State v. Oscar Ramirez

SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion. State v. Oscar Ramirez (A-1-21) (085943) Argued September 28, 2022 -- Decided November 21, 2022 SABATINO, P.J.A.D. (temporarily assigned), writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers the conflicting rights of a sexual assault victim -- to decline to participate in an investigation and to enjoy solitude at home -- and a person accused of a sexual offense -- to receive an effective defense, to assert the right to confrontation and compulsory process of witnesses, and to due process -- in the context of a prosecutor’s motion for a protective order relieving the prosecution of its obligation to supply a victim’s residential address to defense counsel. D.C., a twenty-three-year-old woman, was sexually assaulted shortly after midnight on October 25, 2019, in a North Bergen cemetery. The victim stated that the attacker held a box cutter to her neck and told her to be quiet or he would kill her. Based on surveillance footage collected from that night, the police identified defendant Oscar Ramirez as the attacker. The police arrested defendant, who had previously been convicted of two assaults that arose out of initial charges of alleged sexual contact. Defendant gave a statement in which he denied -- without being asked about the attack -- having committed “the rape” but identified himself as the man shown in the surveillance footage and stated that he had previously killed people. Laboratory results matched defendant’s DNA to swabs taken from the victim, and defendant was charged with multiple offenses related to the incident. When supplying pretrial discovery to defense counsel, the prosecution redacted the address where the victim lived at the time of the offense and also declined to provide the new address to which she moved after the attack. To justify withholding that information, the prosecution moved for a protective order under Rule 3:13-3(e) and submitted a sworn certification from an assistant prosecutor asserting that the victim did not want her address to be provided to the defense, that she was afraid defendant or someone close to him would locate her, and that she did not want to speak to the defense before trial. Defense counsel opposed the motion, arguing that Rule 3:13-3(e) required the prosecution to provide the victim’s contact information to the defense, even if defendant himself is not allowed to have access. 1  The motion judge granted the prosecutor’s motion in part, ordering that the address be disclosed to defendant’s counsel, who would not be permitted to disclose any of the information to the defendant. Notably, the judge’s written decision did not discuss the statutory or constitutional rights of sexual assault victims, beyond citing the Court’s recognition in State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 28 (1986), that there is a “heightened need to protect victims from trauma and intimidation in sexual assault cases.” More specifically, the judge did not cite to the Victim’s Rights Amendment, the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, or the Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights. The Appellate Division reversed, stressing that “to permit defense investigators to access the victim’s home, against her expressed instructions,” would violate her right to privacy. 467 N.J. Super. 359, 369 (App. Div. 2021). The Court granted leave to appeal. 248 N.J. 252 (2021) HELD: After reviewing the relevant statutes and authorities that must be considered in balancing the competing interests and rights of a sexual assault victim and the person accused of the sexual offense, the Court sets forth a framework of procedures and considerations to apply going forward when a prosecutor seeks to withhold from discovery a sexual assault victim’s address. Because neither the ruling of the trial court nor that of the Appellate Division sufficiently addresses the competing interests explored in the Court’s opinion, the Court remands the matter for a more fulsome balancing of the competing interests. 1. Rule 3:13-3 governs the prosecution’s general discovery obligations and the contested motion for a protective order in this case. Under Rule 3:13-3(a) and (b)(1), once an indictment has issued, a defendant has a right to automatic and broad discovery of the evidence the State has gathered in support of its charges. Reciprocally, under Rule 3:13-3(b)(2), defense counsel must supply the prosecution with similarly broad categories of items. Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(F) specifically imposes upon the prosecutor an obligation to provide a defendant post-indictment with a witness’s address. Nevertheless, criminal discovery has its limits, and information must be shown to be relevant to the issues in the case in order to be subject to disclosure. Another important limit on a defendant’s right to discovery is the chilling and inhibiting effect that discovery can have on material witnesses who are subject to intimidation, harassment, or embarrassment. Rule 3:13-3(e) details how the prosecution may obtain a protective order from the court, allowing it to withhold from the defense certain discovery that otherwise would be mandated. A trial court considers “the totality of the circumstances” in determining whether good cause exists to grant the motion. One factor the court may consider when evaluating good cause is the “protection of witnesses and others from physical harm [and] threats of harm”; another is “confidential information recognized by law.” R. 3:13-3(e)(1). Appellate courts defer to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a protective order unless the trial court abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law. (pp. 15-21) 2 2. The Court reviews in detail the legislative enactments, constitutional amendment, and court rules that afford enhanced protections to sexual assault victims and other crime victims in New Jersey. Together, the authorities reviewed by the Court reflect a robust codified public policy to protect sexual assault victims in this State from undue incursions upon their rights of privacy and solitude and the Legislature’s recognition that victims can re-experience trauma each time they discuss the violent incident. (pp. 21-28) 3. Weighing against those important rights of a victim are the countervailing rights of a person accused of a criminal offense, protected expressly or impliedly by the federal and New Jersey Constitutions and decades of jurisprudence. Conceptually, they encompass the rights (1) to the effective assistance of counsel in defending the case, (2) to confront the prosecution’s witnesses at trial and to have the compulsory process of exculpatory witnesses, and (3) to due process. The Court reviews the nature and scope of each of those rights. Significantly, the right to the effective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding includes the right to conduct a reasonable investigation to prepare a defense, but that right is not absolute and has been balanced in case law against the victim’s privacy rights. The constitutionally granted right to compulsory process permits a defendant to call and examine witnesses as part of the defense, and the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that asking a witness during cross-examination where that witness lives is important to the exercise of the related right of confrontation. Again, however, those rights are not absolute, and trial judges have discretion to limit cross- examination if it invades the witness’s constitutional rights or merely seeks to harass, annoy, or humiliate the witness. Finally, the Due Process Clause gives defendants the right of access to adverse witnesses during the investigation phase of the defense. State v. Blazas, 432 N.J. Super. 326, 340 (App. Div. 2013). Even so, because a witness has the “absolute and personal right to either grant or deny” a pretrial interview, “the protected [due process] right is the opportunity for pretrial access; it is not a guarantee of pretrial access.” See id. at 343-46. A witness’s decision must be a personal one, however; any prosecutorial “interference with a witness’s decision to grant or deny an interview to the defense . . . deprives a defendant of his right to present a complete defense.” Id. at 343. (pp. 28-35) 4. Relying on principles distilled from the authorities reviewed, the Court holds that, going forward, certain procedures and considerations apply when a prosecutor seeks to withhold from discovery a sexual assault victim’s address: The prosecution must move for a protective order under Rule 3:13-3(e). The motion must be supported by a sworn statement from the victim attesting the victim does not want the address disclosed to the defendant or defense counsel. If such a motion is filed, the defense may file a response with the court expressing reasons 3 why a protective order should be denied and, in particular, why the defense needs the victim’s address. The trial court may permit a reply by the prosecutor. If the defense asserts it wants the address, among other things, for the purpose of contacting and interviewing the victim, the court shall then consider various “supervised pathway” options designed to assure that the victim’s decision is personal and also that the victim has been made aware of the defense’s reasons for wanting the address and to make contact. The supervised pathway options include, but are not limited to, a written request by the defense that the court may permit to be conveyed to the victim through the prosecutor or court staff; an in camera interview of the victim by the judge; a limited call between defense counsel and the victim; or another court-devised option that would fairly balance the victim’s rights to refrain from participation against the defendant’s rights to prepare a defense. After implementing one or more of those options, the court shall rule on whether good cause for a protective order has been shown, and, if so, what court- imposed restrictions or conditions shall be observed. In fashioning a protective order, the trial court shall accord heavy weight to the victim’s interests in having solitude and privacy at that victim’s residence in the wake of a highly traumatic experience. The home can be a place of refuge for a victim, and the Court’s jurisprudence has long respected the heightened protections of privacy and