State v. Schuster

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: 3 Filing Date: July 8, 2026 4 NO. S-1-SC-40419 5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 6 Plaintiff- Respondent, 7 v. 8 BRYAN SCHUSTER, 9 Defendant- Petitioner. 10 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI 11 Melissa A. Kennelly, District Judge 12 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 13 Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender 14 MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Petitioner 17 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General 18 Santa Fe, NM 19 Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor General 20 Albuquerque, NM 21 for Respondent  1 OPINION 2 BACON, Justice. 3 {1} Defendant Bryan Schuster challenges the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the 4 district court’s grant of his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy 5 trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 6 enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”); see also N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 (“In 7 all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to have . . . a speedy 8 public trial.”). Defendant was arrested pursuant to a traffic stop and charged with 9 receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, 10 false evidence of title and registration, driving with a suspended license, and driving 11 without insurance. Three years elapsed between Defendant’s arrest and the district 12 court’s disposition of his motion to dismiss, though Defendant was released on his 13 own recognizance throughout. 14 {2} Speedy trial challenges in New Mexico are governed by “the four-factor test 15 set forth in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)], balancing the length of 16 delay, the reason[s] for delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, 17 and the prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4, 406 P.3d 18 505. Defendant challenges three of the Court of Appeals’ determinations under 19 Barker as improper in differing from the district court’s correct determinations.  1 Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded the reasons-for-delay factor weighs 2 “moderately to heavily” for Defendant rather than “heavily,” the assertion-of-the- 3 right factor does not weigh heavily against the State, and Defendant did not show 4 particularized prejudice. See State v. Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶¶ 7, 22, 5 25 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2024) (nonprecedential). Defendant further asserts the 6 Court of Appeals ignored its own precedent in concluding his claimed prejudice was 7 not particularized. 8 {3} Under our weighing of the Barker factors, we hold the first three factors weigh 9 heavily against the State. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals without 10 reaching analysis of the prejudice factor. In addition, to guide lower courts, we 11 explain in detail our departure from the Court of Appeals’ analysis regarding the 12 reasons-for-delay and assertion-of-the-right factors. 13 I. BACKGROUND 14 {4} Defendant was arrested on March 8, 2019, and released on his own 15 recognizance the same day under conditions of release set by the magistrate court 16 and subsequently largely adopted by the district court. On March 15, 2022, more 17 than three years later, the district court conducted a hearing on Defendant’s Motion 18 to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Rights, which the court granted. We discuss  1 the intervening procedural background below as relevant to the lower courts’ speedy 2 trial determinations. 3 {5} In granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court’s findings 4 included that “[t]his is a simple case, in which a delay of longer than one year is 5 presumptively prejudicial to Defendant.” In State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2, 6 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387, we “update[d] our guidelines for determining the 7 length of delay necessary to trigger the speedy trial inquiry[:] twelve months for 8 simple cases, fifteen months for cases of intermediate complexity, and eighteen 9 months for complex cases” (Garza guidelines). Accordingly, the district court found 10 the three-year length of delay—being three times the Garza guideline—to be 11 presumptively prejudicial to Defendant, thereby triggering further inquiry into the 12 Barker factors. See State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 11, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 13 1061 (“The first factor, the length of the delay, serves two functions. Initially, the 14 length of delay must cross a threshold to establish a presumption of prejudice and to 15 trigger further inquiry into the other factors. Once that threshold has been crossed, 16 the burden of persuasion shifts to the [s]tate to show that, considering the four factors 17 as a whole, the defendant’s constitutional rights have not been violated.”). 