In Re Detsoi

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: 3 Filing Date: July 10, 2026 4 NO. S-1-SC-40574 5 INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, 6 JSC Inquiry Nos. 2023-061, 2023-078, 7 2024-020, 2024-021, 2024-024, 8 2024-030, 2024-085, 2024-089, 9 2024-090, 2024-111, 2024-130 10 IN THE MATTER OF 11 HON. BRENT A. DETSOI, 12 McKinley County Magistrate Court 13 New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission 14 Phyllis A. Dominguez 15 Marcus J. Blais 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Petitioner 18 Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, PA 19 Jack M. Brant 20 Charles K. Purcell 21 Albuquerque, NM 22 Wiggins, Williams & Wesenberg, PC 23 Patricia G. Williams 24 Albuquerque, NM 25 for Respondent  1 OPINION 2 PER CURIAM. 3 {1} This matter came before the Court on a petition for discipline filed by the 4 Judicial Standards Commission (the Commission). As grounds for recommending 5 the immediate and permanent removal of the Honorable Brent A. Detsoi 6 (Respondent) from his position as a magistrate judge in McKinley County, New 7 Mexico, the Commission determined that Respondent had engaged in willful 8 misconduct in a series of thirteen cases in which he raised the issue of criminal 9 jurisdiction sua sponte at various points in cases, including at arraignment and, after 10 informally confirming the respective defendants’ Indian status, summarily dismissed 11 each of the prosecutions without sufficient or any notice and without a hearing. 12 Testimony elicited at Respondent’s hearing before the Commission indicated that 13 Respondent had dismissed as many as sixty-three criminal prosecutions under 14 similar circumstances. Respondent continued to dismiss criminal prosecutions 15 despite multiple prior occasions on which he was reversed on appeal or counseled, 16 warned, or admonished about the impropriety of such wholesale dismissals by fellow 17 judges, court staff, and Administrative Office of the Courts personnel. 18 {2} To counter the Commission’s recommendation to discipline and remove him 19 from office, Respondent advances two principal contentions. First, Respondent  1 argues that the Commission violated principles of fundamental fairness and 2 procedural due process by denying his motion to appoint masters to adjudicate the 3 charges against him. In Respondent’s view, the Commission could not be fair and 4 impartial because, in accordance with its own rules, it had overseen the investigation 5 into the allegations of his misconduct and engaged in “secret, ex parte 6 communications” with the executive director of the Commission and investigative 7 trial counsel before issuing a notice of formal proceedings and adjudicating the 8 charges against him. See, e.g., Rule jsc-15(G)(1) NMRA (“[U]ntil issuance of a 9 notice of formal proceedings, investigative trial counsel shall report to the 10 Commission at each regular meeting on the progress of an investigation and the 11 response to a notice of investigation. The Commission may monitor reports, direct 12 the nature and extent of the investigation, or dispose of the complaint.”). To be clear, 13 Respondent does not argue or offer evidence to support a finding that the 14 Commission was actually biased or prejudged the charges against him; 1 rather, he 15 argues the Commission’s dual roles of investigator and adjudicator create the 1 Respondent also conceded at oral argument before this Court that he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the Commission’s factual findings in this case.  1 appearance of prejudgment bias and “a lack of impartiality inherent in the challenged 2 procedure.” 3 {3} Second, Respondent challenges the validity of the Commission’s disciplinary 4 recommendation on the ground that the charges against him are founded on nothing 5 more than accusations of simple legal error, which he asserts “[can]not constitute 6 willful misconduct in office . . . [and are not] a permissible basis upon which to 7 discipline a [j]udge.” As Respondent sees it, reversal on appeal—not a judge’s 8 discipline or removal—is the appropriate remedy for a judge’s legal error. 9 {4} After oral argument, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on 10 Respondent’s first argument, limited to the following question: “whether the 11 procedure provided by [the Commission] in this proceeding is constitutional under 12 the New Mexico Constitution.” Amended Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. 13 Nov. 3, 2025). Upon review of the briefing from the parties, we issued an order 14 granting the Commission’s petition for discipline and imposing the recommended 15 sanction of removal. Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. Feb. 25, 2026). At 16 the Commission’s request, we now file this opinion to set out the reasoning behind 17 our prior order. Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. Apr. 13, 2026).  1 I. DISCUSSION 2 A. Standard of Review 3 {5} In deciding whether to discipline a judge, this Court “undertake[s] an 4 independent evaluation of the record to determine whether clear and convincing 5 evidence supports the Commission’s recommendation, but in so doing, . . . give[s] 6 weight to the evidentiary findings of those who were able to judge credibility.” In re 7 Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 617, 190 P.3d 338 (per curiam) (internal 8 quotation marks and citation omitted). The meaning of clear and convincing 9 evidence is well established: the evidence “‘instantly tilts the scales in the 10 affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s 11 mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.’” Id. (text only)2 12 (quoting State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t v. Joseph M., 2006-NMCA-029, 13 ¶ 15, 139 N.M. 137, 130 P.3d 198). And “[t]here need not be clear and convincing 14 evidence to support each and every one of the Commission’s evidentiary findings,” 15 so long as there is “clear and convincing evidence that there is willful judicial 16 misconduct which merits discipline.” In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 37, 119 2 “(Text only)” indicates the omission of nonessential punctuation marks— including internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets—that are present in the text of the quoted source, leaving the quoted text otherwise unchanged.  1 N.M. 140, 889 P.2d 175 (per curiam). “[W]e review conclusions of law and 2 recommendations for discipline de novo.” In re Griego, 2008-NMSC-020, ¶ 7, 143 3 N.M. 698, 181 P.3d 690 (per curiam). Applying our standard of review to this case, 4 we turn first to Respondent’s arguments related to the constitutionality of the 5 Commission’s procedures. Finding no merit in those arguments, we address his 6 argument about the viability of judicial discipline founded on legal error and 7 determine that he is not entitled to relief based on that theory. 8 B. The Commission Has Wide Discretion Under Article VI, Section 32 of the 9 New Mexico Constitution and as a Matter of Federal Due Process to 10 Decide Whether to Appoint Masters or Hear a Matter Itself Absent 11 Evidence of Unconstitutional Bias 12 {6} A body of binding and persuasive case law already exists to help navigate the 13 question of whether the procedures followed by the Commission in this disciplinary 14 proceeding pass muster under the New Mexico Constitution. As explained below, 15 this Court has repeatedly recognized the Commission’s discretionary authority to 16 appoint masters absent evidence of actual or inherent bias under Article VI, Section 17 32 of the New Mexico Constitution and as a matter of federal due process. This 18 recognition reflects the rule in New Mexico for more than sixty years that, absent 19 evidence of actual or inherent bias, the combining of investigatory and adjudicatory 20 functions by an administrative body is permissible. See In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC- 21 050, ¶¶ 5-8 (discussing the history of Article VII, Section 32). This is hardly a  1 minority view, particularly in the context of judicial disciplinary proceedings; 2 indeed, courts have routinely dismissed and refused to consider arguments such as 3 those advanced by Respondent. 4 1. Role of the Commission 5 {7} From a historical perspective, the Commission was created by constitutional 6 amendment in 1967 for the purpose of “oversee[ing] and investigat[ing] the 7 performance, conduct and fitness of members of the judiciary.” State ex rel. N.M. 8 Jud. Standards Comm’n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 2, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 9 197 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The provisions of Article VI, 10 Section 32 establish the framework of the Commission, define the Commission’s 11 membership, and set out the procedure for disciplining or removing a “justice, judge 12 or magistrate of any court” for, inter alia, “willful misconduct in office.” Article VI, 13 Section 32 authorizes the Commission to investigate potential misconduct and either 14 hold a hearing itself or appoint a panel of masters “to hear and take evidence.” “[I]f 15 the commission finds good cause, it shall recommend to the supreme court the 16 discipline, removal or retirement of the justice, judge or magistrate.” Id. The relevant 17 portion of Article VI, Section 32 provides as follows: 18 The commission may, after investigation it deems necessary, order 19 a hearing to be held before it concerning the discipline, removal 20 or retirement of a justice, judge or magistrate, or the commission 21 may appoint three masters who are justices or judges of courts of  1 record to hear and take evidence in the matter and to report their 2 findings to the commission. After hearing or after considering the 3 record and the findings and report of the masters, if the 4 commission finds good cause, it shall recommend to the supreme 5 court the discipline, removal or retirement of the justice, judge or 6 magistrate. 