State v. Eddie L. Oliver

SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion. State v. A.M. (A-56-21) (087057) State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A-57-21) (087088) Argued September 13, 2022 -- Decided January 9, 2023 RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. In these consolidated appeals, the Court considers whether the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), enacted in 2020, gives judges discretion to deny compassionate release to inmates who satisfy the statute’s medical and public safety requirements. The CRA, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e, expressly repealed the medical parole statute, under which the State Parole Board could release inmates diagnosed with a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity under certain circumstances. The CRA replaced medical parole with a streamlined process to apply for compassionate release. The Act also expanded the prior law’s criteria for eligibility and transferred the power to grant release from the Parole Board to the courts. If an inmate is diagnosed with a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity as defined in the CRA, the Department “shall promptly issue to the inmate a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release” with which the inmate may then seek compassionate release. See id. at (d)(2) to (3). Inmates “shall serve a copy of the petition” on the prosecutor in the matter. Id. at (e)(1). And the prosecutor must “notify the victim or family member of the opportunity to present a statement at the hearing on the petition or to testify to the court.” Id. at (e)(2). The CRA provides that “the court may order the compassionate release of an inmate who has been issued a Certificate of Eligibility . . . if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [1] the inmate is so debilitated or incapacitated by the terminal condition, disease or syndrome, or permanent physical incapacity as to be permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released and, [2] in the case of a permanent physical incapacity, the conditions established in accordance with [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(h)] under which the inmate would be released would not pose a threat to public safety. Id. at (f)(1) (emphasis added). The basic facts in A.M.’s case are not in dispute. A.M. fatally shot her husband in May 2010 and was convicted of first-degree murder and a weapons 1 offense. In March 2021, following diagnoses of end-stage multiple sclerosis by two physicians, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release for A.M. A.M. filed a petition with the court, which the State opposed. The State advised the court that A.M.’s children intended to testify against her release at a hearing, as did the victim’s mother. The trial court denied A.M.’s petition for release. The court found that A.M.’s remaining period of parole ineligibility did not bar compassionate release under the CRA; that A.M. had established by clear and convincing evidence that she had a “permanent physical incapacity” within the meaning of the Act; and that conditions of release “likely could be established” to assure that she “would not pose a risk to public safety.” The trial court, however, concluded that compassionate release was not mandatory when those conditions were met. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that once those factors are met, a trial court has no discretion to deny relief. State v. A.M., 472 N.J. Super. 51, 57 (App. Div. 2022). The Court granted certification. 251 N.J. 199 (2022). The Court refers to the defendant in State v. Eddie Oliver by the name he uses, Al-Damany Kamau. In 1993, Kamau shot and killed a detective in an Essex County courthouse to prevent him from testifying in a criminal case. Defendant also shot and wounded two other officers, attempted to kill a third official, and planned to kill the judge. A jury convicted Kamau of one count of first-degree murder and three counts of attempted murder. In September 2021, two physicians examined Kamau in prison. Based on their findings, the Department of Corrections issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release for Kamau in November 2021. He filed a petition for release two months later, which the State and the victims opposed. Explaining the tensions between the statutory limits placed on the disclosure of medical information in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(e)(4) and the interest of public access to information, the Court limits its description of Kamau’s medical condition and asks the Legislature to review the confidentiality provision in (e)(4). The trial court denied Kamau’s petition. The court found that Kamau had a permanent physical incapacity and would not pose a threat to public safety if released. The court nonetheless explained that subsection (a) of the CRA affords judges discretion to deny relief even when an applicant meets the law’s medical and public safety factors. The court declared that Kamau had “committed perhaps one of the most heinous, brutal, bold, cold-blooded premeditated murders ever committed in Essex County” and denied the petition. Kamau appealed, and the Court granted direct certification. 