18 {6} Analyzing the reasons-for-delay factor, the district court began by attributing 19 two months to Defendant, due to his requested extension pursuant to the preliminary  1 examination; six months to neither party, due to COVID-19-related suspensions of 2 jury trials; and the remaining two years and four months to the State. Regarding the 3 State’s culpable delay, the district court then took notice in its findings of the judicial 4 backlog “situation . . . unique to Colfax County,” New Mexico, stemming from a 5 prosecutorial “policy of prosecuting all types of cases to the fullest extent and 6 offering plea agreements that provide relatively little benefit to defendants, without 7 regard for the effect that such a policy has on the [c]ourt’s caseload, on the 8 administration of justice, on defendants, or on victims and the community.” The 9 court further found “[t]he unintended effect of the Colfax County prosecutors’ policy 10 has been to create an ever-expanding jury trial docket (from about 50 cases in 2019 11 to about 175 cases as of February 2022),” resulting in “an untenable bottleneck that 12 has rendered it impossible for defendants to get speedy trials that are guaranteed by 13 the federal and state constitutions.” The court stated the situation is not explained by 14 the effects of COVID-19, as even “[w]ithout the pandemic, the jury trial docket 15 would still contain around 150 or more cases and would still be expanding each 16 month.” The hearing on the motion to dismiss included extensive discussion of this 17 context, including the court questioning how the prosecutor’s office planned to 18 “triage” the backlog of simple fourth-degree felony cases like this one. The 19 prosecutor, serving that jurisdiction since 2017, did not refute the court’s  1 characterization and offered no clear plan to resolve the situation. Notably, the 2 prosecutor did not refute the court’s analysis of the plea terms offered to Defendant, 3 offered three times without alteration, as “not a great plea,” nor the court’s 4 perspective that such “lukewarm plea agreement[s]” have resulted in “a whole 5 docket flooded with low-level felonies.” In its order, the court stated it “has raised 6 this issue with the prosecution in 2020 and again in 2021, and nothing has changed.” 7 Under this analysis, the court implicitly weighed “the reasons for the delay in this 8 case and other cases like it” heavily against the State. 9 {7} For the assertion-of-the-right factor, the district court found that “Defendant 10 has more than adequately asserted his speedy trial right in this case by filing about 11 five demands for speedy trial, in addition to the present motion to dismiss.” 12 {8} For the prejudice factor, the district court found particularized prejudice in 13 Defendant having “lost employment and housing opportunities, his liberty [having] 14 been restricted to the boundaries of Colfax County for three years, and [his having] 15 been subject to arrest at any time during the past three years if he violates that 16 restriction.” The court found exacerbation of “typical stress and anxiety” in such a 17 case due to “the extreme delay . . . attributable to the government.” Alternatively, 18 the district court found presumed prejudice under “the prosecution’s bureaucratic 19 indifference to the capacity of the criminal justice system [which] has caused a delay  1 so excessive that no showing of particularized prejudice is necessary.” As support 2 for this presumed prejudice theory, the court cited State v. Taylor, 2015-NMCA- 3 012, ¶ 25, 343 P.3d 199, which it summarized as holding “the defendant’s speedy 4 trial right was violated without a particularized showing of prejudice” and quoted 5 State v. Palacio, 2009-NMCA-074, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 594, 212 P.3d 1148, “‘It is well 6 established that bureaucratic indifference weighs against the [s]tate and can establish 7 a speedy trial violation.’” 8 {9} In granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court implicitly 9 weighed the Barker factors and concluded, under a finding of either presumed or 10 particularized prejudice, that Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The 11 State timely appealed. 12 {10} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court in a memorandum opinion, 13 concluding that Defendant failed to show particularized prejudice and that the other 14 three factors did not all weigh heavily to support a claim of presumed prejudice. 