Haydee Gallardo v. Walmart

SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion. Haydee Gallardo v. Walmart (A-65-24) (089466) Argued November 5, 2025 -- Decided July 30, 2026 JUSTICE PATTERSON, writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a snow removal measure undertaken by a contractor hired by defendant Walmart -- the application of salt to the surface of the parking lot during a storm without pretreating the lot before precipitation began -- created “unusual circumstances” within the meaning of the first exception to the ongoing storm rule. That exception, which was recognized in Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, applies if a commercial landowner’s actions “increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees on their property” by “creating ‘unusual circumstances’ where the defendant’s conduct exacerbates and increases the risk of injury to the plaintiff.” 246 N.J. 546, 559 (2021). At around 1:30 p.m. on January 3, 2015, plaintiff Haydee Gallardo fell in the parking lot of Walmart’s Union Township store during an ongoing storm of mixed precipitation that had begun at around 11:30 a.m. Land Pros of New Jersey, LLC was the snow removal contractor for that store. At the time of plaintiff’s accident, there was minimal accumulation on the parking lot -- “about a trace” to one tenth of an inch. According to Land Pros’ co-owner, he arrived at the Walmart store at 12:35 p.m. and “spread salt” on the “lots and walks” until 1:15 p.m. He testified that when he visited the Walmart property, the snow had not accumulated sufficiently to warrant plowing the parking lot. It is undisputed that prior to the storm, Land Pros did not pretreat the parking lot with salt or another de-icing compound. In October 2016, Gallardo filed this action alleging that Walmart acted in a negligent, careless, and/or reckless manner. Her designated expert in the field of snow and ice management opined that that when Gallardo slipped and fell, “there was a dangerously slippery condition that should have been pretreated with an application of ice melt.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Land Pros but denied Walmart’s motion for summary judgment. On June 10, 2021, the Court decided Pareja. Walmart then filed its second motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that the first exception identified in Pareja governs this case. The court did not 1 mention the “unusual circumstances” requirement of Pareja; instead, under the court’s interpretation of Pareja, the exception would apply if a commercial landlord’s actions “increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees on their property.” Following a five-day trial, the jury found Walmart negligent and determined that its negligence was the proximate cause of Gallardo’s fall. After molding the verdict to account for past medical expenses and awarding prejudgment interest, the trial court entered judgment in Gallardo’s favor in the amount of $1,328,658.59. Walmart appealed, and the Appellate Division vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. It held, however, that Walmart was not entitled to summary judgment, judgment at trial, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it found, addressing the first exception of Pareja, that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to “whether Walmart’s conduct . . . made the parking lot more dangerous on the day of the accident.” The Court denied Gallardo’s petition for certification, 260 N.J. 553 (2025), and granted Walmart’s cross-petition, 260 N.J. 562 (2025). HELD: A snow removal contractor’s spreading of salt on the minimal accumulation of snow at issue does not give rise to “unusual circumstances” warranting the imposition of a duty on a commercial landowner during an ongoing storm. 1. Writing that the dissent is substantially premised on two arguments that were not asserted by any party or amicus in this case and were not ruled upon by any trial judge or appellate court, the Court explains that it will address only the issue presented by this appeal: whether this matter falls within the first exception set forth in Pareja, 246 N.J. at 559. (pp. 21-24) 2. To establish her claim for negligence, Gallardo had the burden to prove (1) that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty by defendant; (3) an injury to plaintiff proximately caused by defendant’s breach; and (4) actual damages. This appeal centers on the first element, the defendant’s duty of care. In Pareja, the Court held “that commercial landowners do not have the absolute duty, and the impossible burden, to keep sidewalks on their property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm.” Id. at 557. Pareja expressly adopted the ongoing storm rule, which it found consistent with New Jersey case law on sidewalk liability and snow removal. “Absent unusual circumstances,” the Pareja Court explained, “a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice hazards arises not during the storm, but rather within a reasonable time after the storm.” Id. at 558. Pareja then identified settings in which “unusual circumstances” warrant an exception to the ongoing storm rule, setting forth two exceptions. Id. at 558-59. The first exception -- the exception