251 N.J. 209 (2022). HELD: *Based on the text of the new statute and its legislative history, the Court concludes the Compassionate Release Act affords judges discretion to deny relief, in exceptional circumstances, even if the law’s medical and public safety 2 conditions are satisfied. In individual cases, when the medical and public safety factors are met, courts can assess whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist that justify the denial of compassionate release. That high standard comports with the Legislature’s goal to make greater use of compassionate release. Absent any such circumstances, petitions for relief should be granted. *In the first appeal, State v. A.M., the record does not present extraordinary aggravating circumstances. The Court therefore modifies and affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment to release A.M. *The second appeal, State v. Eddie L. Oliver, involves the kind of extraordinary aggravating circumstances that justify denying relief. The Court therefore modifies and affirms the trial court’s judgment and denies defendant’s petition for release. 1. The CRA states that judges “may release” and “may order” compassionate release when an inmate meets the law’s medical and public safety conditions. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(a), (f)(1). The word “may” generally conveys that an action is permissive, not mandatory, but “may” and “shall” “have been held to be interchangeable whenever necessary to execute the clear intent of the Legislature . Here, the Appellate Division correctly found that the use of “may” in the CRA vests courts with the authority to decide petitions for compassionate release -- a responsibility previously reserved to the State Parole Board. A.M., 472 N.J. Super. at 72-73. But allocating power to judges does not by itself reveal whether they must grant or have discretion to deny relief when an inmate satisfies the law’s medical and public safety conditions. Nor do the introductory clauses in subsections (a) and (f)(1) deprive the court of discretion or call for judges to grant relief. Subsection (e)(2), meanwhile, expressly mandates that victims and family members be allowed to testify about any harm they suffered. Considering that mandate, as well as constitutional and statutory rights accorded to crime victims, the Court concludes that the CRA cannot be read to require courts to grant compassionate release when only the medical and public safety conditions are met. The Court reviews closely the CRA’s legislative history, which also signals that the law’s use of “may” is permissive, not mandatory. (pp. 22-30) 2. For all of those reasons, the Court finds that when trial judges evaluate a request for compassionate release, they must consider (1) whether there is clear and convincing evidence that an inmate “is so debilitated” by a specified medical condition “as to be permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released”; (2) whether, in the case of an inmate with a “permanent physical incapacity,” there is clear and convincing evidence that the inmate “would not pose a threat to public safety” if released under the conditions imposed; and (3) testimony or statements from victims and family members about “any harm” they “suffered.” 3 N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(e)(2), (f)(1). Consistent with the text and history of the statute, trial courts have discretion to decide whether to release an inmate who meets the first two requirements. (pp. 30-31) 3. Turning to the question of how trial courts should exercise their discretion under the CRA, the Court notes that the structure and history of the new law reveal that the Legislature intended to expand the use of compassionate release. The CRA outlined a more expedited process for compassionate release. It also removed certain barriers from the medical parole statute it replaced, signaling intent to broaden the number of inmates who could apply for and be granted compassionate release. (pp. 31-33) 4. A standard to limit discretion under the CRA should further the purposes of the statute and provide for uniformity and overall fairness. Relying on certain core aims of the CRA -- to expand the use of compassionate release for inmates with serious medical conditions; to eliminate categorical bars to relief; to protect public safety; and to consider the harm suffered by victims -- the Court holds that inmates who are not disqualified under the Act’s medical and public safety criteria should be granted compassionate release unless one or more extraordinary aggravating factors exist. Trial judges, for example, may consider whether an offense involved any of the following extraordinary circumstances: (1) particularly heinous, cruel, or depraved conduct; (2) a particularly vulnerable victim, based on the person’s advanced age, youth, or disability; (3) an attack on the institutions of government or the administration of justice; and (4) whether release would have a particularly detrimental effect on the well-being and recovery process of victims and family members. For the fourth factor, courts should apply a standard of objective reasonableness. The standard is a necessarily high one -- whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist. Such factors cannot be used as a substitute for all serious crimes. They are limited to exceptional and rare circumstances to comport with the statute’s goal of increasing