Todd Yukutake v. Anne E. Lopez

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TODD YUKUTAKE; DAVID No. 21-16756 KIKUKAWA, D.C. No. Plaintiffs-Appellees, 1:19-cv-00578- JMS-RT v. ANNE E. LOPEZ, In her Official OPINION Capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellant, and CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 24, 2026 Pasadena, California 2 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ Filed September 22, 2026 Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, John B. Owens, Ryan D. Nelson, Bridget S. Bade, Daniel A. Bress, Danielle J. Forrest, Lawrence VanDyke, Gabriel P. Sanchez and Holly A. Thomas, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Owens; Dissent by Judge R. Nelson; Dissent by Judge Forrest; Dissent by Judge VanDyke SUMMARY* Second Amendment The en banc court reversed the district court’s injunction that blocked the implementation of the State of Hawaii’s firearm licensing regime on Second Amendment grounds, and remanded for further proceedings. Hawaii is a “shall-issue” jurisdiction for firearm permits, meaning that as long as an applicant satisfies certain requirements, they may obtain a firearm. This differs from a “may-issue” regime, where the State retains some discretion in deciding whether to issue a firearm license to an applicant. * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 3 Plaintiffs Todd Yukutake and David Kikukawa challenged the constitutionality of two requirements of Hawaii’s shall-issue regime: 1) Hawaii Revised Statutes § 134-2(e), which provides a narrow time window within which to acquire a handgun after obtaining the requisite permit; and 2) Hawaii Revised Statutes § 134-3, which provides that once the applicant has obtained the firearm, a form with information about the firearm must be completed, and one must bring the firearm to a police station for inspection in certain circumstances. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs, concluding that the challenged aspects of both provisions were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and permanently enjoined their enforcement. After the injunction was entered, the Supreme Court issued New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), which outlined how courts should analyze shall-issue regimes like Hawaii’s. While Bruen instructs courts to engage in a two-step inquiry when evaluating Second Amendment claims, the en banc court wrote that Bruen distinguished shall-issue from may-issue regimes and, in footnote 9, included an apparent carve-out to the two-step test, providing that objective, non-abusive “shall-issue” licensing regimes are presumptively constitutional. The en banc court further wrote that despite a wide range of methodological approaches to assessing shall-issue regulations after Bruen, the circuit courts have converged on one unifying principle: non-abusive, shall-issue laws comport with the Second Amendment. With the guidance of Bruen, the en banc court held that Hawaii’s shall-issue regime comports with the Second Amendment because Plaintiffs failed to show that the two challenged provisions, which are presumptively lawful, have 4 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ been put toward abusive ends that would effectively deny ordinary citizens their Second Amendment rights. Rather, at most, the provisions impose only modest, procedural burdens, and do not materially impede Plaintiffs from acquiring firearms. Dissenting, Judge R. Nelson, joined by Judges Bress and VanDyke, and joined except as to Part I–C by Judges Bade and Forrest, wrote that the majority incorrectly holds that footnote 9 of Bruen creates a “carve-out” or “safe harbor” from Second Amendment scrutiny, and is thus analytically distinct from Bruen’s framework. He wrote that the correct application of Bruen to Hawaii’s regulations makes this case straightforward. First, the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the acquisition of arms, and Hawaii’s statewide restrictions govern the process by which ordinary citizens take possession of handguns. Second, Hawaii has not identified a representative historical analogue for either its short permit use period or its acquisition-linked inspection mandate. Accordingly, because Hawaii has not carried the burden Bruen places on the government, the en banc court should have affirmed the district court’s judgment. Dissenting, Judge Forrest joined all but Part I–C of Judge Nelson’s opinion explaining the problems with the majority’s approach and wrote separately to address the scope of the injunction issued. Judge Forrest would have affirmed the district court on the merits and remanded with instructions for the district court to narrow its permanent injunction in light of Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S 831 (2025), because there is no need to enjoin enforcement of Hawaii’s challenged laws against anyone other than Plaintiffs to afford Plaintiffs complete relief.  