Gallardo invokes in this appeal -- applies if commercial landowners’ 2 actions “increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees on their property, for example, by creating ‘unusual circumstances’ where the defendant’s conduct ‘exacerbate[s] and increase[s] the risk’ of injury to the plaintiff.” Id. at 559. The second exception to the ongoing storm rule, irrelevant to this appeal, applies “where there was a pre- existing risk on the premises before the storm.” Ibid. (pp. 25-29) 3. The first exception to Pareja does not apply simply because a jury could determine that a commercial landowner’s remediation of snow and ice increases the risk to pedestrians and invitees on the property -- a construction that reads out the “unusual circumstances” requirement. Noting that Gallardo cited Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B as contrary support, the Court explains that model charges are not binding authority and asks the Committee on Model Civil Jury Charges to review that 5.20B and align it with the language of Pareja. (p. 30) 4. The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713 (R.I. 1999), cited in Pareja, illustrates the meaning of Pareja’s first exception. The “unusual circumstances” recognized in Terry arose when the plaintiff, who had left her car at an auto repair company during an ongoing storm, returned to find it “had been removed by one of the defendant’s employees to a rear lot some hundred feet distant.” Id. at 717. The defendant’s employee told the plaintiff to “go and get her vehicle” and advised her “to be careful of the accumulating snow and ice on the very portion of property that she was directed to use in walking the extended distance to her vehicle.” Ibid. The action by the commercial landowner that increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff in Terry was not a failed attempt to remove snow and ice as it accumulated during an ongoing storm, but rather the defendant’s direction to the plaintiff to traverse uncertain conditions to retrieve her vehicle. Id. at 717-18. Terry illustrates the Court’s intent to limit Pareja’s first exception to unusual settings. Absent the “unusual circumstances” requirement, a court could impose a duty on a commercial landowner if that landowner or its contractor applies a de-icer such as salt during an ongoing storm or shovels the snow, but its efforts fail and a pedestrian or business invitee is injured. Such a rule would incentivize landowners and their contractors to forgo any remediation effort until a storm is over, thereby increasing the risk of injury to pedestrians and invitees. The Court declines to impose such a rule and instead reaffirms that the first Pareja exception includes an “unusual circumstances” requirement, in accordance with the opinion’s express terms. (pp. 31-35) 5. Construing the record of this case in the light most favorable to Gallardo, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact as to whether “unusual circumstances” warranted an exception to the ongoing storm rule. Walmart was entitled to judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims based on the ongoing storm rule. (pp. 35-36) REVERSED. REMANDED for the entry of summary judgment. 3  JUSTICE FASCIALE, dissenting, expresses the view that the majority misinterprets Pareja’s first exception by adding an undefined “unusualness” requirement. Justice Fasciale writes that the two circumstances noted in Pareja -- increasing the risk and a pre-existing risk -- are themselves the “unusual circumstances” that reimpose a legal duty of reasonable care on the landowner during a storm; the risk-increasing conduct need not also be “unusual.” Justice Fasciale also states that it is error to apply Pareja’s framework to this case for two reasons: first, the Pareja Court adopted the ongoing storm rule and the “unusual circumstances” exception at the heart of this appeal six years after plaintiff’s 2015 accident, so the well-established principles of general negligence that governed prior to Pareja should govern here; and, second, the accident at issue here occurred in Walmart’s private parking lot, whereas the express focus of Pareja and the decades of precedent upon which it relied focused on public walkways. Justice Fasciale adds that summary judgment should not be granted given the unresolved disputed issues of fact in this case. Justice Fasciale would uphold the jury’s verdict. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PIERRE-LOUIS and WAINER APTER join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE FASCIALE filed a dissent in which JUSTICES NORIEGA and HOFFMAN join. 4  SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-65 September Term 2024 089466 Haydee Gallardo, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Walmart, Debra Lewis, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Union 22 Plaza, LLC, Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, and Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Defendants-Appellants, and Land Pros of New Jersey, LLC, Defendant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided November 5, 2025 July 30, 2026 Matthew D. Vodzak argued the cause for appellants (Fowler Hirtzel McNulty & Spaulding, attorneys; Matthew D. Vodzak, of counsel and on the briefs). Paul K. Caliendo argued the cause for respondent (Gill & Chamas, attorneys; Paul K. Caliendo, on the brief). 