the use of compassionate release. Absent one or more extraordinary aggravating factors, inmates who are otherwise eligible should be granted compassionate release. The Court does not rely on the factors outlined in State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123 (1985), to guide the trial court’s discretion. (pp. 33-37) 5. Applying that standard in A.M.’s case, the Court observes that the trial court’s findings that A.M. satisfies the statute’s medical and public safety requirements are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Although A.M.’s crime is an inherently serious one, the law no longer bars inmates convicted of murder from seeking compassionate release, and there are no extraordinary aggravating factors that would bar her release. Consistent with the CRA, her petition should therefore be granted. (pp. 37-38) 4 6. In Kamau’s case, the trial court’s findings that he suffers from a permanent physical incapacity and would not pose a threat to public safety upon release are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Kamau was convicted of murder and three counts of attempted murder. In the commission of those offenses, he executed a plot against the justice system itself. Kamau’s crime presents the type of extraordinary aggravating circumstances that justify denying relief. His petition for release is therefore denied. (pp. 38-39) The judgments under review are MODIFIED and AFFIRMED. JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS, and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE FASCIALE did not participate. 5  SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-56 September Term 2021 A-57 September Term 2021 087057 and 087088 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A.M., Defendant-Respondent. State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eddie L. Oliver, a/k/a Damany Al Kamua, Defendant-Respondent. State v. A.M. (A-56-21): On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 472 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 2022). State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A-57-21): On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 13, 2022 January 9, 2023 1 Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant in State v. A.M. (A-56-21) (Robert J. Carroll, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney; Tiffany M. Russo, on the briefs). Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant in State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A-57-21) (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of counsel and on the briefs). Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent A.M. in State v. A.M. (A-56-21) and respondent Eddie L. Oliver in State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A-57-21) (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Alison Gifford, of counsel and on the briefs). Angela Cai, Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey in State v. A.M. (A-56-21) and State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A- 57-21) (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Angela Cai and Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). Dyanne Veloz Lluch argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center in State v. A.M. (A-56-21) and State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A-57-21) (New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center, attorneys; Richard D. Pompelio, of counsel and on the brief, and Dyanne Veloz Lluch, on the brief). Daniel D. Barnes argued the cause for amicus curiae V.M. in State v. A.M. (A-56-21) (Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, attorneys; Daniel D. Barnes, on the brief). Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey in State v. A.M. (A-56-21) and State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A-57-21) (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey 2  Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). Barry Evenchick argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey in State v. A.M. (A-56-21) and State v. Eddie L. Oliver (A-57-21) (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin on the brief). CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. The Legislature enacted the Compassionate Release Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4- 123.51e, in 2020. The new law provides for the release of inmates who suffer from a medical condition so severe that they are incapable of committing a crime and, in certain cases, would not pose a threat to public safety if released. In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether the Act gives judges discretion to deny compassionate release to inmates who satisfy two requirements in the statute: its medical and public safety conditions. The new law was designed to expand the use of compassionate release. Inmates convicted of certain serious crimes could not apply for relief under the prior statute, and fewer than five people were released from about 2015 to 2019. In place of the old law, the Legislature enacted a statute that applies to all inmates; even individuals convicted of murder are eligible to apply. The statute also outlines a streamlined process to obtain relief. Those measures reflect the Legislature’s intent to show compassion to people with serious 3 medical needs, decrease