solitude in one’s dwelling. Accordingly, there shall be a presumption that, if the defense is allowed by the court to obtain the address, its investigators shall not appear at the victim’s residence without the victim’s advance consent and court approval. In the rare instance in which the court finds the presumption is overcome, it shall specify within the protective order reasonable limitations on the time, place, and manner of such at- home contact. (pp. 35-41) 5. So that the process outlined in this opinion may be implemented in this case, the Court remands the matter and provides guidance for the proceedings on remand. The Court expresses no view, however, of the facts of this case or how the trial court should rule on remand. (pp. 41-42) The judgment of the Appellate Division is VACATED. The matter is REMANDED for further proceedings. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRE- LOUIS, and FASCIALE; and JUDGE FISHER (temporarily assigned) join in JUDGE SABATINO’s opinion. 4  SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-1 September Term 2021 085943 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Oscar Ramirez, Defendant-Appellant. On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 467 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 2021). Argued Decided September 28, 2022 November 21, 2022 Rochelle Watson, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Rochelle Watson, of counsel and on the briefs, and Nakea J. Barksdale, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs). John R. Mulkeen, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation and Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic Center for Law & Justice, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne 1  LoCicero, of counsel and on the brief, and Ronald K. Chen, on the brief). Joshua P. Law argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, on the brief). Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Sarah D. Brigham, of counsel and on the brief). JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we consider the conflicting rights of a sexual assault victim -- to decline to participate in an investigation and to enjoy solitude at home -- and a person accused of a sexual offense -- to receive an effective defense, to assert the right to confrontation and compulsory process of witnesses, and to due process. Specifically, we ponder these issues in the context of a prosecutor’s motion under Rule 3:13-3(e) for a protective order relieving the prosecution of its obligation under subsection (b) of that rule to supply a victim’s residential address to defense counsel. We hold that the resolution of such motions requires careful judicial oversight and a sensitive balancing of the competing interests. To guide that process, we provide a gloss to Rule 3:13-3 to ensure that a defendant’s counsel 2 and agents do not have unfettered access to a sexual assault victim’s home address through pretrial discovery, while also requiring the trial court to consider, in its discretion, judicially supervised “pathways” for: (1) conveying to the victim the defense’s reasons for seeking to contact the victim; and (2) verifying that, after being neutrally informed of those reasons, the victim still declines to be interviewed or to participate in the defense’s investigation. Because neither the ruling of the trial court nor that of the Appellate Division in this case anticipated such guidance or fully addressed the competing interests at stake, we vacate their decisions and remand for further proceedings. I. A. We briefly summarize the facts that provide the backdrop to this discovery dispute, mindful they have not yet been established at a trial. In the late evening hours of October 25, 2019, D.C.,1 a twenty-three- year-old woman, was walking home from her shift as a waitress at a restaurant in North Bergen. Shortly after midnight, a man approached D.C. and grabbed her. He held a box cutter to her neck and told her to be quiet or he would kill 1 We use initials for the alleged sexual assault victim to protect her privacy. See R. 1:38-3(a)(6), (12). We generally will refer to her as “the victim.” 3 her. He forced her into a nearby cemetery, removed all her clothing, and sexually assaulted her in multiple ways. The man reiterated to the victim to be quiet, or he would kill her. When the attacker heard police sirens, he pulled up his pants, told the victim to count to twenty, stole her purse and phone, and left. The victim believed the man had ejaculated without wearing a condom because he wiped his penis with his clothing before leaving. She fled from the cemetery in her underwear, holding her clothes. She flagged down a couple driving by for help, and they took her to the North Bergen Police Department. At 4:15 a.m., a nurse examined the victim using a rape kit. The victim described her attacker to the nurse as “short, Hispanic, white skin, beard, long hair, loose big eyes.” She also stated he was “approximately five feet, four inches tall, wearing a dark sweatshirt, pants and . . . a cross body backpack.” She reported that he smelled of alcohol. Local surveillance footage from that night showed a man getting a haircut at a nearby barber