15 Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 26; see Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 16 (“[G]enerally a defendant must show particularized prejudice of the kind against 17 which the speedy trial right is intended to protect. However, if the length of delay 18 and the reasons for the delay weigh heavily in [the] defendant’s favor and [the] 19 defendant has asserted [the] right and not acquiesced to the delay, then the defendant  1 need not show prejudice for a court to conclude that the defendant’s right has been 2 violated.”). 3 {11} Applying the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals first deferred to the district 4 court’s written finding that this is a simple case, determined the three-year length of 5 delay triggered further analysis under Barker, and weighed the length-of-delay 6 factor heavily against the State. Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶¶ 3-4 & n.1. 7 {12} Analyzing the reasons-for-delay factor, the Court of Appeals organized the 8 total delay between arrest and dismissal into six specific periods, organization that 9 the parties do not contest and we adopt below. Id. ¶ 7. 10 {13} During Period (A), March 8, 2019, to June 14, 2019 (three months and one 11 week), the case was before the magistrate court. Id. ¶ 8. The Court of Appeals 12 attributed two months of this period to Defendant for his requested extension of time 13 regarding the preliminary examination and the remaining one month and one week 14 of the period to the State as negligent or administrative delay. Id. ¶ 9. 15 {14} During Period (B), June 15, 2019, to March 16, 2020 (nine months), the case 16 was bound over to the district court. Id. ¶ 7. The Court of Appeals confirmed and 17 accepted the State’s concession that the delay during Period (B) was negligent or 18 administrative, noting the State “actively moved the case forward” only between 19 June and August. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Subsequent to the State’s filings on August 26, 2019,  1 the record reflects no action by the State in this period to advance the case and 2 includes a continuance due to the State not having obtained lab results as of March 3 2, 2020. The Court’s assessment of Period (B) included a prior continuance of two 4 months attributable to Defendant’s failure to appear at the docket call on January 6, 5 2020. 1 Id. ¶ 10. 6 {15} During Period (C), March 17, 2020, to July 15, 2020 (four months), jury trials 7 were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. ¶ 12. The district court did not 8 assign this delay to either party, and accordingly, the Court of Appeals “presume[d] 9 the district court was correct.” Id. ¶ 13. 10 {16} During Period (D), July 16, 2020, to November 15, 2020 (four months), the 11 suspension of jury trials was lifted, but the Court of Appeals concluded the State did 12 not take “any action to move the case forward.” Id. ¶ 14. The Court weighed Period 13 (D) against the State as negligent or administrative delay. Id. 14 {17} During Period (E), November 16, 2020, to January 1, 2021 (one month and 15 two weeks), jury trials were again suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. ¶ 1 The dissent asserts, based on Defendant’s failure to appear, we should not accept the State’s concession of negligent or administrative delay as the reason for the two months of the prior continuance. Dissent ¶ 69. However, the State conceded in its response to the motion to dismiss that it also did not have the relevant lab results at the time of the prior continuance. Accordingly, we accept the State’s concession regarding the reasons for the Period (B) delay as a whole.  1 15. As with Period (C), the Court of Appeals again presumed the district court was 2 correct and did not assign this delay to either party. Id. 3 {18} Period (F), January 2, 2021, to March 16, 2022 (fourteen months and two 4 weeks), commenced when the suspension of jury trials was again lifted. Id. ¶ 16. The 5 Court of Appeals determined “the State made no attempt to move the case forward” 6 during Period (F), including representing to the district court in February 2022 “that 7 it had neither subpoenaed nor contacted its witnesses even though the trial was 8 scheduled in three weeks.” Id. The Court also recognized that trial was rescheduled 9 twelve times by the district court during Period (F) without any reason being 10 provided and that Defendant filed two additional written demands for a speedy trial 11 and his motion to dismiss. Id. The Court of Appeals weighed Period (F) against the 12 State as “negligent or administrative delay related to a ‘congested docket.’” Id. 13 (brackets omitted) (quoting Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 29). 