7 (Emphasis added.) 8 {8} The New Mexico Constitution assigns this Court an active—and ultimately 9 dispositive—role in those judicial disciplinary cases in which discipline is 10 recommended. Upon receiving a recommendation for discipline from the 11 Commission, the Court “shall review the record of the proceedings on the law and 12 facts” and order any discipline it deems “just and proper.” Id. The Court also may 13 “wholly reject the recommendation.” Id. Thus, Article VI, Section 32 creates a 14 scheme in which the Commission “acts as an advisory body, and makes 15 recommendations to this Court, which has the final decision[-]making authority.” 16 Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 13. 17 {9} Article VI, Section 32 says little about the procedures the Commission should 18 follow when investigating and adjudicating alleged judicial misconduct and instead 19 provides that “[t]he commission shall promulgate regulations establishing 20 procedures for hearings under this section.” The constitutional provision provides: 21 “No justice, judge or magistrate who is a member of the commission or supreme 22 court shall participate in any proceeding involving the justice’s, judge’s or  1 magistrate’s own discipline, removal or retirement.” Id. But relevant here, the 2 constitutional provision explicitly states that the Commission may preside over the 3 adjudicatory hearing or appoint masters “to hear and take evidence,” without 4 providing a standard to guide the Commission in exercising that discretion. Id. The 5 Legislature has clarified that masters shall be appointed “if the commission deems it 6 necessary or convenient,” a broad and forgiving standard the Commission has also 7 adopted in its own rules. NMSA 1978, § 34-10-2.1(B)(3) (2023); Rule jsc-4(G)(1) 8 NMRA (“[A]t any time the Commission deems it necessary or convenient, it may 9 appoint three (3) masters . . . to hear testimony and receive other evidence.”). 10 Plainly, the repeated use of the permissive term may together with the disjunctive 11 term or in these contexts affords wide discretion to the Commission in deciding 12 whether to hold a hearing itself or instead appoint a panel of masters to do so. 13 2. Our precedent supports the Commission’s discretion to hear disciplinary 14 matters or appoint masters without violating due process 15 {10} Applying these ground rules, this Court held in In re Rodella that “the decision 16 whether to appoint special masters is left to the discretion of the Commission” and 17 is reviewed for “an abuse of that discretion.” 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8; see also In re 18 Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 16 (declining to impose limitations on the 19 Commission’s “flexibility in adopting procedures” for the appointment of masters). 20 The conclusion in In re Rodella came in response to and refuted an argument that  1 the Commission was politically biased against the respondent judge and should have 2 referred the Commission’s “investigation and fact finding . . . to special masters in 3 order to ensure objectivity.” 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 5. The In re Rodella Court was “not 4 persuaded that the Commission is either inherently biased or that there is evidence 5 that it was [actually] biased in its investigation or examination of [the judge in that 6 case].” Id. ¶ 6. With regard to inherent bias, the Court stated that “there are sufficient 7 checks on political influence, both in the form of confidentiality, and in this Court’s 8 power to review the Commission’s actions, to ensure the independence of the 9 Commission in fulfilling its role in overseeing judicial conduct.” Id. ¶ 7. And 10 regarding actual bias, the Court concluded that the respondent judge had not 11 provided evidence to show that the Commission abused its discretion by refusing to 12 appoint masters in his case. Id. ¶ 8. 13 {11} In re Rodella is consistent with In re Castellano, an earlier case from this 14 Court, which rejected arguments that due process was violated when the 15 Commission appointed masters who were also members of the Commission.3 See 16 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 16. Before addressing the merits, the In re Castellano Court The In re Castellano Court did not specify whether it decided that case under 3 the federal or state constitutional guarantee of due process. While the Court’s silence suggests it relied on the federal right to due process, the Court’s reasoning seems rooted in general principles of fairness, rather than any specific understanding or application of federal law. See In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 15-16.  