Moshe Rozenblit v. Marcia v. Lyles

SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Moshe Rozenblit v. Marcia V. Lyles (A-41/42-19) (083434) Argued October 13, 2020 -- Decided February 3, 2021 PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions in a collective negotiations agreement (CNA) between the Jersey City School District (District) and the Jersey City Education Association (Association) that authorized two teachers, or “releasees,” employed and compensated by the District to work full-time on the Association’s business, a practice known as “release time.” The CNA states that “[t]he president of the [Association], and his/her designee, shall be permitted to devote all of his/her time to the Association business and affairs.” The two employees designated as releasees receive full-time salaries and benefits from the District. The releasees’ duties include facilitating labor-management relations, resolving disagreements, promoting effective communications between teachers and administration, promoting harmonious employer/employee relationships, and helping set and clarify school policies with the administration. The releasees keep an appropriate Associate Superintendent apprised of the work they are doing and their location. Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, filed this action contending that the CNA’s release time provisions violate the New Jersey Constitution’s Gift Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, holding that the release time provisions represented the District’s implementation of its right under N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 to grant teachers leave other than sick leave. The trial court also found that plaintiffs did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the release time provisions violate the Gift Clause. The Appellate Division reversed. 461 N.J. Super. 20, 31-32 (App. Div. 2019). Declining to address the constitutional issue on which plaintiffs based their claim, id. at 24-25, the Appellate Division concluded that the Jersey City Board of Education (Board) acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority when it paid the salaries and benefits of the two releasees, id. at 31-32. The Court granted the petition and cross-petition for certification. 240 N.J. 551 (2020); 240 N.J. 552 (2020). 1 HELD: The Board’s payment of salaries and benefits to the releasees did not exceed its statutory grant of authority. The Board’s agreement to the CNA’s release time provisions is authorized by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, construed in conjunction with two related provisions of the Education Code, N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4 and N.J.S.A. 18A:11- 1(c), and with a core provision of the Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2. Further, the release time serves a public purpose and is so consonant with the accomplishment of that purpose that it does not offend the State Constitution. 1. The Court first considers the statutory question raised by the Appellate Division -- whether the Legislature granted the Board the authority to pay the salaries and benefits of the two releasees. Local boards of education may exercise only those powers granted to them by the Legislature. Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes, the Education Code, includes several provisions addressing the scope of the legislative grant of authority to boards of education. The Court reviews N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c), N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4, and the provision at the center of this appeal -- N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7. Entitled “Power of boards of education to pay salaries,” N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall affect the right of the board of education to fix either by rule or by individual consideration, the payment of salary in cases of absence not constituting sick leave, or to grant sick leave over and above the minimum sick leave as defined in this chapter . . . .” The Legislature did not define “absence not constituting sick leave,” or limit leaves of absence other than sick leave that a board of education may authorize school employees to take. The EERA also informs the determination of this appeal. In the EERA, the Legislature declared, in part, that “the best interests of the people of the State are served by the prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes.” N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2. The Court considers the Education Code and the EERA in tandem. (pp. 17-22) 2. By its plain language, N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 confers on boards the authority to grant leaves of absence -- in addition to and distinct from sick leave -- to school employees. The Legislature could have limited the boards’ power in this regard by enumerating specific categories of leaves of absence in the statute, but it declined to do so. The legislative goal is clear: to afford to boards expansive authority to make rules with respect to such leaves of absence. A releasee is “absent” from ordinarily assigned duties within the meaning of the statute. And the mandatory leave prescribed in N.J.S.A. 18A:30-8 for elite athletes competing internationally does not constitute “absence not constituting sick leave” under N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, which school boards are permitted at their discretion -- but not required -- to grant. Nothing in N.J.S.A. 18A:30-8 suggests legislative intent to limit boards’ discretion to grant leaves of absence in other settings under N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7. (pp. 23-25) 3. Interpreting N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 to encompass release time furthers the Legislature’s intent that boards of education make rules “for the government and management of the public schools . . . and for the employment, regulation of conduct and discharge of [their] employees.” N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c). It also comports with the Legislature’s grant of 2 power to boards to make rules “governing the employment, terms and tenure of employment, . . . and salaries and time and mode of payment thereof of teaching staff members.” N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4. Finally, it promotes the EERA’s primary objective: “the prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes,” in order to forestall “strikes, lockouts, work stoppages and other forms of employer and employee strife” that waste public resources and hamper public education. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2. And that interpretation is consonant with the Court’s jurisprudence and with scope-of-negotiations determinations by the Public Employment Relations Commission over many years. (pp. 25-27) 4. The Court next considers plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the payment of the releasees’ salaries and benefits pursuant to the CNA. The Gift Clause provisions relevant here -- N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 3, ¶¶ 2, 3 -- reflect the fundamental doctrine that public money should be raised and used only for public purposes. Under the standard prescribed in Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 218-19 (1964), and later case law, a court addressing a Gift Clause challenge must first determine whether the transaction is for a public purpose, and second, whether the means to accomplish that public purpose are consonant with it. For purposes of the first inquiry, courts consider whether the disputed activity serves as a benefit to the community as a whole and is directly related to the functions of government. The second inquiry requires the resolution of two subsidiary questions: (1) whether the transaction is contractual and involves some obligation on the part of the private entity that is intimately tied to fulfilling the public purpose, and (2) whether the accomplishment of the public purpose is the paramount factor in the contract with any private advantage being merely incidental or subordinate. (pp. 28-32) 5. Here, the release time serves public purposes expressly recognized by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2. And the releasees work to enhance the collective bargaining process, recognized to “promote labor stability in the public sector and enhance the delivery and avoid the disruption of public services.” N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.12. As to the second prong, the release time is part of an agreement arrived at through collective negotiations in which the Association made concessions. The releasees’ duties directly relate to the resolution of employer-employee disputes, and the District maintains sufficient oversight to ensure that the public purpose is served. Finally, the public purpose of the release time provisions is the paramount factor in the agreement. The releasees’ primary assignment is to engage with District personnel and Association members to resolve labor disputes at an early stage. The releasees are routinely asked by District or school officials to intervene, and they report to the District on the results achieved. The release time provisions conform to the two-part standard and do not constitute gifts to the Association in violation of the State Constitution. (pp. 33-36) REVERSED. The judgment of the trial court is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. 3  SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-41/42 September Term 2019 083434 Moshe Rozenblit, and Won Kyu Rim, Plaintiffs-Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. Marcia V. Lyles, in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Jersey City Board of Education, Vidya Gangadin, in her official capacity as President of the Jersey City Board of Education, and Jersey City Public Schools of the City of Jersey City, Defendants, and Jersey City Board of Education, Defendant, and Jersey City Education Association, Inc., Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 461 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2019). Argued Decided October 13, 2020 February 3, 2021 1 Leon Dayan, of the California and District of Columbia bars, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman, National Education Association, and Bredhoff & Kaiser, attorneys; Richard Friedman, Leon Dayan, Jason Walta, of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts bars, admitted pro hac vice, and John M. West, of the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania bars, admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs). Jonathan Riches, of the Arizona bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents/cross-appellants (Law Offices of G. Martin Meyers and Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater Institute, attorneys; Justin A. Meyers and Jonathan Riches, on the briefs). Steven R. Cohen argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Education Association (Selikoff & Cohen and New Jersey Education Association, attorneys; Steven R. Cohen, Keith Waldman, Hop T. Wechsler, Daniel R. Dowdy, and Aileen O’Driscoll, on the brief). Flavio L. Komuves argued the cause for amici curiae Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, the International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees, AFL-CIO and the Public Employee Committee of the New Jersey State AFL-CIO (Weissman & Mintz, attorneys; Flavio L. Komuves, Ira Mintz, and Steven P. Weissman, on the brief). Christine Lucarelli argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission, attorneys; Christine Lucarelli, on the brief). 