge: This appeal is the latest turn in the government’s long and winding pursuit of telemarketing scam artists who bilked consumers out of more than $130 million. For years, Benjamin E. Hoskins and his co-defendants promoted worthless “business coaching” services that amounted to tips on how to sell items on eBay. In 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) sued them and obtained a money judgment of over $130 million against Hoskins and about $1.5 million against his wife, Leanne Rodgers, who received proceeds from the scam. But the defendants hampered the government’s efforts to collect on the judgment by weaving a web of shell entities to shield themselves. The FTC finally obtained a writ of execution under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3308 (“FDCPA”), to levy on Hoskin and Rodgers’ house in Las Vegas. The district court blocked the FTC’s collection efforts, ruling that the enforcement was barred by the Nevada statute of limitations. It also quashed the writ of execution, holding that under Nevada law the FTC had to file a separate action to establish that the trust holding the house is Rodgers’s alter ego. We reverse both rulings. We have long held that the FDCPA preempts a state statute of limitations for the enforcement of judgments. See United States v. Gianelli, 543 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court, however, reasoned that the FDCPA does not apply because a “debt” under the statute must be owed to the United States—and here the proceeds from the judgment will ultimately be disbursed to the victims. But the judgment 6 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS against Rodgers on its face states that $1.5 million is payable to the FTC. It is thus a “debt” owing to the United States under the FDCPA, and the Nevada statute of limitations is preempted. We also reverse the order quashing the writ of execution. Contrary to the district court’s ruling, the FTC need not show that the trust holding the house is Rodgers’s alter ego under Nevada law. Under the FDCPA, the FTC may levy any property, however held, in which Hoskins and Rodgers have a substantial nonexempt interest. They have such an interest in the house because of their status as trustees and beneficiaries of the trust. Accordingly, the writ of execution was properly issued and should not have been quashed. BACKGROUND I. Factual Background A. The telemarketing scheme Starting in 2007, Benjamin Hoskins and his co- defendants operated a telemarketing scheme that scammed consumers out of more than $130 million. Operating as Ivy Capital, the defendants sold worthless “business coaching” services with false promises that their program would enable people to earn up to $10,000 per month. At the same time, the defendants engaged in deceptive tactics to stymie consumers’ efforts to receive refunds. The scheme played out in four stages. First, the defendants used “lead generators”—such as promotional websites, blast emails, and internet advertisements—to collect the contact information of potential targets. The lead-generation materials promised people that if they followed a work-from-home program that cost between $50 and $250, they could make hundreds, if  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 7 not thousands, of dollars per week. Unsuspecting consumers provided their contact information in response to the materials. Second, telemarketers called those consumers to persuade them to spend thousands of dollars on a personal business coaching program. Sales representatives promised the consumers that they would receive everything they needed to start internet businesses that would generate substantial income with little effort. For example, as part of the business coaching program, sales representatives guaranteed that consumers would get weekly coaching sessions with experts. The program’s price varied, ranging from $2,000 to over $20,000. The defendants falsely represented to consumers that the coaches were experts who had their own profitable internet businesses. The coaches did not have any formal education or specialized training, and they were not even required to complete the defendants’ own business coaching program. The most that any “coaching expert” taught a consumer was how to sell items on eBay—something that anyone could research online without having to spend thousands of dollars on a business coaching program. To sell the program, sales representatives used testimonials from “successful” consumers. But the testimonials were deceptive. Several of the defendants’ employees testified that a “success story” included virtually anyone who had sold anything on eBay for any amount. Most, if not all, consumers who purchased the business coaching program could not recoup the cost of the program through eBay sales. Third, the defendants upsold a variety of products and services that produced little to no value to consumers who 8 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS had already purchased the business coaching program. In one instance, a consumer testified that, after spending over $7,000 on “upsell” products alone, he sold three items on eBay. One was a legitimate sale that did not come close to earning back his initial investment. And the other two were purchases that the consumer made to confirm that his website was working. Fourth, the defendants engaged in deceptive strategies to prevent consumers from receiving refunds and voicing complaints. Many consumers, after making good-faith efforts to establish a successful internet business using defendants’ plans and services, became dissatisfied and sought refunds from Ivy Capital. The defendants