Full Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JASON S. BROWN, No. 25-730 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cv-00500- MMD-CSD v. Doctor KIM ADAMSON; Doctor DANA MARKS, OPINION Defendants - Appellants, CARROLL, First Name Unknown, Doctor, CLARA, First Name Unknown, Nurse, FRALEY, First Name Unknown, Coach, HARLOW, First Name Unknown, PRESTON, First Name Unknown, Lt., Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 15, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona 2 BROWN V. ADAMSON Filed November 20, 2026 Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ERIC C. TUNG, Circuit Judges, and YVETTE KANE, District Judge.* Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. SUMMARY** Qualified Immunity The panel reversed the district court’s denial, on summary judgment, of qualified immunity to two prison doctors, Drs. Kim Adamson and Dana Marks, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by Jason Brown, an inmate incarcerated by the Nevada Department of Corrections, alleging that they showed deliberate indifference to Brown in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In June 2018, Brown was hit on the left side of his face with a softball, resulting in a left zygomatic fracture that required surgery. Following his injury and recovery from surgery, Brown received medical care from Drs. Adamson and Marks for medical complaints, some of which may have related back to his head injury. Despite continued complaints, Brown was not referred to a specialist. * The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. BROWN V. ADAMSON 3 Brown brought this action in 2021, asserting that Drs. Adamson and Marks ineffectively treated him for his medical complaints. The district court denied qualified immunity to the doctors by relying on Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982), as having clearly established the law to require prisons doctors to be able to treat medical problems or to refer prisoners to others who can. The panel held Drs. Adamson and Marks were entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law defining the point at which a delay in making an outside medical referral constitutes deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. None of the cases relied upon by Brown are sufficient to meet the demanding standard of factual comparison required by Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 568 (2026), to clearly establish the law. Therefore, Drs. Adamson and Marks were not on notice as to the circumstances under which a failure to enact a referral for outside treatment for an inmate constitutes deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment and are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Drs. Adamson and Marks. 4 BROWN V. ADAMSON COUNSEL Kory J. Koerperich (argued), Grace Willard, and Meng Zhong, Womble Bond Dickinson LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellee. Chris Davis (argued), Senior Deputy Attorney General; Leo T. Hendges, Deputy Attorney General; Aaron D. Ford, Nevada Attorney General; Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Defendants-Appellants. OPINION M. SMITH, Circuit Judge: Jason Brown, an inmate incarcerated by the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) brought a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two prison doctors, alleging that they showed deliberate indifference to Brown in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that defendants Drs. Kim Adamson and Dana Marks were not entitled to qualified immunity and that there were genuine disputes of material fact on the deliberate indifference claim sufficient to proceed to trial. Because we find that there is not clearly established law of sufficient factual similarity to this case, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity with respect to both Drs. Adamson and Marks. I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review Although an order denying summary judgment is not usually immediately appealable, orders denying qualified BROWN V. ADAMSON 5 immunity fall under the collateral order doctrine exception to that baseline rule. See Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021). However, the scope of our review is limited to the legal determination of whether the defendants’ conduct violated the Constitution and whether the law at issue was clearly established. The panel does not have jurisdiction over purely factual disputes concerning “whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record was sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 730–31 (internal quotation marks omitted). Review of the district court’s denial of summary judgment is de novo, “consider[ing] all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Williams v. City of Sparks, 112 F.4th 635, 642 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2017)). II. Factual Background In June 2018, while walking the track at the Lovelock Correctional Center, Brown was hit on the left side of his face with a softball. Staff at the prison’s infirmary determined that Brown had “swelling & redness to L [Left] temple/jaw area” and could not open or close his mouth. Brown was transported to a nearby hospital, where he underwent a CT scan that revealed a left zygomatic fracture. The doctor at the hospital referred Brown to a plastic surgeon, who recommended surgery to repair the fracture. Dr. Adamson requested and received approval authorizing the surgery, which occurred a day later. Between his injury and the surgery, Brown experienced head pain and nausea and was treated with pain relievers and Zofran, an anti- emetic. 