shop, going to a bar or club, and then following another woman before losing track of her. The footage later showed the same man following the victim on the street. At 12:13 a.m., the video showed the victim leaving the cemetery, clutching her clothes. The man appears on the 4 video walking on a nearby street at 12:30 a.m. The footage did not show the alleged sexual assault. Based on information from an employee who worked at the barber shop depicted in the footage, the police identified the man in the video as defendant Oscar Ramirez, who resided in North Bergen. The police learned that defendant had previously been convicted of two assaults that arose out of initial charges of alleged sexual contact. Specifically, in October 2017, after being charged with aggravated sexual assault with a weapon, defendant was convicted of third-degree aggravated assault. In May 2018, after being charged with criminal sexual contact, defendant was convicted of simple assault. The police arrested defendant. Apparently without being asked about the alleged attack, defendant gave a statement to the police in which he denied committing what he termed “the rape of a girl.” A police officer responded, “I didn’t mention anything about the rape of a girl.” Defendant explained that his father had told him about a rape in North Bergen. Defendant added that if he had done something to a woman, he did not remember it because he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs. Defendant denied that he had been in the cemetery. 5  Despite his denials, defendant did identify himself to the police as the man shown in the surveillance footage. He also referred to himself as a “bad person.” He admitted, without specifics, to previously “killing people in Mexico.” When asked what he would say to the victim if she were present, defendant told the detective that he would apologize. Defendant has been confined in pretrial detention since his arrest. Laboratory results thereafter matched defendant’s DNA to swabs taken from the victim’s external genitalia and underwear on the night of the assault. A Hudson County grand jury charged defendant with kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, armed robbery, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, unlawful possession of a weapon, aggravated criminal sexual contact, and terroristic threats. B. When supplying pretrial discovery to defense counsel, the prosecution furnished the victim’s name and date of birth, as well as a search reflecting that the victim had no prior criminal history of arrests. However, the prosecution redacted from the supplied materials the address where the victim lived at the time of the offense. According to the prosecution, the victim moved to a different residence after the attack, and she provided an updated 6 home address to the prosecutor’s office. The prosecution also did not provide the new address to defense counsel. To justify withholding the victim’s former and current addresses, the prosecution moved for a protective order under Rule 3:13-3(e). The prosecution submitted a sworn certification from an assistant prosecutor in support of the motion. His certification asserts, in relevant part, that [v]ia a Zoom conference on September 17, 2020, Victim told the undersigned and [an agent within the Prosecutor’s Office] that she does not want her address information provided to the defense. She is afraid that Defendant or someone close to him would be able to locate her. Moreover, she also stated she does not want to speak to the Defense before trial about the case, including in-person, by telephone or by video conference. The undersigned told her this decision was her choice, not the decision of the Prosecutor’s Office. Other than the certification, the record contains no documents memorializing the Zoom call between the prosecutor’s office and the victim. Notably, the prosecution did not provide a statement signed or attested to by the victim herself with its motion. The prosecution served the motion and supporting certification on defense counsel, who filed opposition. In oral argument on the motion, the prosecutor asserted that this case -- one in which defendant reportedly made threats to kill the victim and admitted to killing people in the past -- is particularly egregious and justifies a 7 protective order. The prosecutor specifically represented that some victims have told him in previous cases that defense investigators have come to their homes and claimed they work for “the State” without explaining they work for the public defender. Defense counsel responded that Rule 3:13-3(e) required the prosecution to provide the victim’s contact information. Counsel asked that, at the very least, the defense team, including professional investigators, be given access to the victim’s contact information, even if defendant himself is not allowed to have access. Defense counsel urged that his investigators be allowed to knock on the victim’s door, explain what their purpose is, and let the victim decide whether she wants to talk to them. He maintained that his investigators are professional, always identify themselves as working for the defendant, try only to get information, and do not intimidate or