Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AMY L. STENDAL, No. 25-3778 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:23-cv-01380-ODW-PD v. MEMORANDUM* MEMORIAL HEALTH SERVICES; LONG BEACH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants - Appellants, MILLER CHILDRENS HOSPITAL LONG BEACH AUXILIARY, INC., DOES, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 21, 2026 Pasadena, California Before: BUMATAY, VANDYKE, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendants-Appellants Memorial Health Services and Long Beach Memorial Medical Center (“LBMMC”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff-Appellee Amy Stendal’s (“Appellee”) claims relating to alleged violations of rest and meal period provisions of the California Labor Code. We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a), and we reverse and remand. We review “a district judge’s order to compel arbitration de novo[,] … factual findings for clear error, and the interpretation and meaning of contract provisions de novo.” Patrick v. Running Warehouse, LLC, 93 F.4th 468, 475 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). The core issue in this case is whether Appellee’s CBA contains a waiver of her right to sue in a judicial forum for alleged statutory violations of rest and meal period provisions contained within the CBA. The negotiated waiver of a specific statutory protected right may only be enforced if the waiver was “clear and unmistakable.” Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). As to the dispute involving Appellee’s rest and meal provision claims, that standard is met. First, Section 26(B) of the CBA specifically references relevant California law, including specific provisions of the California Labor Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 5-2001 (“IWC Wage Order”), reproducing the operative language nearly verbatim. That distinguishes this case from the waiver found defective in Wright v. Universal Maritime Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). Section 26(B) leads with the provision that LBMMC “will provide meal periods and rest periods in accordance with State law.” Subsection 26(B)(1) authorizes rest periods using the phrase “authorized and permitted,” which is lifted directly from IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001, § 12(A). See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050(12)(A) (“Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods . . . .”). Subsection 26(B)(1)’s rest-time calculation “at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof,” is also taken verbatim from the IWC Wage Order. See id. Subsection 26(B)(2) states that LBMMC will “provide meal periods in accordance with State law, including California Labor Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order.” Subsection 26(B)(2) also mirrors Labor Code § 512(a)’s requirement when it provides RNs “an unpaid meal period of at least thirty (30) minutes if the RN works more than five (5) hours,” but that the “meal period may be waived if the RN works less than six (6) hours in one day.” See Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a). Moreover, its second meal period waiver provision is consistent with IWC Wage Order 5-2001 § 11(D), which is applicable to healthcare workers. Finally, Subsection 26(B)(3) references the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, providing that as an “alternative[]” to arbitration, “a RN may bring a dispute” to this specific body that enforces a subset of Labor Code violations, such as the alleged rest and meal violations.1 The numerous references in Section 26(B) to relevant state statutory language meets the “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard as subsequently interpreted in Wright. See 525 U.S. at 80. Second, the waiver contained in the CBA is unlike the blanket waiver rejected in Wright. In that case, the waiver swept in “all matters affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Id. Subsection 26(B)(3), by contrast, is triggered only by a failure to pay a penalty for missed rest and meal periods, or “a dispute related to this Section” (which covers only rest and meal periods). Third, Subsection 26(B)(3)’s language satisfies Wright’s demand that an arbitration provision clearly indicate which disputes are to be arbitrated. See id. Subsection 26(B)(3) states “[i]n the event a RN does not receive a penalty payment called for by or otherwise has a dispute related to this Section, such despite shall be resolved through the Grievance and Arbitration procedures under Articles 9 and 10.” As the title of Section 26(B) indicates, disputes that would be “related to” Section 26(B) are disputes involving “Rest and Meal Periods,” which is far more specific 1 Appellee was covered by both a 2016 and 2019 CBA. The 2016 CBA lacks reference to the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, which adjudicates specific types of claims, such as alleged rest and meal violations, as well as other differences in language. But because the parties on appeal have not raised this distinction, but instead have primarily addressed their arguments towards the language contained within the 2019 CBA, we follow that approach and decline to address any differences. than the unclear direction in Wright that “matters under dispute” would be arbitrated. Id. In sum, Section 26(B) of Appellee’s CBA “explicit[ly] incorporate[es]” statutory language, does not contain a blanket waiver intended to cover “all matters,” and accurately and narrowly directs that only disputes related to rest and meal periods must be arbitrated. Id. at 80–81. This is a “clear and unmistakable” waiver of Appellee’s right to bring related statutory claims in a judicial forum.2 For these reasons, the district court’s denial to compel arbitration as to the rest and meal period claims (Claims Three and Four)—and the corresponding components of Appellee’s claim under California’s Private Attorneys General Act claim—is reversed and remanded so that arbitration of those claims may proceed.3 2 Because Section 26(B) contains an enforceable waiver requiring that Appellee’s rest and meal period claims be resolved through the CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedure, we do not reach the separate question of whether that procedure permits arbitration on a classwide basis. In any event, Appellee did not make arguments on this point, and we note that there is a presumption against classwide arbitration. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 189 (2019). 3 Appellants’ request for a complete stay of litigation of all other claims pending arbitration of the rest and meal claims—and the corresponding portion of her Private Attorneys General Act claim—is denied. Appellants may raise any arguments in support of their request for a broader stay before the district court in the first instance.