the prison population, and reduce healthcare costs for correctional facilities. The Act requires judges to evaluate an inmate’s medical condition and, in certain situations, to decide whether the person would pose a threat if released. Id. at (f)(1). But before judges can rule on petitions for release, the law calls on them to assess a third factor: any harm suffered by victims and their family members. Id. at (e)(2), (3), (7). Based on the text of the statute and its legislative history, we conclude the law affords judges discretion to deny relief, in exceptional circumstances, even if the first two factors are satisfied. We also offer guidance to trial courts on how to exercise their discretion. In individual cases, when the medical and public safety factors are met, courts can assess whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist that justify the denial of compassionate release. That high standard comports with the Legislature’s goal to make greater use of compassionate release. Absent any such circumstances, petitions for relief should be granted. Defendants in both appeals were convicted of murder. Both have serious medical conditions; they are permanently bedridden, unable to perform basic activities of daily life, and require round-the-clock care. They pose no realistic threat to public safety if released. 4  In the first appeal, State v. A.M., the Appellate Division ordered defendant’s release. Her offense was both serious and tragic: she killed her spouse, a beloved father to their three minor children at the time. The record, however, does not present extraordinary aggravating circumstances. We therefore modify and affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment to release A.M. In the second appeal, State v. Eddie L. Oliver, defendant murdered a detective in a courthouse to prevent him from testifying in a criminal case. Defendant also shot and wounded two other officers, attempted to kill a third official, and planned to kill the judge. Because the case involves the kind of extraordinary aggravating circumstances that justify denying relief, we modify and affirm the trial court’s judgment and deny defendant’s petition for release. I. We carefully reviewed the Compassionate Release Act (CRA or Act) for the first time in State v. F.E.D., 251 N.J. 505 (2022). We begin with a brief overview of the Act again to provide relevant background information for these appeals. The Act expressly repealed the medical parole statute, formerly codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51c. See L. 2020, c. 106, § 3. Under that statute, the State Parole Board could release inmates diagnosed with a terminal condition 5 or permanent physical incapacity under certain circumstances. N.J.S.A. 30:4- 123.51c(a)(2) (repealed 2020). The CRA replaced medical parole with a streamlined process to apply for compassionate release. The Act also expanded the prior law’s criteria for eligibility and transferred the power to grant release from the Parole Board to the courts. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. The Act calls on the Commissioner of Corrections to “establish and maintain a process” for inmates to “obtain a medical diagnosis” from two licensed physicians, designated by the Commissioner, to determine whether inmates are “eligible for compassionate release.” Id. at (b). The medical diagnosis must include a description of the inmate’s condition, a prognosis about “the likelihood of recovery,” a description of the person’s “physical incapacity,” and “a description of the type of ongoing treatment . . . requir ed if the inmate is” released. Id. at (b)(1) to (4). The law defines three conditions that can trigger further action: (1) a “[g]rave medical condition,” meaning the inmate either has more than 6 and up to 12 months to live, or has a condition that “for at least 3 months has rendered the inmate unable to perform activities of basic daily living” and has required 24-hour care; (2) a “terminal condition, disease, or syndrome,” meaning the “inmate has 6 months or less to live”; and (3) a “[p]ermanent physical 6 incapacity,” meaning the inmate is “permanently unable to perform activities of basic daily living,” requires 24-hour care, and did not have the condition “at the time of sentencing.” Id. at (l). In the case of an inmate with a grave medical condition, “the Department of Corrections shall promptly notify the inmate’s attorney or, if the inmate does not have an attorney, the Public Defender,” in anticipation of the person’s condition deteriorating. Id. at (d)(1). Only inmates in the second and third categories -- those with a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity -- can be considered for compassionate release. Id. at (d)(2). If an inmate is diagnosed with a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity, the Department “shall promptly issue to the inmate a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release.” Ibid. With that certificate, the inmate “may petition the court for compassionate release” or ask the Public Defender to do so. Id. at (d)(2) to (3). Several provisions of the law that follow are central to these appeals. First, the law provides that inmates “shall serve a copy of the petition” on the County Prosecutor or Attorney General, depending on who prosecuted the matter. Id. at (e)(1). The