Childs v. San Diego Family Housing, LLC

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LENA CHILDS, an individual; No. 24-1256 DONALD CHILDS, an individual; T. D.C. No. CHILDS, a minor by and through her 3:19-cv-02329- guardian ad litem, Lena Childs; A. JM-SBC CHILDS, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, Lena Childs, OPINION Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC, a California Limited Liability Corporation; LINCOLN MILITARY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LP, a Delaware Limited Partnership, Defendants - Appellants, and INDEPTH CORPORATION, a California Corporation, Defendant - Appellee. 2 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC On Remand from the United States Supreme Court Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding Filed September 24, 2026 Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Gabriel P. Sanchez and Holly A. Thomas, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Sanchez SUMMARY * Federal Jurisdiction / Removal On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the panel affirmed the district court’s order remanding a removed action to state court based on a lack of federal jurisdiction. Donald and Lena Childs rented the “Saipan Property,” military housing within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado. During their lease, the Childs dealt with water- intrusion and mold contamination issues that allegedly damaged their personal property and impacted their health. According to the Childs, defendants San Diego Family Housing, a public-private venture created by federal * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 3 statute, and Lincoln Military Property Management, the property manager, were aware of these issues and did not adequately remediate the problem. The Childs filed suit in state court, asserting negligence and other state law claims. Defendants removed the action to federal district court on the basis of federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the action and remanded to state court. The panel held that, although federal courts of appeals generally lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s remand order based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an exception to this rule applied because defendants asserted federal officer jurisdiction as one of the grounds for removal. The panel therefore had jurisdiction to review the remand order in its entirety. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that no basis for subject matter jurisdiction applied. First, regardless of the parties’ competing versions of events as to how the Saipan Property came into the United States’ possession, the Childs did not provide any evidence that the federal government had assented to exclusive jurisdiction over it so as to establish federal enclave jurisdiction. Second, the district court lacked jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Consistent with the Supreme Court’s remand for further consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, 608 U.S. 1 (2026), the panel clarified the elements for federal officer removal and held that to satisfy the requirements for such removal, (1) the removing defendant must be the United States, a federal agency, a federal officer, or a person “acting under” a federal 4 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC officer, such as certain private parties hired to assist federal officers; (2) the suit must be for or relating to any act under color of such office; and (3) the removing defendant must assert a colorable federal defense. A removing defendant need not show that his federal duties specifically required or strictly caused the challenged conduct. Applying this standard, the panel concluded that defendants did not satisfy the federal officer removal statute because they did not show that they were involved in an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of a federal superior, and that they therefore were “acting under” a federal officer in managing the Saipan Property. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not have jurisdiction on the theory that San Diego Family Housing was a federal agency. COUNSEL Christian B. Clark (argued), Lenden F. Webb, and Katherine E. Cervantes, Webb Law Group APC, Fresno, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. Kristin N. Reyna DeHart (argued), Buchalter LLP, San Diego, California; Matthew P. Nugent, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, San Diego, California; Don Willenburg, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Walnut Creek, California; for Defendants-Appellants. Christina Matian, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP, San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellee. Daniel L. Winik (argued) and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys, Appellate Staff; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 5 Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Tara K. McGrath, United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, San Diego, California; for Amicus Curiae the United States of America. OPINION SANCHEZ, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs Donald and Lena Childs rented military housing within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado. During their lease, the Childs dealt with water-intrusion and mold contamination issues that allegedly damaged their personal property and impacted their health. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants San Diego Family Housing, a public- private venture created by federal statute, and Lincoln Military Property Management, the property manager, were aware of these issues and did not adequately remediate the problem. Plaintiffs filed the instant action in state court asserting negligence and other state law claims. Defendants removed the action to federal district court on the basis of federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. After assessing each of these grounds for removal, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the action and remanded to state court. We conclude that no basis for federal jurisdiction applies and affirm. 