had a strict three-day refund policy, but most consumers were not told of this policy. And even when consumers did seek a refund within three days, the defendants imposed substantial obstacles, such as not responding to phone calls. Consumers who were persistent enough to speak with someone at the “Resolutions Department” were cajoled, intimidated, berated, and often eventually denied a refund. Portions of the tens of millions of dollars extracted through this scam were funneled to entities controlled by the defendants’ spouses, including Rodgers. Rodgers used a company called Oxford Financial, LLC, to shift money from the Ivy Capital enterprise into Hoskins’ and Rodgers’ personal accounts. Rodgers personally received over $1 million from Oxford between May 2007 and January 2011, as well as additional financial benefits in the form of school tuition, a personal credit card, IRS fees, a vehicle, and other personal and household expenses.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 9 B. The judgments against Hoskins and Rodgers In 2011, the FTC sued numerous defendants who operated the scam and/or who received money from it. All the defendants settled with the FTC except for Hoskins, Rodgers, and their affiliated companies. The district court in 2013 granted summary judgment to the FTC and entered a monetary judgment against these defendants. The court held Hoskins and his company, Dream Financial, jointly and severally liable with the settling defendants for $130,375,057.52; Oxford liable for $1,529,292.25; and Rodgers liable for $1,128,795.78. The judgment characterized these awards as “equitable monetary relief.” The judgment maintained an existing freeze on Hoskins’s and Rodgers’s assets and provided that it would be lifted only as necessary to affect the turnover of their assets in partial satisfaction of the monetary relief awards. On appeal, this court affirmed the liability determination and the judgment against Hoskins but held that Rodgers should be jointly and severally liable with Oxford because the company was her alter ego. FTC v. Ivy Cap., Inc., 616 F. App’x 360, 360–62 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). On remand, the district court entered an amended judgment against Rodgers, holding her liable for $1,550,848.48 (including prejudgment interest). Consistent with its usual practice, the FTC intends to use any funds that it recovers from Hoskins and Rodgers to pay back the victims of Hoskins’s business-coaching scam. C. The FTC’s collection efforts Hoskins and Rodgers satisfied little of their judgments. The judgment balances on Hoskins and Rodgers as of July 2023 were about $131 million and $1.4 million, respectively. The FTC spent years investigating their assets so that it could 10 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS collect the judgments and provide redress to victims of the scam, but Hoskins and Rodgers have thus far evaded the FTC’s collection efforts. The property at issue is Hoskins and Rodgers’s current residence (“the Corona Vista property”), which was bought with the proceeds from the sale of their prior home (“the Drifting Shadow property”) in violation of the court-ordered asset freeze. In 2013, Hoskins and Rodgers moved for relief from the asset freeze to permit them to sell the Drifting Shadow property, claiming that they could not make mortgage and homeowners-association payments and that the property was at risk of foreclosure. The court said that it would permit them to put the Drifting Shadow property up for sale, but that it would not necessarily permit Hoskins and Rodgers to buy a new house with the proceeds. Faced with these restrictions, Hoskins and Rodgers did not sell at that time. Instead, in 2016, they conveyed the Drifting Shadow property to the Hambil Trust (“the Trust”), of which Hoskins and Rodgers are trustees and beneficiaries. The Trust, in turn, conveyed the property to an LLC of which the Trust is the managing member. Although Hoskins and Rodgers never sought court approval to sell the Drifting Shadow property through the Trust, they eventually sold the property. In 2021, Rodgers bought the Corona Vista property using some proceeds from the sale of the Drifting Shadow property. Although Rodgers at first named herself as the buyer on the purchase agreement, she later tried to obscure her interest in the property through an elaborate web of shell entities. Rodgers instructed the title company that the buyer would be “Monte Bello, LLC,” and requested that the title company “[l]eave my name off of [the deed] if possible.”  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 11 Monte Bello is owned by Resolute 21, LLC, which in turn is owned by the Trust. II. Procedural History A. The writ of execution In August 2023, after learning that Hoskins and Rodgers had circumvented the court’s orders by selling the Drifting Shadow property and purchasing the Corona Vista property, the FTC applied for a writ of execution under the FDCPA. The FTC sought to levy on the Corona Vista property to satisfy part of the outstanding judgments against Hoskins and Rodgers. The district court issued the writ. Rodgers then moved to quash the writ of execution. The magistrate judge granted the motion, holding that, under Nevada law, the FTC had to “file a separate action for alter ego” to establish Rodgers’s interest in the property. The FTC objected, arguing that the FDCPA preempts state law, but the district court denied the objection, agreeing that a separate action for alter ego was required. B. Relief from judgment Rodgers separately moved for relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), arguing that enforcement was