Brown v. Adamson
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-730
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASON S. BROWN, No. 25-730
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee,
3:21-cv-00500-
MMD-CSD
v.
Doctor KIM ADAMSON; Doctor
DANA MARKS, OPINION
Defendants - Appellants,
CARROLL, First Name Unknown,
Doctor, CLARA, First Name
Unknown, Nurse, FRALEY, First
Name Unknown, Coach, HARLOW,
First Name Unknown, PRESTON,
First Name Unknown, Lt.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 15, 2026
Phoenix, Arizona
2 BROWN V. ADAMSON
Filed November 20, 2026
Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and ERIC C. TUNG,
Circuit Judges, and YVETTE KANE, District Judge.*
Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
SUMMARY**
Qualified Immunity
The panel reversed the district court’s denial, on
summary judgment, of qualified immunity to two prison
doctors, Drs. Kim Adamson and Dana Marks, in a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action brought by Jason Brown, an inmate
incarcerated by the Nevada Department of Corrections,
alleging that they showed deliberate indifference to Brown
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In June 2018, Brown was hit on the left side of his face
with a softball, resulting in a left zygomatic fracture that
required surgery. Following his injury and recovery from
surgery, Brown received medical care from Drs. Adamson
and Marks for medical complaints, some of which may have
related back to his head injury. Despite continued
complaints, Brown was not referred to a specialist.
*
The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
BROWN V. ADAMSON 3
Brown brought this action in 2021, asserting that Drs.
Adamson and Marks ineffectively treated him for his
medical complaints. The district court denied qualified
immunity to the doctors by relying on Hoptowit v. Ray, 682
F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982), as having clearly established the
law to require prisons doctors to be able to treat medical
problems or to refer prisoners to others who can.
The panel held Drs. Adamson and Marks were entitled
to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established
law defining the point at which a delay in making an outside
medical referral constitutes deliberate indifference under the
Eighth Amendment. None of the cases relied upon by
Brown are sufficient to meet the demanding standard of
factual comparison required by Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 568
(2026), to clearly establish the law. Therefore, Drs.
Adamson and Marks were not on notice as to the
circumstances under which a failure to enact a referral for
outside treatment for an inmate constitutes deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment and are entitled
to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s
denial of summary judgment and remanded with instructions
to grant qualified immunity to Drs. Adamson and Marks.
4 BROWN V. ADAMSON
COUNSEL
Kory J. Koerperich (argued), Grace Willard, and Meng
Zhong, Womble Bond Dickinson LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Chris Davis (argued), Senior Deputy Attorney General; Leo
T. Hendges, Deputy Attorney General; Aaron D. Ford,
Nevada Attorney General; Office of the Nevada Attorney
General, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Jason Brown, an inmate incarcerated by the Nevada
Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) brought a claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two prison doctors,
alleging that they showed deliberate indifference to Brown
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court
denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding
that defendants Drs. Kim Adamson and Dana Marks were
not entitled to qualified immunity and that there were
genuine disputes of material fact on the deliberate
indifference claim sufficient to proceed to trial. Because we
find that there is not clearly established law of sufficient
factual similarity to this case, we reverse the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity with respect to both Drs.
Adamson and Marks.
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Although an order denying summary judgment is not
usually immediately appealable, orders denying qualified
BROWN V. ADAMSON 5
immunity fall under the collateral order doctrine exception
to that baseline rule. See Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985
F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021). However, the scope of our
review is limited to the legal determination of whether the
defendants’ conduct violated the Constitution and whether
the law at issue was clearly established. The panel does not
have jurisdiction over purely factual disputes concerning
“whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record was
sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Id. at
730–31 (internal quotation marks omitted). Review of the
district court’s denial of summary judgment is de novo,
“consider[ing] all disputed facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.” Williams v. City of Sparks, 112
F.4th 635, 642 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Isayeva v.
Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir.
2017)).
II. Factual Background
In June 2018, while walking the track at the Lovelock
Correctional Center, Brown was hit on the left side of his
face with a softball. Staff at the prison’s infirmary
determined that Brown had “swelling & redness to L [Left]
temple/jaw area” and could not open or close his mouth.
Brown was transported to a nearby hospital, where he
underwent a CT scan that revealed a left zygomatic fracture.
The doctor at the hospital referred Brown to a plastic
surgeon, who recommended surgery to repair the fracture.
Dr. Adamson requested and received approval authorizing
the surgery, which occurred a day later. Between his injury
and the surgery, Brown experienced head pain and nausea
and was treated with pain relievers and Zofran, an anti-
emetic.
