Escalante v. Benaderet
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-5924
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
United States of America, ex rel.; State of No. 25-5924
California, ex rel. KATHERINE D.C. No.
ESCALANTE, Relator 8:22-cv-01040-MWC-ADS
Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM*
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Interested Party - Appellee,
THEODORE BENADERET,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michelle Williams Court, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 16, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ, District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Appellant Katherine Escalante appeals from the district court’s orders denying
her motions for default judgment and reconsideration in her qui tam action under the
False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and the California False Claims
Act (CFCA), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12650 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of default judgment, Eitel v.
McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986), and the denial of reconsideration,
Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Escalante’s renewed
motion for default judgment on her FCA and CFCA claims based on its application
of the Eitel factors. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72 (setting forth factors governing
default judgment); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (concluding there was no abuse of discretion in denying default judgment
where substantive claims lacked merit); NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d
606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that default judgments are disfavored). The district
court properly weighed the merits of the substantive claims and the sufficiency of
the complaint under Eitel factors two and three, concluding that Escalante failed to
adequately allege that the government suffered actionable financial harm or to
identify specific fraudulent claims within the records provided. See United States ex
rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (outlining FCA
elements); cf. United States v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.
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2002) (affirming summary judgment against a qui tam relator where the evidence
failed to satisfy an FCA element).
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Escalante’s
motion for reconsideration. Because an order denying a motion for default judgment
is an interlocutory, non-final order, neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
nor Rule 59(e) governed Escalante’s motion. See Bird v. Reese, 875 F.2d 256, 256
(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that an order denying a motion for default judgment is not
final); United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
Rules 60(b) and 59(e) apply only to motions attacking final orders). Reconsideration
was instead subject to the district court’s inherent authority under Rule 54(b). See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (providing that any non-final order may be revised prior to entry
of final judgment); City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d
882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a district court has “inherent procedural
power” to reconsider an interlocutory order for sufficient cause) (citation omitted).
Although the district court evaluated the motion under Rule 59(e), any error
was harmless because Escalante failed to demonstrate any grounds for
reconsideration under Local Rule 7-18 or Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61
(harmless error rule); 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (statutory harmless error); Glanzman v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that harmless error applies
on Ninth Circuit appeals); Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003)
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(asserting that motions for reconsideration should only be granted in extraordinary
circumstances).
AFFIRMED.
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