prosecutor, in turn, “shall provide notice of the petition to any victim or member of the family of a victim entitled to notice under the [Parole Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to .76].” Id. at (e)(2). More 7 specifically, prosecutors must “notify the victim or family member of the opportunity to present a statement at the hearing on the petition or to testify to the court concerning any harm suffered by the victim or family member at the time of the hearing.” Ibid. (emphases added). Within 15 days of receiving notice, victims and family members can submit comments and advise the court that they intend to testify at the hearing. Id. at (e)(3). Prosecutors also have 15 days to respond to the petition, which can “be extended to 30 days for good cause.” Id. at (e)(6). If the prosecutor objects to the petition or notifies the court “that a victim or a family member intends to testify to the court at the hearing, the court shall hold a hearing . . . on an expedited basis.” Id. at (e)(7). Otherwise, the court can rule on the application without a hearing. Ibid. Second, the Act outlines the following standard: Notwithstanding the provisions of [N.J.S.A. 30:4- 123.53(a)], the court may order the compassionate release of an inmate who has been issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(2)] if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [1] the inmate is so debilitated or incapacitated by the terminal condition, disease or syndrome, or permanent physical incapacity as to be permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released and, [2] in the case of a permanent physical incapacity, the conditions established in accordance with [N.J.S.A. 30:4- 8  123.51e(h)] under which the inmate would be released would not pose a threat to public safety. [Id. at (f)(1) (emphasis added).] We refer to the two criteria as the “medical” and “public safety” factors or conditions. Subsection (f)(1) mirrors the Act’s introductory language: “Notwithstanding any provision of [the Parole Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to .76] to the contrary, the court may release an inmate who qualifies under this section for compassionate release at any time during the term of incarceration.” Id. at (a) (emphasis added). When an inmate is granted release, “the court shall require, as a condition precedent to release,” that the Parole Board “ensure . . . the inmate’s release plan includes . . . identification of a community sponsor” and “verification of . . . appropriate medical services . . . and . . . housing.” Id. at (h)(1) to (3). The Parole Board may impose additional conditions, including “periodic medical diagnoses by a licensed physician.” Id. at (i). If an inmate’s medical condition improves or the person poses a threat to the public, the inmate can be “return[ed] . . . to confinement.” Id. at (j). We review a trial court’s factual findings about an inmate’s medical condition to see “whether they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.” F.E.D., 251 N.J. at 525. A trial court’s assessment of public 9 safety issues, as well as its decision to grant or deny compassionate release, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. F.E.D., 469 N.J. Super. 45, 66 (App. Div. 2021). Legal determinations about the meaning of the CRA are reviewed de novo. F.E.D., 251 N.J. at 526. II. The basic underlying facts in A.M.’s case are not in dispute. A.M. fatally shot her husband on May 22, 2010. According to evidence presented at trial, A.M. and her husband experienced marital difficulties in the months leading up to the murder. They discussed getting a divorce, and A.M. contacted an attorney. In April, she reached out to a friend several times and asked how to get a gun -- legally as well as illegally. When that failed, she hired a locksmith to open her husband’s safe and removed his gun. She later used it to shoot him. On the night of the murder, A.M. and her husband argued about money. She also told him she intended to report his allegedly inappropriate actions with one of their daughters. 1 A.M. testified that her husband became furious, 1 On direct appeal, the Appellate Division observed that “the evidence demonstrated the abuse never occurred.” In addition, in April 2010, the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) investigated a similar allegation A.M. had leveled. DYFS concluded the abuse allegations were unfounded. 10 and she shot him more than once as he approached her. When one of their three children entered the room and saw her father on the floor, A.M. said he was drunk and had fallen. Hours later, she called 9-1-1 and admitted she shot her husband. After a ten-day trial, a jury convicted A.M. of first-degree murder and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The trial judge sentenced A.M. to an aggregate term of forty years in prison, with thirty- four years of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The presentence report noted that A.M. “was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis [MS] in 2005,” had lost the use of her legs and left arm, and required constant medical assistance. A.M.’