barred by Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed and granted the motion, rejecting the FTC’s argument that the FDCPA preempted that state law. The court later entered an order stating that the judgment against Rodgers was “of no further force or legal effect, as any attempt to enforce the judgment is barred by Nevada’s six-year period of limitation governing enforcement of a judgment.” For these reasons, the court held that “the FTC may no longer seek to collect or enforce the judgment against Rodgers” and directed the FTC to 12 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS release any liens affecting real property or other recordings of the judgment. STANDARD OF REVIEW The district court’s determination that the FDCPA does not preempt Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations raises a question of statutory construction that we review de novo. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. v. Bensal, 853 F.3d 992, 996 (9th Cir. 2017). For a motion to quash, we review for abuse of discretion, United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th Cir. 1996), but an error of law is an abuse of discretion, Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins., 594 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). DISCUSSION I. The district court erred in barring enforcement of the judgment against Rodgers. The FDCPA0F establishes the exclusive procedures for the United States to recover a judgment on a debt and expressly preempts inconsistent state law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001(a), 3003(d). Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1990 “to create a comprehensive statutory framework for the collection of debts owed to the United States government.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, at 23 (1990).0F1 Before that time, the 1 We cite H.R. Rep. No. 101-736 merely to provide general background on an obscure statute that is distinct from a more commonly known statute that shares the same acronym, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (statute barring debt collectors from engaging in abusive and deceptive tactics against consumers). But in interpreting the meaning of the statutory provisions in the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, we rely on the statutory text, not some larger purpose not defined in the statute. See Salisbury v. City of Santa Monica, 998 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Vague notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 13 federal government had to rely on state-law procedures to enforce its judgments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1) (stating that the procedure on execution of a money judgment “must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies”). By enacting the new law, Congress sought to “bring an end to the . . . situation whereby a crazy patchwork of laws in the 50 states dictate[s] the debt collection remedies available to [the government] in collecting Federal debts.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-825, at 19 (1990). The FDCPA defines “debt” broadly to include any amount “owing to the United States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B) (emphases added). The statute further defines “United States” to include “an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States.” Id. § 3002(15)(B). The FDCPA provides several ways for the government to enforce a judgment debt. See id. §§ 3202–3205. The one at issue here is execution on property. Under the statute, “[a]ll property in which the judgment debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest shall be subject to levy pursuant to a writ of execution.” Id. § 3203(a). A district court may issue a writ of execution upon written application of counsel for the United States. Id. § 3203(c)(1). specific issue under consideration.”) (alterations adopted) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993)). 14 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS The district court erred in holding that Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations precludes the FTC from enforcing the judgment against Rodgers. The FDCPA has a sweeping preemption provision: “This chapter shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent with a provision of this chapter.” 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d). The FDCPA also has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by writ of execution. See id. § 3203. We have thus held that the FDCPA preempts state statutes of limitations for enforcement of judgments. See Gianelli, 543 F.3d at 1183 (“[T]he California state law at issue, . . . which would preclude enforcement of a restitution judgment after ten years from the entry of that judgment, is . . . an inconsistent state law and is, therefore, preempted.”). A. Gianelli controls here. In Gianelli, a criminal defendant was ordered to pay $125,000 in restitution to the United States. Id. at 1181. More than a decade after the district court issued that order, the government applied for a writ of execution under the FDCPA, seeking to levy the writ on a house and land owned by the defendant. Id. The defendant argued that a ten-year California statute of limitations barred the government from collecting on the balance of the debt. Id. at 1182. We disagreed, noting that the FDCPA “provides no time limit for the collection of debts by writ of execution” and holding that it thus preempts state statutes of limitations. Id. at 1183. As we explained, “because the purpose of the FDCPA is to create a comprehensive statutory framework for the collection of debts owed