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 5 Dissenting, Judge VanDyke proposed two “bright-line” rules that he believes could resolve a large part of this court’s Second Amendment cases and accord with Supreme Court precedent: (1) if a firearm product or usage that a state seeks to ban is currently prevalent throughout our nation, then it should simply be unconstitutional to ban it; and (2) if a state has a firearm regulation that most other states don’t have, then the regulation should be unconstitutional. Applying these bright-line rules, Judge VanDyke would hold that because the challenged regulations here are outliers, they are unconstitutional. COUNSEL Alan A. Beck (argued), Law Offices of Alan Beck, San Diego, California; Stephen D. Stamboulieh, Stamboulieh Law PLLC, Olive Branch, Mississippi; for Plaintiffs- Appellees. Jo-Ann T. Sagar (argued), Kristen Love I, Reedy C. Swanson, Natalie J. Salmanowitz, Eric S. Roytman-Cash, and Ryan M. Campbell, Hogan Lovells Cadwalader US LLP, Washington, D.C.; Robert T. Nakatsuji First Deputy Solicitor General; Caron M. Inagaki and Kendall J. Moser, Deputy Attorneys General; Kaliko’onālani D. Fernandes and Kimberly T. Guidry, Solicitors General; Anne E. Lopez and Holly T. Shikada, Hawaii Attorneys General; Office of the Hawai’i Attorney General, Honolulu, Hawai’i; for Defendants-Appellants. Kevin O’Grady, Law Office of Kevin O’Grady LLC, Honolulu, Hawai’i, for Amicus Curiae Hawai’i Rifle Association. 6 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ Donald E.J. Kilmer Jr., Law Offices of Donald Kilmer, Caldwell, Idaho, for Amici Curiae The Second Amendment Foundation and The Madison Society Foundation, Inc.. Erin M. Erhardt and Michael T. Jean, National Rifle Association of America, Institute for Legislative Action, Fairfax, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc.. Jeremiah L. Morgan, William J. Olson, and Robert J. Olson, William J. Olson PC, Vienna, Virginia; Rick Boyer, Integrity Law Firm PLLC, Lynchburg, Virginia; John I. Harris, Schulman Leroy & Bennett PC, Nashville, Tennessee; Joseph W. Miller, Law Offices of Joseph Miller LLC, Fairbanks, Alaska; for Amici Curiae Gun Owners of America, Gun Owners Foundation, Gun Owners of California, Tennessee Firearms Association, Tennessee Firearms Foundation, Virginia Citizens Defense League, Virginia Citizens Defense Foundation, Coalition of New Jersey Firearm Owners, Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Heller Foundation, Oregon Firearms Federation, Grass Roots North Carolina, America’s Future Inc., U.S. Constitutional Rights Legal Defense Fund, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Restoring Liberty Action Committee. Ian Simmons, David K. Roberts, Catherine A. Ward, Arjun A. Shenoy, and Danielle N. Siegel, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington D.C., for Amici Curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Everytown for Gun Safety, and Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence. Konstadinos T. Moros, Second Amendment Foundation, Bellevue, Washington, for Amici Curiae Second Amendment Foundation, California Rifle & Pistol Association Inc., and Second Amendment Law Center Inc..  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 7 Barry K. Arrington, Arrington Law Firm, Wheat Ridge, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae National Association for Gun Rights. Mark G. Sands, Assistant Attorney General; Donald S. McGehee, Division Chief; Christopher M. Allen, Assistant Solicitor General; Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General; Dana Nessel, Michigan Attorney General; Office of the Michigan Attorney General, East Lansing, Michigan; Rob Bonta, California Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, California; William Tong, Connecticut Attorney General, Office of the Connecticut Attorney General, Hartford, Connecticut; Philip J. Weiser, Colorado Attorney General, Office of the Colorado Attorney General, Denver, Colorado; Brian L. Schwalb, District of Columbia Attorney General, Office of the District of Columbia Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; Kathleen Jennings, Delaware Attorney General, Office of the Delaware Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware; Kwame Raoul, Illinois Attorney General, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, Illinois; Aaron M. Frey, Maine Attorney General, Office of the Maine Attorney General, Augusta, Maine; Anthony G. Brown, Maryland Attorney General, Office of the Maryland Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland; Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; Andrea J. Campbell, Massachusetts Attorney General, Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General, Boston, Massachusetts; Matthew J. Platkin, New Jersey Attorney General, Office of the New Jersey Attorney General, Trenton, New Jersey; Letitia James, New York Attorney General, Office of the New York Attorney General, New York, New York; Dan Rayfield, Oregon Attorney General, Office of the Oregon Attorney General, Salem, 8 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ Oregon; Peter F. Neronha, Rhode Island Attorney General, Office of the Rhode Island Attorney General, Providence, Rhode Island; Charity R. Clark, Vermont Attorney General, Office of the Vermont Attorney General, Montpelier, Vermont; Nicholas W. Brown, Washington Attorney General, Office of the Washington Attorney General, Olympia, Washington; for Amici Curiae States of Michigan, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. Erin E. Murphy, Paul D. Clement, Matthew D. Rowen, and Nicholas A. Aquart, Clement & Murphy PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia; Lawrence G. Keane and Shelby B. Smith, National Shooting Sports Foundation Inc., Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.. Michael T. Jean, U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Foundation. Sean Corkery, Assistant Solicitor General; Alan M. Hurst, Solicitor General; Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General; Office of the Idaho Attorney General, Boise, Idaho; Steve Marshall, Alabama Attorney General, Office of the Alabama Attorney General, Montgomery, Alabama; Stephen