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. In December 2020, two physicians separately examined A.M. and diagnosed her with progressive end-stage MS. The doctors noted she was “completely dependent on nursing care for [activities of daily living],” was bedridden, and required round-the-clock care. Her prognosis was “poor and progressive.” A Managing Physician employed by the Department of Corrections reviewed the reports and concluded that A.M.’s medical condition 11 “would be fatal in the near future” or amounted to a “permanent physical disability.” The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release for A.M. on March 15, 2021. A.M. then filed a petition with the court, which the State opposed. The State also advised the court that A.M.’s children intended to testify against her release at a hearing. The State did not dispute that A.M. was physically incapacitated; it objected on the ground that A.M. had MS at the time of sentencing, contrary to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). The trial court conducted three days of hearings. The first two days focused on A.M.’s medical condition. A neurologist who first examined A.M. in 2013 testified that her condition had advanced from “relapsing-remitting” MS, marked by transient episodes of weakness and vision loss as well as periods of recovery, to progressive end-stage MS, when there are no longer any periods of partial recovery and the patient experiences a steady decline in neurological functions. The neurologist added that A.M. was unable to move except for the limited use of one hand, was bedridden, had experienced a progressive loss of vision, and had difficulty expressing herself. The trial court credited the testimony and found that A.M.’s condition was “materially different from what it was” eight years earlier at sentencing. 12 The court observed “[t]here has been a material change” and concluded that A.M. “met her burden to establish that her current condition did not exist at the time of sentencing.” See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). The victim’s daughters, V.M. and A.M., his son, N.M., and his mother testified on the third day of the hearing. All of them opposed A.M.’s release. The children, now young adults, portrayed A.M. as an abusive and absent mother in contrast to their loving, engaged father. The family members described the trauma they suffered as a result of the murder and said that, if A.M. were released, they “would feel . . . grief . . . all over again.” They added that A.M. had shown no remorse for her crime and no compassion for its effect on their lives. In a detailed written opinion, the trial court denied A.M.’s petition for release. The court found that A.M.’s remaining period of parole ineligibility did not bar compassionate release under the CRA; that A.M. had established by clear and convincing evidence that she had a “permanent physical incapacity” within the meaning of the Act; and that conditions of release “likely could be established” to assure that she “would not pose a risk to public safety.” The trial court, however, concluded that compassionate release was not mandatory when those conditions were met. Because subsection (f)(1) of the 13 CRA states that trial judges “may order” compassionate release, the court looked to the factors outlined in State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123 (1985), to guide its exercise of discretion. We discuss Priester further below. In conducting a balancing test, the trial court gave greater weight to factors that counseled against release and accordingly denied A.M.’s petition. The Appellate Division reversed. State v. A.M., 472 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 2022). It found that the phrase “may order” compassionate release in subsections (a) and (f)(1) of the CRA, viewed in context, “vest[ed] the courts with authority to make compassionate release” decisions, which had previously been the responsibility of the Parole Board. Id. at 74. In the appellate court’s view, the language did not address how courts should exercise that authority. Ibid. The Appellate Division explained that, in A.M.’s case, subsection (f)(1) lists only two conditions that determine whether she should be released: whether she suffers from a permanent physical disability, as defined in the Act, and whether she “would not pose a threat to public safety” if released. Id. at 75-76. The appellate court held that once those factors are met, a trial court has no discretion to deny relief. Id. at 57. Opposition from victims and family members, the Appellate Division observed, is to be considered only in connection with the above two conditions. Id. at 79. 14  We denied the State’s motion to stay the judgment of the Appellate Division, 251 N.J. 201 (2022), and granted the State’s petition for certification, 251 N.J. 199 (2022). The following week, consistent with the Appellate Division’s judgment, the trial court issued an order releasing A.M. from custody. We granted leave to appear as amici curiae to the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU), the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL), the Attorney General of New Jersey, V.M. (the victim’s daughter), and the New Jersey Crime Victims’ Law Center. III. A. We refer to the defendant in State v. Eddie Oliver by the name he uses, Al-Damany Kamau, with his preferred spelling. To recount the facts, we rely primarily on the transcript of defendant’s hearing for compassionate release. In 1993, Kamau shot and killed Newark Police Detective John Sczyrek inside the Essex County Veterans Courthouse. Detective Sczyrek was about to testify in a criminal case in which Kamau’s brother and cousin were on trial. An employee with the probation office, Tinesha James, smuggled a handgun into the courthouse for Kamau and passed it to him. Kamau used it to murder Detective Sczyrek as he waited to enter the courtroom. 