1 acknowledged that the Commission proceedings “must be conducted to provide the 2 respondent with procedural due process.” Id. ¶ 15; accord In re Rodella, 2008- 3 NMSC-050, ¶¶ 5-8 (considering whether the Commission was unconstitutionally 4 biased against the respondent judge, an issue that sounds in due process). The In re 5 Castellano Court also announced a harmless error standard for procedural errors in 6 the Commission proceedings, holding errors will not affect the Court’s review 7 “unless the errors actually prejudiced the respondent.”4 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 15. 8 {12} Addressing the merits, the In re Castellano Court disagreed that the masters’ 9 participation in multiple stages of the proceedings violated due process. Id. The 10 Court saw “no basis in the record for finding . . . conduct that could be viewed as 11 having predetermined the facts,” even in circumstances where the masters had 12 presided over the respondent judge’s hearings, issued findings of fact and 13 conclusions of law recommending his removal, and voted with the Commission to 14 recommend his removal by the Court. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. The Court also disagreed that 15 the Commission had given “disproportionate influence” to its member-judges by Respondent has not offered evidence or argument that unconstitutional bias 4 actually affected the outcome of this proceeding. Therefore, even if we were to agree with Respondent that the Commission’s dual roles create the appearance of prejudgment bias and a “lack of impartiality inherent in the challenged procedure” such that the Commission should have appointed masters in this case, Respondent simply has not shown—or even claimed—that he suffered resultant prejudice as In re Castellano requires.  1 appointing them as masters. Id. ¶ 16. The Court readily acknowledged that 2 “[c]hoosing special masters who are not Commissioners might be a wise precaution 3 against an erroneous perception of even greater influence.” Id. But because the 4 masters were “judges of courts of record” and therefore met the sole qualification 5 for appointment under Article VI, Section 32, their appointments nonetheless 6 satisfied due process. In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 16. 7 {13} A final aspect of the parallel reasoning of In re Rodella and In re Castellano 8 is noteworthy. In both cases, the Court emphasized the distinct roles assigned to the 9 Commission and the Court under Article VI, Section 32, recognizing that the 10 Commission’s authority is limited to “recommend[ing discipline or] removal to this 11 Court,” while this Court “independently review[s] the proceedings below to 12 determine, de novo, whether to accept the recommendation of the Commission.” In 13 re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8; In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 15 (citing 14 In re O’Dea, 622 A.2d 507, 514 (Vt. 1993), as standing for the proposition that a 15 “due process violation [is] less likely when [an] administrative body is not [the] final 16 decision[-]making authority”). The Court’s role as “the final decision[-]making 17 authority” thus serves as a significant safeguard against accusations of bias in a 18 particular case. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 13.  1 {14} At bottom, In re Rodella and In re Castellano provide a ready framework for 2 determining whether the Commission’s procedures in this case pass muster under 3 the New Mexico Constitution. Be it based on the explicit provisions of Article VI, 4 Section 32 or as a matter of basic fairness and due process, this Court has long 5 deferred to the Commission’s discretion to appoint masters, absent evidence of 6 unconstitutional bias that “prejudiced the respondent [judge].” In re Castellano, 7 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 15; see also In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8. And 8 particularly in In re Castellano, the Court saw no cause for concern even though the 9 masters’ participation throughout the Commission’s proceedings was extensive. See 10 In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 13, 15. Absent any suggestion of 11 unconstitutional bias or resulting prejudice in this case—and indeed with no 12 challenge whatsoever to the Commission’s factual findings overall—it is clear that, 13 under governing New Mexico case law, the Commission neither abused its 14 discretion under Article VI, Section 32 nor violated general principles of due process 15 when it opted not to appoint masters to adjudicate the charges against Respondent. 