14 {19} In weighing the aggregated periods of delay, the Court of Appeals recognized 15 “[t]he State’s twenty-eight[-]month delay is twice as long as that necessary to trigger 16 a speedy trial inquiry of a simple case” and that, while “the State made some efforts 17 to take the case to trial, . . . there are long periods of time in which it either was 18 inactive, caused further delay, or did not move the case forward.” Id. ¶ 17. The Court 19 then concluded “the State’s delay weighs moderately to heavily” and that, “[b]ecause  1 the State’s period of delay goes well beyond the [period of delay attributed to 2 Defendant and the neutral periods of delay], . . . this factor in total weighs 3 moderately to heavily against the State.” Id. ¶ 18. 4 {20} Analyzing the assertion-of-the-right factor, the Court of Appeals concurred 5 with the district court “that Defendant ‘more than adequately asserted his speedy 6 trial right’” but nonetheless did not weigh this factor heavily against the State. Id. ¶ 7 22. The Court stated that any one of Defendant’s five assertions “would suffice”— 8 we note six assertions in the record 2—but explained two reasons for not weighing 9 the factor heavily. Id. ¶ 20. 10 First, other than his motion to dismiss, his assertions are pro forma and 11 therefore are given little weight. See [Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 41]. 12 Defendant’s three written demands are identical to each other, the body 13 of each is one sentence, and none contain any argument or provide 14 details about the alleged violation. Second, Defendant’s written 15 assertions and motion to dismiss were all filed within months of 16 scheduled trials. Such assertions merit less weight because, “the closer 17 to trial an assertion is made, the less weight it is given.” [State v.] 18 Gurule, 2025-NMSC-010, ¶ 39[, 536 P.3d 775] (text only) (citation 19 omitted). 20 Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 20. The Court of Appeals’ tally includes Defendant’s “oral demand at 2 Defendant’s arraignment,” as well as three written demands and the motion to dismiss. Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 20. This count omits defense counsel’s initial assertion of the right in his written entry of appearance in the magistrate court.  1 {21} For the prejudice factor, the Court of Appeals determined Defendant did not 2 show particularized prejudice, finding no evidentiary support in the record 3 substantiating the district court’s conclusion otherwise. Id. ¶ 25 (citing State v. 4 Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 39, 283 P.3d 272); see Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, 5 ¶ 39 (“Allegations of counsel are not generally considered evidence.”). 6 {22} The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of the motion to dismiss on the basis 7 of the lack of particularized prejudice and the other three Barker factors not weighing 8 heavily against the State as required under a presumed prejudice analysis. Id. ¶ 26. 9 Defendant timely appealed, and this Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari 10 as to whether the Court of Appeals properly weighed the Barker factors. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 {23} In reviewing a speedy trial claim under the four-factor test in Barker, “We 13 defer to the district court’s factual findings . . . but weigh each factor de novo.” 14 Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4. “The speedy trial analysis is not a rigid or mechanical 15 exercise, but rather ‘a difficult and sensitive balancing process.’” Id. ¶ 5 (quoting 16 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). “The speedy trial right is ‘amorphous, slippery, and 17 necessarily relative.’” Id. (quoting Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89 (2009)); see 18 also Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 (“Barker’s formulation ‘necessarily compels 19 courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis’” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S.  1 at 530)). Notwithstanding its unique character among constitutional rights, Barker, 2 407 U.S. at 519, discussed further below, we remain mindful that “the right to a 3 speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.” 4 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). 5 A. The Length-of-Delay Factor Weighs Heavily Against the State 6 {24} The total delay in this case is more than three years between Defendant’s 7 arrest and the grant of the motion to dismiss. Being three times the Garza guideline 8 for a simple case, this length of delay is presumptively prejudicial and requires 9 further inquiry into the Barker factors. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21; see also State 10 v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 26, 366 P.3d 1121 (“A delay that crosses the threshold 11 for presumptive prejudice necessarily weighs in favor of the accused; the only 12 question is, how heavily?”). But see Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 49 (“We emphasize 13 that these guidelines should not be construed as bright-line tests. Rather, they are 14 meant to guide the district courts’ determination of ‘presumptively prejudicial’ 15 delay.”). 