1  Evan J. Lide argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Stark & Stark, attorneys; Evan J. Lide, of counsel, and John C. Lowenberg, on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, this Court invoked longstanding precedent to hold that unless a case presents “unusual circumstances,” a commercial landowner’s duty to remove snow and ice from its property does not arise during an ongoing storm, but instead arises only within a reasonable time after the storm concludes. 246 N.J. 546, 558 (2021). The Court identified two “unusual circumstances” warranting exceptions to the ongoing storm rule. Id. at 559. The first exception that the Court recognized in Pareja applies if a commercial landowner’s actions “increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees on their property” by “creating ‘unusual circumstances’ where the defendant’s conduct exacerbates and increases the risk of injury to the plaintiff.” Ibid. (internal quotation and alterations omitted). In this matter, plaintiff Haydee Gallardo filed a negligence action against defendants Wal-Mart Stores East, LP i/p/a Walmart, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Wal-Mart Real Estate Trust (collectively, Walmart). She alleges that she suffered serious injuries due to a fall in the parking lot of Walmart’s Union 2 Township store on January 3, 2015. According to Gallardo’s expert, at the time of her accident, there was only a “trace” to one tenth of an inch of snow and sleet on the surface of Walmart’s parking lot. Gallardo contends that a snow removal measure undertaken by a contractor hired by Walmart -- the application of salt to the surface of the parking lot during the storm without pretreating the lot before precipitation began -- created “unusual circumstances” warranting application of the first exception to the ongoing storm rule. We disagree. A snow removal contractor’s spreading of salt on the minimal accumulation of snow at issue does not give rise to “unusual circumstances” warranting the imposition of a duty on a commercial landowner during an ongoing storm. Were we to recognize such a duty in the unremarkable factual setting of this appeal, the exception would defeat the purpose of the ongoing storm rule. We decline to depart from our precedent regarding that rule. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred when it denied Walmart’s motion for summary judgment, its motions for judgment at trial, and its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment remanding the matter to the trial court for a new trial and remand 3 this matter to the trial court for the entry of summary judgment in Walmart’s favor. I. A. We summarize the facts based on the complaint, the summary judgment record, and the trial record. On January 2, 2014, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and a snow removal contractor, Land Pros of New Jersey LLC, entered into a Master Services Agreement for the performance of work on certain Walmart properties. Although the Master Services Agreement envisioned that specific work assignments to the contractor would be defined in scope of work agreements, the record does not contain a scope of work agreement defining Land Pros’ snow and ice removal responsibilities. 1 It is undisputed, however, that on the date of Gallardo’s accident, Land Pros was retained to conduct snow and ice removal in the parking lot of Walmart’s Union Township Store. Indeed, Gallardo alleges that on the date of her accident, Walmart and Land Pros “owned, controlled, 1 Land Pros and Walmart certified in discovery that they could not locate a scope of work agreement defining Land Pros’ snow and ice removal responsibilities. Walmart produced an exemplar agreement as representative of its scope of work agreements with its snow and ice removal contractors. That exemplar agreement provided that the contractor “shall remove snow and ice continuously before, during and after an Event until snow and ice is removed and bare pavement has been achieved.” 4 operated, inspected and/or maintained” the premises of Walmart’s store in Union Township. The record establishes that when Gallardo fell in the Walmart parking lot at approximately 1:30 p.m. on January 3, 2015, there was an ongoing storm. According to Gallardo’s expert in the field of forensic meteorology, Thomas Else, it began to snow in Union at approximately 11:30 a.m. on January 3, 2015. Else testified that at 1:00 p.m., “there was still some snow falling but it was sleet and rain mixed in,” and that between 11:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. there was continuous precipitation. The record also makes clear that at the time of plaintiff’s accident, there was minimal accumulation on the parking lot. Else testified that “[a]t 1:30, around the time of the incident,” the accumulation amounted to “about a trace” to one tenth of an inch, which “is the smallest amount that you can measure with a ruler that we do for snow and sleet accumulation.” According to Land Pros’ co-owner, John Fierro, who testified based on a Land Pros service record, he arrived at the Walmart store at 12:35 