Medrano v. Acosta

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ALEX ROMERO MEDRANO, No. 24-6346 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:18-cv-10108- MEMF-SP v. Officer ACOSTA; Officer ROBERTS, OPINION Defendants - Appellants, CITY OF BELL GARDENS, BELL GARDENS POLICE, MONTEREY PARK POLICE, CITY OF MONTEREY PARK, MP JAILER, BG JAILER, BG COMMANDER, JENNIFER CHOU, CLAIRE KELLY, Marshal K. DOMINGO, CHAPMAN, 037, BG Jailer, BG Transp, SCOTT B. FAIRFIELD, ROBERT BARNES, BG Chief of Police, Officer NUNO, Monterey Park Jailer, KELLY GORDON, MP Watchcommander, JIM SMITH, MP Chief Police, Defendants. 2 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 16, 2026 Pasadena, California Filed September 25, 2026 Before: Richard A. Paez, Consuelo M. Callahan, and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Callahan; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Paez SUMMARY * Qualified Immunity The panel reversed the district court’s denial, on summary judgment, of qualified immunity to Bell Gardens Police Department Officers Acosta and Roberts (the “Officers”), and remanded, in an action brought by Alex R. Medrano pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force to effectuate his arrest. To execute a felony arrest warrant against Medrano, the Officers approached him from ten to twenty feet away with * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 3 their guns drawn. The Officers kept their guns drawn until they had safely placed him under arrest. Medrano sued, claiming that by aiming their firearms at his head, the officers used excessive force. The panel held that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching Medrano with their weapons drawn and ready to use. While the Officers used a high level of force, they reasonably believed that Medrano may have committed multiple serious offenses, posed a threat to their safety, and was actively on the run from a felony arrest warrant and may again attempt to flee. Accordingly, the Officers’ use of force under these circumstances was reasonable and did not violate Medrano’s Fourth Amendment rights. The panel further held that Medrano’s claimed Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established under existing law because it was not sufficiently clear to the Officers here that what they were doing violated Medrano’s Fourth Amendment right. Judge Paez concurred in part and dissented in part. He joined Section II.C of the majority opinion, which held that the Officers’ conduct did not violate clearly established law. However, he dissented from the majority’s conclusion that the Officers did not violate Medrano’s Fourth Amendment rights. When all disputes of fact are resolved in Medrano’s favor, a rational jury could conclude that it was no longer objectively reasonable to keep two guns trained on Medrano’s head, rather than at the ground away from him, once he was closer and compliant. In his view, the panel could have, and should have, resolved this case on the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity analysis. 4 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA COUNSEL Carlos Fairbanks (argued) and Victor Bao (argued), Certified Law Students; Peter R. Afrasiabi, Supervising Attorney; One LLP, Newport Beach, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee. Daniel P. Barer (argued) and Karen M. Stepanyan, Pollak Vida & Barer, Los Angeles, California; Scott J. Carpenter, Carpenter Rothans & Dumont LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellants. OPINION CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge: To execute a felony arrest warrant against Plaintiff Alex R. Medrano, two police officers approached Medrano from ten to twenty feet away with their guns drawn. The officers kept their guns drawn until they had safely placed him under arrest. Medrano sued, claiming that by aiming their firearms at his head, the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that a juror could find that they used excessive force and that “under the circumstances, such action was a clear violation of an established constitutional right.” In arresting Medrano, the officers reasonably believed that he had committed serious crimes, presented a threat to their safety, and may resist arrest or attempt to flee. We hold that they did not violate the Fourth Amendment by  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 5 approaching him with their weapons drawn and ready to use. We thus reverse and remand. 1 I A On June 8, 2018, Bell Gardens Police Department (BGPD) Officers Acosta and Roberts were both working patrol duty. 2 Around 7:30 p.m., each Officer received a report that Medrano had been seen leaving his girlfriend’s residence in Bell Gardens and was headed to his father’s residence. Both Officers were familiar with Medrano, who they believed was affiliated with a local street gang. On or around May 25, roughly two weeks prior to receiving the June 8 report, Officer Acosta learned that “Medrano had [recently] fled from a lawful traffic stop conducted by a BGPD officer,” and was currently “on the run” from a “felony ‘no bail’ federal warrant for [his] arrest related to drug charges.” The next day, Medrano’s mother contacted BGPD regarding Medrano and asked that officers respond to his residence. 3 When BGPD officers (including Officer Acosta) arrived at the residence, Medrano’s mother 1 Medrano was ably represented on appeal by counsel appointed through the Ninth Circuit’s pro bono program. We thank counsel for their service. 2 “Because this case comes here on [the Officers’] motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, [Medrano].” Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 568, 570 n.1 (2026). We also “consider facts offered by the defendants that are ‘uncontradicted by any evidence in the record.’” Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010)). 3 The record is unclear as to whether this was Medrano’s residence, his mother’s residence, or a shared residence. 