1 1 On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted Defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari, vacated our prior judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, 6 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC I. A. Defendant San Diego Family Housing (“SDFH”) is a public-private venture between the Navy and Lincoln/Clark San Diego, LLC under the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (“MHPI”). See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2871‒2885. SDFH contracted with Lincoln Military Property Management (“Lincoln”) to provide property management services to the Silver Strand I housing community, which includes military housing on Naval Amphibious Base Coronado (“NAB Coronado”). In 2016, Plaintiffs Donald and Lena Childs, with their minor children, leased a home from SDFH at 1333 Saipan Road, Coronado, California (“the Saipan Property”). Soon after Plaintiffs moved into their home, the property began to suffer from repeated water intrusion and related mold contamination. According to Plaintiffs, these problems caused damage to their personal property and eventually impacted the family’s health, causing fatigue, shortness of breath, chronic headaches, and other symptoms. After reporting these issues to Defendants, Lincoln sent InDepth, a mold remediation company, to inspect the property. InDepth discovered visible mold in multiple areas of the home and allegedly told Plaintiffs that there “[was] no reason to run any tests” because the mold was visible. InDepth informed Lincoln of its findings, and Lincoln provided temporary relocation assistance to the family while InDepth performed remediation services. After Plaintiffs were told that the remediation service was successfully completed, Plaintiffs requested Louisiana, 608 U.S. 1 (2026). We now address our federal officer removal doctrine consistent with that remand.  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 7 documentation verifying that the mold had been addressed, which Lincoln allegedly refused to provide. Upon their return to the property, Plaintiffs engaged their own mold testing service provider who ran tests that indicated heightened levels of hazardous mold. Plaintiffs told Lincoln and InDepth about the test results and allege that Defendants dismissed their concerns and insisted that the home was habitable. Plaintiffs refused to remain at the property and, after rejecting alternative housing in the same community, Defendants immediately ceased paying the Childs’ relocation costs. Defendants allegedly refused to acknowledge the presence of mold and took no further steps to properly remediate the property. B. In 2019, Plaintiffs brought suit in state court against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, asserting claims for negligence, private nuisance, breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of peaceful and quiet enjoyment, and constructive eviction. SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal enclave, federal officer, and federal agency jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Upon removal, SDFH and Lincoln moved to dismiss the action under a claim of derivative sovereign immunity pursuant to the Yearsley doctrine. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed. We held that the district court’s order rejecting dismissal was not an immediately appealable collateral order and dismissed the appeal. See Childs v. San Diego Fam. Hous. LLC, 22 F.4th 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2022). 8 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC Following remand, SDFH and Lincoln moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Yearsley provided them derivative sovereign immunity and that the legal effect of federal enclave jurisdiction precluded most of Plaintiffs’ state law claims. 2 The United States then filed a Statement of Interest before the district court asserting that (1) Yearsley did not apply to Defendants, (2) the Saipan Property was not within a federal enclave, and (3) under this court’s intervening precedent in Lake v. Ohana Military Communities, LLC, 14 F.4th 993 (9th Cir. 2021), the district court lacked federal officer or agency jurisdiction. The district court ordered supplemental briefing and eventually rejected all of Defendants’ proffered grounds for federal jurisdiction. Specifically, the district court found that Defendants failed to establish that the Saipan Property was within a federal enclave because there was no evidence that the United States had retained or assented to exclusive federal jurisdiction over the property. Next, the district court concluded that Defendants failed to show the requisite causal nexus between the challenged actions and the federal government’s involvement in Defendants’ housing management to establish federal officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Finally, the district court concluded that Defendants were unable to establish federal agency jurisdiction under the six-factor test of In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d 1225, 1227‒28 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court 2 SDFH and Lincoln also challenged Plaintiffs’ settlement with InDepth. The district court did not address the propriety of that settlement in its remand order, and Defendants do not seek review of this issue on appeal.  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 9 remanded the case to state court. 3 Defendants timely appealed. II. Before reaching the merits of these claims, we must first assess our appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Federal courts of appeals generally lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s remand order based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,” subject to certain exceptions); see also Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dept. of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Remand orders based on a defect in removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction are immune from review even if the district court’s order is erroneous.”). Nonetheless, § 1447(d) provides for two exceptions to this bar. Under the statute, a remand order is reviewable for actions initially removed pursuant to the federal officer removal statute codified at § 1442. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“[A]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”). In their notice of removal, SDFH and Lincoln asserted federal enclave jurisdiction under § 1331 as well as federal officer and federal agency jurisdiction under 3 In its remand order, the district court also ruled on Defendants’ evidentiary objections, sustaining their objection to an unauthenticated parcel map of NAB Coronado, thereby declining to take judicial notice of the parcel map. The district court also sustained, in part, Defendants’ objections to the declaration of a senior land surveyor, Lonie Cyr, determining that legal conclusions as to whether the federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the Saipan Property were improper witness testimony. 10 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC § 1442(a)(1). Because one of the asserted grounds for removal was § 1442, we have jurisdiction to review the remand order in its entirety. Id. § 1447(d); see also BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 593 U.S. 230, 238 (2021) (explaining that the scope of appellate jurisdiction extends to the “whole of [the district court’s] order” when a defendant cites § 1442 as a ground for removal). III. We review de novo the district court’s decision to remand a removed case and its determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc. 456 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2006). The defendant bears the burden of proving that the requirements for removal jurisdiction have been met. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014). On appeal, Defendants renew their contentions that subject matter jurisdiction exists under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Saipan Property is located within a federal enclave, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1442 because SDFH and Lincoln operated under a federal officer’s oversight and control in dealing with the Childs’ complaints, and (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1442 because SDFH qualifies as a federal agency. We consider each of these arguments in turn. A. Federal enclave jurisdiction is dependent on the federal government’s exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction. See Lake, 14 F.4th at 1003‒04; Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263‒64 (1963); United States v. Jenkins, 734 F.2d  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 11 1322, 1325‒26 (9th Cir. 1983). The Enclave Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock- Yards, and other needful Buildings. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Beyond the Enclave Clause’s specified method of establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction through the purchase of land with a state’s consent, the Supreme Court has also recognized two other methods by which the federal government can acquire exclusive jurisdiction over land. First, Congress may condition the admission of a state to the Union on a cession of jurisdiction of land within that state. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526‒27 (1885). And second, states themselves may cede legislative jurisdiction over land within their borders to the federal government. Id. at 540–42. Defendants’ arguments for enclave jurisdiction over the Saipan Property do not involve a straightforward application of any of these methods. Instead, Defendants rely on an intricate web of state and federal statutes to support their theory. Therefore, to determine whether federal enclave jurisdiction exists over the Saipan Property requires a brief historical detour. 12 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC In 1897, California passed a law ceding “to the United States of America exclusive jurisdiction over all lands within this State now held, occupied, or reserved by the Government of the United States for military purposes or defense, or which may hereafter be ceded or conveyed to said United States for such purposes.” 1897 Cal. Stat. ch. 56, § 1. 4 In 1940, Congress passed legislation applying to land acquired thereafter which required the federal government’s assent to exclusive or partial jurisdiction over federal property located within state boundaries. See 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940) (re-codified at 40 U.S.C. § 3112); Paul, 371 U.S. at 264; Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 313 (1943). The 1940 Act provided that “it shall be conclusively presumed that no [exclusive or partial] jurisdiction has been accepted,” “[u]nless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired.” 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940). The 1940 Act mandated that the federal government indicate its acceptance of jurisdiction by “filing a notice of such acceptance with the Governor of such State or in such other manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where such lands are situated.” Id. Following re- codification, the statutory text makes clear that “[i]t is not required that the Federal Government obtain exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over land or an interest in land it acquires.” 40 U.S.C. § 3112(a). From 1941 to 1976, the United States acquired the lands now comprising NAB Coronado, including the Saipan 4 This state law also required the United States to provide “a sufficient description by metes and bounds” of the land and that “a map or plat of such lands” be filed in “the proper office of record in the county” in which the land is located. 1897 Cal. Stat. ch. 56, § 1. The statute was amended with minor modifications in 1943, see 1943 Cal. Stat. ch. 134 § 114, but was later repealed in 1947, see 1947 Cal. Stat. ch. 1532.  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 13 Property, in a series of land transactions as well as by dredging and filling portions of the San Diego Bay. The precise mode and date of the federal government’s acquisition of the Saipan property, however, is contested by the parties. The United States and Plaintiffs rely on a declaration by Lonie Cyr, a senior land surveyor for the Navy, who attests that the government did not acquire the lands where the Saipan Property is located until 1955 through civil condemnation. 5 According to Plaintiffs and the United States, because the acquisition of land through civil condemnation occurred after the 1940 Act, federal enclave jurisdiction over the Saipan Property requires the federal government’s assent to exclusive jurisdiction by “filing a notice of . . . acceptance with the Governor of [the] State or in such other manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where [the] lands are situated.” 