p.m. on January 3, 2015, and “spread salt” on the “lots and walks” until 1:15 p.m. He testified that when he visited the Walmart property, the snow had not accumulated sufficiently to warrant plowing the parking lot. It is undisputed 5 that prior to the storm, Fierro did not pretreat the parking lot with salt or another de-icing compound. At 1:30 p.m., approximately fifteen minutes after Fierro finished salting the parking lot and sidewalks, Gallardo, driven by her son, arrived at Walmart to purchase Tylenol for her grandson. She testified that when she and her son walked from her car toward the Walmart store, the parking lot surface “had white areas and dark areas,” but “was very slushy.” She said that she was “looking straight ahead, being very careful because it was very slushy.” Gallardo testified, “I don’t know what, I just slipped and fell. I lost my balance, I couldn’t catch it. So, my -- my right leg went under my left leg, I landed on my butt on my right side.” Asked by her counsel at trial why she fell, Gallardo testified that she fell because of “[t]he slushy ice, snow.” Gallardo stated that immediately after her fall, she could not get up on her own, so her son assisted her, and they went into the store and made their purchase. Gallardo alleges that due to her fall, she hurt her lower back and sustained other injuries. 6  B. 1. On October 31, 2016, Gallardo filed this action. Gallardo alleged that Walmart acted in a negligent, careless, and/or reckless manner. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. filed a third-party complaint against Land Pros, alleging breach of contract and seeking contribution and common-law indemnification. In an amended complaint, Gallardo asserted a direct action against Land Pros and named additional defendants. In addition to Else, her meteorology expert, and a medical expert to opine on her injuries, Gallardo designated J. Nelson Wiest as an expert in the field of snow and ice management. Wiest adopted Else’s opinions, including his opinion that when Gallardo fell, the snow accumulation was estimated to be between a trace and one tenth of an inch. Among other opinions regarding the alleged negligence of Walmart and Land Pros, Wiest opined that when Gallardo slipped and fell, “there was a dangerously slippery condition that should have been pretreated with an application of ice melt,” and that “[t]his slippery condition was due to existing slippery conditions in the area.” Land Pros moved for summary judgment. Citing Bodine v. Goerke Co., 102 N.J.L. 642, 643-44 (E. & A. 1926), and other authority, the trial court held that “the reasonable time in which a commercial property owner must act to 7 clear snow and ice from public walkways does not begin until after the storm ends.” The court accordingly granted Land Pros’ motion for summary judgment. Walmart then filed its first motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion. 2 On June 10, 2021, this Court decided Pareja. In the wake of that decision, Walmart filed its second motion for summary judgment. Walmart argued that it owed no duty to clear snow and ice before the storm ended and noted that there was no dispute that the storm was ongoing when Gallardo fell. Walmart also asserted that under the law of the case doctrine, because Land Pros was found not to have been negligent and was granted summary judgment, Gallardo’s claim -- premised on Land Pros’ allegedly negligent removal of snow and ice from the store parking lot -- should be dismissed on summary judgment. Gallardo argued that Pareja did not compel the grant of summary judgment in this case. She maintained that Walmart voluntarily assumed a duty to conduct snow removal during an ongoing storm by virtue of its 2 The record does not reveal the trial court’s reasoning in denying Walmart’s first motion for summary judgment. The trial court’s denial of that motion is not challenged in this appeal. 8 contract with Land Pros and its exemplar scope of work’s mandate that the contractor remove snow and ice continuously before, during, and after a storm. Gallardo also noted that although this Court in Pareja granted Walmart “absolute immunity” whether an ongoing storm is major or minor, it also created an exception that applies if the defendant “does something that under the circumstances makes the condition worse” or “creates a condition.” She asserted that because Land Pros applied salt to accumulated snow without pretreating the parking lot, this case fits within Pareja’s first exception. The trial court agreed with Gallardo’s argument that the first exception identified in Pareja governs this case. The court did not mention the “unusual circumstances” requirement of Pareja; instead, under the court’s interpretation of Pareja, the exception would apply if a commercial landlord’s actions “increase the risk to pedestrians and invitees on their property.” The court found a “genuine issue of fact as to whether [Walmart’s] contractor’s failure to pretreat the parking lot and then spreading an ice-melting agent on the ground surface after some snow fell created a risk to pedestrians and business invitees.” The trial court denied summary judgment. 