6 BROWN V. ADAMSON
After his initial recovery from the surgery, Brown
continued to receive regular medical care from Dr. Adamson
until he left NDOC in March 2020. Brown alleges that some
of his medical complaints over this period may have related
back to his head injury and were ineffectively treated by Dr.
Adamson, and later, by Dr. Marks, who replaced Dr.
Adamson when he retired. In January 2019, Dr. Adamson
prescribed a continuing dose of Indocin, a prescription
NSAID pain reliever frequently used in the treatment of
arthritis that Brown had begun taking in July 2018 as part of
his recovery from surgery. In February 2019, Brown
complained to Dr. Adamson of nasal allergies, and Dr.
Adamson in turn prescribed allergy medication. In 2020,
Brown filed multiple kites (requests for medical care)
complaining of persistent pain, vertigo, nausea, and other
symptoms and asking to see the doctor. According to
Brown, Dr. Adamson indicated that despite Brown’s
continued complaints, “there was nothing else that he could
do” and to “continue taking the medication he prescribed.”
In March 2020, Dr. Adamson left NDOC and defendant
Dr. Marks replaced him in May 2020. Around the same
time, all medical specialists left NDOC. Thereafter,
determining whether a prisoner needed specialized care was
assigned to the Utilization Review Committee (URC), on
which both Dr. Adamson and Dr. Marks served.
Meanwhile, Brown’s symptoms continued. In May
2020, Brown complained to Dr. Marks of dizziness,
weakness, and no energy. Dr. Marks diagnosed Brown with
weakness and vertigo, leading to the prescription of Antivert.
Brown sought medical care again in June of that year,
similarly complaining of vertigo, nausea, and vomiting.
After various visits in June 2020 with medical staff, Dr.
Marks requested additional labs and made a note that Brown
BROWN V. ADAMSON 7
should be seen by an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) specialist.
In July 2020, Brown followed up asking for his blood work
results and indicated that his “vision [had] gone from blurred
to double vision” and that he was “seeing floaters when [he
went] outside.” In August 2020, Brown continued to have
follow-up appointments with Dr. Marks and underwent
additional testing to attempt to diagnose his symptoms,
including a spinal tap. However, Dr. Marks did not discuss
the results of the spinal tap with Brown or otherwise indicate
that he had made progress on diagnosing or treating Brown’s
symptoms. In November 2020, Dr. Marks renewed Brown’s
prescription for an anti-nausea medication, but there is no
indication in the record that he took any other steps at this
time. Dr. Marks saw Brown regarding several other medical
issues over the course of the intervening year without raising
the results of his testing or following up on Brown’s head
pain and other symptoms.
In May 2021, Brown again asked to see the doctor
regarding his symptoms, including vertigo, loss of eyesight,
tremors, numbness, headaches, and nausea. His medical kite
indicates that he was not seen regarding these complaints
until November and December 2021, at which point he
continued to complain of pain in his head, “visual spots,”
and fatigue. Dr. Marks’ notes from this visit reiterate that
Brown needed to see an ENT and additionally recommended
he see “neuro.” However, there is no indication in the record
that Dr. Marks raised Brown’s referral needs to the URC in
June 2020 or December 2021, even though he was a member
of that committee.
Also in December 2021, Brown filed the instant suit pro
se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. During preliminary
proceedings, Brown continued to complain of worsening
symptoms. Brown moved for a preliminary injunction in
8 BROWN V. ADAMSON
January 2023, which the district court granted in part,
directing that defendants ensure that Brown was seen by a
neurologist and an ENT. Dr. Marks ultimately brought the
referral request to the URC around May 2023, after the
injunction issued. Brown was seen by both a neurologist and
an ENT in June 2023. These referrals resulted in diagnoses
of Brown’s conditions and amended courses of treatment
based on those diagnoses. The neurologist diagnosed Brown
with chronic migraines and pulsatile headaches. He
prescribed Imitrex, a migraine medication, and ordered a CT
scan of Brown’s head. The ENT doctor diagnosed Brown
with vertigo, aura migraines, and pulsatile tinnitus, and
recommended an audiogram and VNG
(videonystagmography).
This case comes before us now after defendants moved
for summary judgment on qualified immunity and
administrative exhaustion grounds. The district court
partially granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment
but denied the motion as to Drs. Adamson and Marks,
determining that there were genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether Drs. Adamson and Marks were
deliberately indifferent to Brown’s medical needs. Drs.