harass victims. Counsel further assured that if his investigators call the victim and she declines to speak, that choice would be honored. The motion judge granted in part and denied in part the prosecution’s motion. Specifically, the judge “order[ed] the [prosecution] to provide 8 defendant’s counsel with [the] victim’s contact information 2 and counsel and his investigatory team to not disclose any of the information to defendant.” The motion judge acknowledged the prosecution’s contention that a protective order would “ensure [the] victim’s physical safety and keep her free from intimidation.” The judge also noted the defense’s counterargument that the defense team should have the victim’s address to exercise defendant’s own constitutional rights, “so that [his counsel and investigators] may contact [the] victim and effectuate effective assistance of counsel.” The judge stated that the court must “assess the reasonableness of any intimidation [the victim] may feel” and balance “the victim’s physical safety” and “subjective fears” against “defendant’s Constitutional rights.” The judge specifically found that the victim’s concerns about defendant personally learning of her address were “objectively reasonable,” given what he termed the “heinous” facts of this case. The judge further noted the victim “could potentially be in danger if defendant knew her address.” He added, “[a]lthough defendant is currently incarcerated, there is a potential danger that if he desired to harm or intimidate the victim he could enlist others to do so if he knew her contact information.” 2 Although the opinion used the phrase “contact information,” the trial court’s statement of the issue, the record, and the parties’ briefing all reflect that the only information in dispute before us is the victim’s home address. 9  Even so, the judge also recognized that a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights to confront his accuser, to compulsory process, to prepare a defense, and to the effective assistance of counsel “encompass access to a witness during the investigatory phase of a case,” relying on State v. Blazas, 432 N.J. Super. 326, 339 (App. Div. 2013). That recognition led the judge to authorize the victim’s address to be divulged, but only to defendant’s attorney and investigators, and to prohibit them from disclosing the address to their client. The judge reasoned that although partial release of the victim’s address to the defense team “may not entirely relieve her subjective fears,” defendant was incarcerated, defense investigators are trained to identify themselves, and the defense team had represented that it would not coerce or intimidate the victim. He added that when the defense team contacts her, the victim can still decline to speak with them. Thus, the judge concluded that the release of the victim’s address to only defense counsel and defense investigators struck a proper balance between defendant’s constitutional rights to contact a witness and the victim’s “physical safety.” Notably, the judge’s written decision did not discuss the statutory or constitutional rights of sexual assault victims, beyond citing the Court’s recognition in State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 28 (1986), that there is a “heightened 10 need to protect victims from trauma and intimidation in sexual assault cases.” More specifically, the judge did not cite to the Victim’s Rights Amendment (VRA), N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22; the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights (CVBR), N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to -38; or the Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights (SAVBR), N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.2, provisions which we will discuss below. The prosecutor requested that the trial court stay its order pending an interlocutory appeal, which the court denied. The Appellate Division then granted the prosecutor leave to appeal the portion of the protective order that required disclosure of the address to the defense team and issued a corresponding stay. C. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court in a published decision. See State v. Ramirez, 467 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 2021). The Appellate Division held that the prosecutor’s motion should have been granted in full, keeping the victim’s address totally confidential from both defendant individually and the defense team. Id. at 363. The appellate court reasoned that because the trial court failed to adequately consider sexual assault victims’ rights under the VRA and the victim-related statutes, the trial court’s partial denial of the protective order amounted to an abuse of discretion, warranting reversal. Id. at 363, 369. 