16 3. This Court’s longstanding interpretation of federal due process in the 17 administrative context additionally undercuts Respondent’s position 18 {15} Even beyond In re Rodella and In re Castellano, this Court has long adopted 19 the consensus—if not unanimous—view that, as a matter of federal due process, an 20 administrative agency’s dual role as investigator and adjudicator does not, “in itself,”  1 create an unconstitutional risk of bias. Seidenberg v. N.M. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 2 1969-NMSC-028, ¶ 24, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d 469 (“The fact that charges are made 3 by the same body which tries the issues does not, in itself, operate as a 4 disqualification.”). This approach is consistent with a long line of federal 5 jurisprudence on the issue. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54-55 (1975) 6 (holding there was no violation of due process where adjudicators presided over 7 hearings on charges they themselves investigated); Knapp v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 8 796 F.3d 445, 468 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that “an agency’s dual role of 9 investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints does not alone demonstrate 10 unconstitutional bias” (text only) (citation omitted)). In order to establish a due 11 process violation in the judicial disciplinary context, adherence to this approach 12 requires a showing “that the Commission [was] either inherently biased or that there 13 [was] evidence that it was [actually] biased in its investigation or examination of 14 [the respondent judge].” In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 6. The combined force 15 of the holdings in Seidenberg and Withrow undermine a determination that the 16 Commission was inherently biased as a structural matter, while Respondent’s full 17 acceptance of the factual findings made by the Commission below all but preclude 18 a determination that the Commission was actually biased in this case.  1 4. Similar procedures have been unanimously upheld by state courts 2 nationwide under substantively identical challenges 3 {16} Looking to other state court jurisdictions for guidance, there seems to be near 4 unanimity that a judicial disciplinary body’s combined investigatory and 5 adjudicatory functions do not violate due process. Because these cases are heavily 6 influenced by the United States Supreme Court’s holding to that effect in Withrow, 7 we summarize Withrow’s holding and rationale before discussing the uniform out- 8 of-state authorities that cut against Respondent’s position here. 9 {17} Similar to the approach taken by Respondent in this case, the physician in 10 Withrow objected to a licensing board’s dual roles of investigator and adjudicator in 11 overseeing his disciplinary proceeding, arguing the arrangement would violate the 12 physician’s right to a neutral, detached decisionmaker. See 421 U.S. at 38-39, 42. 13 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that due process requires “a fair 14 trial in a fair tribunal,” including in administrative agencies. Id. at 46 (internal 15 quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court also noted circumstances when 16 “the probability of actual bias . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable,” such 17 as when a decisionmaker “has a pecuniary interest in the outcome . . . [or] has been 18 the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.” Id. at 47 19 (footnote omitted). But the Court remained unpersuaded that “conferring 20 investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of  1 actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden.” Id. Rather, the Court 2 established “a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators” 3 that may be overcome with contradictory evidence, on a case-by-case basis. Id. 4 “Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators are assumed to be [people] 5 of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy 6 fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). 8 {18} In the matter at hand, the Commission cites persuasive authority from other 9 jurisdictions citing and reaching the same conclusion as Withrow, specifically in the 10 context of judicial disciplinary proceedings. See Gentry v. Jud. Conduct Comm’n, 11 612 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Ky. 2020) (citing Withrow in concluding that the judge under 12 investigation “offer[ed] no persuasive evidence to overcome the presumption of lack 13 of bias” purportedly resulting from “the combined investigative and adjudicative 14 functions of the [c]ommission”); Adams v. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, 897 P.2d 15 544, 550 (Cal. 1995) (en banc) (discussing precedent that relied on Withrow to reject 16 the argument that “the [c]ommission did not provide a neutral forum, because the 17 accusatory, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions were combined so that the 18 adjudicatory process did not comport with generally accepted standards of due 19 process”); In re Zoarski, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Conn. 1993) (citing Withrow and  1 other cases in rejecting the judge’s argument that due process was violated when 2 “members of the council . . . conducted the investigatory hearing that led to a finding 3 of probable cause and thereafter . . . adjudicated the ultimate merits of the charges 4 against him”). 5 {19} Further, in a case cited by neither party, the Alaska Supreme Court explained 6 that as of 1975, twenty-four states, including New Mexico, had adopted procedures 7 allowing “the [c]ommission both to conduct a preliminary investigation and to 8 adjudicate facts and make a recommendation to the supreme court.” 5 In re Hanson, 9 532 P.2d 303, 306 & n.9 (Alaska 1975). Disagreeing that this “combination of 10 judicial and investigative functions” violated due process “under [either] the federal 11 constitution or Alaska’s constitution,” the In re Hanson court observed that the 12 “argument has been rejected by all courts which have considered the question.” Id. 13 at 306; see also In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 736 (Mich. 1977) (per curiam) 14 (“[T]he authority is legion in support of the proposition that combining the 15 investigative and adjudicative roles in a single agency does not necessarily violate 16 due process in administrative adjudications such as judicial fitness hearings.”). Since 5 At oral argument in this case, the Commission represented that New Mexico is one of thirty-three states currently operating under a “single-tiered system,” where the judicial disciplinary body investigates and adjudicates charges against a judge before recommending discipline to the state’s high court.  1 then, the trend of rejecting arguments similar to the one advanced by Respondent 2 herein has continued, most recently in 2022 by the Michigan Supreme Court. See In 3 re Morrow, 976 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Mich. 2022) (per curiam) (reaffirming under 4 Withrow that the Michigan commission’s combined investigatory and adjudicative 5 functions do not violate due process). 6 {20} In re Hanson also presaged this Court’s approach in In re Rodella on two 7 important points. First, in holding that the Alaska commission’s dual functions “did 8 not result in a biased or partial tribunal,” the Alaska Supreme Court emphasized its 9 own role in the disciplinary process, noting that it has “the ultimate authority in 10 disciplinary matters affecting the judiciary.” In re Hanson, 532 P.2d at 306-07; 11 accord In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8. Second, the Alaska high court rejected 12 an argument—identical to the one made by Respondent here—that due process was 13 violated by the Alaska commission’s “option to hear the matter itself or to refer the 14 charges to a master for a hearing.” In re Hanson, 532 P.2d at 307 & n.15. The In re 15 Hanson court found it “untenable” that “the [c]ommission must always appoint a 16 master,” reasoning as follows: 17 The [c]ommission should have the option of referral to a master where 18 the particular matter requires extensive testimony or specialized fact- 19 finding. On the other hand, where the [c]ommission wishes to handle 20 the matter without appointment of a master, we can discern no legal 21 impediment to proceeding in such a manner.  1 Id. at 307. Thus, as in New Mexico, the decision whether to appoint a master in In 2 re Hanson was properly entrusted to the commission’s discretion. Accord In re 3 Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8. 4 {21} The rule appears to be unanimous in New Mexico and elsewhere that the 5 Commission’s combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions do not, of 6 themselves, violate generally accepted standards of due process, including in the 7 many states that employ judicial disciplinary structures and procedures substantially 8 identical to those in use in New Mexico. Effectively conceding as much, Respondent 9 urges this Court to “part company with Withrow” and its progeny by invalidating the 10 Commission’s procedures through a broadening of the due process provisions of 11 Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. For reasons discussed below, 12 we decline Respondent’s request.  