16 {25} As the first factor, the length of delay is not at issue here, as we agree with 17 both lower courts and both parties that this factor weighs heavily against the State. 18 See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA (“The argument [of the brief in chief] shall set forth 19 a specific attack on any finding, or the finding shall be deemed conclusive.”); Rule  1 12-318(B) (“An answer brief shall conform to the requirements of the brief in 2 chief.”). 3 B. The Reasons-for-Delay Factor Weighs Heavily Against the State 4 {26} As we explain herein, when analyzing the reasons-for-delay factor, the Court 5 of Appeals should have assigned heavy weight to the State’s protracted delay 6 because that delay constituted bureaucratic indifference. Concurrently, this delay 7 was exacerbated by the prosecutorial policy of taking every case to trial and offering 8 pleas without favorable terms—a policy recognized by the district court as effecting 9 systemic delay in Colfax County. Under either of these considerations, we hold this 10 factor weighs heavily against the State. We additionally caution that when 11 determining the weight of this factor, courts should not apply methodologies that 12 improperly defray or excuse governmental culpability. 13 {27} “Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to 14 justify the delay. The reasons for a period of the delay may either heighten or temper 15 the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay.” Garza, 2009- 16 NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the Court of 17 Appeals correctly noted, Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶ 23, the Barker test 18 considers three types of delay: 19 First, [a] deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 20 defense should be weighted heavily against the government. Second,  1 negligent or administrative delay weighs less heavily but nevertheless 2 weighs against the [s]tate because the ultimate responsibility for such 3 circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the 4 defendant. Third, neutral delay, or delay justified by a valid reason, 5 does not weigh against either party. 6 Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 18 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 7 and citations omitted); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“[D]ifferent weights should be 8 assigned to different reasons.”). 9 1. The reasons-for-delay factor weighs heavily due to the protractedness of 10 the negligent delay and the inaction by the State amounting to 11 bureaucratic indifference 12 {28} Importantly for this case, we have recognized, “The degree of weight we 13 assign against the [s]tate for negligent delay is closely related to the length of delay: 14 ‘[O]ur toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness, and its 15 consequent threat to the fairness of the accused’s trial.’” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 16 26 (second alteration in original) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 17 657 (1992)). We have further recognized that negligent delay may rise to the level 18 of bureaucratic indifference, which “weigh[s] more heavily against the state than 19 [negligence based on] simple case overload, particularly when the defendant has 20 attempted to safeguard his rights.” Zurla v. State, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 16, 109 N.M. 21 640, 789 P.2d 588. As our Court of Appeals has stated, such bureaucratic 22 indifference may be demonstrated by “[t]he [s]tate’s failure to act.” Palacio, 2009-  1 NMCA-074, ¶ 19. While Zurla and Palacio both concerned the state’s insufficient 2 efforts to locate incarcerated defendants, the principle we cite is not bound to that 3 context. See Zurla, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 15 (criticizing “an unacceptable indifference 4 by the prosecution to its constitutional duty ‘to make a diligent, good-faith effort to 5 bring a defendant to trial’” (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969))); see 6 also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 (“[P]ersistent neglect in concluding a criminal 7 prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to 8 justice.”); State v. Moore, 2016-NMCA-067, ¶ 14, 378 P.3d 552 (weighing eight 9 months heavily against the state where its “actions [in the magistrate court], or lack 10 thereof, qualify as bureaucratic indifference”); Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 15-17 11 (assigning heavy weight to the reasons-for-delay factor where “the [s]tate did 12 nothing to bring the case to trial . . . and offers no explanation for its inaction”); State 13 v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25, 140 N.M. 676, 147 P.3d 885 (“[T]he [s]tate’s 14 inaction in this case can be characterized as ‘bureaucratic indifference,’ which we 15 have held to weigh against the state more heavily than mere negligence.” (quoting 16 State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591)). 