Adamson and Marks timely appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
III. Legal Background
a. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials from
liability “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their
conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Williams, 112
F.4th at 642 (citation omitted). Courts are “permitted to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two
BROWN V. ADAMSON 9
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009).
The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that there is
a high bar to a court’s finding that the unlawfulness of the
officer’s conduct was clearly established such as to support
a denial of qualified immunity. See generally Zorn v. Linton,
607 U.S. 568 (2026). For a right to be clearly established,
“courts generally ‘need to identify a case where an officer
acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have
violated’ the Constitution.” Zorn, 607 U.S. at 572 (quoting
Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43 (2019)). This prior
case “must define the right with a ‘high degree of
specificity,’ so that ‘every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks
to apply.’” Id. (citation omitted). Courts must grant
qualified immunity “unless [the officers] could have ‘read’
the relevant precedent beforehand and ‘know[n]’ that it
proscribed their specific conduct.” Id. (quoting City and
Cnty. Of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 616
(2015)).
In Zorn, the Supreme Court warned that “[p]rinciples
stated generally . . . do not suffice” to provide such warning.
Id. In that case, the Court reversed a denial of qualified
immunity to an officer who used a rear wristlock in arresting
a nonviolent protestor participating in a sit-in at the Vermont
state capitol, who had refused to stand up when asked to do
so by the arresting officer. Id. at 570–71. The Court held
that Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d
113 (2d Cir. 2004) lacked the specificity necessary to clearly
10 BROWN V. ADAMSON
establish the law despite close factual similarities between
the cases:
The Second Circuit . . . read[] Amnesty
America to establish the general principle
“that the gratuitous use of pain compliance
techniques—such as a rear-wristlock—on a
protestor who is passively resisting arrest
constitutes excessive force.” But that
principle . . . lacks the “high degree of
specificity” needed to make it “clear” to
officers which actions violate the law.
Id. at 573–74 (cleaned up). The Court reasoned that Amnesty
America “does not ‘obviously resolve’ whether using a rear
wristlock to move a noncompliant protester after repeated
warnings violates the Fourth Amendment, as it fails to
specify which circumstances make the use of force
‘gratuitous.’” Id. at 574 (citation omitted). Prior qualified
immunity caselaw has made clear that there need not be “a
case directly on point” in order to clearly establish the law.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). However, in light
of Zorn, we are mindful of the requisite high degrees of both
(1) specificity in the established formulation of the law and
(2) similarity between the facts of the prior and instant cases
in order to clearly establish the law.
b. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Difference
Claims
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims, like
the one Brown asserts here, have both an objective and
subjective component. First, the “inmate must allege that the
deprivation was, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’”
Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2023)
BROWN V. ADAMSON 11
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). This
requires a showing of “a serious medical need by
demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition
could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.
& Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). “Indications
that a plaintiff has a serious medical need include ‘[t]he
existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient
would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;
the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects
an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic
and substantial pain.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060,
1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Second, “[t]he inmate must also allege that the defendant
official acted, subjectively, with ‘deliberate indifference’ to
inmate health or safety.” Hampton, 83 F.4th at 766 (citation
omitted). This subjective inquiry requires “(a) a purposeful
act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible
medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.”
Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d
1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). This indifference “must be
substantial,” not mere “indifference,” “negligence,” or
“medical malpractice.” Id. at 1082 (citations omitted). And
“mere delay” of care, “without more,” is insufficient to show
deliberate indifference. Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison
Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). However, if
out-of-prison physicians are required for treatment, “[s]uch
referrals” must be “reasonably speedy.” Hoptowit v. Ray,
682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
12 BROWN V. ADAMSON
IV. Analysis
We focus on the second part of the qualified immunity
inquiry first to consider whether there was sufficiently
specific clearly established law to sustain a denial of
qualified immunity under Zorn. The district court denied
qualified immunity by relying on Hoptowit as having clearly
established the law to require “prisons doctors ‘[to] be able
to treat medical problems or to refer prisoners to others who
can.’” 682 F.2d at 1253. Additionally, on appeal Brown
argues that existing circuit precedent establishes that prison
officials “violate the [C]onstitution when they persist in a
treatment known to be ineffective,” Stewart v. Aranas, 32
F.4th 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022), that “prison medical staff
must refer prisoners to specialists when they cannot treat
them,” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253, and that “ignoring
specialist recommendations for years raises a jury question
on deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d
978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds
by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
However, none of these cases establish the law with a
sufficient degree of specificity such that either Dr. Adamson
or Dr. Marks “could have ‘read’ the relevant precedent
beforehand and ‘known’ that it proscribed their specific
conduct.” Zorn, 607 U.S. at 572.