J. Cox, Alaska Attorney General, Office of the Alaska Attorney General, Anchorage, Alaska; Tim Griffin, Arkansas Attorney General, Office of the Arkansas Attorney General, Little Rock, Arkansas; James Uthmeier, Florida Attorney General, Office of the Florida Attorney General, Tampa, Florida; Christopher M. Carr, Georgia Attorney General, Office of the Georgia Attorney General, Atlanta, Georgia; Theodore E. Rokita, Indiana Attorney General,  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 9 Office of the Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana; Brenna Bird, Iowa Attorney General; Office of the Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, Iowa; Lynn Fitch, Mississippi Attorney General, Office of the Mississippi Attorney General, Jackson, Mississippi; Kris W. Kobach, Kansas Attorney General, Office of the Kansas Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas; Liz Murrill, Louisiana Attorney General, Office of the Louisiana Attorney General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Michael T. Hilgers, Nebraska Attorney General, Office of the Nebraska Attorney General, Lincoln, Nebraska; Keith G. Kautz, Wyoming Attorney General, Office of the Wyoming Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Catherine L. Hanaway, Missouri Attorney General, Office of the Missouri Attorney General, Jefferson City, Missouri; Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Office of the Montana Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Russell Coleman, Kentucky Attorney General, Office of Kentucky Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky; Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio; Drew H. Wrigley, North Dakota Attorney General, Office of the North Dakota Attorney General, Bismarck, North Dakota; Alan Wilson, South Carolina Attorney General, Office of the South Carolina Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina; Marty Jackley, South Dakota Attorney General, Office of the South Dakota Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota; Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney General, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Austin, Texas; Derek Brown, Utah Attorney General, Office of the Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah; John B. McCuskey, West Virginia Attorney General, Office of the West Virginia Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia; Steve Montenegro, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, Phoenix, 10 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ Arizona; Warren Peterson, President of the Arizona Senate, Phoenix, Arizona; for Amicus Curiae Idaho, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the Arizona Legislature. OPINION OWENS, Circuit Judge: The State of Hawaii appeals from a 2021 injunction that blocked the implementation of its firearm licensing regime on Second Amendment grounds. After the injunction was entered, the Supreme Court issued New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), which outlined how courts should analyze “shall-issue” regimes like Hawaii’s. With the benefit of Bruen’s guidance, we hold that Hawaii’s shall-issue regime comports with the Second Amendment, and we reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND A. Hawaii’s Shall-Issue Firearm Regulation Regime Like most States, Hawaii is a so-called “shall-issue” jurisdiction for firearm permits. See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-2(a)–(e) (mandating that authorities “shall issue” firearm permits to applicants who satisfy specified criteria). As long as an applicant satisfies certain requirements, they may obtain a firearm—Hawaii does not retain any discretion to block their efforts. See id. § 134-2. These requirements are “narrow, objective, and definite.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 11 n.9 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969)). This differs from a “may-issue” regime, where the State “retains some discretion in deciding whether to issue a firearm license to an applicant.” Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Moore, 116 F.4th 211, 216 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1049 (2025) (comparing “may-issue” with “shall-issue” licensing schemes). As part of its shall-issue regime, Hawaii requires an applicant to provide, among other things, their fingerprints, social security number, and mental health history to the police before obtaining a firearms permit. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-2(b). These requirements, which are commonplace in shall-issue jurisdictions, are not challenged here. However, as part of its shall-issue regime, Hawaii has two unique requirements that are at issue. The first requirement provides: “Permits issued to acquire any pistol or revolver shall be void unless used within thirty days after the date of issue.” Id. § 134-2(e). And if the permit becomes void, the applicant must restart the permitting process. See id. The second requirement comes into play once the applicant has obtained the firearm. After completing a form with information about the firearm (such as its caliber, serial number, and manufacturer), one must bring the firearm to a police station for inspection in certain circumstances. Id. § 134-3(b)–(c). B. This Litigation Todd Yukutake and David Kikukawa (“Plaintiffs”), residents of Honolulu County, challenged these laws in 12 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ federal court.1 As for § 134-2(e), they alleged that although Yukutake received the necessary permit for a handgun, he was unable to obtain the firearm within the governing time limit and thus had to initiate a new application. As for § 134- 3, Plaintiffs contended that requiring them to bring their firearms to a police station for inspection forces them to take time off from work and wastes the time of both the registrant and the police. Accordingly, Plaintiffs alleged that § 134- 2(e) and § 134-3 violated their Second Amendment rights. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In August 2021, the district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs. See Yukutake v. Conners, 554 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1090 (D. Haw. 2021). The court, applying intermediate scrutiny under then-applicable circuit precedent, facially 1 Plaintiffs challenged the prior versions of § 134-2(e) and § 134-3(c), but the controversy remains live. Under the prior version of § 134-2(e), the validity period for a handgun acquisition permit was ten rather than thirty days. And under the prior version of § 134-3, virtually all firearms acquired pursuant to § 134-2 were subject to an in-person inspection requirement at registration. Now, that requirement is limited to firearms acquired through private party transfers, certain self-manufactured or three-dimensional-printed firearms, and firearms brought into Hawaii from another jurisdiction. See id. § 134-3(a)–(c). During this litigation, the State contended that these amendments mooted the case, and the three-judge panel disagreed. See Yukutake v. Lopez, 130 F.4th 1077, 1082–84 (9th Cir. 2025), vacated, 144 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2025). We continue to hold that the controversy remains live, as the amended provisions remain sufficiently similar to the prior versions that the alleged constitutional defects have not been eliminated. See Teter v. Lopez, 125 F.4th 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (holding that an amendment to a statutory provision does not moot a challenge to that provision if the amended provision is “substantially similar” to the original provision regarding the alleged constitutional defect (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc))).  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 13 invalidated both requirements. Id. at 1080 & n.6. The court concluded that there was no reasonable fit between the law’s stated objective of promoting public safety and the ten-day permit use period imposed by § 134-2(e). Id. at 1086. The court similarly held that § 134-3’s in-person inspection and registration requirements did not survive intermediate scrutiny. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of both provisions. Id. at 1090–91.2 Nine months later, in Bruen, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the then-existing framework for evaluating Second Amendment claims in favor of a history and tradition test. See 597 U.S. at 17–24. As detailed infra, Bruen instructs courts to engage in a two-step inquiry: First, does the Second Amendment’s plain text cover the plaintiff’s conduct? And second, if so, is the legislation at issue consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation? Id. at 24. Yet in a footnote, the Bruen Court included an apparent carve-out to this test: objective, non-abusive “shall-issue” licensing regimes are presumptively constitutional. Id. at 38 n.9. At odds with every other circuit court to analyze shall- issue laws after Bruen, a divided three-judge panel of this court held that Hawaii’s shall-issue regime is unconstitutional. See Yukutake, 130 F.4th at 1104. The majority concluded that the acquisition of firearms is conduct protected by the Second Amendment’s plain text because the right to keep and bear arms necessarily includes 2 In a subsequent September 2021 order, the district court clarified that the permit-use period requirement and the in-person inspection and registration requirement were severable from the rest of the provisions, and that the court had invalidated neither § 134-2 nor § 134-3 entirely. Yukutake v. Connors, 2021 WL 4342320, at *1 (D. Haw. 2021). 14 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ the right to acquire them. See id. at 1092. In the majority’s view, Hawaii’s laws did not pass constitutional muster under Bruen footnote 9. Id. at 1096–98. The panel therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment and remanded for revision of the injunction in light of Hawaii’s intervening statutory amendments. Id. at 1104. Drawing parallels to permitting systems in the First Amendment context, Judge Collins, writing only for himself, reasoned that the challenged Hawaii laws were insufficiently tailored and therefore abusive. Id. at 1095–99. Judge Lee concurred in full except for Judge Collins’s discussion of Bruen footnote 9. Id. at 1104–08 (Lee, J., concurring). In his view, the case could be resolved solely through Bruen’s text-and-history methodology, as Hawaii failed to identify a sufficient historical analogue for the challenged restrictions. Id. at 1108 (Lee. J., concurring). He cautioned against reading Bruen footnote 9 to authorize any form of means-end scrutiny. Id. Judge Bea dissented. Id. at 1108 (Bea, J., dissenting). He maintained that the acquisition of a firearm is not itself conduct that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects. Id. at 1109 (Bea, J., dissenting). In his view, the challenged provisions were merely ancillary regulations governing the manner of obtaining firearms. Id. at 1109, 1116 (Bea, J., dissenting). He would have reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the injunction. Id. at 1110 (Bea, J., dissenting). Our court granted rehearing en banc. See Yukutake, 144 F.4th at 1119.  