17 {29} The Court of Appeals characterized the State’s culpable delay in the present 18 case—identified by the Court in Periods (A), (B), (D), and (F)—as negligent or 19 administrative, noting that “nothing in the record suggests deliberate or intentional  1 delay.” Schuster, A-1-CA-40322, mem. op. ¶¶ 8-17. As discussed, the Court 2 weighed this factor moderately to heavily against the State, explaining that result as 3 follows: 4 The State’s twenty-eight[-]month delay is twice as long as that 5 necessary to trigger a speedy trial inquiry of a simple case. During those 6 twenty-eight months, the record shows that the State made some efforts 7 to take the case to trial, but there are long periods of time in which it 8 either was inactive, caused further delay, or did not move the case 9 forward. 10 Id. ¶ 17 (citation omitted). 11 {30} We conclude the Court of Appeals underweighed the State’s culpability where 12 Period (F) alone constitutes a period of negligent delay so protracted as to weigh this 13 factor heavily against the State and where the State’s persistent inaction constitutes 14 bureaucratic indifference. The case remained in apparent limbo for more than a year 15 during Period (F), rescheduled almost every month without any stated reason, and 16 “the State made no attempt to move the case forward” during this period. Id. ¶ 16. 17 Meanwhile, Defendant asserted his desire for a speedy trial during Period (F) 18 through two written motions and his motion to dismiss, thereby “attempt[ing] to 19 safeguard his rights” in a manner further supporting heavy State culpability. Zurla, 20 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 16. Despite these facts, and despite this fourteen-month-and- 21 two-week period of delay ending only due to dismissal, the Court of Appeals 22 classified the delay as ordinary negligent or administrative delay. Schuster, A-1-CA-  1 40322, mem. op. ¶ 16. Further, we note the State’s final action in the record to 2 actually advance this case occurred on August 26, 2019, during Period (B)—one 3 year and four months before Period (F) began—thus resolving any doubts as to 4 whether the State’s inaction was sufficiently protracted to result in heavy weight of 5 the factor. See id. ¶¶ 10-16. We exclude the five months and two weeks of delay of 6 Periods (C) and (E) from this consideration, during which periods jury trials were 7 suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic; even with that exclusion, however, the 8 facts otherwise between August 29, 2019, and the grant of the motion to dismiss on 9 March 16, 2022, clearly demonstrate the State’s bureaucratic indifference in this 10 case, bolstering the heavy weight of the factor in favor of Defendant’s claim. 11 {31} The State does not meaningfully refute these facts. The State primarily argues 12 that the factor should not weigh heavily where “[t]here is nothing in the record 13 suggesting that the delay was intentional or tantamount to intentional.” Attempting 14 to answer Defendant’s invocation of Taylor, the State further claims, without 15 supporting detail, that this case does not involve conduct that falls within the 16 “‘inexcusably indifferent’” governmental conduct in that case. 17 {32} The State’s cursory arguments fail. First, as our caselaw cited herein 18 establishes, intentionality is not a requirement for concluding heavy weight of the 19 factor either under protractedness of negligent delay generally or under bureaucratic  1 indifference specifically. Second, Taylor characterized as “inexcusably indifferent” 2 the state’s complete inaction during a fifteen-month period of delay between a 3 continuance and a trial setting, in dereliction of its constitutional duty to bring the 4 defendant to trial. 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 14-16; see id. ¶ 16 (“[T]his is a case in which 5 the [s]tate was inexcusably indifferent to its affirmative obligation to bring a simple 6 case to trial.”). Given the comparable facts of Period (F), much less the State’s 7 inaction dating back to Period (B), we see the characterization in Taylor as aptly 8 invoked here by Defendant, and the State presents no meaningful argument under 9 the facts otherwise. The State’s anemic rebuttal is significant here, as the State, 10 “consistent with general principles regarding claims of prejudice to a criminal 11 defendant’s constitutional rights,” bears the burden “to demonstrate that, on balance, 12 the defendant’s speedy trial right was not violated.” Zurla, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 28- 13 29. 