Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE No. 26-498 INSURANCE COMPANY, D.C. No. 1:25-cv-00005-TJC Plaintiff-ctr-defendant - Appellee, MEMORANDUM* v. FRANZ CONSTRUCTION, INC.; GRIZZLY COIL TUBING SERVICES, INC.; DON FRANZ; ARLON FRANZ, Defendant-ctr-claimants - Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Timothy J. Cavan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted November 17, 2026** Seattle, Washington Before: McKEOWN, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“St. Paul”) sought a declaratory * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Franz Construction, Inc. (“Franz Construction”), Grizzly Coil Tubing Services, Inc. (“Grizzly”), Arlon Franz (“Arlon”), and Don Franz (“Don”) under its policies. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Paul. The parties are familiar with the facts, and we do not recite them here. “We review the district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.” Westport Ins. Corp. v. Cal. Cas. Mgmt. Co., 916 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 2019). “We also review its interpretation of state law and [] insurance policies de novo.” Id. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. St. Paul had no duty to defend Don under the Franz Construction and Grizzly policies. The complaint in the underlying litigation alleges intentional conduct by Don—namely, that he provided funding, assistance and encouragement to Arlon with the intention of facilitating Arlon’s fraudulent conduct. The policies do not cover this conduct because they only cover bodily injury or property damage caused by an “event,” defined as an accident. The alleged conduct does not constitute an accident because it was intentional and the harm from the takeover was objectively expected. See Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Fisher Builders, Inc., 371 P.3d 375, 380 (Mont. 2016) (clarifying that “policy language defining ‘accidents’ may include intentional 2 26-498 acts if the damages were not objectively intended or expected by the insured”).1 St. Paul could not have breached its duty to defend when it did not have such a duty in the first instance. See, e.g., Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rumph, 170 P.3d 934, 938 (Mont. 2007) (noting that because the complaint “unequivocally demonstrated that the [] claim was not covered, no duty to defend arose”). The district court properly granted summary judgment. AFFIRMED. 1 Appellants argue for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in considering summary judgment as to Franz Construction, Inc. Because the appellants did not raise this argument before the district court, we do not consider it here. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 495 (9th Cir. 2022) (“We need not consider Smartt’s remaining arguments, which are waived because she raises them for the first time on appeal.”). In any case, appellants admit: “The underlying action did not specifically name [Franz Construction] as a defendant, so St. Paul had no duty to provide [Franz Construction] a defense to the underlying action.” 3 26-498