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 15 II. DISCUSSION When considering a Second Amendment challenge to firearm laws, courts generally begin with three modern Supreme Court decisions: District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Bruen, 597 U.S. 1; and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). In Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, regardless of militia service.3 See 554 U.S. at 595. Fourteen years later, Bruen established the two-step framework—focused on text, history, and tradition—for evaluating firearm regulations under the Second Amendment. See 597 U.S. at 24. And in Rahimi, the Court clarified that Bruen does not require a rigid search for historical twins and instead permits a more nuanced analogical inquiry, which “involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” 602 U.S. at 692. So what does Bruen’s two-step inquiry require? At step one, a court asks whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. If so, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and the government bears the burden at step two of demonstrating that its regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.4 Id. If the 3 McDonald v. City of Chicago held that the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 4 The proper time frame at which to consider the Nation’s history and tradition remains unclear, as the Court has repeatedly declined to decide “whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual right” at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, in 16 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ government cannot make that showing at step two, the challenged law is unconstitutional. Id. In Bruen, the Court struck down New York’s public carry licensing requirement because the State had failed at step two to demonstrate that its discretionary licensing regime was consistent with the Nation’s history and tradition. 597 U.S. at 70–71. In Rahimi, the Court upheld a federal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders from possessing a firearm after a judicial finding that they pose a credible threat. 602 U.S. at 698–700. The Court concluded at step two that the law was sufficiently analogous to historical provisions that permitted the disarmament of dangerous individuals. Id. Yet the Court in Bruen took care to distinguish shall- issue from may-issue regimes. May-issue regimes, like the handgun permit regulation at issue in Bruen, are constitutionally suspect because they grant authorities the discretion to deny licenses and permits even after applicants satisfy objective criteria. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13–14. Shall-issue laws, by contrast, generally require applicants to satisfy only objective criteria, like background checks and firearm safety training, and are designed to ensure that those bearing arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. at 38 n.9 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). Unless a shall-issue law is “put toward abusive ends,” such as through “lengthy” processing delays or “exorbitant fees” that effectively deny 1791, or at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, in 1868. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 37–38 (declining to address the issue because “the public understanding of the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868 was, for all relevant purposes, the same with respect to public carry”); accord United States v. Hemani, 146 S. Ct. 1677, 1687 n.3 (2026).  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 17 ordinary citizens their Second Amendment rights, it is presumptively constitutional. Id. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, underscored this point in his concurrence. See id. at 79–80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). He emphasized that Bruen addressed only discretionary, may-issue licensing systems and did not call into question the constitutionality of objective, shall-issue regimes that employ background checks, fingerprinting, mental-health record checks, and firearm training requirements. Id. In his view, those systems remain constitutionally permissible so long as they operate as “objective licensing requirements” without granting “open-ended discretion to licensing officials.” Id. at 80. In its subsequent jurisprudence featuring shall-issue regimes, the Court has not altered its “abusive ends” test. See Wolford v. Lopez, 146 S. Ct. 2032 (2026). Nor has the Court further clarified how to approach shall-issue laws. Two years after Bruen, Rahimi demonstrated that substantial disagreement remains about what, precisely, Bruen requires courts to do. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691 (“[S]ome courts have misunderstood the methodology of our recent Second Amendment cases.”); see id. at 743 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that after Bruen, “confusion plagu[es] the lower courts” (bracketing in original)). The Court produced seven separate opinions, which reflected different views concerning the proper level of generality for historical analogues, the role of historical evidence, and the extent to which courts may reason by analogy. See, e.g., id. at 703–04 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (urging that courts consider whether “the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition”) (emphasis added); id. at 709 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing for a more precise analogue). And 18 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ Rahimi offered no guidance on how lower courts should relate Bruen footnote 9 to the two-step analysis. This Second Amendment confusion, as detailed in Rahimi, has spread to circuit courts that have analyzed similar shall-issue laws. As the Tenth Circuit put it, “it is difficult to forecast how the Supreme Court would decide the issue, given the apparent tension between the Bruen two-step framework and the safe harbor list of presumptively lawful regulations.” Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96, 120 (10th Cir. 2024). Yet despite a wide range of methodological approaches to assessing shall-issue regulations, the circuit courts have converged on one unifying principle: non-abusive, shall-issue laws comport with the Second Amendment. The First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have resolved Bruen footnote 9’s indeterminacy largely at step one. The First Circuit, when reviewing Maine’s seventy-two-hour cooling-off period, held that under Bruen, shall-issue regulations “do[] not regulate conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment” and are “presumptively constitutional unless a challenger could show that they were abusive toward Second Amendment rights.” Beckwith v. Frey, 171 F.4th 560, 570–71 (1st Cir. 2026). When reviewing Maryland’s firearm laws, the Fourth Circuit held that “non-discretionary ‘shall-issue’ licensing laws are presumptively constitutional and generally do not ‘infringe’ the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms under step one of the Bruen framework.” Md. Shall Issue, 116 F.4th at 222; see id. at 224 (noting that to skip to Bruen step two when analyzing shall-issue laws would “improperly treat[] the plain text inquiry as a meaningless check-the-box exercise”); see also United States v. Speed, 175 F.4th 272, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2026) (upholding a federal regulation on  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 19 silencers as a presumptively constitutional shall-issue licensing law). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s shall-issue scheme because “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the sale and purchase of arms do not implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.” Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 120. By contrast, the Second Circuit proceeded through the history and tradition inquiry at Bruen step two when evaluating New York’s post-Bruen, shall-issue licensing provisions. See Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941, 998 (2d Cir. 2024). The court concluded that the provisions were constitutionally permissible by drawing an analogy to pre- modern surety laws. Id. The Fifth Circuit, in rejecting a challenge to federal background check procedures for dealer transfers, did not focus on a particular step in the Bruen framework. See McRorey v. Garland, 99 F.4th 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2024). It instead emphasized that Bruen’s footnote 9 preserves the constitutionality of objective conditions on commercial firearm sales and background checks that are designed to ensure that firearms are acquired by law-abiding citizens, and did not engage in a full analysis of steps one and two. Id.; see also United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331, 338– 39 (5th Cir. 2025) (upholding the suppressor licensing regime of the National Firearms Act (“NFA”) as a shall-issue law under Bruen footnote 9). But see United States v. Comeaux, 179 F.4th 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2026) (holding that the plaintiff’s challenge to the NFA’s silencer regime failed at Bruen’s first step, as the challenged provision is a presumptively constitutional, non-abusive, shall-issue law under footnote 9, so no step two historical analysis was required). Similarly, we have upheld the NFA’s regulation 20 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ of silencers as presumptively constitutional under Bruen footnote 9. See United States v. DeBorba, 177 F.4th 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2026). In DeBorba, we analyzed the Bruen footnote 9 presumption of constitutionality as analytically distinct from the step one and step two inquiry. Id. Despite these cases’ different paths, they share a common destination: non-discretionary, objective, and non- abusive shall-issue laws, especially those involving background checks, firearm training, fingerprinting, or other ordinary eligibility requirements, pass constitutional muster under Bruen footnote 9. Today, we follow the lead of the McRorey, Petersen, and DeBorba courts. When analyzing a ten-day background check, the Fifth Circuit in McRorey did not undertake an extensive discussion of historical analogues and the like. McRorey, 99 F.4th at 837. This approach is prudent, as Bruen footnote 9 never asked the lower courts to subject shall-issue regulations to history-and-tradition analyses. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit took the Supreme Court at its word that a shall-issue regime with background checks is presumptively lawful. Id. at 836–39. The court then addressed whether the plaintiffs had rebutted that presumption of lawfulness by showing that the regulations had been “put towards abusive ends.” Id. at 839–40. And because the plaintiffs could not make that showing, the Fifth Circuit rejected the challenge. Id. Ultimately, we need not decide the bedeviling question of whether this is a step one or step two case under Bruen. We also need not—and should not—chart the entire constellation of possible shall-issue laws that one could draft or challenge. As the Fifth Circuit did in McRorey, we instead ask whether Plaintiffs have shown that the two  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 21 presumptively lawful requirements in question—the thirty- day purchase provision and the police station inspection requirement—have been put toward “abusive ends” that would effectively “deny ordinary citizens” their Second Amendment rights. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9. Plaintiffs in this case have failed to make that showing. Cf. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 116 F.4th at 227–29 (holding that Maryland’s comprehensive background check regime is permissible under Bruen and not abusive); McRorey, 99 F.4th at 836, 839–40 (noting that standard requirements such as background checks, “especially when not at all lengthy,” are not abusive for purposes of Bruen footnote 9); Peterson, 161 F.4th at 340–42 (holding that no evidence indicated that the challenged NFA provision was abusive as applied to the plaintiff). And while certain background checks, firearms safety courses, lengthy wait times, exorbitant fees, or other components of a shall-issue regime could trigger the Second Amendment’s protections, nothing in Plaintiffs’ Complaint suggests that either the thirty-day restriction or the police station inspection requirement crosses that line. At most, the provisions impose only modest, procedural burdens. They require compliance with a reasonable deadline and, for firearms that fall into the categories set out in § 134-3(a)– (c), see supra note 1, a brief administrative visit to verify basic information. They do not materially impede Plaintiffs from acquiring firearms. Even in light of Hawaii’s distinctive tradition of heightened firearm regulation, which the Supreme Court has viewed with skepticism, see Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2040, 2046, the requirements at issue here are not abusive. Cases like this one threaten to unleash countless, consequential questions about our Second Amendment jurisprudence. For example: What does “infringe” mean for 22 YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ Second Amendment purposes? Or “meaningfully constrain”? See, e.g., B&L Prods., Inc. v. Newsom, 104 F.4th 108, 118–19 (9th Cir. 2024). Those important inquiries will await another day. Judge R. Nelson’s dissent—which acknowledges that our holding is consistent with other courts applying Bruen—thoughtfully presents a different take on footnote 9. And Judge VanDyke shares, as only he can, his Second Amendment worldview. Like the vast majority of courts reviewing footnote 9, we respectfully disagree with both of them. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will make clear which analysis it thinks is correct. REVERSED AND REMANDED. R. NELSON, Circuit Judge, with whom BRESS and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, join, and with whom BADE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, join except as to Part I–C, dissenting: The majority offers a narrow analysis of the Second Amendment precedent on shall-issue licensing regimes. It correctly acknowledges that “certain background checks, firearms safety courses, lengthy wait times, exorbitant fees, or other components of a shall-issue regime could trigger the Second Amendment’s protections.” Maj. Op. 21. But the majority incorrectly holds that footnote 9 of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), creates a “carve-out” or “safe harbor” from Second Amendment scrutiny, and is thus analytically distinct from Bruen’s framework. Maj. Op. 13, 18. Footnote 9 does not say that all objective regulations placed within a “shall- issue” licensing regime are “presumptively constitutional.”  YUKUTAKE V. LOPEZ 23 Id. at 13. It only addresses “public carry” regulations not at issue here. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9. And it does not shift to the citizen the burden to prove that a law governing protected conduct has been “put toward abusive ends.” Maj. Op. 17 (cleaned up). That interpretation violates Bruen’s clear command that it is the government’s burden to show that restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition.” 597 U.S. at 24. Instead, footnote 9 described non-abusive regulations to ensure that only “law-abiding, responsible citizens” were carrying handguns outside the home, preserved challenges when a permitting system denies citizens their right to carry, and concerned only longstanding licensing regimes. Id. at 38 n.9 (citation omitted). Hawaii’s challenged provisions are something else. Hawaii requires purchasers of handguns to obtain a handgun-acquisition permit that is void unless the permittee completes the purchase within 30 days, and it requires persons acquiring certain firearms to bring them to a police station for physical inspection within five days of acquisition. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 134-2(e), 134-3(c). Neither regulation has anything to do with determining whether applicants are “‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’” eligible for licenses to “exercis[e] their Second Amendment right to public carry.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). Indeed, the challenged laws operate after the applicant has completed a background check, firearms training course, and myriad other requirements—i.e., after he has proven himsel