State v. Eaker

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: 3 Filing Date: June 17, 2026 4 NO. S-1-SC-40604 5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellant, 7 v. 8 HEZEKIAH D. EAKER, 9 Defendant-Appellee. 10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 11 Stephen P. Ochoa, District Judge 12 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 Sarah M. Karni, Assistant Solicitor General 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellant 17 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 18 Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender 19 Mark A. Peralta-Silva, Assistant Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellee  1 OPINION 2 VARGAS, Chief Justice. 3 {1} In this case we determine whether NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-10.1 (2007)— 4 which establishes a parole framework for sex offenders—provides that incarceration 5 in prison is a prerequisite to the imposition of sex offender parole. We conclude that 6 it does not. Instead, pursuant to the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the plain 7 language of Section 31-21-10.1 and for additional reasons explained herein, sex 8 offender parole is imposed at sentencing. 9 {2} Defendant Hezekiah Eaker filed a habeas petition requesting release from his 10 indeterminate five- to twenty-year term of sex offender parole, arguing that the 11 parole sentence was illegally imposed because he was never incarcerated in prison 12 on the related conviction. Because the district court erroneously granted Defendant’s 13 petition and released him from sex offender parole, we reverse and remand for 14 proceedings consistent with this opinion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 {3} In July 2012, Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of criminal sexual 17 penetration (CSP) in the third degree, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-11(F) 18 (2009), and one count of incest, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-10-3 (1963).  1 Guided by the wishes of the victim—who is Defendant’s sister—the State did not 2 oppose a conditional discharge for Defendant, which the district court granted. 3 {4} The district court cautioned Defendant that he did not “deserve” a conditional 4 discharge and that future incarceration in the case would result in a five- to twenty- 5 year term of sex offender parole. Accordingly, the conditional discharge order 6 provided for a five- to twenty-year sex offender parole term in the event of 7 incarceration. It also ordered a five-year term of supervised probation. 8 {5} In November 2013, the State moved to revoke Defendant’s probation. He was 9 apprehended after a woman called the police to report a man—Defendant—staring 10 at her from across the road for hours. She later reported that Defendant, while 11 looking at her residence, placed his hands on his unexposed genitals and made 12 thrusting motions. She stated that it was not the only time Defendant had stared at 13 her from across the road. The State’s probation revocation motion was based on 14 Defendant violating probation conditions related to the use of controlled substances, 15 use of alcohol, violating laws or ordinances, and contact with a child. 16 {6} In November 2014, after a competency evaluation and various delays, 17 Defendant pleaded no contest to violating parole in November 2013. After further 18 delay, the district court entered an order revoking Defendant’s probation and 19 conditional discharge at a hearing in November 2015. On December 22, 2015, 2  1 Defendant was transferred from jail to prison. The district court amended its order 2 revoking Defendant’s probation and conditional discharge in January 2016. 3 {7} The revocation order adjudicated Defendant guilty of both CSP and incest. 4 See NMSA 1978, § 31-20-13(A)-(B) (1994) (“If the person violates any of the 5 conditions of probation” after receiving a conditional discharge, then “the court may 6 enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided by law.”). The 7 district court sentenced Defendant to three years of incarceration for each count, to 8 run consecutively. Defendant received a two-year parole sentence for incest and an 9 indeterminate five- to twenty-year sex offender parole term for CSP in the third 10 degree. 11 {8} Defendant filed a habeas petition in district court in December 2022 and then 12 an amended petition in May 2023. He raised three issues in his amended petition, 13 including a request to be released from his indeterminate five- to twenty-year term 14 of sex offender parole. He argued that the sentence for CSP expired before he was 15 transferred to prison, and because prison is a prerequisite to sex offender parole, his 16 sex offender parole was “not authorized” as a matter of law. The district court agreed 17 with Defendant that he could not be sentenced to an indeterminate five- to twenty- 18 year term of sex offender parole because Defendant did not serve any of that 3  1 sentence in prison. The district court therefore discharged Defendant from his sex 2 offender parole term and declined to address Defendant’s other two arguments.1 3 {9} The State appeals directly to this Court. See Rule 5-802(N)(1) NMRA; Rule 4 12-102(A)(3) NMRA (requiring that “appeals from the granting of writs of habeas 5 corpus” be taken to this Court). 