1 C. Respondent Has Offered No Persuasive Reason to Depart from Our 2 Existing Procedural Due Process Protections in the Judicial Disciplinary 3 Context in New Mexico 4 {22} In undertaking an interstitial analysis6 in support of his state constitutional 5 claim, Respondent invokes two of the three grounds generally relied on to justify a 6 state constitutional departure from federal jurisprudence: first, that “the federal 7 analysis [in Withrow] is flawed,” and second, that “distinctive state characteristics 8 exist that would support the departure.” See State v. Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 9 329 P.3d 689 (citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932 10 P.2d 1). As we explain, Respondent misses the mark on both points. 11 {23} To begin, Respondent likens the situation at bar to that presented to this Court 12 in State v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 36, 85, 478 P.3d 880, in which we agreed 13 to construe the due process provisions of Article II, Section 18 of our state 14 Constitution more broadly than its federal counterpart in assessing the admissibility 15 of eyewitness identification evidence. The chief inspiration underlying this doctrinal 6 Respondent acknowledges this Court’s invitation in Lujan Grisham v. Van Soelen, 2023-NMSC-027, ¶ 19 n.7, 539 P.3d 272, to revisit whether the interstitial approach still serves New Mexico and promotes the development of independent state-constitutional protections. But Respondent has chosen to adhere to the interstitial method in his argument here, maintaining that it remains the law and “neither alters the outcome of the present inquiry nor fails to give the New Mexico Bill of Rights its due.”  1 sea change was “the substantial body of empirical scientific studies on human 2 memory and perception undertaken in the wake of [the, then outdated, governing 3 federal precedent] and the legal literature, decisional law, and statutory enactments 4 that have developed accordingly.” Id. ¶ 38. Clearly, the “vast body of social science 5 research” and “[t]he legal literature . . . replete with discussions of the doctrinal and 6 scientific shortcomings of the [federal] reliability test” that were presented to the 7 Martinez Court, id. ¶¶ 40, 53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), are a 8 far cry from the sparse—three in all—and narrowly conceived psychological journal 9 and law review articles relied on by Respondent in this case. While this trio of 10 commentaries—primarily addressing a concept known in the scientific community 11 as confirmation bias7—may provide an articulable basis to question the rationale 12 supporting the Commission’s joint investigative and adjudicatory framework, these 13 isolated writings are inadequate, standing alone, to warrant the complete 14 abandonment of a long-held administrative practice. 7 Confirmation bias has been defined as “bias that results from the tendency to process and analyze information in such a way that it supports one’s preexisting ideas and convictions.” Confirmation bias, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary .com/browse/confirmation-bias [https://perma.cc/RE72-FD9Y] (last visited June 2, 2026).  1 {24} And despite Respondent’s protestations to the contrary, New Mexico case 2 authorities such as Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 1979- 3 NMSC-005, 92 N.M. 414, 589 P.2d 198, and New Mexico Board of Veterinary 4 Medicine v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947, provide no 5 persuasive basis to depart from the teachings of Seidenberg and Withrow in the 6 matter now before us. As explained below, neither Reid nor Riegger establishes any 7 distinct feature of New Mexico law that would afford Respondent an expanded right 8 to greater due process protections during disciplinary proceedings than Seidenberg 9 and Withrow now provide. 10 {25} As Respondent would have it, “Reid calls for heightened vigilance against 11 denials of due process in administrative settings,” in contrast to Withrow’s more 12 permissive approach in entertaining what the United States Supreme Court described 13 therein as a rebuttable “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as 14 adjudicators.