11  Among other things, the Appellate Division noted that “[o]ur Supreme Court has long recognized that ‘criminal discovery has its limits . . . [and courts must prevent] the chilling and inhibiting effect that discovery can have on material witnesses who are subjected to intimidation, harassment, or embarrassment.’” Id. at 368 (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 256 (1992)). Based on its interpretation of the SAVBR, the Appellate Division held that the motion judge and defendant “mistakenly create[d] an irreconcilable conflict” between a defendant’s right to confront an accuser and a victim’s right to choose whether to participate in an assault investigation under the SAVBR. Id. at 366-67. The appellate court stated that the trial court’s “untenable ‘compromise’ protective order . . . left the victim unprotected and exposed to the very trauma she desperately sought to avoid.” Id. at 367. The Appellate Division expressly linked the defense’s desire for the victim’s residential address to an anticipated effort to contact her at her home and persuade her to take part in an interview. As the court explained: Defendant’s right to access the physical evidence the State has in its possession related to this case remains inviolate. However, to permit defense investigators to access the victim’s home, against her expressed instructions, would directly violate the Constitutional protections of the CVBR, the public policy established by the Supreme Court in D.R.H., 127 N.J. at 256, and 12  the protection codified by the Legislature in [the SAVBR,] N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.2(c)(7). In sharp contrast to State v. Scoles, 214 N.J. 236 (2013), in which, over the State’s objections, the Court established a carefully drafted protocol to permit the defense team access to highly sensitive evidence, this case involves only honoring and preserving the privacy of a sexual assault victim. Neither defense counsel nor any person associated with the defense team has the right to violate a crime victim’s right to privacy. [Id. at 369 (emphases added).] Defendant moved for leave to appeal, which we granted, although we denied his motion to stay the Appellate Division’s judgment. 248 N.J. 252 (2021). We also granted motions to appear as amici curiae by the Attorney General, the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL), and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU). II. Defendant, the ACDL, and the ACLU all argue that the Appellate Division’s opinion unfairly curtails an accused’s constitutionally protected ability to develop an effective defense of the case. They urge the reinstatement of the trial court’s decision allowing the release of the victim’s address to the defense team (but not to defendant himself). They argue the ruling is a sound compromise and not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion over criminal discovery matters. 13  These advocates maintain the Appellate Division’s prohibition on disclosure is overbroad and excessively protective of the victim’s interests to the detriment of defendant’s constitutional rights. They assert the Appellate Division unfairly assumed that defense attorneys or investigators are prone to act unprofessionally by harassing victims at their addresses and failing to honor victims’ right to decline to participate in interviews or investigations. Defendant and the ACLU further criticize the hearsay nature of the prosecutor’s motion certification, contending it is insufficient to establish the victim’s personal reasons for opposing disclosure and to substantiate “good cause” for relief under Rule 3:13-3(e).3 The prosecutor and the Attorney General, meanwhile, urge that we affirm the Appellate Division’s opinion. They argue the appellate court’s decision appropriately enforces the right of a sexual assault victim to decline to be interviewed by the defense or otherwise participate in an investigation. 3 The ACLU’s amicus brief advances a new argument that was not raised in either the trial court or the Appellate Division. The ACLU contends that a victim’s home address can be “essential” to the criminal defense team as an investigative tool, independent of a desire to interview the victim. Specifically, the ACLU asserts that witnesses’ home addresses are commonly used for searching public information databases and social media sites; conducting background checks; identifying aliases; pulling Motor Vehicle Commission records, criminal history records, and credit history records; discovering legal and financial conflicts; and uncovering relationships to others in the case. After receiving the ACLU’s amicus brief, defendant adopted this new argument in a supplemental brief. 14 They stress the post-event mental anguish and fear that is commonly experienced by victims of violent crimes, especially persons who have been sexually assaulted. The prosecutor and the Attorney General maintain the defense can conduct a sufficient pretrial investigation and mount a vigorous defense without depending on the prosecution to disclose the victim’s home address. As a procedural matter, they contend the prosecutor’s motion certification in this case complied with Rule 3:13-3(e)(2), which requires good cause to be shown only “in the form of a written statement,” and which does not require that statement to be sworn or attested to directly by a victim. They further argue that such “good cause” is manifest in this case. In this regard, they underscore the brutal nature of this sexual assault, defendant’s threats to kill the victim if she sought help, his claim to the police that he had previously committed murders, his