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 A. Standard of Review and Principles of Construction 8 {10} When reviewing the grant or denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, we 9 review factual questions for substantial evidence, and questions of law are reviewed 10 de novo. State v. Worley, 2020-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 12-13, 476 P.3d 1212. 11 {11} Statutory construction of Section 31-21-10.1 “is a matter of law that we 12 review de novo.” State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 13 868. “When construing statutes, our guiding principle is to determine and give effect 14 to legislative intent.” Ferlic v. Mesilla Valley Reg’l Dispatch Auth., 2025-NMSC- 15 028, ¶ 10, 578 P.3d 1051 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The 1 Defendant’s two unreviewed arguments were that he should be “Immediately Discharge[d] . . . from Any Further Obligations Under His Sentence” because he did not receive a parole duration review hearing after serving five years of sex offender parole, as required by statute, and that the district court failed to advise Defendant of his maximum sentence prior to accepting Defendant’s plea. 4  1 primary indicator of the Legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute,” and 2 when the plain language of the “statute is clear and unambiguous, we interpret it as 3 written.” Lion’s Gate Water v. D’Antonio, 2009-NMSC-057, ¶ 23, 147 N.M. 523, 4 226 P.3d 622. But “[i]f the result of adopting a strict construction of the statutory 5 language would be absurd or unreasonable, then we interpret the statute according 6 to its obvious spirit or reason.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 {12} To discern the legislative spirit or reason, we may consider “[t]he legislative 8 history of the statute, including historical amendments, and whether it is part of a 9 more comprehensive act.” State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 10 P.3d 1064 (citation omitted). In considering a statute’s meaning by reference to its 11 place within a more comprehensive act, we “read different legislative enactments as 12 harmonious instead of as contradicting one another,” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC- 13 001, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and citation 14 omitted); that is, in pari materia, Bolen v. N.M. Racing Comm’n, 2025-NMSC-034, 15 ¶ 17, 578 P.3d 1121. 16 B. The District Court Erred in Discharging Defendant from His Five- to 17 Twenty-Year Sex Offender Parole Sentence, Which Had Been Ordered 18 Pursuant to Section 31-21-10.1 19 {13} Section 31-21-10.1(A), (A)(1) provides: 20 If the district court sentences a sex offender to a term of incarceration 21 in a facility designated by the corrections department, the district court 5  1 shall include a provision in the judgment and sentence that specifically 2 requires the sex offender to serve an indeterminate period of supervised 3 parole for a period of . . . not less than five years and not in excess of 4 twenty years for the offense of . . . [CSP] in the third degree. 5 (Emphasis added.) 6 {14} The State argues that in order to impose sex offender parole, the plain 7 language of Section 31-21-10.1 merely requires that a sex offender be sentenced to 8 a prison term. The State relatedly argues that the statute does not require that a sex 9 offender also serve time in prison, contrary to the conclusion of the district court. 10 {15} We agree with the State. In light of our conclusion, we need not address the 11 State’s alternative argument with respect to the sequence of the sentences. The plain 12 language of Section 31-21-10.1 clearly connects sex offender parole to the sentence 13 of a sex offender. Under the plain language of Section 31-21-10.1(A)(1), a defendant 14 who is sentenced for CSP (or another enumerated sex crime) is subject to 15 indeterminate sex offender parole. See also State v. Benavidez, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 16 33, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-40452, Feb. 23, 2026) (“[O]ur criminal sentencing laws 17 impose a period of parole on every defendant convicted of a felony and sentenced to 18 imprisonment for more than one year.” (emphasis added)). There is no additional 19 requirement in the statutory language of Section 31-21-10.1 that a defendant who 20 commits one of the enumerated sex crimes must serve time in prison to be subject 21 to indeterminate sex offender parole, and “[w]e will not read into a statute language 6  1 which is not there.