14 {33} The dissent asserts that classifying otherwise negligent delay as bureaucratic 15 indifference requires evidence the state took no affirmative steps to advance a case 16 despite possessing available resources to do so, whereas “[h]ere there is no action 17 the State failed to take.” Dissent ¶¶ 83-86. We agree that the essence of bureaucratic 18 indifference under Zurla, Palacio, and Taylor is the state’s failure to act where it 19 otherwise could do so. Zurla, 1990-NMSC-011, ¶ 15; Palacio, 2009-NMCA-074, ¶  1 19; Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 14-16. However, the dissent’s suggestion that the 2 State took all available steps to advance this case, dissent ¶ 85, is refuted both by the 3 governmental inaction in the record, discussed above, and by our caselaw’s frequent 4 recognition that “[i]t is ultimately the state’s duty to make sure that defendants are 5 brought to trial in a timely manner.” Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25 (citing Barker, 6 407 U.S. at 527); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 527 (“A defendant has no duty to bring 7 himself to trial; the [s]tate has that duty as well as the duty of [e]nsuring that the trial 8 is consistent with due process.”); see also Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 (quoting 9 Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25). We echo the conclusion in Stock that the state has a 10 responsibility “to ascertain what [is] happening in [a] case or to move the case 11 forward,” and nothing in this case would support that the State exerted appreciable 12 effort to meet such a responsibility. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 25. For these reasons, 13 we weigh this factor heavily against the State. 14 2. The reasons-for-delay factor weighs heavily due to the prosecutorial 15 policy exacerbating delay as found by the district court 16 {34} Additionally, Defendant points to the district court’s findings “that the delay 17 in this case resulted from the policy of the Colfax County district attorney’s office” 18 of refusing to offer “meaningful pleas or diversion [programs]” even for low-level 19 felonies, resulting in unique systemic congestion that rendered speedy trials 20 unavailable to defendants in that jurisdiction.  1 {35} The Court of Appeals made no mention whatsoever of the district court’s 2 findings regarding the determinative role in the delay played by the relevant 3 prosecutorial “policy of prosecuting all types of cases to the fullest extent and 4 offering plea agreements that provide relatively little benefit to defendants.” This 5 absence is significant because (1) the district court specifically attributed the reasons 6 for the two-year-and-four-month governmental delay to the “untenable bottleneck” 7 of the county’s trial docket created by this prosecutorial policy and (2) factual 8 findings by the district court in a speedy trial claim are entitled to deference, Serros, 9 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 20. Applying that deference, and in the absence of relevant 10 rebuttal by the State, we conclude the prosecutorial policy identified by the district 11 court provides an independent basis for the reasons-for-delay factor to weigh heavily 12 against the State. 13 {36} As discussed above, the district court found that the prosecutorial policy in 14 question was responsible “for the delay in this case and other cases like it” where 15 the resultant congestion of the trial docket “has rendered it impossible for defendants 16 to get speedy trials.” The court further found the relevant policy had been exercised 17 for at least five years, the “ever-expanding jury trial docket” was not attributable to 18 the COVID-19 pandemic, and “nothing has changed” in this situation despite the 19 court raising the issue with the prosecution in each of the previous two years. These  1 findings in the district court’s order followed extensive discussion of these issues at 2 the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The discussion included the following 3 characterizations by the court, unrebutted by the prosecutor: 4 Analyzing the plea that was offered [in this fourth-degree felony case], 5 it’s not a great plea. . . . What’s happening now is we just have a whole 6 docket flooded with low-level felonies. . . . The court can’t possibly 7 have 100, 150 jury trials. We don’t even have enough people in the 8 county to serve on those juries. . . . The way I see it is that it’s the 9 [prosecutor’s] office that’s in complete control over how many cases 10 are maintained on the court’s docket [and over] how many cases that 11 the public defenders have to have on their caseload. 