2  Mark Miller argued the cause for amici curiae Pacific Legal Foundation and Americans for Prosperity-New Jersey (Pacific Legal Foundation, attorneys; Steven Simpson, of counsel, and Mark Miller, on the brief). Sanford R. Oxfeld submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae East Orange Education Association and Wayne Education Association (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Sanford R. Oxfeld and William P. Hannan, of counsel and on the brief). Arnold Shep Cohen submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae IFPTE, Local 195, AFL-CIO (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Arnold Shep Cohen, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we consider statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions in a collective negotiations agreement (CNA) between the Jersey City School District (District) and the Jersey City Education Association (Association). The disputed provisions authorized two teachers, or “releasees,” employed and compensated by the District to work full-time on the Association’s “business and affairs,” a practice known as “release time.” Plaintiffs Moshe Rozenblit and Won Kyu Rim sought a declaratory judgment holding that the District’s payment of the salaries and benefits of employees on release time is contrary to the Gift Clause provisions of Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 1; Article VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 2; and Article 3 VIII, Section 3, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution. Plaintiffs and the Association cross-moved before the trial court for summary judgment. The court held that the disputed provisions did not violate the Gift Clause. It denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment and invalidated the CNA’s release time provisions on statutory grounds. Rozenblit v. Lyles, 461 N.J. Super. 20, 25-32 (App. Div. 2019). It held that N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, the statute on which the Jersey City Board of Education (Board), the District, and the Association relied as authority for their agreement to the release time provisions, did not authorize the Board to disburse public funds to the two releasees. Id. at 28. The Appellate Division did not reach the constitutional issue raised by plaintiffs. Id. at 24-25. We granted the parties’ cross-petitions for certification. We do not share the Appellate Division’s view that the Board’s agreement to the disputed provisions exceeded its statutory grant of authority. In the Education Code, the Legislature empowered boards of education to make rules governing the compensation of teachers, N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4, and to fix “the payment of salary in cases of absence not constituting sick leave,” N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7. The Legislature thus authorized the Board to grant a paid 4 leave to the releasees to allow them to attend to labor relations work pursuant to the CNA. Moreover, because the releasees’ efforts encourage cooperative labor relations and facilitate the early resolution of employer-employee disputes, the CNA’s release time provisions facilitate the Board’s management of the public schools pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c). The releasees also further the mediation and resolution of labor disputes in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2, a provision of the Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA). We conclude that the Board’s payment of salaries and benefits to the releasees is within its statutory grant of authority. We concur with the trial court that the Board did not violate the Gift Clause of the New Jersey Constitution when it agreed to the release time provisions in the CNA. Applying the standard prescribed in Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 218-19 (1964), and later case law, we conclude that the release time provisions serve a public purpose and are so consonant with the accomplishment of that public purpose that they do not offend the Gift Clause . Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. 5  I. A. We summarize the facts based on the record submitted to the trial court in connection with the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and the Association. On May 10, 2010, the District and the Association executed the CNA, which was effective from September 1, 2013 to August 31, 2017. 1 Two provisions of the contract’s Article 7, which addresses “Association Rights,” are relevant to this appeal. First, Section 7-2.3 stated that “[t]he president of the [Association], and his/her designee, shall be permitted to devote all of his/her time to the Association business and affairs. The [p]resident shall continue to be granted adequate office and parking facilities.” Second, Section 7-2.4 stated that “[t]he president’s designee shall carry out appropriate Association business, provided that the aforesaid business shall not disrupt the educational process. The designee shall notify the Superintendent or his/her 1 In the CNA, the District recognized the Association as the exclusive and sole bargaining representative for “all certificated personnel, attendance counselors and teaching assistants employed in the [D]istrict.” The Association states that it not only represents the 3,000 employees covered by that CNA, but that it is also involved in the administration of three other CNAs governing approximately 800 District employees who are members of other unions. 6 designee as to where and when he/she is carrying out such Association business during school time.” During the period relevant to this appeal, the two employees designated as releasees pursuant to Sections 7-2.3 and 7-2.4 were the Association’s president, Ronald Greco, and its second vice president and Grievance Chair, Tina Thorp. It is undisputed that Greco and Thorp received full-time salaries and benefits during the contract term. According to a certification submitted by Greco to the trial court, since 1969 or before, the collective negotiations agreements between the District and the Association have provided that the Association’s president would be a full- time employee on release time. Greco certified that in 1998, school administrators requested that a second releasee be designated to work full-time on the resolution of labor disputes and other Association duties, and the Association agreed to that request. Greco described his release time duties to include “facilitating labor- management relations, informally and formally resolving disagreements, promoting effective communications between teachers and administration, improving education quality and personnel skill, promoting harmonious employer/employee relationships, helping set and clarify school polic[i]es with the administration, and working with the staff to understand and comply with 7 all policies.” He contended that he and Thorp “keep labor peace in the [school] buildings by facilitating the resolution of disputes that may arise between employees and management.” Greco certified that he was regularly asked by District administrative staff to report to them on the results of his efforts to conciliate labor disputes. He stated that he and Thorp also “resolve policy issues” between the District and its employees by “explaining to the staff the purpose of policies and to understand why administration might be contemplating or taking certain action,” and by stating the position of the employees on contested issues to school administration. Greco estimated that he and Thorp spend approximately seventy percent of their working hours attempting to resolve grievances and other disputes between teachers and school administration, and both releasees certified that they spend ninety percent of their school day personally interacting with District personnel in school buildings or Board headquarters. Greco represented that he is “regularly asked by central administrative staff to travel to a school to conciliate a dispute, and then report back on the results of those efforts.” Greco and Thorp certified that they are required to work a specified number of days per year. Greco stated that he “keep[s] an appropriate Associate Superintendent apprised” of the work he is doing and his location, 8 that he reports to District administrators regarding any absence from duty, and that he “could be subjected to discipline by the school district” for conduct related to his employment. In deposition testimony, Celeste Williams, the District’s Chief of Talent responsible for human resources issues, testified that to the best of her knowledge, the District did not direct the daily activities of Greco or Thorp, formally evaluate them, or assign them a supervisor. B. 1. Plaintiffs, who asserted standing based on their status as taxpayers, filed this action against the Jersey City Public Schools, the Superintendent of the Jersey City Public Schools, the Board, the Board’s President, and the Association. They contend that the CNA’s release time provisions violate the New Jersey Constitution’s Gift Clause because the District exercises insufficient control over the two releasees. Plaintiffs allege that the work performed by the releasees served only the private purposes of the Association, not the public welfare or the community as a whole. The Association filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial court denied that motion, reasoning that plaintiffs had stated a claim for a violation of the Gift Clause 9 sufficient to avoid dismissal. It ruled that a determination of the merits of that claim would require a full record developed in expedited discovery and dispositive motions. The parties conducted discovery and then cross-moved for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 4:46-2. Applying this Court’s decision in Roe, the trial court held that the release time provisions of the CNA represented the District’s implementation of its right under N.J.S.A. 18A:30 -7 to grant teachers leave other than sick leave. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs did not directly challenge N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7. It nonetheless applied the heightened standard imposed when a party challenges a statute on constitutional grounds under this Court’s decision in Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957), and required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the release time provisions were unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court found that the Board’s grant of the challenged release time serves public purposes important to the District’s educational mission: the facilitation of effective collective bargaining, disciplinary hearings, and grievance procedures; avoiding the expense of prolonged arbitration; and ensuring effective labor-management communications. The court also held that the District exercises sufficient control to ensure that the releasees would serve those public purposes. It concluded that plaintiffs did not demonstrate 10 beyond a reasonable doubt that the release time provisions in the CNA violated the Gift Clause. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. 2. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s judgment. The Appellate Division granted the application of the Pacific Legal Foundation to participate as amicus curiae. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of the trial court. Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 31-32. Invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the court premised its determination on statutory grounds. Id. at 24-30. It concluded that the Association had cited to no statute authorizing “the Board to pay the salaries of teachers whose job duties are exclusively devoted to the service of another organization.” Id. at 30. The Appellate Division construed N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, which authorizes the Board to determine payment of salary “in cases of absence not constituting sick leave,” to apply only to employees who were physically absent from school property; the court therefore found that statute to be irrelevant to the two employees at issue here. Id. at 27-28. Citing several categories of 11 “absence not constituting sick leave” addressed in the CNA -- “death related” absences, absences due to a quarantine ordered by official action, absences due to a court order, and leaves of absence for study or for rest and recuperation -- the court distinguished release time on the basis that it conferred no “reciprocal benefit” on the District. Id. at 29-30. The Appellate Division further noted that N.J.S.A. 18A:30-8 mandates that a school district employee who qualifies to represent the United States in “athletic competition on the world, Pan American or Olympic level” is entitled to a leave of absence. Id. at 26. It found the “conspicuous omission” of a similar provision addressing release time to signal legislative intent not to authorize school districts to pay full-time salaries and benefits to releasees. Id. at 31. The Appellate Division accordingly held Section 7-2.3 of the CNA to be against public policy and unenforceable, and found the Board’s disbursement of public funds pursuant to that provision to be ultra vires. Id. at 31-32. It declined to reach plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the release time provisions. Id. at 24-25. 