15  While attempting to escape, Kamau shot Essex County Sheriff’s Officer Ralph Rizzolo, Jr. in the chest and injured him. Kamau also shot at and injured Officer Thomas King, and fired at Jacinto Rivera, a security guard. The investigation revealed that Kamau planned to kill the trial judge as well. A jury convicted Kamau of one count of first-degree murder and three counts of attempted murder. The jury did not agree unanimously on whether to sentence him to death. The trial judge then sentenced Kamau, in the aggregate, to life imprisonment with a 75-year period of parole ineligibility. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. In September 2021, two physicians examined Kamau in prison. They diagnosed him with a serious medical condition and reported that he suffered from a “terminal condition,” with less than six months to live, as well as a “permanent physical incapacity.” Based on those findings, the Department of Corrections issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release for Kamau on November 4, 2021. He filed a petition for release two months later, which the State and the victims opposed. B. A hearing was held on Kamau’s petition on February 14, 2022. Before discussing the hearing, we note that the CRA states that “information contained in the petition and the contents of any comments submitted by a 16 recipient in response . . . shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to a ny person who is not authorized to receive or review the information or comments.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(e)(4). The statute does not expressly address testimony in open court at a hearing on a petition. In F.E.D., we highlighted a challenge the law presents. Court records are generally open to the public. R. 1:38-1. “Records required to be kept confidential by statute,” however, are not. R. 1:38-3(a). As a result, if a court details a defendant’s medical condition in a compassionate release proceeding, it cannot identify the defendant by name. See F.E.D., 251 N.J. at 536. In those instances, the public at large will not be made aware of the case, even in matters of great public interest. Kamau’s case is a prime example. It garnered extensive media coverage at the time of the offense, and the public has an interest in knowing about later developments. The case also raises a practical concern in that it is not possible to describe the offense meaningfully without identifying the defendant unless the facts are sterilized. To promote transparency, we identify Kamau by name but limit our description of his specific medical condition. Because it is largely undisputed that Kamau suffers from a condition that qualifies as a permanent physical incapacity under subsection (l), it is not essential to describe the medical 17 evidence before the Court in detail.2 In disputed cases, however, that will not ordinarily be possible. Indeed, in A.M.’s case, the State contests whether defendant’s current medical condition existed at the time of sentencing , so we discuss her condition in greater detail and use initials to ensure confidentiality. In the interest of open public access to information, we ask the Legislature to review the confidentiality provision in subsection (e)(4). See id. at 537. C. At the hearing on Kamau’s petition, the trial court heard testimony from a physician who oversees medical treatment at the Department of Corrections, as well as testimony from the victims and their family members. The physician relied on reports from the two examining physicians and testified that Kamau suffered from a serious medical condition, was bedridden, immobile, unable to carry out activities of daily living, and required 24-hour care. The physician agreed that Kamau had a “permanent physical incapacity” and a “terminal condition” within the meaning of the CRA. Although the latter definition applies to inmates who have six months or less to live, the physician explained “[i]t could be possible” for Kamau to live longer. 2 At the hearing, the State argued it was possible Kamau’s condition might improve, without pointing to evidence for support. 18  The court also heard from Officer Rizzolo, Officer King, and Detective Sczyrek’s surviving spouse and brother. All opposed Kamau’s release. Officer Rizzolo testified that he had been shot in the chest, ran to the courtroom, and collapsed -- thinking he was about to die. He lost a lung as a result of the shooting. Officer King recounted how he followed Kamau down a stairwell, and how Kamau pointed a gun at King’s head and fired. The officer was hit by shrapnel and suffered hearing loss and other lasting injuries. Cheryl Sczyrek, Detective Sczyrek’s widow, spoke about how she learned of her husband’s murder and how it affected her and their two-year-old daughter, whom she raised as a single mother. Stanley Sczyrek, the Detective’s brother, relayed that he felt the impact of his brother’s murder every day. He added that if Kamau were “let out of