12 While the issues were discussed at length by the court and counsel for both parties, 13 the existence and effect of the prosecutorial policy at issue was not meaningfully 14 rebutted by the State at the hearing. Under the foregoing evidence, we have no 15 trouble concluding the district court’s findings regarding the relevant prosecutorial 16 policy are sufficiently substantiated by the record to warrant deference. 17 {37} Before this Court, the State effectively concedes the issue. The State 18 acknowledges the district court’s relevant findings and relies on the premise that, 19 “even if the prosecution’s plea bargaining approach resulted in more trials and a 20 larger trial docket, that does not equate to intentional delay or anything functionally 21 equivalent.” As we have discussed, intentionality is not a requirement for heavy 22 culpability for this factor.  1 {38} The dissent contends the district court’s findings are not entitled to deference 2 because they were not supported by substantial evidence in the record, where the 3 hearing consisted only of discussion between the court and counsel for both parties. 4 Dissent ¶¶ 88-90. While we agree the evidentiary value of this hearing was limited, 5 the dissent ignores that the district court inherently took judicial notice of 6 adjudicative facts well within its purview under Rule 11-201 NMRA. Under the rule, 7 a court “at any stage of the proceeding” may sua sponte take notice of facts “not 8 subject to reasonable dispute because [they are] generally known within the court’s 9 territorial jurisdiction[ or] can be accurately and readily determined from sources 10 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Rule 11-201(B)-(D). In its order, 11 regarding “the reasons for the delay in this case and other cases like it,” the district 12 court implicitly took judicial notice of facts sufficient to establish the relevant policy 13 based on the court’s own experience in its territorial jurisdiction, including: 14 • The absence of a “rule of criminal procedure in the district courts setting forth 15 a time limit for trial as there is in the magistrate courts” which would provide 16 “incentive for prosecutors in Colfax County to seek early and efficient 17 resolution of cases”; 18 • The “policy” exercised by “[t]he prosecutors who have worked in Colfax 19 County over the last five years or more, and more particularly the prosecutors  1 who have been involved [in] this case” “of prosecuting all types of cases to 2 the fullest extent and offering plea agreements that provide relatively little 3 benefit to defendants”; 4 • The court’s “ever-expanding jury trial docket (from about 50 cases in 2019 to 5 about 175 cases as of February 2022),” resulting in “an untenable bottleneck 6 that has rendered it impossible for defendants to get speedy trials”; 7 • The effects of the pandemic not being responsible for the congested jury trial 8 docket in Colfax County, which “would still contain around 150 or more cases 9 and would still be expanding each month” under the prosecutorial policy; and 10 • The court having “raised this issue with the prosecution in 2020 and again in 11 2021, and nothing has changed.” 12 Additionally, the concerns of Rule 11-201(E) (opportunity to be heard) are not 13 raised, as the State had ample opportunity to address the court’s noticed facts at the 14 hearing and since, including in its briefing here. In that context, the lack of rebuttal 15 by the prosecutor on relevant circumstances is significant. The dissent cites 16 anecdotal information shared by the prosecutor at the hearing, such as that her own 17 personal caseload had decreased during the relevant period, dissent ¶ 89, but nothing 18 in the prosecutor’s commentary or the State’s briefing here impugns the district  1 court’s factual findings supporting the existence of the relevant policy affecting the 2 Colfax County trial docket generally. 3 {39} The dissent also asserts the district court’s commentary on the specific plea 4 terms offered to Defendant was improper. Dissent ¶ 102. We disagree. The issue 5 before the court included whether the State was culpable for unreasonable delay in 6 violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Discussion at the hearing relevantly 7 included whether a prosecutorial policy existed in tension with the State’s obligation 8 to move cases forward, including Defendant’s case. In that context, it was not 9 improper for the court to consider whether the prosecution had taken available steps 10 to advance Defendant’s three-year-old case, including offering reasonable plea 11 terms. This was not a hearing for judicial approval of the plea itself, and thus the 12 dissent’s citations invoking the specter of judicial curtailment of prosecutorial 13 discreti