Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ALEXIS EDELSTEIN, No. 25-3765 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 2:25-cv-00003-GMN-MDC v. MEMORANDUM* TARA MICHELLE NELSON, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 29, 2026 San Francisco, California Before: BYBEE and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and LIN, District Judge.** Alexis Edelstein appeals the district court’s decision denying his petition seeking the return of his child, E.E., to Argentina pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”) and * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Rita F. Lin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”). Edelstein specifically challenges the district court’s finding that E.E. was habitually resident in the United States at the time Tara Nelson (Edelstein’s then-wife and E.E.’s mother) retained E.E. in Nevada. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Nisbet v. Bridger, 124 F.4th 577, 581 n.3 (9th Cir. 2024). For the reasons stated below, we affirm. The habitual-residence inquiry seeks to determine whether the child is “at home in the particular country at issue.” Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 84 (2020). As part of that inquiry, the trial court should consider “the totality of the circumstances specific to the case.” Id. at 71. “There are no categorical requirements for establishing a child’s habitual residence . . . .” Id. at 80–81. “The habitual-residence determination thus presents a task for factfinding courts, not appellate courts, and should be judged on appeal by a clear-error review standard deferential to the factfinding court.” Id. at 84. The parties agree that a parental agreement to reside in a new place for an indefinite period is probative of a child’s habitual residence. See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1076–78 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting the probative value of parental agreement), abrogated on other grounds by Monasky, 589 U.S. at 76, 84. We have previously warned trial courts to be cautious about relying solely on one party’s testimony “when the persons entitled to fix the child’s residence no longer agree on 2 where it has been fixed.” Id. at 1076. This warning directs trial courts to consider such testimony in light of “all available evidence.” Id.; see also id. at 1081–82 (discussing the district court’s consideration of “the conflicting testimony of both parties” alongside “all the evidence”). Here, the district court relied in part on Nelson’s testimony, which the court found more credible than Edelstein’s, to find that the parties agreed to reside in Nevada during an hour-long phone call in November 2024. But the district court also noted that Nelson’s testimony was supported by other available evidence, including a text message memorializing the agreement; the parties’ continued presence in Nevada; and the parties’ earlier discussions about relocating to the United States. Beyond the parties’ agreement to reside in Nevada, the district court considered additional evidence that it deemed relevant to assessing “the totality of the circumstances specific to the case”—evidence that the district court concluded further supported finding that E.E. was habitually resident in the United States by late 2024. See Monasky, 589 U.S. at 71. As the district court acknowledged, some evidence supports a contrary determination, suggesting that the parties’ stay in the United States was intended to be temporary. Arguably, the record supports several inferences regarding E.E.’s habitual residence. Nonetheless, “[t]he clear-error standard of review, by definition, admits the possibility that more than one inference can be drawn from any given 3 record; when that occurs, a trial court’s choice between these permissible inferences cannot be clearly erroneous.” Nisbet, 124 F.4th at 589 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). Here, the district court drew permissible inferences from the record. Consequently, the district court did not clearly err when it found that E.E.’s habitual residence was the United States and thus that no wrongful retention had occurred under the Hague Convention and ICARA. AFFIRMED. 4