6 BROWN V. ADAMSON After his initial recovery from the surgery, Brown continued to receive regular medical care from Dr. Adamson until he left NDOC in March 2020. Brown alleges that some of his medical complaints over this period may have related back to his head injury and were ineffectively treated by Dr. Adamson, and later, by Dr. Marks, who replaced Dr. Adamson when he retired. In January 2019, Dr. Adamson prescribed a continuing dose of Indocin, a prescription NSAID pain reliever frequently used in the treatment of arthritis that Brown had begun taking in July 2018 as part of his recovery from surgery. In February 2019, Brown complained to Dr. Adamson of nasal allergies, and Dr. Adamson in turn prescribed allergy medication. In 2020, Brown filed multiple kites (requests for medical care) complaining of persistent pain, vertigo, nausea, and other symptoms and asking to see the doctor. According to Brown, Dr. Adamson indicated that despite Brown’s continued complaints, “there was nothing else that he could do” and to “continue taking the medication he prescribed.” In March 2020, Dr. Adamson left NDOC and defendant Dr. Marks replaced him in May 2020. Around the same time, all medical specialists left NDOC. Thereafter, determining whether a prisoner needed specialized care was assigned to the Utilization Review Committee (URC), on which both Dr. Adamson and Dr. Marks served. Meanwhile, Brown’s symptoms continued. In May 2020, Brown complained to Dr. Marks of dizziness, weakness, and no energy. Dr. Marks diagnosed Brown with weakness and vertigo, leading to the prescription of Antivert. Brown sought medical care again in June of that year, similarly complaining of vertigo, nausea, and vomiting. After various visits in June 2020 with medical staff, Dr. Marks requested additional labs and made a note that Brown BROWN V. ADAMSON 7 should be seen by an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) specialist. In July 2020, Brown followed up asking for his blood work results and indicated that his “vision [had] gone from blurred to double vision” and that he was “seeing floaters when [he went] outside.” In August 2020, Brown continued to have follow-up appointments with Dr. Marks and underwent additional testing to attempt to diagnose his symptoms, including a spinal tap. However, Dr. Marks did not discuss the results of the spinal tap with Brown or otherwise indicate that he had made progress on diagnosing or treating Brown’s symptoms. In November 2020, Dr. Marks renewed Brown’s prescription for an anti-nausea medication, but there is no indication in the record that he took any other steps at this time. Dr. Marks saw Brown regarding several other medical issues over the course of the intervening year without raising the results of his testing or following up on Brown’s head pain and other symptoms. In May 2021, Brown again asked to see the doctor regarding his symptoms, including vertigo, loss of eyesight, tremors, numbness, headaches, and nausea. His medical kite indicates that he was not seen regarding these complaints until November and December 2021, at which point he continued to complain of pain in his head, “visual spots,” and fatigue. Dr. Marks’ notes from this visit reiterate that Brown needed to see an ENT and additionally recommended he see “neuro.” However, there is no indication in the record that Dr. Marks raised Brown’s referral needs to the URC in June 2020 or December 2021, even though he was a member of that committee. Also in December 2021, Brown filed the instant suit pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. During preliminary proceedings, Brown continued to complain of worsening symptoms. Brown moved for a preliminary injunction in 8 BROWN V. ADAMSON January 2023, which the district court granted in part, directing that defendants ensure that Brown was seen by a neurologist and an ENT. Dr. Marks ultimately brought the referral request to the URC around May 2023, after the injunction issued. Brown was seen by both a neurologist and an ENT in June 2023. These referrals resulted in diagnoses of Brown’s conditions and amended courses of treatment based on those diagnoses. The neurologist diagnosed Brown with chronic migraines and pulsatile headaches. He prescribed Imitrex, a migraine medication, and ordered a CT scan of Brown’s head. The ENT doctor diagnosed Brown with vertigo, aura migraines, and pulsatile tinnitus, and recommended an audiogram and VNG (videonystagmography). This case comes before us now after defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity and administrative exhaustion grounds. The district court partially granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment but denied the motion as to Drs. Adamson and Marks, determining that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Drs. Adamson and Marks were deliberately indifferent to Brown’s medical needs. Drs. Adamson and Marks timely appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. III. Legal Background a. Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Williams, 112 F.4th at 642 (citation omitted). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two BROWN V. ADAMSON 9 prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that there is a high bar to a court’s finding that the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was clearly established such as to support a denial of qualified immunity. See generally Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 568 (2026). For a right to be clearly established, “courts generally ‘need to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated’ the Constitution.” Zorn, 607 U.S. at 572 (quoting Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43 (2019)). This prior case “must define the right with a ‘high degree of specificity,’ so that ‘every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.’” Id. (citation omitted). Courts must grant qualified immunity “unless [the officers] could have ‘read’ the relevant precedent beforehand and ‘know[n]’ that it proscribed their specific conduct.” Id. (quoting City and Cnty. Of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 616 (2015)). In Zorn, the Supreme Court warned that “[p]rinciples stated generally . . . do not suffice” to provide such warning. Id. In that case, the Court reversed a denial of qualified immunity to an officer who used a rear wristlock in arresting a nonviolent protestor participating in a sit-in at the Vermont state capitol, who had refused to stand up when asked to do so by the arresting officer. Id. at 570–71. The Court held that Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) lacked the specificity necessary to clearly 10 BROWN V. ADAMSON establish the law despite close factual similarities between the cases: The Second Circuit . . . read[] Amnesty America to establish the general principle “that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques—such as a rear-wristlock—on a protestor who is passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.” But that principle . . . lacks the “high degree of specificity” needed to make it “clear” to officers which actions violate the law. Id. at 573–74 (cleaned up). The Court reasoned that Amnesty America “does not ‘obviously resolve’ whether using a rear wristlock to move a noncompliant protester after repeated warnings violates the Fourth Amendment, as it fails to specify which circumstances make the use of force ‘gratuitous.’” Id. at 574 (citation omitted). Prior qualified immunity caselaw has made clear that there need not be “a case directly on point” in order to clearly establish the law. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). However, in light of Zorn, we are mindful of the requisite high degrees of both (1) specificity in the established formulation of the law and (2) similarity between the facts of the prior and instant cases in order to clearly establish the law. b. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Difference Claims Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims, like the one Brown asserts here, have both an objective and subjective component. First, the “inmate must allege that the deprivation was, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2023) BROWN V. ADAMSON 11 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). This requires a showing of “a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). “Indications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992)). Second, “[t]he inmate must also allege that the defendant official acted, subjectively, with ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Hampton, 83 F.4th at 766 (citation omitted). This subjective inquiry requires “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). This indifference “must be substantial,” not mere “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice.” Id. at 1082 (citations omitted). And “mere delay” of care, “without more,” is insufficient to show deliberate indifference. Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). However, if out-of-prison physicians are required for treatment, “[s]uch referrals” must be “reasonably speedy.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). 12 BROWN V. ADAMSON IV. Analysis We focus on the second part of the qualified immunity inquiry first to consider whether there was sufficiently specific clearly established law to sustain a denial of qualified immunity under Zorn. The district court denied qualified immunity by relying on Hoptowit as having clearly established the law to require “prisons doctors ‘[to] be able to treat medical problems or to refer prisoners to others who can.’” 682 F.2d at 1253. Additionally, on appeal Brown argues that existing circuit precedent establishes that prison officials “violate the [C]onstitution when they persist in a treatment known to be ineffective,” Stewart v. Aranas, 32 F.4th 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022), that “prison medical staff must refer prisoners to specialists when they cannot treat them,” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253, and that “ignoring specialist recommendations for years raises a jury question on deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). However, none of these cases establish the law with a sufficient degree of specificity such