6 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA stated that he was inside alone, “acting paranoid and spray painting ‘the federal police [a]re out to get me’ inside the interior.” BGPD officers obtained a search warrant and entered the residence but did not find Medrano. On June 5, a federal magistrate judge recalled Medrano’s outstanding arrest warrant after Medrano voluntarily appeared in court. But the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) had not been updated to reflect that new development, and on June 8 CLETS still indicated that Medrano had an active warrant out for his arrest. Accordingly, the Officers did not know that the federal arrest warrant had been recalled. On June 8, after receiving their respective reports that Medrano was en route to his father’s residence, Officers Acosta and Roberts went to the residence “and established a perimeter.” They approached the house from a neighboring driveway, which was separated from the house by a chain- linked fence approximately six feet tall. The fence had white aluminum strips that “obstructed visibility from atop to six feet below.” The Officers saw Medrano in the backyard alone with an unidentified dog, likely “some type of pit bull.” From approximately ten to twenty feet away, the Officers drew their weapons, aimed them at Medrano’s head, and “commanded [Medrano] to approach [their] position.” 4 4 There is no dispute that the Officers drew their weapons. However, where the Officers aimed their weapons is subject to dispute. Medrano alleges that the Officers both had their weapons aimed at his head. Officer Roberts denies that he had his firearm pointed at Medrano’s head. He claims that he had his weapon drawn, without specifying in which direction it was pointed. Officer Acosta also denies that he had his gun aimed at Medrano’s head. He asserts that he had his weapon  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 7 It was still light outside, and Medrano first became aware of the Officers when he looked to the right and saw Officer Roberts’s firearm pointed at him. Medrano claims that he was not fully aware of what Officer Acosta was doing because he was “under extreme fear and extreme shock by Officer Roberts’[s] firearm[,]” and feared for his life. He complied with the Officers’ command and climbed the fence without incident. The Officers immediately handcuffed him as soon as he was over the fence. Medrano does not recall at what point they put away their firearms during the arrest. After handcuffing Medrano, the Officers walked him to a patrol vehicle. They then transported him to Bell Gardens jail, where he was booked based on the arrest warrant and for violating California Penal Code § 148 due to his having fled from law enforcement during the May 25 traffic stop. On June 11, the U.S. Marshals Service took custody of Medrano. That same day, a federal magistrate judge ordered Medrano to be released because the earlier arrest warrant had been recalled. B On December 4, 2018, Medrano initiated this pro se civil rights action. On July 8, 2022, following some preliminary litigation, Medrano filed his operative complaint. Relevant to this appeal, the operative complaint brings claims against Officers Acosta and Roberts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force to effectuate his arrest. aimed in the direction of Medrano’s torso. For present purposes, we accept the facts as alleged by Medrano. 8 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA Eventually, the Officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that “their use of force was reasonable, and, in the alternative, they are shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.” The district judge referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who issued a report and recommendation that the district judge grant summary judgment to the Officers. The report reasoned that: (1) Officer Acosta did not violate Medrano’s Fourth Amendment rights, because Medrano could not specifically recall whether Officer Acosta had a firearm drawn at all and the record established only that Officer Acosta had his firearm drawn and pointed at Medrano’s torso; (2) Officer Roberts may have violated Medrano’s Fourth Amendment rights, because a reasonable juror could conclude Officer Roberts aimed his firearm at Medrano’s head; and (3) both Officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Medrano’s claimed Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established under existing law. The district judge rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendations and denied the Officers’ motion for summary judgment. The district judge held that Officer Acosta was not entitled to summary judgment because “Medrano has shown a genuine dispute of material fact” as to “whether Officer Acosta pointed his gun at Medrano’s head,” which the district judge found to be “material to the excessive force analysis.” In the district judge’s view, neither Officer was entitled to qualified immunity because “a juror could find that both of the Officer Defendants pointed their guns at Medrano’s head, and under the circumstances, such action was a clear violation of an established constitutional right.” The Officers timely appealed.  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 9 II We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review a district court’s summary judgment order denying qualified immunity. Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 696–97 (9th Cir. 2023); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding that “a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”). Reviewing de novo, we must decide “whether the facts, ‘considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’ show that qualified immunity is warranted.” Hopson, 71 F. 4th at 697 (citing Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 2017)). “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, police officers are not liable under § 1983 ‘unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018)). We may “approach the qualified immunity question using either prong as [the] starting point.” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). A The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” See Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013). The Amendment’s central purpose is “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Chatrie v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 10 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 2193, 2204 (2026) (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. 296, 303 (2018)). The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from using excessive force in conducting a seizure, including a lawful arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Excessive force, however, must be distinguished from appropriate force; an officer’s “right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968)); see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (noting the “sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force’” (quoting Priester v. Riveria Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000))). “[W]hen an officer reasonably believes force is necessary to protect his own safety or the safety of the public, measures used to restrain individuals, such as stopping them at gunpoint and handcuffing them, are reasonable.” Hopson, 71 F.4th at 701 (emphasis in original) (quoting Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995)). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular [arrest] is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation modified); see also Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). “The operative question . . . is ‘whether the totality of the circumstances, justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure.’” County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427–28 (2017) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)). In answering this question, we must view the circumstances  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 11 “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight[,]” bearing in mind that “[a]n officer’s use of force cannot be deemed excessive based on facts that he reasonably would not have known or anticipated.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1256. B 1 To consider whether the Officers used unconstitutionally excessive force in arresting Medrano, we first “assess the severity of the intrusion on [Medrano’s] Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating ‘the type and amount of force inflicted.’” Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1256–57. The Officers concede, as they must, that under our precedent, “pointing guns at a suspect is deemed a high level of force.” See Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In the context of a residential confrontation, ‘pointing a loaded gun at a suspect, employing the threat of deadly force, is use of a high level of force.’” (quoting Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537)). We thus agree that the Officers used a high level of force here. 2 “The second step of the excessive force analysis” requires us “to ‘evaluate the government’s interest in the use of force.’” Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011)). In doing so, we look to “three primary factors: ‘(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or 12 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. (quoting Miller, 340 F.3d at 964); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (establishing factors). These factors “are not exclusive,” and we may also evaluate other relevant factors such as “‘whether proper warnings were given’ and ‘the availability of less intrusive alternatives to the force employed.’” Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1257, 1259 (quoting Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872). The key factor is “whether the suspect pose[d] a threat.” Hopson, 71 F.4th at 698. Severity of the crimes at issue The Officers sought to arrest Medrano for being on the run from “a felony ‘no bail’ federal warrant . . . related to felony drug charges,” and for fleeing from other BGPD officers during a recent local traffic stop. Three separate potential crimes are at issue here: distribution of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine), failure to appear (in the drug distribution case), and resisting arrest. See 21 U.S.C.§ 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii); 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b); Cal Pen. Code § 148(a)(1). The first two of these three are felony offenses that carry significant criminal penalties. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Medrano argues that the crimes at issue were not severe because (1) his methamphetamine distribution crime did not necessarily include violent conduct, (2) his failure to appear offense was already resolved, (3) his resisting arrest crime was only a misdemeanor, and (4) he was not actively engaging in any felonious conduct at the time of the arrest. The Officers, however, had no reason to know that his drug distribution offense did not include violent conduct or that the arrest warrant was no longer active. We cannot judge the Officers’ conduct through the lens of “facts that [they] reasonably would not have known[.]”  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 13 Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1256. Considering that the Officers had an objective basis to think that Medrano was actively on the run from a felony arrest warrant related to distributing dangerous drugs (and had recently fled from another encounter with law enforcement), we conclude that they reasonably believed that the crimes at issue were serious. Accordingly, this factor weighs in the Officers’ favor. Whether Medrano posed an immediate threat to safety We next consider whether it was reasonable for the Officers to believe that Medrano presented a threat to their safety. We do so, bearing in mind that the “calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the use of force that is necessary in a particular situation[.]” Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395). Upon making contact with Medrano, the Officers did not have an opportunity to check him for weapons and saw him with a pit bull. The Officers knew that Medrano had previously been on the run from law enforcement related to felony drug distribution charges; believed that he still was an active fugitive; and were aware that he had recently fled during another attempt by law enforcement to detain him. They also believed that he had long been affiliated with a local street gang. And they knew that Medrano’s mother had recently called the police to have Medrano arrested, due to his erratic behavior and her knowledge of his outstanding arrest warrant. The totality of these circumstances would lead reasonable officers to believe that Medrano posed an objective threat, at least until they had an opportunity to 14 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA “secure the premises and to ensure their own safety.” Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007). Medrano contends that he “presented little to no objective threat” to the Officers’ safety and that he fully complied with their commands. He disputes that he actually had gang affiliations. He argues that the evidence does not show that the Officers suspected Medrano of having a firearm or that the dog presented a threat. He also contends that he was compliant and did not pose a flight risk. Medrano’s arguments are not persuasive because they each require us to view the circumstances “based on facts that [a reasonable officer] would not have known or anticipated,” and “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1256; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. But, even accepting the facts as alleged by Medrano, we find that reasonable officers confronting the circumstances here would justifiably determine that Medrano presented a threat to their safety. Therefore, this factor, “the most important single element” of our inquiry, weighs in favor of the Officers. See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). Whether Medrano was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee We turn next to the third factor and conclude that the Officers had a reasonable basis to believe that Medrano was both actively evading arrest and might further resist arrest or flee. Indeed, the entire interaction at issue was premised upon the Officers’ reasonable belief that they were arresting an active fugitive subject to a felony arrest warrant, who had recently fled from law enforcement. Although Medrano was not physically resisting arrest at the exact moment the Officers attempted to arrest him, he was nonetheless  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 15 generally seeking to evade arrest. See id. at 1442 (finding “a slight edge goes to the government on this [factor]” under analogous circumstances where defendant officers sought to arrest a suspect who had recently fled from a traffic stop and had outstanding arrest warrants); contra Dissent 28–29. Medrano’s sole counterargument is that he was compliant with the Officers’ commands. The Officers, however, had no reason to believe that he would be compliant at the time that they drew their weapons and approached him, given what they already believed about Medrano. We must “evaluate the nature of any resistance in light of the actual facts of the case.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 830 (9th Cir. 2010). In doing so, we find that this factor provides further support for the Officers. Other relevant factors Medrano urges us to consider several other factors. He asserts that: (1) “less intrusive methods of arresting [him] were available,” (2) the “Officers did not adequately warn [him] prior to pointing a gun at his head,” and (3) the “Officers failed to identify themselves as law enforcement.” We find these points unpersuasive. As an initial matter, it is not clear what less intrusive method would have been effective here. Medrano claims that the Officers could have “knocked on the front door or called to Medrano without pointing their guns at his head.” But the Officers had an objective basis to believe that Medrano was actively evading a felony arrest warrant, had recently fled from law enforcement, and was potentially dangerous. With a six-foot fence separating the Officers from Medrano, the Officers could have reasonably believed that their use of force was the best method of ensuring compliance while preventing the situation from escalating. As we have said before, “officers 16 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA ‘are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible.’” Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1259 (quoting Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 882 (9th Cir. 2012)). Similarly, the fact that the Officers did not provide a warning has little relevance because in this context the Officers’ use of force served as a warning to Medrano so as to mitigate the need to use additional, potentially deadly force. Cf. Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1018 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (“The threat [of force] may . . . escalate and finally lead to an excessive application of force to the person of another. Still, the threat alone is not that application. One can bare a fang without biting.”); Thompson, 885 F.3d at 586 (noting that “pointing a loaded gun at a suspect” is a “threat of deadly force” (quoting Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537)). Nor is there any reason to believe that the Officers identifying themselves would have made a difference, because Medrano has never asserted that he did not know that the Officers were law enforcement. In sum, Officers Acosta and Roberts reasonably believed that Medrano may have committed multiple serious offenses, posed a threat to their safety, and was actively on the run from a felony arrest warrant and may again attempt to flee. Therefore, the Officers had strong countervailing interests in employing the force at issue here. 3 Finally, we balance the parties’ respective interests, remaining mindful that “[t]he operative question . . . is ‘whether the totality