12  3. We granted the Association’s petition for certification, 240 N.J. 551 (2020), and plaintiffs’ cross-petition for certification, 240 N.J. 552 (2020). We also granted several individual and joint applications for amicus curiae status. II. A. The Association contends that the Appellate Division improperly determined that there is no statutory authority for the time-honored and widespread practice of negotiating release time in collective bargaining between school boards and their employees. In the Association’s view, N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7’s plain language authorizes the Board to grant leaves of absence to the releasees. The Association urges that we read N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 in conjunction with the EERA’s expansive provisions promoting negotiation of the terms and conditions of employment, provisions of the Education Code establishing school boards’ authority to make rules regarding such terms and conditions, and the Legislature’s mandate that boards govern and manage the public schools. Further, the Association asks the Court to address the constitutional challenge that the Appellate Division did not reach, and to hold that the Gift Clause does not bar provisions on release time in contracts such as the CNA. 13  B. The following amici curiae concur with the Association’s arguments: the New Jersey Education Association; the International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 195; the East Orange Education Association, participating jointly with the Wayne Education Association; and the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, participating jointly with the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, the International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees, AFL- CIO, and the Public Employee Committee of the New Jersey State AFL-CIO. Amici contend that the Appellate Division misconstrued N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, which they argue authorizes the Board to set rules for release time status. Amici also agree with the Association that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the release time provisions violate the Gift Clause, given the substantial public benefit of those provisions and the provisions’ nexus to that public benefit. C. Plaintiffs urge the Court to affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment. They concur with the Association that the Court should decide the 14 constitutional issue that they raised in this case, and urge that we find the practice of release time to contravene the Gift Clause. Plaintiffs also assert a statutory argument not raised before the trial court: they contend that N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 does not apply to release time because the term “absence” in that provision denotes a period during whic h an employee is not working. Plaintiffs assert that the EERA neither directly governs education nor permits school districts to spend public funds in a manner not permitted by statute. They argue that release time is not a subject of mandatory bargaining because it is not a term or condition of employment and it is unrelated to the employee’s service as a teacher. D. Jointly participating amici curiae the Pacific Legal Foundation and Americans for Prosperity - New Jersey concur with plaintiffs that release time is unauthorized by any New Jersey statute. Amici view release time in the setting of this appeal to constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds for which the District received no consideration and over which it exercised no control. E. The New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) asserts as amicus curiae that the Appellate Division improperly made a scope- 15 of-negotiations determination despite PERC’s status as the agency authorized by statute to make such a determination. It asks the Court to reverse that judgment and remand the matter to PERC for a scope-of-negotiations determination under In re Local 195, IFPTE, 88 N.J. 393 (1982). Citing several of its decisions, PERC asserts that N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 does not preempt the negotiation of release time under the second prong of the Local 195 test, and that release time is therefore mandatorily negotiable. III. A. We review the trial court’s determination of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in accordance with the standard that governed the court’s analysis. See R. 4:46-2; Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). A court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.” Friedman v. Martinez¸ 242 N.J. 449, 471-72 (2020) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). 16  B. 1. We first consider the statutory question raised by the Appellate Division’s determination. See Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 24-30. Our review of issues involving statutory construction is de novo. Christian Mission John 3:16 v. Passaic City, 243 N.J. 175, 184 (2020). In that inquiry, “our goal is to ‘ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.’” Kean Fed’n of Tchrs. v. Morell, 233 N.J. 566, 583 (2018) (quoting Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015)). To that end, we first look to the statute’s language and ascribe to the Legislature’s chosen words their ordinary meaning. Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68 (2008) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). If “the statutory language is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic materials such as legislative history, committee reports, and other relevant sources.” Kean Fed’n of Tchrs., 233 N.J. at 583 (citing Cashin, 223 N.J. at 335-36). We “take into consideration the entire scheme of which a provision is a part.” Headen v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 212 N.J. 437, 450-51 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reading “[a]n enactment that is part of a larger statutory framework,” we are mindful of that context “so that a sensible meaning may be given to the whole of the legislative scheme.” Wilson ex rel. 17 Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012). Accordingly, “[w]e may also turn to extrinsic guides if a literal reading of the statute would yield an absurd result, particularly one at odds with the overall statutory scheme.” Ibid. 2. Declining to address the constitutional issue on which plaintiffs based their claim, the Appellate Division concluded that the Board acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority when it paid the salaries and benefits of the two releasees. Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 31-32.2 Accordingly, we consider whether the Legislature granted the Board the authority to agree to the disputed contractual provisions, and to pay the salaries and benefits of the two releasees. As this Court has held, “[l]ocal boards of education are creations of the State and, as such, may exercise only those powers granted to them by the 2 In this appeal, we do not conduct a scope-of-negotiations inquiry pursuant to State v. IFPTE, Local 195, 169 N.J. 505, 525-26 (2001). No party sought a scope-of-negotiations determination before PERC, which has primary jurisdiction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4 “to determine in the first instance whether a matter in dispute is within the scope of collective negotiations.” In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 16 (2020) (quoting In re New Brunswick Mun. Emps. Ass’n, 453 N.J. Super. 408, 413 (App. Div. 2018)). The Appellate Division did not hold that release time is non-negotiable under Local 195, but addressed a different question: whether any statute authorized the Board to pay the releasees’ salaries and benefits in accordance with the CNA. See Rozenblit, 461 N.J. Super. at 31-32. 18 Legislature -- either expressly or by necessary or fair implication.” Fair Lawn Educ. Ass’n v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 79 N.J. 574, 579 (1979); accord Atl. City Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Atl. City, 299 N.J. Super. 649, 654-55 (App. Div. 1997). Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes, the Education Code, includes several provisions addressing the scope of the legislative grant of authority to boards of education. In N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c), the Legislature authorized a board of education to [m]ake, amend and repeal rules, not inconsistent with this title or with the rules of the state board, for its own government and the transaction of its business and for the government and management of the public schools and public school property of the district and for the employment, regulation of conduct and discharge of its employees, subject, where applicable, to the provisions of Title 11, Civil Service, of the Revised Statutes. The Legislature further addressed board of education oversight of teaching staff members’ employment in N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4. That provision authorizes a board of education to make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, governing the employment, terms and tenure of employment, promotion and dismissal, and salaries and time and mode of payment thereof of teaching staff members for the district, and may from time to time change, amend or repeal the same, and the employment of any person in any such capacity and his rights and duties with respect to such employment shall be 19  dependent upon and governed by the rules in force with reference thereto. [N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.] In Chapter 30 of the Education Code, the Legislature addressed the topic of leaves of absence for public school employees. Several provisions in Article 1 of that chapter mandate that boards of education provide sick leave for certain school employees, and provide for accumulated sick leave under certain circumstances. N.J.S.A. 18A:30-2 to -6.3 In Article 2 of Chapter 30, the Legislature considered additional sick leave “or other leaves of absence.” Among the statutes set forth in Article 2 is N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, the provision at the center of this appeal. Entitled “Power of boards of education to pay salaries,” N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7 provides: Nothing in this chapter shall affect the right of the board of education to fix either by rule or by individual consideration, the payment of salary in cases of absence not constituting sick leave, or to grant sick leave over and above the minimum sick leave as defined in this chapter or allowing days to accumulate over and above those provided for in section 18A:30-2, except that no person shall be allowed to increase his total accumulation by more than 15 days in any one year. 3 Sick leave is defined for purposes of Chapter 30 of Title 18A as a person’s “absence from his or her post of duty,” because of “personal disability due to illness or injury, or because he or she has been excluded from school by the school district’s medical authorities on account of a contagious disease or of being quarantined for such a disease in his or her immediate household.” N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1. 20  The Legislature did not define the term “absence not constituting sick leave,” or limit leaves of absence other than sick leave that a board of education may authorize school employees to take. See ibid. The Legislature specifically addressed one form of leave other than sick leave. It required boards of education to grant a limited “leave of absence with pay and without loss of rights, privileges and benefits” to “[a]ny school district employee who qualifies as a member of the United States team for athletic competition on the world, Pan American or Olympic level, in a sport contested in either Pan American or Olympic competitions.” N.J.S.A. 18A:30-8. That mandatory leave for elite athletes competing internationally is distinct from the leaves of absence other than sick leave that a board of education may, in its discretion, grant pursuant to N.J.S.A.