3 3 The trial court acknowledged Walmart’s argument that its contract with Land Pros could not afford Gallardo a cause of action given her failure to allege that she was a beneficiary of that contract, calling that argument “logical.” The court stated, however, that Walmart’s motion “relies solely on the ongoing storm rule.” 9  The case was tried before a jury for five days. Gallardo, her husband, and her daughter testified about the circumstances of the accident and Gallardo’s injuries. Gallardo presented the deposition testimony of current and former Walmart representatives. She relied on her expert witnesses, Else and Wiest, and a medical expert addressing damages. In his trial testimony, Wiest stated that when Fierro “put salt and apparently not enough salt to melt it all because we have the pictures of what the result was, when he put the salt down,” he threw it “on top of the snow and that snow melts and runs down and when it hits that cold untreated surface it becomes black ice.” Wiest asserted that Fierro “essentially exacerbated the condition by throwing water on it, which is what he did,” and that Fierro “increased the risk.” Wiest also reiterated his opinion that Land Pros’ failure to “pretreat before accumulation started” contributed to Gallardo’s fall. After Gallardo rested her case, the trial court denied Walmart’s motion for judgment at trial pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, finding Gallardo’s evidence sufficient to warrant denial of that motion. Walmart presented the testimony of Fierro, a Walmart assistant manager, and expert witnesses addressing Gallardo’s claim for damages. At the close of the evidence, Walmart again moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, and the trial court denied the motion. 10  At the charge conference, Walmart submitted to the trial court a jury instruction based on the first exception prescribed in Pareja, 246 N.J. at 559. The charge that Walmart proposed would have directed the jury to determine whether Land Pros’ application of an ice melting agent during a snowstorm gave rise to an unusual circumstance that increased the risk of injury to pedestrians such as Gallardo. Because the dissent suggests that the trial court declined to charge the jury on Pareja because Pareja was decided before Gallardo’s accident, see post at ___ (slip op. at 17-18, 21, 35-39), we present in detail the court’s discussion of the charge with counsel for the parties. In response to Walmart’s request for a Pareja charge, the trial court commented that “[t]here are many doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court that are applied,” but “none of them have their own jury charge.” Gallardo opposed the proposed charge without explaining the reason for that position. Walmart stated that the court had denied summary judgment on the Pareja question because it was a question of fact and added that the jury should be told about Pareja because “that is the law right now.” The trial court commented that “the question of fact in this case is not -- it was prior to the Supreme Court ruling,” and that under case law “going back to the 40s, if you do something to make the conditions, you’re liable. And 11 there is no special charges to that.” The court stated that prior to Pareja, there had been no jury charge; rather, “It’s simply if you find them negligent. In other words, if the jury finds that Walmart undertook the obligation to clear it and didn’t do it properly, making conditions worse, that’s what it is.” Gallardo responded that when Bodine “was the controlling law,” there was “no charge given to the jury that if you believed there was an ongoing storm, they had no duty.” The court added that “the only difference” Pareja created “is that there’s no absolute duty to do anything if there’s an ongoing storm. There -- but the -- law was always, before that and continued to be, that if you choose to do something, you better do it right.” The trial court suggested, as an alternative to a jury charge based on Pareja, a post-verdict jury interrogatory intended to elicit the jury’s views as to whether Walmart or an entity on its behalf had salted the parking lot prior to Gallardo’s arrival, which would be followed by a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the jury concluded that Walmart did not apply salt. After considering the comments of counsel, the court abandoned that suggestion. The trial court then stated that its objection to Walmart’s proposed Pareja charge was that “if I use your charge, I’ve got to tell them to -- ask the jury first, was there a continuing storm, yes or no?” The court added that it 12 would then have to ask the jury, “[i]f there was a continuing storm, did Walmart undertake actions despite the continuing storm, yes or no?” The trial court observed, the Supreme Court didn’t change the law, by the way. The exception existed prior to the law. The exception was basically, if you undertake -- they made it an exception but it was the law before. And if you undertake to do something -- you know, you go out and shovel your sidewalk and you do a bad job and you weren’t obligated to shovel your sidewalk, you created a liability for yourself. You know, it’s -- it’s the old maxim. You -- have no obligation to do it, but if you do it, you better make sure you do it right because you’ve now