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940). By this time, California had also enacted legislation conditioning any transfer of jurisdiction on, inter alia, the federal government’s written assent and the State Lands Commission’s declaration that the transfer was “in the interest of the State.” 1951 Cal. Stat. ch. 875, § 1. Because Defendants have not offered any evidence that the federal government assented to exclusive federal jurisdiction over this property by filing notice or written consent, there can be no federal enclave jurisdiction under this theory. 5 Defendants’ claim that this proffered fact was excluded by the district court is incorrect. The district court expressly overruled Defendants’ objections concerning the factual contentions in the Cyr Declaration, such as how the property came into the United States’ ownership. See supra note 3. 14 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC Defendants respond that the 1940 Act (and its notice- filing requirement) does not apply to the Saipan Property because the relevant parcel was not “acquired” through civil condemnation in 1955; it was instead “made” by the United States by dredging and filling the San Diego Bay to create a seaplane base between 1941 and 1943. According to Defendants, the United States “has sole ownership over land created in this manner,” and they rely on United States v. F.E.B. Corp., 52 F.4th 916, 926‒29 (11th Cir. 2022) to buttress their arguments. 6 But, as the 1940 Act clarified, the United States’ acquisition and ownership of land does not require that the United States obtain exclusive jurisdiction over that land. See 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940); 40 U.S.C. § 3112(a). Therefore, Defendants’ claim of enclave jurisdiction requires two predicates: (1) a factual predicate that the Saipan Property originated from the United States’ own dredging and filling operation from 1941 to 1943 and not the 1955 condemnation proceeding; and (2) a legal predicate that land created by the United States for its own use lies outside the scope of the 1940 Act because it was not “acquired” and instead passed exclusively to the United States based on California’s 1897 ceding statute. We need not resolve the parties’ dispute over the factual predicate because Defendants’ arguments fail to establish the legal predicate. The 1940 Act does not itself define the term “acquire.” See generally, 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940); see also 40 U.S.C. 6 That case involved a dispute about ownership of an island created by the Navy via dredging activities near Key West, Florida. The question presented was not about whether the United States held exclusive jurisdiction over the island, but whether the United States had a claim of ownership over the island pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315.  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 15 §§ 3101‒3177. “Where Congress does not furnish a definition of its own,” courts “generally seek to afford a statutory term its ordinary or natural meaning.” HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refin., LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382, 388 (2021) (quotation and citation omitted). Under Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “acquire” means “[t]o gain possession or control of” or “to get or obtain” “by any means.” Acquire, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also Acquire, Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) (“[t]o become the owner of property; to make property one’s own” “[t]o gain permanently”). Under both its contemporary and historical plain meanings, the term “acquire” contemplates the United States’ acquisition of land created by dredging and filling operations and therefore the Saipan Property falls within the scope of the 1940 Act’s requirements. This plain meaning of the term “acquire” also accords with the purpose of the 1940 Act. The Act followed several Supreme Court decisions that addressed “controversies concerning the relation of federal and state powers over government property,” and, specifically, whether the federal government’s acquisition of property resulted in exclusive federal jurisdiction. Adams, 319 U.S. at 314 (collecting cases). Before enactment, federal government officials conducted a cooperative study which resulted in legislation “aimed at giving broad discretion to the various agencies in order that they might obtain only the necessary jurisdiction.” Id. The 1940 Act achieved this goal by enshrining a presumption against exclusive federal jurisdiction in the absence of express federal assent. See 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940). Defendants rely on a definition of “acquire” from an inapplicable statute relating to timber resources on federal 16 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC lands. See 16 U.S.C. § 620e (noting the definitions of § 620e apply only “[f]or purposes of sections 620 to 620j of this title [16 U.S.C. §§ 620‒620j]”). And the relevant chapter at issue, Title 40, Subtitle II, Chapter 31, does not contain any provision which would suggest that the term “acquire” should be limited to lands obtained via transaction as opposed to creation by the government itself. See generally, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3101‒3177. Even if we were to credit Defendants’ contention that the land was created by the United States and therefore the 1940 Act does not apply because there was no “acquisition,” the California 1897 statute forecloses their argument. That statute provided for the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction only in lands “which may hereafter be ceded or conveyed to said United States for” military purposes or defense. 