that either Dr. Adamson or Dr. Marks “could have ‘read’ the relevant precedent beforehand and ‘known’ that it proscribed their specific conduct.” Zorn, 607 U.S. at 572. Hoptowit arose in the context of a class action lawsuit regarding conditions in a Washington state prison and only cursorily addressed the necessity of a proper medical referral mechanism as part of a “system of ready access to adequate medical care.” 682 F.2d at 1253. Hoptowit did not opine on the specific referral responsibilities of prison medical providers in the event multiple courses of treatment prove ineffective. This precedent standing alone is therefore not detailed enough to establish the “high degree of specificity” BROWN V. ADAMSON 13 necessary so that “every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Zorn, 607 U.S. at 572 (citation omitted). Instead, Hoptowit merely articulates the general principle that when medical care is outside the expertise of prison staff, they should seek outside specialists. 682 F.2d at 1253. From a reading of Hoptowit, Drs. Adamson and Marks could not have ascertained particularized guidance as to when internal care no longer sufficed, triggering their legal obligation to refer Brown for external care. Stewart is more specific but similarly inapposite. That case concerned an inmate whose complaints of pain and difficulty urinating were treated with generic medication and a “wait and see” plan until intake staff at a different prison initiated emergency medical treatment upon his arrival. Stewart, 32 F.4th at 1194–95. Unlike in Brown’s case, where Drs. Adamson and Marks developed a plan to further investigate his medical complaints but failed to follow through, the officials who treated Stewart “never deviated from their ‘wait and see’ treatment plan,” and there was no evidence in the record to indicate that they considered doing so, even as his condition “sharply deteriorated” over several years. Id. at 1195. Stewart additionally suffered medical harms that were directly attributable to the delayed care in a clearer manner than Brown, including a prostatectomy that resulted in lingering pain, erectile dysfunction, persistent urine build-up, and stage 3 kidney disease. See id. While the record indicates that Brown’s symptoms were chronic in nature and Drs. Adamson and Marks both struggled to find adequate relief for him, there is no indication that the only possible cause of such symptoms was a failure to adequately treat and follow-up on his head injury. Indeed, the record reflects that they both considered a variety of potential 14 BROWN V. ADAMSON diagnoses and engaged various diagnostic tools, unlike the physicians in Stewart. Stewart therefore fails to adequately establish the law for purposes of qualified immunity when the treating physicians here—Drs. Adamson and Marks— tried several medical treatments and approaches in response to Brown’s conditions. Finally, Snow also fails to articulate a specific-enough principle for qualified immunity purposes. In Snow, NDOC medical staff initially failed to note the plaintiff prisoner’s need for a referral to an orthopedic surgeon, despite his excruciating hip and leg pain. 681 F.3d at 982–83. Once the necessary referral was made, the URC denied outside doctors’ recommendations for surgery to replace his hips three times, even as his condition substantially worsened, including two different denials of care after an outside doctor described the situation as “potentially life-threatening.” Id. at 983–84. There is no indication on the record that Drs. Adamson or Marks failed to act on similarly extreme indicators of medical emergency in the present case. Additionally, there is no record evidence suggesting that Drs. Adamson or Marks ignored the recommendations of outside medical specialists once they were sought. In fact, the record shows that the URC immediately approved the emergency surgery that Brown needed. Additionally, the record does not indicate that the URC ever denied any referral request for Brown to receive outside care, further distinguishing this case from Snow. Although the delay in making the referral to an outside medical provider was more protracted in this case than in Snow, Brown does not rely on Snow to clearly establish the law regarding the permitted length of delay in pursuing referrals. Rather, Brown asserts that Snow establishes the law regarding implementing the BROWN V. ADAMSON 15 treatment plan recommended by outside providers. Such law is not applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, neither Snow, Stewart, nor Hoptowit are sufficient to meet the demanding standard of factual comparison required by Zorn to clearly establish the law. A reasonable prison medical provider surveying the case law here cannot ascertain the specific right to which Brown is entitled. Drs. Adamson and Marks were therefore not on notice as to the circumstances under which a failure to enact a referral for outside treatment for an inmate constitutes deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment and are entitled to qualified immunity. CONCLUSION Because there is no clearly established law defining the point at which a delay in making an outside medical referral constitutes deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Drs. Adamson and Marks. REVERSED AND REMANDED.