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 2 579. 3 {16} Defendant argues that the comprehensive statutory scheme for parole counsels 4 a different result. Because the language of the statute at issue is plain and 5 unambiguous, we can interpret it as written without searching for its meaning within 6 a more comprehensive scheme. See Lion’s Gate Water, 2009-NMSC-057, ¶ 23 7 (stating that we interpret the language of a statute as written when the language is 8 clear and unambiguous); Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 10, 13 (stating that we can 9 consider a statute’s meaning within a more comprehensive act, and in doing so 10 attempt to read statutes in harmony, where the language of the statute is unclear or 11 ambiguous). Yet even reading Section 31-21-10.1(A)(1) in pari materia with other 12 parole-related statutes is unavailing to Defendant. 13 {17} As Defendant suggests, Section 31-21-10.1 is part of the broader statutory 14 framework of parole. Cf. State v. Pelt, 2025-NMSC-042, ¶ 4, 580 P.3d 164 (holding 15 that “both the general probation statute and the sex-offender-specific statute apply 16 to sex offenders”). In Pelt, we recognized that “there are key differences between 17 the general and sex-offender-specific probation statutes”; however, we concluded 18 that “[r]eading those differences harmoniously . . . evinces a coherent scheme of sex- 19 offender probation that provides for an extended period of supervision that is 7  1 integrable with the process used for other probationers.” Id. ¶ 8. The Pelt approach 2 to the statutory scheme for probation is analogous to the statutory scheme for parole 3 rendering it helpful here: the sex-offender-specific parole statute—Section 31-21- 4 10.1—is not self-contained; rather, it is integrated into the broader parole scheme. 5 See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 31-21-10(F) (2025)2 (providing a mechanism for 6 satisfaction and discharge from parole); § 31-21-10.1 (providing terms, conditions, 7 and period of sex offender parole but without providing any mechanism for 8 satisfaction and discharge from parole akin to that provided in Section 31-21-10(F)); 9 § 31-21-10(D) (“Except for certain sex offenders as provided in Section 31-21-10.1 10 NMSA 1978, an inmate who was convicted of a first, second or third degree felony 11 and who has served the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the court in an 12 institution designated by the corrections department shall be required to undergo a 13 two-year period of parole.” (emphasis added)). 14 {18} Defendant argues that his proposed construction of Section 31-21-10.1—that 15 sex offender parole can only be imposed after a defendant has served time in 16 prison—is supported by construing Section 31-21-10.1 in pari materia with NMSA Section 31-21-10 was amended, effective May 20, 2025. Although the 2 wording did not change, the subsections were redesignated. We cite to the 2025 subsection designations as relied upon by the parties. 8  1 1978, Section 31-18-15(C), (D) (2007, amended 2025), and in light of State v. 2 Brown, 1999-NMSC-004, 126 N.M. 642, 974 P.2d 136. We are not persuaded. 3 {19} Following the reasoning of the district court, Defendant argues that Section 4 31-18-15(C) (2007) establishes that sex offender parole cannot be imposed unless a 5 defendant has served time in prison. Section 31-18-15(C) (2007) provides, 6 The court shall include in the judgment and sentence of each person 7 convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a corrections facility 8 designated by the corrections department authority for a period of 9 parole to be served in accordance with the provisions of Section 31-21- 10 10 NMSA 1978 after the completion of any actual time of 11 imprisonment. 12 The district court, in its order discharging Defendant from sex offender parole, 13 interpreted Section 31-18-15(C) (2007) to mean that “parole may only be imposed 14 after the completion of any actual time of imprisonment in a NMCD corrections 15 facility” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 {20} We disagree with the conclusion of the district court and Defendant—based 17 on Section 31-18-15(C) (2007)—that sex offender parole cannot be imposed unless 18 a defendant has been incarcerated in prison. Indeterminate sex offender parole is in 19 fact imposed at sentencing because the Legislature has stated in Section 31-21- 20 10.1(A) that the district court must include it in the judgment and sentence for certain 21 enumerated sex crimes. Id. (“If the district court sentences a sex offender to a term 22 of incarceration in a facility designated by the corrections department, the district 9  1 court shall include a provision in the judgment and sentence that specifically requires 2 the sex offender to serve an indeterminate period of supervised parole.”). Indeed, 3 Section 31-18-15(C) (2007) itself provides that the “period of parole shall be deemed 4 to be part of the sentence of the convicted person in addition to the basic sentence 5 imposed.” Thus, parole is imposed and attaches at sentencing along with the basic 6 sentence; parole simply does not commence until the completion of the initial basic 7 sentence. Gillespie v. State, 1988-NMSC-068, ¶ 3, 107 N.M. 455, 760 P.2d 147 8 (“[T]he parole period for each offense commences immediately after the completion 9 of the period of incarceration for each offense so that the parole period attached to 10 each felony will run concurrently with any subsequent sentence then being served.”). 