criminal record, and the victim’s decision to move to a new address after the attack. III. A. We begin our analysis with an examination of Rule 3:13-3, the court rule that governs the prosecution’s general discovery obligations and the contested motion for a protective order in this case. 15  As codified in Rule 3:13-3, New Jersey has a tradition of what is often described as an “open file” model of reciprocal pretrial criminal discovery. “Our courts do not countenance trial by surprise.” State in Int. of A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 555 (2014). “To advance the goal of providing fair and just criminal trials, we have adopted an open-file approach to pretrial discovery in criminal matters post-indictment.” Scoles, 214 N.J. at 252. Thus, criminal defendants are “‘entitled to broad discovery’” because it “advances the quest for truth.” Ibid. (quoting D.R.H., 127 N.J. at 256). Under Rule 3:13-3(a) and (b)(1), “[o]nce an indictment has issued, a defendant has a right to automatic and broad discovery of the evidence the State has gathered in support of its charges.” Ibid. (citing R. 3:13-3); see also A.B., 219 N.J. at 555 (calling R. 3:13-3(b) the “automatic discovery provision”). The automatic discovery model is “intended to speed up the discovery process.” Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.1 on R. 3:13-3 (2022). “The onus is on the State” to make the discovery available to the defendant. Scoles, 214 N.J. at 253. Reciprocally, under Rule 3:13-3(b)(2), defense counsel must supply the prosecution with similarly broad categories of items. 16  Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(F) specifically imposes upon the prosecutor an obligation to provide a defendant post-indictment with a witness’s address: Discovery shall include exculpatory information or material. It shall also include, but is not limited to, the following relevant material: ... (F) names, addresses, and birthdates of any persons whom the prosecutor knows to have relevant evidence or information including a designation by the prosecutor as to which of those persons may be called as witnesses. [R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(F) (emphases added).] Nevertheless, despite a criminal defendant’s general and automatic right to “broad discovery,” including witnesses’ addresses under Rule 3:13- 3(b)(1)(F), this Court also has long held that “criminal discovery has its limits.” See D.R.H., 127 N.J. at 256. Defendants are not permitted to conduct a “fishing expedition,” R.W., 104 N.J. at 28, or “transform the discovery process into an unfocused, haphazard search for evidence,” D.R.H., 127 N.J. at 256. Hence, information must be shown to be relevant to the issues in the case in order to be subject to disclosure. R. 3:13-3(b)(1); see State v. Desir, 245 N.J. 179, 193 (2021). Another important limit on a defendant’s right to discovery is “the chilling and inhibiting effect that discovery can have on material witnesses 17 who are subject to intimidation, harassment, or embarrassment.” D.R.H., 127 N.J. at 256. For instance, in D.R.H., this Court held that criminal defendants do not have an unconditional discovery right to a physical examination of a child sex-abuse victim absent compelling or substantial need, because the examination may have harmful consequences for the child, including invasion of privacy, emotional trauma, and mental distress. Id. at 258-59. Similarly, in R.W., this Court held that the invasion of a child victim’s privacy outweighed the defendant’s evidentiary need for a psychiatric examination. 104 N.J. at 28. More recently, we have admonished that “[c]ourts must guard against abusive discovery tactics that can have a chilling effect on the readiness of witnesses and victims to come forward and participate in the criminal justice process.” A.B., 219 N.J. at 557-58. Rule 3:13-3(e), the key subsection of the rule involved in this case, details how the prosecution may obtain a protective order from the court, allowing it to withhold from the defense certain discovery that otherwise would be mandated. Subsection (e)(1) of the rule identifies the grounds for such protective relief: Grounds. Upon motion and for good cause shown the court may at any time order that the discovery sought pursuant to this rule be denied, restricted, or deferred or make such other order as is appropriate. In determining the motion, the court may consider the following: protection of witnesses and others from 18  physical harm, threats of harm, bribes, economic reprisals and other intimidation; maintenance of such secrecy regarding informants as is required for effective investigation of criminal activity; confidential information recognized by law, including protection of confidential relationships and privileges; or any other relevant considerations. [R. 3:13-3(e)(1) (emphases added).] Subsection (e)(2) of the rule then spells out procedures that a trial court may follow concerning such motions for a protective order: Procedure. The court may permit the showing of good cause to be made, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone, and if the court thereafter enters a protective order, the entire text of the statement shall be