of the circumstances justified’” the Officers’ actions here. Mendez, 581 U.S. at 428 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9). On the one hand, the Officers used a high level of force that did not physically injure Medrano but nonetheless allegedly placed him “in shock” and “in fear  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 17 for [his] life.” On the other hand, the Officers had an objective basis to reasonably believe that Medrano: (1) had committed multiple serious felony offenses; (2) presented an objective threat to their safety; and (3) was actively evading arrest on a felony warrant and may continue to do so. An officer’s “right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. And “[w]hen officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm . . . the Fourth Amendment is not violated.” Rettele, 550 U.S. at 616. Here, the Officers’ conduct fits that description. We thus hold that the Officers’ use of force under these circumstances was reasonable and did not violate Medrano’s Fourth Amendment rights. C Even assuming that the Officers used excessive force, Medrano’s claim still fails because the Officers “enjoy qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established law.” Zorn, 607 U.S. at 571. “A right is clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Rivas- Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021). “A right is not clearly established if existing precedent does not place the constitutional question ‘beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5). “The relevant precedent must define the right with ‘a high degree of specificity,’ so that ‘every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.’” Id. (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63). “The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear to a reasonable officer that his 18 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). Medrano argues that our Court’s holding in Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d at 1014, clearly established the unlawfulness of the Officers’ conduct. We disagree. “In Robinson, we held that police used excessive force in pointing their guns at a 64-year old unarmed retired police officer who had his hand up.” Thomspon, 885 F.3d at 588 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1010, 1015). There, police officers responded to “a radio dispatch regarding a man carrying a shotgun who had just shot two dogs and [was] ‘in the middle of the street yelling[.]’” Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1010. When the officers arrived at Robinson’s home, Robinson went out to greet the officers and two of them pulled out their guns from roughly six feet away. Id. Robinson put his hands over his head at one of the officer’s command. Id. That officer then “thrust his gun three or four feet from Robinson’s head.” Id. We ruled that “[a] police officer who terrorizes a civilian by brandishing a cocked gun in front of that civilian’s face may not cause physical injury, but he has certainly laid the building blocks for a section 1983 claim against him.” Id. at 1015 (quoting Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 905 (5th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). Robinson is not analogous to this case and certainly did not put the constitutional question at issue here “beyond debate.” See Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5. The police officers in Robinson did not believe that they were making a felony arrest but were “investigating a mere misdemeanor.” Hopson, 71 F.4th at 704 (citing Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1010, 1014). In seizing Robinson, the officers needlessly “terrorize[d]” him by pointing their firearms at him from  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 19 point blank range, despite him having his hands on his head. See Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1015. Moreover, the officers had no cause to believe that Robinson was resisting arrest or would try to flee. These facts are materially different than those present here, such that our holding in Robinson would not have made “clear to [the Officers] that [their] conduct was unlawful in the situation [they] confronted.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202) (internal quotation marks omitted). In denying the Officers qualified immunity, the district judge looked to Ninth Circuit precedent based on Robinson that established the specific rule “that officers use unconstitutionally excessive force when they aim their weapons at people who are not suspected of violent crimes, who do not pose a threat, who have complied with the officer’s instructions, who are not resisting and who are not attempting to flee.” See, e.g., Thompson, 885 F.3d at 586– 87; Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 538; Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2009); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 845–846 (9th Cir. 2007); Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1015. But for the reasons we have explained, that rule does not square with the circumstances of this case, when viewed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Accordingly, it did not make “sufficiently clear” to the Officers here “that what [they were] doing violate[d]” Medrano’s Fourth Amendment right. See Rivas- Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5. III In this case, the Officers reasonably believed that Medrano had committed serious offenses, presented a threat to their safety, and may resist arrest or attempt to flee. By 20 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA approaching him with firearms drawn and ready to use, we hold that the Officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We thus reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Officers. REVERSED and REMANDED. PAEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in Section II.C of the majority opinion on the question of clearly established law. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that Officers Acosta and Roberts did not violate Alex Medrano’s Fourth Amendment rights. The majority concludes that it was objectively reasonable for the Officers to aim their guns at Medrano’s head from near point-blank range, as a matter of constitutional law, such that no rational jury could conclude otherwise. That decision is both unnecessary and flawed. The decision is unnecessary because we could have, and should have, resolved this case on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. We are not required to address both prongs, and doing so may run “counter to the older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring)). That is particularly true when certain circumstances “create a risk of bad decisionmaking.” Id. at 239.  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 21 Two such circumstances are present here. First, because the majority’s decision turns on many unique facts, see infra Section II.A, the constitutional question is “so factbound that the decision provides little guidance for future cases.” Id. at 237. Second, and because of that unique confluence of facts, the clearly established question in this case is far easier than the constitutional question. 1 Id. at 239. That risk of bad decisionmaking is borne out here. The majority holds that it is objectively reasonable, as a matter of law, for officers to rely on non-violent acts long predating an arrest to treat a suspect as immediately dangerous and actively evading arrest at the scene. The majority also intimates, in direct conflict with Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), that aiming a gun at a suspect is a warning, rather than a use of force. And the majority ignores a squarely presented argument on a less intrusive alternative that we have repeatedly held precludes summary judgment: holding a gun in the low-ready position, ready to employ but away from the suspect. I address the majority’s errors at each step of the Fourth Amendment excessive force analysis. We are to balance “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 396 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 1 Most notable among those facts is Medrano’s gang affiliation. Medrano now argues that the district court erred in finding no dispute on this material fact, but we lack jurisdiction to entertain that argument, as this case comes to us on the denial of qualified immunity. See Singh v. City of Phoenix, 124 F.4th 746, 755 (9th Cir. 2024). So, we must take the fact of Medrano’s gang affiliation as a given. 22 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA I. Nature and Quality of the Intrusion In all of three sentences, the majority concludes that “the Officers used a high level of force.” Majority 11. While I agree with the bottom-line conclusion, the majority’s analysis omits important detail. “Rather than relying on broad characterizations, we must evaluate the nature of the specific force employed in a specific factual situation.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 825 (9th Cir. 2010). And, to be specific, aiming a gun at a suspect’s head from near point-blank range is a far greater use of force than aiming anywhere else or from a greater distance. See Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1010, 1014–15. It is the threat of instant death. Here, the majority omits from its analysis that the Officers aimed their guns at Medrano’s head from as close as three to five feet away. Medrano testified that the Officers were ten to twenty feet away “when [he] first noticed [them],” but also that they kept their guns aimed at his head at least until he reached the fence, roughly three feet away from the Officers. On the Officers’ account, their guns were as close as five feet away from Medrano. Without these details, we cannot properly weigh the intrusion against the government’s interest, identify fact- specific alternatives (e.g., aiming elsewhere), or ask how the balance of interests changed as the arrest progressed. See infra Sections II.D, III. II. Government Interests A. Immediate Threat to Safety “The central issue is whether it was objectively reasonable under the circumstances for the deputies to  MEDRANO V. ACOSTA 23 believe that [Medrano] posed an immediate threat to their safety.” Hayes v. County of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013). If a reasonable jury could find that Medrano “posed no immediate safety threat,” then this factor weighs against the Officers. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (original emphasis). Because there are many ways to view the objective danger posed by a fact-intensive scenario, we routinely leave this question to the jury. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537–38 (9th Cir. 2010); Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2011); Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2021). Under these standards, a rational jury could easily conclude that Medrano posed no immediate danger to the Officers or anyone else. The Officers did not suspect Medrano of any violent crimes. Medrano neither appeared to be armed nor gave the Officers any reason to believe he would be. Medrano was also “compliant” and “outnumbered,” and five other officers surrounded the home, all of which “counts against a finding that []he posed a threat.” Green v. City & County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2014). I would thus conclude that this most important factor weighs in favor of Medrano. The majority and the Officers contend that six facts compel the conclusion that Medrano posed an immediate danger: 1) one month before the arrest, Medrano skipped a detention hearing in his drug distribution case; 2) two weeks before the arrest, Medrano fled a traffic stop; 3) also two weeks prior, Medrano was acting erratically at his mother’s house, spray-painting her walls; 4) at the scene, Medrano was with a pitbull; 5) the Officers believed Medrano was affiliated with a gang; and 6) the Officers had not checked 24 MEDRANO V. ACOSTA Medrano for weapons. Properly applying our case law, a rational jury could discount each of these facts. The first thre