11 {21} Moreover, to the extent that Defendant correctly identifies tension between 12 the plain language of Section 31-21-10.1(A) and the language in Section 31-18- 13 15(C) (2007) referring to “a period of parole to be served in accordance with the 14 provisions of Section 31-21-10 NMSA 1978 after the completion of any actual time 15 of imprisonment,” the general/specific canon of statutory interpretation resolves that 16 tension in favor of Section 31-21-10.1. See State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 17 7, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456 (stating that, under the general/specific statute rule, 18 “if two statutes dealing with the same subject conflict, the more specific statute will 19 prevail over the more general statute absent a clear expression of legislative intent 10  1 to the contrary”). In sum, Defendant’s argument grounded in Section 31-18-15(C) 2 (2007) —that sex offender parole cannot be imposed absent time served in prison— 3 fails to overcome the intent of the Legislature as manifest in the plain language of 4 Section 31-21-10.1 that sex offender parole is mandatory and attaches at sentencing. 5 {22} Defendant also relies on Section 31-18-15(D) (2007), which provides that 6 when a court sentences a defendant to prison but suspends or defers the defendant’s 7 basic sentence: 8 [T]he period of parole shall be served in accordance with the provisions 9 of Section 31-21-10 NMSA 1978 for the degree of felony for the basic 10 sentence for which the inmate was convicted. For the purpose of 11 designating a period of parole, a court shall not consider that the basic 12 sentence of imprisonment was suspended or deferred and that the 13 inmate served a period of imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of 14 the Criminal Sentencing Act. 15 Defendant argues that this statute “recognizes that parole follows a prison term.” 16 That is incorrect. Section 31-18-15(D) (2007) merely requires a court to impose 17 parole based on the basic sentence of the defendant’s crime notwithstanding any 18 suspension or deferral. See Benavidez, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 34 (interpreting Section 19 31-18-15(D) (2022)3 to require a court to designate the period of a defendant’s parole 3 While we interpreted the 2022 version of Section 31-18-15(D) in Benavidez, the pertinent language remains unchanged from Section 31-18-15(D) (2007), the relevant version here, which provides that “the period of parole shall be served . . . for the degree of felony for the basic sentence for which the inmate was convicted.” 11  1 based on the “basic sentence of the defendant’s crime” without reference to “any 2 mitigation in the defendant’s prison sentence”). Also, as Defendant acknowledges, 3 Section 31-18-15(D) (2007) does not apply to the sex offender parole statute, Section 4 31-21-10.1; it applies to other crimes. Compare § 31-18-15(D) (2007) (stating that 5 it applies to defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment under NMSA 1978, 6 Section 31-18-15.1 (2009), NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-16 (1993), or NMSA 1978, 7 Section 31-18-17 (2003)), with § 31-21-10.1(I) (defining “sex offender” as 8 applicable to convictions pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-4-1 (2003), NMSA 9 1978, Section 30-9-11 (2009), NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-13 (2003), NMSA 1978, 10 Section 30-6A-3 (2007), NMSA 1978, Section 30-6A-4 (1989), and NMSA 1978, 11 Section 30-37-3.2 (2007)). 12 {23} Defendant also relies on Brown, and several statutes to make the point that, as 13 we stated in Brown: “only prison sentences, not jail sentences, can have a parole 14 requirement.” 1999-NMSC-004, ¶ 12. True, but unhelpful to Defendant, as 15 Defendant was sentenced to prison by the district court’s revocation order, so 16 Brown’s guidance with respect to jail sentences is of no import. 17 {24} Defendant’s additional argument relying on the result in Brown is somewhat 18 unclear and also unavailing; Brown is entirely distinguishable. The question at issue 19 in Brown was whether the defendant was “entitled to have the time he served on 12  1 probation credited as time served on parole,” and we determined that parole was not 2 authorized under the circumstances in that case. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The question in that 3 case is not at issue here, and we do not issue advisory opinions. See City of Las 4 Cruces v. El Paso Elec. Co., 1998-NMSC-006, ¶ 18, 124 N.M. 640, 954 P.2d 72 5 (explaining that, as a general matter, we will not render advisory opinions). 6 Furthermore, the result in Brown turned on the fact that the defendant was sentenced 7 to jail and not prison; whereas here, Defendant was sentenced to prison. See Brown, 8 1999-NMSC-004, ¶ 12 (“Because the court sentenced Brown to jail and not to 9 prison, parole was not authorized.”). Lastly, Brown was not a sex offender parole 10 case—Brown pleaded guilty to a charge of felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm, id. ¶ 11 2—and our opinion in Brown was issued prior to the passage of Section 31-21-10.1. 12 Compare 2003 N.M. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 9 (enacting Section 31-21-10.1 13 in 2003), with Brown, 1999-NMSC-004 (indicating that it was issued in 1999). See 14 also Dominguez v. State, 2015-NMSC-014, ¶ 16, 348 P.3d 183 (recognizing that 15 “cases are not authority for propositions not considered” (internal quotation marks 16 and citation omitted)). We are not persuaded by Brown or Defendant’s argument 17 based thereon to depart from the plain language of Section 31-21-10.1. 18 {25} We lastly note that Defendant’s proposed interpretation of Section 31-21-10.1 19 would lead to arbitrary disparate treatment of sex offenders with regard to sex 13  1 offender parole and would incentivize pretrial delay on the part of defendants. The 2 result would be deeply contrary to the intent of the Legislature. 3 {26} Our Legislature established that the purpose of parole is to ensure that the 4 treatment of convicts 5 shall take into consideration their individual characteristics, 6 circumstances, needs and potentialities as revealed by case study, and 7 that such persons shall be dealt with . . . under parole supervision when 8 a period of institutional treatment is deemed essential in light of the 9 needs of public safety and their own welfare. 10 NMSA 1978, § 31-21-4 (1963) (stating the construction and purpose of the 11 Probation and Parole Act). “In other words, tailored conditions of parole are 12 contemplated to facilitate the rehabilitation of sex offenders and their reintegration 13 into the community.” Aragon v. Martinez, 2025-NMSC-046, ¶ 19, 580 P.3d 202. 14 {27} With regard specifically to sex offender parole pursuant to Section 31-21- 15 10.1, “The state undoubtedly has a strong interest in rehabilitating and reintegrating 16 convicted sex offenders through indeterminate parole while also ensuring the safety 17 of the community.” Aragon, 2025-NMSC-046, ¶ 40. “New Mexico . . . uses 18 indeterminate parole to allow parole authorities to adjust the length of incarceration 19 based on a prisoner’s progress toward rehabilitation, ensuring that the punishment 20 fits the offender.” Id. ¶ 20 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 21 Sex offender parole is structured differently from parole for other crimes: the period 14  1 of parole supervision is longer relative to the degree of the felony. Compare, e.g., § 2 31-21-10(D) (providing a parole term of two years for a first-degree felony that is 3 not a qualifying sex offense), with § 31-21-10.1(A)(2) (providing a sex offender 4 parole term of five years to life for second-degree CSP). 5 {28} Under Defendant’s proposed reading of Section 31-21-10.1, a sex offender 6 could avoid sex offender parole entirely if preconviction or presentence delay results 7 in the defendant serving out the sentence in jail. That would be contrary to the 8 Legislature’s clear intent to tailor conditions of parole to the “individual 9 characteristics, circumstances, [and] needs” of the defendant, § 31-21-4, and the 10 state’s “strong interest in rehabilitating and reintegrating convicted sex offenders 11 through indeterminate parole,” Aragon, 2025-NMSC-046, ¶ 40. For this reason, 12 also, we reject Defendant’s argument. 13 III. CONCLUSION 14 {29} We hold that under the plain language of Section 31-21-10.1 and as confirmed 15 by the additional reasons explained herein, sex offender parole is imposed at 16 sentencing. Because the district court erroneously granted Defendant’s petition for 17 habeas corpus and released him from sex offender parole, we reverse and remand 18 for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 15  1 {30} IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 3 JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice 4 WE CONCUR: 5 6 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice 7 8 C. SHANNON BACON, Justice 9 10 DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice 11 12 BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice 16