Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT United States of America, ex rel.; State of No. 25-5924 California, ex rel. KATHERINE D.C. No. ESCALANTE, Relator 8:22-cv-01040-MWC-ADS Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Interested Party - Appellee, THEODORE BENADERET, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michelle Williams Court, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 16, 2026** Pasadena, California Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.*** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. Appellant Katherine Escalante appeals from the district court’s orders denying her motions for default judgment and reconsideration in her qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and the California False Claims Act (CFCA), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12650 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of default judgment, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986), and the denial of reconsideration, Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Escalante’s renewed motion for default judgment on her FCA and CFCA claims based on its application of the Eitel factors. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72 (setting forth factors governing default judgment); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (concluding there was no abuse of discretion in denying default judgment where substantive claims lacked merit); NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that default judgments are disfavored). The district court properly weighed the merits of the substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint under Eitel factors two and three, concluding that Escalante failed to adequately allege that the government suffered actionable financial harm or to identify specific fraudulent claims within the records provided. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (outlining FCA elements); cf. United States v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 2 25-5924 2002) (affirming summary judgment against a qui tam relator where the evidence failed to satisfy an FCA element). The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Escalante’s motion for reconsideration. Because an order denying a motion for default judgment is an interlocutory, non-final order, neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) nor Rule 59(e) governed Escalante’s motion. See Bird v. Reese, 875 F.2d 256, 256 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that an order denying a motion for default judgment is not final); United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that Rules 60(b) and 59(e) apply only to motions attacking final orders). Reconsideration was instead subject to the district court’s inherent authority under Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (providing that any non-final order may be revised prior to entry of final judgment); City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a district court has “inherent procedural power” to reconsider an interlocutory order for sufficient cause) (citation omitted). Although the district court evaluated the motion under Rule 59(e), any error was harmless because Escalante failed to demonstrate any grounds for reconsideration under Local Rule 7-18 or Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless error rule); 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (statutory harmless error); Glanzman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that harmless error applies on Ninth Circuit appeals); Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) 3 25-5924 (asserting that motions for reconsideration should only be granted in extraordinary circumstances). AFFIRMED. 4 25-5924