1897 Cal. Stat. ch. 56, § 1. If, under Defendants’ theory, the land was created by the United States through dredging and filling, the land cannot have been ceded or conveyed by the State of California to the United States. Finally, Defendants presented a different theory for exclusive jurisdiction before the district court that merits brief discussion. Defendants posited below that the United States retains exclusive jurisdiction over lands created by dredging and filling operations under the Submerged Lands Act. See 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a). This, too, is incorrect. Although § 1313 carves out an exception to the Act’s general transfer of federal title and claims to submerged lands within the territorial boundaries of states, nothing in the text of § 1313 suggests that it extinguished state jurisdiction over submerged lands within its territories. Id. Indeed, Congress’ purpose in passing the Submerged Lands Act was “not for the Federal Government to retain exclusive jurisdiction over navigation of the waters above the submerged lands, but for  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 17 the Federal Government to retain concurrent jurisdiction over those waters.” Barber v. State of Hawai’i, 42 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, regardless of the parties’ competing versions of events as to how the Saipan Property came into the United States’ possession, Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that the federal government has assented to exclusive jurisdiction over it so as to establish federal enclave jurisdiction. B. The district court did not err in determining that it lacked jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute. Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant may remove to federal court any civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to . . . [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). We first clarify our circuit’s interpretation of the federal officer removal statute in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, 608 U.S. 1 (2026). Plaquemines illuminates an error in our application of the federal officer removal statute. We clarify the elements for federal officer removal and then apply those elements to facts of this case. 18 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC (1) We must first explain where our precedent went astray. Before Plaquemines, our cases explained that removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 required a defendant to show (1) that they are “person[s] within the meaning of the statute”; (2) that “there is a causal nexus between [their] actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions, and plaintiff’s claims”; and (3) that they “can assert a colorable federal defense.” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Within the causal nexus analysis, we required the defendant to show “(1) that the person was ‘acting under’ a federal officer in performing some ‘act under color of federal office,’ and (2) that such action is causally connected with the plaintiff's claims against it.” County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 755 (9th Cir. 2022). The “acting under” element entailed a “relationship between someone acting under a federal officer and the federal officer” that “typically involves ‘subjection, guidance, or control.’” Stirling v. Minasian, 955 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fidelitad, Inc. v. Insitu, Inc., 904 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2018)). And the “causal connection” element required demonstration that the defendant’s actions were “connected or associated, with acts under color of federal office.” DeFiore v. SOC LLC, 85 F.4th 546, 557 n.6 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)). Despite the “causal” label we employed, our precedent noted that the “causal connection” element did not require a strict causal connection. Id.  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 19 Plaquemines involved an environmental suit brought by coastal parishes in the State of Louisiana against Chevron for the company’s production of crude oil in Louisiana’s coastal zone during World War II. In Plaquemines, the Supreme Court articulated the three requirements for federal officer removal differently than this court: First, the removing defendant must be the United States, a federal agency, a federal officer, or a person ‘acting under’ a federal officer, such as certain private parties hired to assist federal officers. Second, the suit must be ‘for or relating to any act under color of such office.’ Third, the removing defendant must assert ‘a colorable federal defense.’ Plaquemines, 608 U.S. at 6 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court primarily analyzed the “relating to” requirement of the officer removal statute. The Court explained that the “phrase ‘relating to’ sweeps broadly” and is ordinarily understood to mean “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.” Id. at 11 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). A defendant must show “a connection that is not ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral’” but need not “show that his federal duties specifically required or strictly caused the challenged conduct” to satisfy the “relating to” requirement. Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted). Applying this requirement, the Supreme Court held that Chevron’s crude oil production “related to” its performance of its contractual duties to refine aviation gas (“avgas”) for 20 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC the military’s war efforts in World War II. Id. at 13-14. Plaquemines explained that “Chevron’s contract [with the Government] did not have to expressly direct or invite Chevron’s crude-oil production for that conduct to “‘relate to’ its avgas refining.” Id. at 14. It was enough that Chevron’s crude oil production methods—which Plaintiffs challenged as environmentally unsound—enabled the company to “maximize production of crude oil” to service its avgas refining contracts with the Government, and that the Government had incentivized Chevron to maximize crude oil production during the wartime in various ways. See id. at 13 (citation modified). Chevron therefore “plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged conduct and the performance of its federal duties” for purposes of federal officer removal. Id. at 12. Plaquemines also clarified the relationship between the “acting under” and “relating to” requirements under the federal officer removal statute. The Court rejected Louisiana’s alternative theory that “the removal statute requires that the defendant was ‘acting under’ a federal officer in taking the specific actions challenged in the suit.” Id. at 15. Louisiana accepted that “Chevron acted under a federal officer while engaged in avgas refining” but asserted that “the suit is not against a defendant ‘acting under’ an officer” because “Chevron did not produce crude oil pursuant to a federal contract.” Id. The Court explained that this argument “impermissibly conflates” the “acting under” and “relating to” requirements of the officer removal statute because it leaves “the ‘relating to’ requirement with little, if any, independent function.