to the United States government and to improve the efficiency and speed in collecting those debts, . . . a state law limiting such collection is inconsistent with the purpose of the act and is,  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 15 therefore, preempted.” Id. (citation modified); cf. Bensal, 853 F.3d at 997–98 (holding that the FDCPA preempted a California law concerning the disclaimer of an interest in a trust). The district court here, however, concluded that Gianelli was not controlling because the judgment entered against the defendant there was criminal rather than civil. But the FDCPA explicitly defines “judgment” as “a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(8) (emphasis added). By its plain text, the FDCPA applies to judgments in both civil and criminal cases. Indeed, another circuit has cited Gianelli when holding that the FDCPA applied to a civil judgment. See FTC v. Namer, 481 F. App’x 958, 960 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“We agree with Gianelli on the following point [that the FDCPA preempts inconsistent state laws] as well.”). B. The judgment against Rodgers, which is payable to the FTC, qualifies as a debt under the FDCPA. The district court offered another reason why the FDCPA purportedly does not apply here: It did not consider Rodgers’s debt to be “owed to the federal government,” as required under the statute, because “the purpose of . . . disgorgement is to refund any ill-gotten gains to consumers, not the federal government.” We disagree. The FDCPA expressly defines “debt” to include “an amount that is owing to the United States on account of . . . restitution . . . or other source of indebtedness to the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B). Those are the words that Congress chose, and we must heed them. “When interpreting a statutory term, we first give effect to [the] statutory 16 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS definition[].” Salisbury, 998 F.3d at 860 (citation omitted). In defining “debt” under the FDCPA, Congress used broad terms that encompass the judgment here: Rodgers “ow[es]” this amount because her judgment to pay money to the FTC is obviously a “source of indebtedness to the United States.” Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, there is nothing tautological about our reading of the statute. The judgment in this case was expressly “entered in favor of the commission.” Under the judgment, Rodgers has a legal duty to pay the federal government. The debt is thus owed to the federal government. The dissent is right in that to determine the actual beneficiary of a monetary judgment, we may at the very least look to the judgment itself and the “face of the record.” Dissent at 38. The FDCPA explicitly defines “judgment” as “a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(8). And the “face of the record” is abundantly clear: the judgment in this case, by its terms, was “entered in favor of the commission.”1F 2 Cf. FTC v. Lederman (In re Lederman), No. SV 94-22688 AG, 1995 WL 792072, at *5 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 26, 1995) (concluding that the FTC had “standing to assert the nondischargeability of its judgment against [a debtor]” and could be “considered a creditor when it ha[d] a claim against a debtor based on the debtor’s alleged violation of the FTC Act”). That the FTC intends to use any money that it collects from Rodgers for 2 When the district court issued abstracts of judgments in 2015 to enable the FTC to obtain a lien on the Drifting Shadow property, see 28 U.S.C. § 3201, the court identified the FTC as the “Part[y] in whose favor judgments have been obtained.”  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 17 restitution to consumers does not take the debt outside the scope of the FDCPA. The dissent contends that the catch-all provision in the FDCPA’s definition of “debt”—“other source of indebtedness to the United States”—should be read narrowly to exclude the judgment owing to the FTC. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3). Dissent at 32-35. But the structure of the statutory provision reinforces the intended function of a catch-all provision: it eliminates potential loopholes, fills in possible gaps, and tries to minimize disputes arising out of unforeseen circumstances. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 292 (2011) (“[T]he very purpose of a catch-all provision . . . is to avoid the necessity of listing each matter . . . falling within it.”); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Newsom, 919 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (determining that, viewed in context, certain phrases that “are naturally read as catch-all categories . . . are broader than the more specific topics enumerated”). Here, the statute defines “debt” broadly to include all sorts of debt—any “amount that is owing to the United States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United States”—and then, as a catch-all provision, adds “or other source of indebtedness to the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B). The catch-all provision here thus eliminates a potential loophole that Rodgers is trying to exploit. The dissent also contends that our reading of the catch- all provision renders superfluous the earlier phrase “an amount that is owing to the United States.” Dissent at 33. It goes as far as to say that the definition of debt has two statutory requirements—(1) an amount “owing to the United 18 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS States” (2) “on account of a . . . source of indebtedness to the United States,” the latter of which the dissent construes as a debt that “will inure to the benefit of the United States.” Dissent at 32. If Congress wanted to say a debt must ultimately inure to the benefit of the United States, it could have said so. But it did not. Further, the catch-all provision’s reference to an “other source of indebtedness to the United States” is not superfluous. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B) (emphasis added). If the provision merely stated “or other source of indebtedness,” it could potentially add ambiguity, as the term “other” could suggest that it includes a debt owed to another party.3 Finally, the dissent leans on 28 U.S.C. § 3001(c) to argue that the definition of “debt” under 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3) is not what the plain text says. Dissent at 30-33. Section 3001(c) states that the FDCPA “shall not apply to an amount owing that is not a debt.” The dissent argues that the majority’s interpretation of “debt” under § 3002(3) would render § 3001(c) a nullity. Dissent at 33. But the most plausible reading of § 3001(c) is that it merely reinforces the definition of “debt” under § 3002(3)—a belt-and-suspenders approach to underscore that “debt” covers only what is included in that definition. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395, 407 n.7 (2021) (“‘It is no superfluity,’ however, for Congress 3 Suppose, for example, Party A owes a debt to Party B, who in turn owes a debt to the United States. By adding “indebtedness to the United States,” the statute makes clear that the federal government cannot try to collect on Party A’s debt to Party B because Party A’s debt is not an “other source of indebtedness to the United States.” Similarly, the previous clause in the laundry list of sources of debt—“recovery of a cost incurred by the United States”—clarifies that a cost incurred by a party other than the United States is not a debt under the FDCPA. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3) (emphasis added).  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 19 to include both functions in the autodialer definition so as to clarify the domain of prohibited devices. . . . [E]ven if [both] functions often merge, Congress may have ‘employed a belt and suspenders approach’ in writing the statute.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Myers, 170 F.4th 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2026) (“Congress may use a ‘belt and suspenders approach’ to dispel any doubt about a statute's scope.” (citation omitted)). This approach leaves little ambiguity for what the text means. So, for example, the federal government could not say that someone owes a “debt” to the United States based on an unenforceable oral contract because that would not fall within the statutory definition. Importantly, § 3001(c) certainly does not support the dissent’s view that the wording somehow creates a new definition of debt beyond the statutory text to include the requirement that “debt” must inure to the benefit of the government. The dissent cites legislative history to support its view that “debt” should be defined by a “direct beneficiary test” and that such a definition is what would most “make[] sense” in aligning with Congress’s intent. Dissent at 36-37. But legislative history—no matter how clear—cannot override statutory text. See Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2011). Our decision today tracks the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in FTC v. National Business Consultants, Inc., 376 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2004). In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that the FDCPA’s relevant text was “clear and unambiguous” and that a judgment requiring defendants to make payments to the FTC is a “debt” for purposes of the FDCPA even if “a portion of the judgment representing the damages awarded for consumer redress may ultimately be paid by the government to the defrauded [victims].” Id. at 320. As the court explained, where “[t]he terms of the judgment render 20 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS [defendants] . . . liable to the FTC, not to private individuals, for the entire amount of the judgment[,] . . . the United States, not any individual or group of individuals, is the formal owner of the judgment.” Id. Further, “nothing in the statutory text requires that the government be the exclusive beneficiary of the judgment for the [FDCPA] to apply.” Id.1F2F4 So too here. Because the judgment makes Rodgers liable to the FTC—not to private individuals—it is an amount owing to the United States and thus is subject to the FDCPA. The defendants argue that we should look beyond the four corners of the judgment and instead determine the ultimate beneficiary of the judgment. We decline to do so. The statutory text says nothing about the beneficiary of the judgment but instead refers simply to money that is “ow[ed] to the United States.” Here, the $1.5 million judgment payable to the FTC is “an amount that is owing to the United States on account of . . . restitution” or “other source of indebtedness to the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B). It falls squarely within the statutory definition of “debt.” In any event, if we looked beyond the judgment itself to try to determine the beneficiaries, it may not be possible to identify or locate the victims, in which case the government would retain the funds. Cf. Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71, 87 4 See also United States v. Pioch, 5 F.4th 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[A] ‘debt’ [under the FDCPA] can constitute the amount due to be paid because of an assessment, an order of restitution (including restitution owed to individuals arising out of criminal cases), or another source of indebtedness to the United States.”); cf. United States v. Mays, 430 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act provides that the FDCPA can be used to enforce orders of restitution).  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 21 (2020) (“The SEC, however, does not always return the entirety of disgorgement proceeds to investors, instead depositing a portion of its collections in a fund in the Treasury.”). And even if the FTC might need judicial approval to deposit any leftover funds into the U.S. Treasury, the judgment is still “entered in favor of the commission,” which is an amount “owing to the United States” and hence a “debt” under the FDCPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15)(B) (defining “United States” to include a “commission . . .of the United States”). Rodgers, and the dissent, rely on United States v. Bedi, 15 F.4th 222 (2d Cir. 2021), to argue that the judgment against Rodgers is not a “debt” under the FDCPA. That reliance is misplaced. Bedi involved an administrative law judge’s order “requiring a private employer to remit back pay to its former employee.” Id. at 223. In other words, the order required payment directly to the employee, not to the federal government, and thus the judgment was not a debt owed to the United States. See id. at 228 (“[T]he Administrative Order requires [defendants] to pay ‘Ingvarsdóttir,’ not ‘the United States.’”). Here, by contrast, the judgment is payable to the FTC, not to a private party. The dissent also relies on United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997). There, the First Circuit determined that “a debt cannot be eligible for inclusion under the FDCPA if the United States is neither the formal owner nor the direct beneficiary of it.” Id. at 1037 (emphasis added). The court came to this conclusion in large part by looking at the legislative history and the purported purpose of the statute to protect the public fisc. Id. at 1036–37 (quoting floor statement of Rep. Brooks). The court reasoned that if the money paid to the federal government is ultimately disbursed to others, then it does not benefit the government 22 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS and thus the judgment should not be considered a “debt” owing to the United States. Id. But the FDCPA’s statutory text does not support the First Circuit’s purposivist characterization of “debt.” See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“[A] statute is not to be confined to the ‘particular application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.”’). Indeed, a judgment that is owed to the government, that can be collected only by the government, and that arises under a public-interest statute that vests enforcement authority exclusively in the government, is an amount “owing to the United States” and hence is a “debt” under the FDCPA. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B). The First Circuit recognized as much when it suggested that the result might have been different if the United States were the “formal owner” of the debt, Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1037, as is the case here, see Nat’l Bus. Consultants, 376 F.3d at 319 n.2, 320 (holding that a monetary judgment that the FTC secured on behalf of defrauded franchisees was a “debt” under the FDCPA and distinguishing Bongiorno, in part, on the ground that the FTC was “the formal owner of the entire debt” and “the only entity entitled to enforce the judgment”). Moreover, Bongiorno was superseded by statute. See United States v. Witham, 648 F.3d 40, 41 (1st Cir. 2011) (recognizing that the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 authorizes the government to invoke the FDCPA to enforce all orders of restitution in criminal cases). Finally, Rodgers makes two more arguments, neither of which is persuasive. First, she argues that the FTC was never authorized to demand such payment from her in the first place, given the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC, 593 U.S. 67 (2021). She thus contends that the agency lacks power under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to seek equitable  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS 23 monetary relief. See id. at 70. That argument fails because this court and others have recognized that pre-AMG judgments for monetary relief under Section 13(b)—like the judgment in this case—may remain valid. See, e.g., FTC v. Hewitt, 68 F.4th 461, 465–70 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a pre-AMG monetary judgment awarded under Section 13(b)); FTC v. Ross, 74 F.4th 186, 191–96 (4th Cir. 2023) (same); cf. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758 (1995) (“New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed.”).2F3F5 Second, Rodgers raises a new theory on appeal, arguing that under the Erie doctrine, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 5 While the Supreme Court in AMG held that the FTC cannot seek equitable monetary relief under Section 13(b) because that provision addresses only injunctive relief, it did not disturb the FTC’s power to obtain monetary relief under Section 19. Although Section 19 imposes additional requirements, it authorizes a court to “grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers,” including, but not limited to, “the refund of money or return of property” and “the payment of damages.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). It is not clear here if the court ordered monetary relief under Section 13(b)