created -- you’ve undertaken a duty you didn’t have to do. The trial court stated its understanding that under Pareja, commercial landowners, lessees, and contractors “have no absolute duty to go out and do something during a continuing storm,” but “there’s already all this law in place that says if you go out and do it, you’d better make sure you do it right because now you’ve undertaken the duty.” The court further commented that “the way I read Pareja” is “that’s an issue for summary judgment. If there’s a continuing storm, you get out on” summary judgment. The trial court’s jury charge on the question of liability, premised on general principles of negligence, did not mention the ongoing storm rule. 13  The following day, after the trial court instructed the jury, Walmart again objected to the court’s decision not to charge the jury regarding Pareja. Gallardo responded, with respect to what occurred prior to Pareja, when, -- when we would rely upon Bodine, which was the, essentially, the absolute defense if an ongoing storm, was alleged, there wouldn’t be a charge with respect to ongoing storm or issues like that. It would be charged as regular negligence, as the court did in this case. Gallardo also argued that in Pareja, “the issue was one of duty, and it is an issue as a matter of law,” and that “that’s an issue of fact which has already been addressed in this case.” Gallardo observed that Walmart’s motion for summary judgment on Pareja “was already denied by this trial court.” Stating that Pareja was “a recent Supreme Court decision” that was not yet the subject of a model jury charge, the trial court commented that Pareja “deals not with what happens at a trial before a jury,” but requires only that if “there’s no question of fact that there’s an ongoing storm and the defendant undertook no action,” then as a matter of law, the defendant would not be liable. The trial court added: This case is not Pareja. This case is dealing with the fact that Walmart, the defendant in this case, the allegations of fact for the jury to decide are that Walmart undertook an action. And whether or not they did that action properly causing, to worsening of the situation -- situation and causing, resulting damages is 14  a question of fact for the jury to decide under regular negligence as in a pre-Pareja case. The trial court commented that it understood Walmart’s objection to its decision not to give the Pareja charge, “but I’m not going to charge the jury as to it because it -- it would bring confusion into the jury in the Court’s view.” The jury found Walmart negligent and determined that its negligence was the proximate cause of Gallardo’s fall. It awarded Gallardo $500,000 for pain and suffering, $213,000 for past medical expenses, and $414,000 for future medical expenses, for a total verdict of $1,127,000. Walmart moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 4:40-2(b); for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1; and for a remittitur. The trial court denied Walmart’s motions, again viewing Pareja to govern only cases in which a commercial landowner takes no action to remove snow or ice, not cases like this one, in which a commercial entity attempted -- by having a contractor apply a de-icer -- to remove snow and ice from the parking lot. After molding the verdict to account for past medical expenses and awarding prejudgment interest, the trial court entered judgment in Gallardo’s favor in the amount of $1,328,658.59. 2. Walmart appealed the trial court’s decisions denying its motions for summary judgment, judgment at trial, and judgment notwithstanding the 15 verdict. Walmart argued that Pareja precluded the imposition of a duty to remove snow and ice during the ongoing storm on the day of Gallardo’s accident and that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, neither exception to the ongoing storm rule recognized in Pareja applied to this case. Walmart further contended that the trial court erred when it declined to charge the jury regarding the ongoing storm rule. 4 Gallardo countered that the trial court properly ruled that the ongoing storm rule set forth in Pareja did not preclude the imposition of a duty because Walmart directed its contractor to conduct snow removal during the storm. She argued that Walmart voluntarily imposed a duty on itself by instructing contractors in its exemplar scope of work to remove snow before, during, and after storms. The Appellate Division agreed with Walmart that the trial court committed error when it declined to instruct the jury regarding the ongoing storm rule. The appellate court stated, “[w]e part ways with the judge’s view that charging the jury on the [ongoing storm] doctrine would have confused 4 Walmart also argued before the Appellate Division that the trial court should have granted summary judgment because it had granted summary judgment to Land Pros; that the court should have excluded the testimony of Gallardo’s snow removal expert on the ground that he rendered a net opinion; and that the trial court improperly declined Walmart’s request for a remittitur, thus allowing Gallardo to be awarded a windfall. 