St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Franz Construction, Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-498
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE No. 26-498
INSURANCE COMPANY, D.C. No.
1:25-cv-00005-TJC
Plaintiff-ctr-defendant -
Appellee,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
FRANZ CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
GRIZZLY COIL TUBING SERVICES,
INC.; DON FRANZ; ARLON FRANZ,
Defendant-ctr-claimants -
Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Timothy J. Cavan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2026**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“St. Paul”) sought a declaratory
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Franz Construction, Inc. (“Franz
Construction”), Grizzly Coil Tubing Services, Inc. (“Grizzly”), Arlon Franz
(“Arlon”), and Don Franz (“Don”) under its policies. The district court granted
summary judgment for St. Paul. The parties are familiar with the facts, and we do
not recite them here.
“We review the district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de
novo.” Westport Ins. Corp. v. Cal. Cas. Mgmt. Co., 916 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir.
2019). “We also review its interpretation of state law and [] insurance policies de
novo.” Id. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
St. Paul had no duty to defend Don under the Franz Construction and Grizzly
policies. The complaint in the underlying litigation alleges intentional conduct by
Don—namely, that he provided funding, assistance and encouragement to Arlon
with the intention of facilitating Arlon’s fraudulent conduct. The policies do not
cover this conduct because they only cover bodily injury or property damage caused
by an “event,” defined as an accident. The alleged conduct does not constitute an
accident because it was intentional and the harm from the takeover was objectively
expected. See Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Fisher Builders, Inc., 371 P.3d 375, 380 (Mont.
2016) (clarifying that “policy language defining ‘accidents’ may include intentional
2 26-498
acts if the damages were not objectively intended or expected by the insured”).1
St. Paul could not have breached its duty to defend when it did not have such
a duty in the first instance. See, e.g., Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rumph, 170
P.3d 934, 938 (Mont. 2007) (noting that because the complaint “unequivocally
demonstrated that the [] claim was not covered, no duty to defend arose”). The
district court properly granted summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
1
Appellants argue for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in
considering summary judgment as to Franz Construction, Inc. Because the
appellants did not raise this argument before the district court, we do not consider
it here. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 495 (9th Cir. 2022) (“We need not
consider Smartt’s remaining arguments, which are waived because she raises them
for the first time on appeal.”). In any case, appellants admit: “The underlying
action did not specifically name [Franz Construction] as a defendant, so St. Paul
had no duty to provide [Franz Construction] a defense to the underlying action.”
3 26-498