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court observed that the federal officer removal statute “permits the removal of state-court suits against ‘any officer (or any person acting under that officer)’ that are ‘for  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 21 or relating to any act under color of such office.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The removal statute thus “contemplates removal of suits against officers or their agents for acts that were not done under color of their offices, so long as the suits ‘relat[e] to’ such acts.” Id. Plaquemines viewed the “acting under” and “relating to” elements of § 1442(a)(1) as involving analytically distinct inquiries: (1) was the defendant “acting under” the color of office—i.e, under the direction, guidance, or control of an officer (such as aviation gas refinement in Plaquemines), and (2) are the defendant’s acts challenged by plaintiffs (such as the production of crude oil) “related to” acts performed under the color of office. Plaquemines illuminates that our federal officer removal doctrine has gone astray in certain respects. In our application of a causal nexus test, we conflated the requirements of the “acting under” element––to show federal subjection, guidance, or control––with the subject of the “related to” element––the challenged acts. We previously framed “the ‘central issue’ in the causal nexus analysis” as “whether a federal officer directed the defendant to take the action challenged.” Lake, 14 F.4th at 1005 (emphasis added) (citing Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 939 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Fidelitad, Inc., 904 F.3d at 1099)); see, e.g., Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Assocs., Inc., 797 F.3d 720, 728 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring the defendant to show “federal control . . . over the handling of the seized fireworks,” which was the subject of the suit). Under Plaquemines, however, § 1442(a)(1) removal does not require that a federal officer direct the defendant to take the specific action challenged. To satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the removal statute, a defendant is not 22 CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC required to show that they acted under a federal officer “in taking the specific actions challenged in the suit.” Plaquemines, 608 U.S. at 15. And to satisfy the “relating to” requirement, a defendant need not show that a federal officer “expressly direct[ed] or invite[d]” the challenged action. Id. at 14; see also id. at 21 (Jackson, J., concurring) (agreeing that the Fifth Circuit erred because it “faulted Chevron for failing to identify a specific contractual directive ‘pertaining to oil production.’”). Our causal nexus standard thus improperly merged the “acting under” and “related to” elements and imposed a more onerous requirement for defendants by demanding a causal relationship between the two. Indeed, our prior opinion in this case illustrates this error. In our prior opinion, we required Defendants to show “federal control or direction over the relevant actions at issue here—mold testing and remediation” to satisfy the “acting under” element of the causal nexus test. Childs v. San Diego Fam. Hous., LLC, 150 F.4th 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2025), vacated sub nom. San Diego Fam. Hous. v. Childs, No. 25- 1027, 2026 WL 1855130 (U.S. June 29, 2026). We concluded that the federal officer removal statute did not permit Defendants to remove this case to federal court based upon Defendants’ failure to show that they “acted pursuant to the Navy’s instructions with regard to mold inspection and remediation” on Plaintiffs’ properties. Id. at 1162. Accordingly, we clarify the requirements for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) in accordance with Plaquemines. To satisfy the requirements for federal officer removal, (1) “the removing defendant must be the United States, a federal agency, a federal officer, or a person ‘acting under’ a federal officer, such as certain private parties hired to assist federal officers,” (2) the suit must be “for or relating  CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC 23 to any act under color of such office,” and (3) “the removing defendant must assert a colorable federal defense.” Plaquemines, 608 U.S. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). This articulation incorporates our requirement that defendants show that they are persons “within the meaning of the statute.” Durham, 445 F.3d at 1251. As Plaquemines makes clear, a causal nexus analysis is inconsistent with the requirements for federal officer removal, and a removing defendant need not show that his federal duties specifically required or strictly caused the challenged conduct. 7 Plaquemines, 608 U.S. at 11. (2) We now turn to the facts of this case. Defendants have not satisfied the federal officer removal statute because they have not shown that they were “acting under” a federal officer in managing the Saipan property. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). We disagree with Defendants’ contention that they acted under a federal officer merely because they “operate the Navy’s military housing under Navy contracts, oversight, guidance and direction, a task the Navy would otherwise have to do by itself.” Because we conclude that Defendants fail to satisfy the “acting under” requirement of 7 Our causal nexus requirement has also been a source of confusion because we have not required a strict causal connection. See DeFiore, 85 F.4th at 557 n.6; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Par., La., 608 U.S. 1 (2026) (No. 24-813) (observing that the Ninth Circuit’s use of the phrase “causal nexus” stokes “confusion” because we have “watered dow