Hoptowit arose in the context of a class action lawsuit
regarding conditions in a Washington state prison and only
cursorily addressed the necessity of a proper medical referral
mechanism as part of a “system of ready access to adequate
medical care.” 682 F.2d at 1253. Hoptowit did not opine on
the specific referral responsibilities of prison medical
providers in the event multiple courses of treatment prove
ineffective. This precedent standing alone is therefore not
detailed enough to establish the “high degree of specificity”
BROWN V. ADAMSON 13
necessary so that “every reasonable official would interpret
it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.”
Zorn, 607 U.S. at 572 (citation omitted). Instead, Hoptowit
merely articulates the general principle that when medical
care is outside the expertise of prison staff, they should seek
outside specialists. 682 F.2d at 1253. From a reading of
Hoptowit, Drs. Adamson and Marks could not have
ascertained particularized guidance as to when internal care
no longer sufficed, triggering their legal obligation to refer
Brown for external care.
Stewart is more specific but similarly inapposite. That
case concerned an inmate whose complaints of pain and
difficulty urinating were treated with generic medication and
a “wait and see” plan until intake staff at a different prison
initiated emergency medical treatment upon his arrival.
Stewart, 32 F.4th at 1194–95. Unlike in Brown’s case,
where Drs. Adamson and Marks developed a plan to further
investigate his medical complaints but failed to follow
through, the officials who treated Stewart “never deviated
from their ‘wait and see’ treatment plan,” and there was no
evidence in the record to indicate that they considered doing
so, even as his condition “sharply deteriorated” over several
years. Id. at 1195. Stewart additionally suffered medical
harms that were directly attributable to the delayed care in a
clearer manner than Brown, including a prostatectomy that
resulted in lingering pain, erectile dysfunction, persistent
urine build-up, and stage 3 kidney disease. See id. While
the record indicates that Brown’s symptoms were chronic in
nature and Drs. Adamson and Marks both struggled to find
adequate relief for him, there is no indication that the only
possible cause of such symptoms was a failure to adequately
treat and follow-up on his head injury. Indeed, the record
reflects that they both considered a variety of potential
14 BROWN V. ADAMSON
diagnoses and engaged various diagnostic tools, unlike the
physicians in Stewart. Stewart therefore fails to adequately
establish the law for purposes of qualified immunity when
the treating physicians here—Drs. Adamson and Marks—
tried several medical treatments and approaches in response
to Brown’s conditions.
Finally, Snow also fails to articulate a specific-enough
principle for qualified immunity purposes. In Snow, NDOC
medical staff initially failed to note the plaintiff prisoner’s
need for a referral to an orthopedic surgeon, despite his
excruciating hip and leg pain. 681 F.3d at 982–83. Once the
necessary referral was made, the URC denied outside
doctors’ recommendations for surgery to replace his hips
three times, even as his condition substantially worsened,
including two different denials of care after an outside doctor
described the situation as “potentially life-threatening.” Id.
at 983–84. There is no indication on the record that Drs.
Adamson or Marks failed to act on similarly extreme
indicators of medical emergency in the present case.
Additionally, there is no record evidence suggesting that
Drs. Adamson or Marks ignored the recommendations of
outside medical specialists once they were sought. In fact,
the record shows that the URC immediately approved the
emergency surgery that Brown needed. Additionally, the
record does not indicate that the URC ever denied any
referral request for Brown to receive outside care, further
distinguishing this case from Snow. Although the delay in
making the referral to an outside medical provider was more
protracted in this case than in Snow, Brown does not rely on
Snow to clearly establish the law regarding the permitted
length of delay in pursuing referrals. Rather, Brown asserts
that Snow establishes the law regarding implementing the
BROWN V. ADAMSON 15
treatment plan recommended by outside providers. Such
law is not applicable to the facts of this case.
Therefore, neither Snow, Stewart, nor Hoptowit are
sufficient to meet the demanding standard of factual
comparison required by Zorn to clearly establish the law. A
reasonable prison medical provider surveying the case law
here cannot ascertain the specific right to which Brown is
entitled. Drs. Adamson and Marks were therefore not on
notice as to the circumstances under which a failure to enact
a referral for outside treatment for an inmate constitutes
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment and are
entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Because there is no clearly established law defining the
point at which a delay in making an outside medical referral
constitutes deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment, we reverse and remand with instructions to
grant qualified immunity to Drs. Adamson and Marks.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.