16 them.” The Appellate Division held that the trial court should have asked the jury to determine whether this case fit into either of the exceptions to the duty recognized in Pareja -- exceptions the appellate court viewed to be “clear” and “not beyond the ken of the average juror.” The Appellate Division therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial, directing the trial court to instruct the jury using Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.20B, “Liability for Defects in Public Streets and Sidewalks: Liability of Owner of Commercial Property for Defects, Snow and Ice Accumulation and Other Dangerous Conditions in Abutting Sidewalks” (rev. Nov. 2022). The Appellate Division, however, held that Walmart was not entitled to summary judgment, judgment at trial, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Addressing the first exception of Pareja, the court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to “whether Walmart’s conduct, through its contractor Land Pros, made the parking lot more dangerous on the day of the accident.” The appellate court viewed “the question of whether spreading salt on snow during the storm was an unusual circumstance increasing or exacerbating the risk” to be a disputed issue warranting a jury determination. It rejected Walmart’s remaining arguments. 17  3. Gallardo filed a petition for certification, challenging the Appellate Division’s decision vacating the trial court’s judgment and remanding for a new trial. We denied Gallardo’s petition for certification. 260 N.J. 553 (2025). Walmart filed a cross-petition, arguing that (1) under Pareja, a commercial landowner’s performance of normal snow removal operations during an ongoing storm does not give rise to “unusual circumstances” warranting application of the first exception to the ongoing storm rule; and (2) given the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Land Pros, Walmart cannot be held liable for Land Pros’ conduct of snow removal. We granted Walmart’s cross- petition for certification. 260 N.J. 562 (2025). We granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ). II. Walmart argues that the first exception to the ongoing storm rule in Pareja, 246 N.J. at 558-59, does not apply unless the commercial landowner’s actions give rise to “unusual circumstances” increasing the risk of injury, and that salting a parking lot in a snowstorm does not rise to the level of “unusual circumstances.” Walmart asserts that if commercial landowners could be held 18 liable for ordinary snow removal activities during an ongoing storm, they would have a compelling incentive not to shovel, apply salt, or otherwise remediate the conditions until after the storm has ended. Gallardo urges us to affirm the Appellate Division’s holding that genuine issues of material fact regarding the application of the first exception of Pareja preclude summary judgment. Citing Model Civil Jury Charge 5.20B, which does not include the “unusual circumstances” language of Pareja, Gallardo argues that the first exception in Pareja applies in any setting in which a commercial property owner, during an ongoing storm, conducts snow removal procedures that increase the risk of injury. NJAJ interprets Pareja to hold that the ongoing storm rule does not shield from liability commercial landowners who engage in conduct during the storm that enhances the risk of harm. In NJAJ’s view, Pareja precludes the imposition of a duty only when landowners choose to do nothing during a snowstorm or conduct snow remediation using due care. III. A. “[I]n construing the law -- whether the common law or a statute -- our review is de novo,” and we need not defer to the interpretive conclusions of the trial court or Appellate Division. Qian v. Toll Bros., Inc., 223 N.J. 124, 19 135 (2015) (quoting Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012)); accord State in Int. of A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 554-55 (2014). When we review a trial court’s grant or denial of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same standard that governs the trial court’s determination. In re Est. of Jones, 259 N.J. 584, 594 (2025). In accordance with Rule 4:46-2(c), an appellate court decides “whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Padilla v. Young Il An, 257 N.J. 540, 547 (2024) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). The standard for determining a motion for judgment under Rule 4:40-1 and the standard for determining a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 4:40-2 are the same: “the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord that party the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom,” and it must deny the motion “if reasonable minds could differ.” Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 to R. 4:40-1 and -2 (2026); see also Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969); Velazquez ex rel. Velazquez v. Jiminez, 336 N.J. Super. 10, 30-31 (App. Div. 2000). 20  B. The dissent is substantially premised on two arguments that were not asserted by any party or amicus in this case and were not ruled upon by any trial judge or appellate court. In a matter litigated for more than a decade, in which the parties and amicus are represented by seasoned counsel, those two arguments are asserted -- for the first and only time -- in th