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. Respondent further argues that since Reid 15 was decided, this Court has favored its requirement that there need be “the 16 appearance of complete fairness” in administrative proceedings, Reid, 1979-NMSC- 17 005, ¶ 7, over Withrow’s above-stated “presumption of honesty and integrity,” 18 Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. But the only support Respondent offers for these assertions 19 is Riegger, which held that allowing the Board of Veterinary Medicine’s recovery  1 of costs for both the hearing officer who served the agency and the hearing room 2 used by the agency would violate the accused veterinarian’s due process rights. See 3 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 26. This Court in Riegger concluded that allowing the recovery 4 of a hearing officer’s costs would create “a possibility that future licensees subject 5 to disciplinary proceedings may objectively believe that hearing officers will be 6 biased in order to be fully-compensated for their services.” Id. ¶ 30. The Riegger 7 Court acknowledged that neither party had accused the hearing officer of bias and 8 that the record demonstrated a lack of actual bias on the hearing officer’s part. Id. 9 Nonetheless, the Court held that the appearance of potential bias outweighed the 10 Withrow “presumption of honesty and integrity in those [who serve as] 11 adjudicators.” Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks and 12 citation omitted). Thus, Respondent’s argument goes, Riegger demonstrates the 13 Court’s preference for a more protective rule than Seidenberg and Withrow presently 14 require. 15 {26} Respondent overstates the holdings in both Reid and Riegger in arguing that 16 they support a higher standard of neutrality in administrative proceedings under 17 Article II, Section 18. This Court’s prior analysis in each of the two cited cases is 18 inapposite to the facts now before us and therefore is not binding here. Neither Reid 19 nor Riegger spoke directly to the core structural issue litigated in this matter: how  1 best to treat the combined investigative and adjudicative functions of the 2 Commission. Instead, Reid primarily serves to illustrate the general rule that due 3 process is violated when there is evidence that an adjudicator may have been biased, 4 demonstrated by “a prejudicial statement” made by one of the board members that 5 signaled “his bias and prejudgment of the issues.” Reid, 1979-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 5, 9. 6 And Riegger, for its part, represents little more than a straightforward application of 7 the age-old prohibition against a judge presiding over a matter in which the judge 8 has a pecuniary interest in the outcome. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 9 1933-NMSC-087, ¶ 22, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (“By the common law, the slightest 10 pecuniary interest would disqualify a judge.”); see also Rule 21-211(A)(3) NMRA 11 (requiring a judge to disqualify themself “in any proceeding [when] . . . [t]he judge 12 knows that [they have] . . . an economic interest in the subject matter in 13 controversy”). 14 {27} Neither Reid nor Riegger can be read to stray from the core rule articulated in 15 Seidenberg and Withrow that, absent evidence of unconstitutional bias, the 16 combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions in the administrative realm 17 does not violate due process. We thus conclude that neither Reid nor Riegger is 18 imbued with any distinctive state characteristics relevant to this case that would  1 warrant an expansion of the due process provisions of Article II, Section 18 of our 2 state Constitution. 3 {28} Having rejected Respondent’s constitutional challenges to the Commission’s 4 disciplinary recommendation, we turn next to Respondent’s alternative argument 5 that even if he committed legal error as alleged—which he steadfastly refuses to 6 concede—his actions did not rise to the level of willful misconduct subject to 7 discipline. As will be shown below, this contention too must fail. 8 D. The Commission Properly Relied on the Series of Improper Case 9 Dismissals Ordered by Respondent as a Basis for Discipline in This Case 10 {29} Respondent relies on the committee commentary to the “[i]mpartiality and 11 fairness” requirement of the Code of Judicial Conduct contained in Rule 21-202 12 NMRA, which provides: “When applying and interpreting the law, a judge 13 sometimes may make good-faith errors of fact or law. Errors of this kind do not 14 violate this rule.” That guidance, in Respondent’s view, is consistent with rulings 15 from other jurisdictions that emphasize the importance of judicial independence and 16 the freedom to make good-faith rulings, “free from extraneous considerations of 17 punishment or reward.” In re Curda, 49 P.3d 255, 261 (Alaska 2002); see also, e.g., 18 Oberholzer v. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, 975 P.2d 663, 680 (Cal. 1999) (“[A] 19 judge must be free not only to make the correct ruling for proper reasons, but also to  1 make an incorrect ruling, believing it to be correct.”).8 Respondent insists that 2 reversal on appeal is the appropriate remedy for a judge’s legal error, not judicial 3 discipline. 4 {30} The Commission, on the other hand, asserts in its petition seeking 5 Respondent’s removal from office that its disciplinary recommen